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INTRODUCTION 
In the year 2001, Time magazine took on the task of selecting "America's Best" 
contributors in the areas of science and medicine, arts and entertainment, and society and 
culture, including—in the last category—"America's Best Theologian." The recipient of 
this honor was Stanley Hauerwas, a United Methodist professor who teaches theology 
and ethics at Duke University. Time chose a Lutheran scholar, Jean Bethke Elshtain, to 
write the profile of Hauerwas that appeared in its September 17, 2001 issue. She writes: 
Hauerwas is contemporary theology's foremost intellectual provocateur.... [He] 
has been a thorn in the side of what he takes to be Christian complacency for 
more than 30 years. For him, the message of Jesus was a radical one to which 
Christians, for the most part, have never been fully faithful. Christians, he 
believes, are called to be a pilgrim people who will always find themselves in one 
political community or another but who are never defined completely by it. Thus, 
as the body of Christ on earth, Christians must be a "sign of contradiction," to 
borrow a term from Pope John Paul II, a moral theologian much admired by the 
very Anabaptist Methodist Hauerwas.1  
Some, without wishing to deny the accolade conferred on Hauerwas in this way, 
have wondered aloud "how the editors of Time would know" who "America's Best 
Theologian" might be.2 Yet even those who question the theological awareness or 
competence of Time's editors are quick to acknowledge Hauerwas's status and influence 
in contemporary theology, thus (in effect) confirming Time's assessment: "He is the 
author of dozens of books, and articles beyond numbering; interviews with him and 
discussions about him appear in numerous academic and popular publications, making 
him probably the most prominent theologian in the country."3  
Time (September 17, 2001), 76. 
2 "In a Time of War," First Things [FT] 120 (February 2002), 14. 
3 Ibid. 
1 
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Anyone who has read even a sampling of Hauerwas's essays, books or interviews 
is almost certain to have encountered his passionately-held views on Christian pacifism 
and its place in the theology and life of the church. Elshtain's brief article in Time calls 
attention to this pacifist concern that surfaces in one way or another in nearly all of 
Hauerwas's writings. 
Hauerwas is a volatile, complex person with an explosive personality and high-
energy style. For many, he is an unlikely pacifist. He insists that Christians 
should exemplify a radical message of peace. Hauerwas learned this lesson from 
the Anabaptist theologian John Howard Yoder. Hauerwas has respect for a 
position known as the just-war perspective, a mode of reflection on war's 
occasional tragic necessity, either for self-defense or to protect those who might 
otherwise be slaughtered. But he insists that most Christians who claim that 
position are not really serious about it, or they would oppose many more wars 
than they do. His radical pacifism leads him to condemn any and all forms of 
patriotism, nationalism and state worship. (And he disdains most distinctions 
between these positions.)4 
Ironically, the issue of Time dubbing this radical pacifist "America's Best 
Theologian" went to press almost simultaneously with one of the most peace-shattering 
days in recent American history: September 11, 2001. The events of that day thrust our 
nation and others—as well as many Christians, theologians and church bodies—into yet 
another complex and passionate debate about the nature and necessity of war and the best 
means for securing and maintaining national and global justice, freedom and peace. In 
December of 2001, the editors of First Things—the editorial board of which Stanley 
Hauerwas had long been a member—published an editorial called "In a Time of War," 
offering their view that the terrorist attack on September 11 constituted a bona fide "act 
of war" placing America into the regrettable but necessary role of defender of 
fundamental national and even international human rights, justice, security and freedom. 
4 Time, 76. 
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The editorial goes on to offer a defense of the "war against terrorism" proposed by the 
Bush administration on the basis of historic "just war" principles. It voices respect, even 
admiration, for authentic pacifist views, with one significant caveat: 
One matter that has been morally muddied in recent decades should now be 
clarified: those who in principle oppose the use of military force have no 
legitimate part in the discussion about how military force should be used. They 
only make themselves and their cause appear frivolous by claiming that military 
force is immoral and futile, and, at the same time, wanting to have a political say 
in how such force is to be employed. The morally serious choice is between 
pacifism and just war. Here, too, sides must be taken.5  
Hauerwas clearly was not a (willing) participant in the preparation of this 
editorial: his passionate dissent was published in the February 2002 issue of First Things. 
While this is not the place to discuss the details of that response, it illustrates well 
Hauerwas's own view of the significance of his pacifist convictions for his theology and 
ethics as a whole: 
The editorial makes clear that the Editors regard the Christian nonviolence I 
represent as at best "a reminder" to those who are about "being responsible." I 
may be tolerated because of my theological commitments, but my pacifism can 
only be regarded as an aberration that is best ignored. The arguments Yoder and I 
have made in an attempt to show how Christian orthodoxy and nonviolence are 
constitutive of one another are quite simply not taken seriously by the Editors. Or 
at least they are not taken seriously if "In a Time of War" indicates the best 
thinking of the Editors of First Things. I did not expect nor do I expect the 
Editors to take a pacifist stance, but I confess that their lack of sadness that should 
accompany the use of violence fills me with sadness.6 
Hauerwas wonders aloud how "my life may be changed" by the publication of this 
editorialised "dismissal" of his strongly held views: 
Should I, for example, continue to be identified as a member of the Editorial 
Board of First Things? If "In a Time of War" constitutes the perspective of this 
magazine, should the Editors continue to list me as a member of the board? 
Surely the position taken in "In a Time of War" comes close to implying that the 
5 "In a Time of War," FT 118 (Dec 2001), 14. 
6 "In a Time of War: An Exchange," FT 120 (Feb 2002), 13. 
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pacifist refusal to respond violently to injustice makes us complicit with evil and 
injustice and, therefore, immoral.' 
A response from the editors followed in the same issue, and additional articles, 
responses and "exchanges" ensued in subsequent months. Eventually, however (in May 
2002), Hauerwas did resign from the editorial board of First Things because of his 
profound disagreement with the position taken by the editorial board and their construal 
of the role of pacifism and pacifists in war and peace debates. In an article published in 
the June 21, 2002 National Catholic Reporter, Richard John Neuhaus—editor in chief of 
First Things—expresses his sympathetic regret at Hauerwas's decision. 
His leaving the editorial board was entirely amicable, and I urged him not to, but 
understood why he did. Our essential disagreement is that for my friend Stan, 
pacifism is...the doctrine by which the church stands or falls, and I think that's 
not only not true, I think it's dangerously schismatic, and about that we have been 
arguing in a friendly manner I suppose going on 30 years.8 
Still, says Neuhaus, Hauerwas is "provocative, energetic and a very, very useful person to 
have on the theological scene"—a well-intended comment, no doubt, but one that might 
be interpreted as implying the very sort of patronizing "dismissal" of his pacifism that 
Hauerwas finds so outrageous and unacceptable.9 
Hauerwas's "project" for reforming Christian ethics—with its emphasis on the 
virtues, character, narrative, the particularity and exclusivity of Christian ethics, and the 
vital role of the church, the Christian community, as witness in and to the world—has 
received a great deal of scholarly attention in recent decades in America and beyond. 
Considerably less attention, however, has been given to his pacifist convictions and the 
7 Ibid. 
8 Patrick O'Neill, "Theologian's Feisty Faith Challenges Status Quo," National Catholic Reporter [NCR] 
(June 21, 2002), 3. Cf. FT 125 (Aug.-Sept., 2002), 106-107. 
9 Mid. 
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role that these convictions play in his theology as a whole. This relative neglect of what 
is arguably the over-riding theme in Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics seems to confirm his 
perception, noted in his classic work The Peaceable Kingdom, that "many have viewed 
my pacifism with a good deal of suspicion, seeing it as just one of my peculiarities."I°  
Whether or not Hauerwas would agree with the assertion that for him pacifism is "the 
doctrine by which the church stands or falls," there is ample evidence to demonstrate that 
Hauerwas does not regard pacifism as a tangential or secondary moral issue, a mere 
"quirk" in an otherwise sound and lucid theological system. Statements like the 
following confirm the utter seriousness of his claim (cited above) that "Christian 
orthodoxy and nonviolence are constitutive of one another:" 
Indeed, nonviolence is not just one implication among others that can be drawn 
from our Christian beliefs; it is at the very heart of our understanding of 
God....such a stance is not just an option for a few, but incumbent on all 
Christians who seek to live faithfully in the kingdom made possible by the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus. Non-violence is not one among other behavioral 
implications that can be drawn from the Gospel but is integral to the shape of 
Christian convictions.11  
For Hauerwas, the phrase "a Christian pacifist" is either redundant or misleading since it 
seems to suggest that "pacifism" is simply one moral choice among many for Christians. 
I believe the narrative into which Christians are inscribed means we cannot be 
anything other than nonviolent....nonviolence is simply one of the essential 
practices that is intrinsic to the story of being a Christian.12 
Pacifism is "the form of life incumbent on those who would worship Jesus as the Son of 
God."I3 "For a Christian to be nonviolent," says Hauerwas, "is not just another political 
I° The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics [PIC] (Notre Dame, 1981), xvii. 
11 PK, xvii; xvi. 
12 "Whose 'Just' War, Which Peace?" in Dispatches from the Front (Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1994), 137. 
13 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" in Dispatches, 134. 
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position, but rather at the very heart of what it means to be a Christian."14 Pacifism is 
"not just another 'moral' issue, but constitutes the heart of our worship of a crucified 
messiah."15 
Statements such as these and the broader context in which they occur make it 
clear that one cannot fully understand or appreciate the theology of Stanley Hauerwas 
without understanding and taking seriously his views on pacifism. The first purpose of 
this study, therefore, is to explore and examine the nature and content of Hauerwas's 
pacifist convictions and claims as a way of understanding more deeply and clearly his 
contribution to contemporary theology and ethics. There are, as we will see, many 
different varieties of pacifism. What are the essential characteristics of Hauerwas's 
pacifism, and what distinguishes it from these other varieties? Where do his pacifist 
convictions fit into his program for reforming Christian ethics? How do they inform and 
impact his theology as a whole? 
A second purpose will be to examine Hauerwas's pacifism in the light of historic 
and contemporary Christian perspectives on war and peace, particularly those that belong 
to the just war tradition with which Hauerwas most frequently finds himself in dialogue 
and debate. Is there in any sense in which Hauerwas's pacifism is compatible with just 
war thinking in the Christian (and Lutheran) tradition, or are the two views simply 
irreconcilable? And if they are irreconcilable, does this mean—as suggested by the 
editors of First Things—that those who adhere to a Hauerwasian type of radical pacifism 
have no legitimate place at the table when it comes to practical discussions in the public 
square about the use of force by governing authorities? How much validity is there to 
14 "Faith Fires Back: A Conversation with Stanley Hauerwas," Duke Magazine (Jan.-Feb., 2002), 12. 
15 "Remembering John Howard Yoder," FT 82 (April 1998), 15-16. 
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Hauerwas's claim that most just war thinking is simply dishonest and disingenuous, and 
how are we to understand his repeated claims—both stated and implied—that the truly 
honest, consistent and clear-thinking Christian will have no choice but to recognize 
radical pacifism as a necessary response to the radical claims of Christ? 
Among those who have been impressed, influenced and discomfited by 
Hauerwas's work are a considerable number of widely respected Lutheran theologians. 
There are many themes in Hauerwas's work—his stress on the particularity of Christian 
truth claims, his strong emphasis on the historical importance of the incarnation, life, 
suffering, death and resurrection of Christ, his high regard for the church and the means 
of grace and the "marks of the church"—that naturally appeal to Lutheran readers and 
thinkers. There are other themes in his work—his apparent merging of justification and 
sanctification, his disdain for "natural law," his dismissal of the Reformation "two 
kingdom" distinction —which are obviously troublesome for those of a Lutheran 
orientation. Any Lutheran who embraces with conviction Article XVI of the Augsburg 
Confession, which clearly asserts that "Christians may without sin...punish evildoers 
with the sword," "wage just wars," and "serve as soldiers,"16 will obviously also be 
troubled by the apparent implications of Hauerwas's claim that all Christians are called 
by God to nonviolence, and that any form of killing—including that of a soldier in war—
is necessarily sinful and to be avoided by Christians at all costs. And yet there are 
Lutheran theologians who have taken the position (along with others) that "just war" 
principles and distinctions no longer apply in this modem age of nuclear warfare. 
16 AC XVI, 2. The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, ed. Robert Kolb 
and Timothy Wengert (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000) [BC]. All quotations from the Lutheran 
Confessions in this study are taken from the Kolb-Wengert edition. 
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In view of the above, the third and primary purpose of this study is to examine the 
possibilities for meaningful, constructive, mutually beneficial dialogue between 
"Hauerwasians" and Lutherans on the issue of war and peace. How do we respond as 
Lutherans to Hauerwas's pacifist claims and his critique of the just war tradition? 
Despite his commitment to a radical pacifism rooted firmly in the theological tradition of 
the radical reformation, does he have anything valuable to say to us as Lutherans—
particularly Lutherans in America—about the potential dangers or weaknesses of just war 
thinking, especially in today's world? Is there anything that Hauerwas might learn from 
"the Lutheran perspective" on war and peace that could serve to challenge and sharpen 
his own thinking on this issue? 
Although (as noted above) a number of Lutheran theologians (e.g., Reinhard 
Witter, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Robert Jenson, Gilbert Meilaender, Arne Rasmusson, 
Ronald Thiemann) have interacted with the work of Hauerwas in various ways, few of 
them have taken up specifically—much less extensively—the question of his pacifist 
convictions. Elshtain, for example, is well known for her expertise on the character and 
history of the just war theory, but she writes not so much as a Lutheran theologian 
drawing on the resources of the Lutheran theological tradition than as a just war scholar 
who also happens to be a Lutheran (e.g., Luther is only mentioned once, in passing, in her 
most recent book Just War Against Terror!). Nor (apart from a few brief, rather 
informal exchanges18) does Elshtain interact directly with Hauerwas's views on pacifism. 
Reinhard Htitter offers his perspective on the implications of Hauerwas's pacifism for 
17 Just War Against Terror (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 101. 
18 E.g., "War, Peace and Jean Bethke Elshtain: An Exchange," FT 138 (October, 2003), 41-46; also Mark 
Tooley, "Theologians Debate Just War at National Press Club" (October 10,2001), http://www.ird-
renew.org/News/News.cfm?ID=207$c=4.  
9 
Lutherans in the essay "Be Honest in Just War Thinking! Lutherans, the Just War 
Tradition, and Selective Conscientious Objection,"I9 but his treatment is very brief (14 
pages), contains only two (very selective) quotations of Luther, and does not include any 
thorough, critical examination of the theological presuppositions on which the pacifism 
of Hauerwas is based. Arne Rasmusson's impressive work The Church As Polis: From 
Political Theology to Theological Politics As Exemplified by Jiirgen Moltmann and 
Stanley Hauerwas contains a helpful chapter (13) comparing the "peace theologies" of 
Hauerwas and Moltmann, but there is no direct engagement with the views of Luther or 
with historic Lutheran theology.20  Meilaender offers a very helpful (albeit brief) 
summary and analysis of Luther's views on just war in his contribution to the LCUSA-
sponsored study Peace and the Just War Tradition, but neither Meilaender nor any of the 
contributors to this volume take up the distinctive pacifist views of Yoder and 
Hauerwas.2I To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has been made by a Lutheran 
scholar to offer a serious theological analysis of Hauerwas's pacifism, nor has an attempt 
been made to engage in dialog with Hauerwas's pacifism from a specifically Lutheran 
perspective. 
In some respects the possibilities for genuine and meaningful conversation 
between those fully committed to Hauerwas's view and Lutherans committed to honoring 
and upholding their own tradition may seem to be rather slim. "To put it plainly," says 
Luther in his 1526 essay Whether Soldiers, Too, May Be Saved, 
19 See The Wisdom of the Cross: Essays in Honor of John Howard Yoder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 
69-83. 
20 Arne Rasmusson, The Church As Polis (Lund: University of Sweden, 1994). 
21 Peace and the Just War Tradition: Lutheran Perspectives in the Nuclear Age, ed. Michael J. 
Stelmachowitz (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1986). [PJWT] 
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I am dealing here with such questions as these: whether the Christian faith, by 
which we are accounted righteous before God, is compatible with being a soldier, 
going to war, stabbing and killing, robbing and burning, as military law requires 
us to do to our enemies in wartime. Is this work sinful or unjust? Should it give 
us a bad conscience before God? Must a Christian only do good and love, and 
kill no one, nor do anyone harm?22 
The diametrically opposed answers given to "such questions as these" by Luther and 
Hauerwas seem to suggest that perhaps the best confessional Lutherans can do is to pay 
Hauerwas what John Howard Yoder disparagingly dubbed "the Niebuhrian 
compliment"23—i.e., to commend him for the courage and integrity of his pacifist 
convictions, but to disregard his views as having any meaningful practical theological (or 
political) value or significance, and thus to disregard any real possibility for constructive 
dialog. We want to argue, however, that there are authentic areas of common ground and 
common concern on the issue of war and peace between committed Hauerwasians and 
confessional Lutherans that encourage the possibility for meaningful and mutually 
beneficial conversation, without any theological compromise. In part two of the paper 
we will seek to identify and explore those possibilities, following a survey in part one of 
Christian perspectives on war and peace (chapter one), a summary of the main features of 
Hauerwas's pacifism (chapter two), and a discussion of the "peaceable witness" of 
Martin Luther (chapter three). 
22 Luther's Works [LW], American Edition, ed. Robert C. Schulz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 46, 
95. 
23 See John H. Yoder, Nevertheless: The Varieties of Religious Pacm (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald 
Press, 1971), 111-112; also the discussion on pages 43ff. below. Hauerwas also refers to this 
"compliment" in the First Things exchange referred to earlier in the introduction. 
PART ONE 
THE PACIFISM OF STANLEY HAUERWAS: A LUTHERAN ANALYSIS 
Chapter One 
Christian Perspectives on War and Peace 
Introduction 
The written history of the world," writes John Keegan, "is largely a history of 
warfare."I Christians who take history seriously, therefore, cannot avoid taking seriously 
the history of warfare, including the various attitudes toward war that have existed within 
the Christian tradition. One of the first challenges confronting a student of this history is 
the problem of enumerating and classifying these varying perspectives. Writing as a 
historian (not as a theologian), Keegan simplifies things helpfully by reducing the 
number of "types" to two, and at the same time zeroing in on one of the essential 
questions with which theologians have been wrestling for centuries: 
The bounds of civilised warfare are defined by two antithetical types, the pacifist 
and the 'lawful bearer of arms.' The lawful bearer of arms has always been 
respected, if only because he has the means to make himself so; the pacifist has 
come to be valued in the two thousand years of the Christian era. Their mutuality 
is caught in the dialogue between the founder of Christianity and the professional 
Roman soldier who had asked for his healing word to cure a servant. 'I also am a 
man set under authority,' the centurion explained. Christ exclaimed at the 
centurion's belief in the power of virtue, which the soldier saw as the complement 
to the force of law which he personified. May we guess that Christ was 
conceding the moral position of the lawful bearer of arms, who must surrender his 
life at the demand of authority, and therefore bears comparison with the pacifist 
who will surrender his life rather than violate the authority of his own creed? It is 
a complicated thought, but not one which Western culture finds difficult to 
John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 386. 
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accommodate. Within it the professional soldier and the committed pacifist find 
room to co-exist—sometimes cheek-by-jowl: in 3 Commando, one of Britain's 
toughest Second World War units, the stretcher-bearers were all pacifists but were 
held by the commanding officer in the highest regard for their bravery and 
readiness for self-sacrifice. Western culture would, indeed, not be what it is 
unless it could respect both the lawful bearer of arms and the person who holds 
the bearing of arms intrinsically unlawful. Our culture looks for compromises 
and the compromise at which it has arrived over the issue of public violence is to 
deprecate its manifestation but to legitimise its use. Pacifism has been elevated as 
an ideal; the lawful bearing of arms—under a strict code of military justice and 
within a corpus of humanitarian law—has been accepted as a practical necessity.2 
Setting aside for now the question of the compatibility of these two antithetical 
positions, we seek to give a brief account of how they have manifested themselves in the 
course of Christian history. Most contemporary Christian surveys follow the lead of 
Roland Bainton, who suggests in his classic work Christian Attitudes Toward War and 
Peace that "broadly speaking, three attitudes to war and peace were to appear in the 
Christian ethic: pacifism, the just war, and the crusade."3 Because of its prominence in 
the literature and its usefulness for grouping these relatively distinct types of historical 
views, Bainton's threefold classification will also be employed here. It should be noted, 
however, that classifying various views according to these three types is a much more 
challenging and complicated task than it may appear to be. Definitions and 
understandings of these terms and "types" vary widely, and specific positions within each 
of these types often seem as different as they are alike. 
In view of the purpose of this study, it is also important to note that Hauerwas has 
a deep distrust of almost any attempt to approach theological, ethical or historical realities 
by way of "categories" or "typologies." While most theologians, for example, have 
considered H. Richard Niebuhr's classic Christ and Culture as a helpful (if necessarily 
2 /bid, 4-5. 
3 Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (New York: Abingdon Press, 1960), 14. 
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generalized) attempt to describe five typical ways in which Christians have interacted 
with culture, Hauerwas insists that "few books have been a greater hindrance to an 
accurate assessment of our situation than Christ and Culture" precisely because of its 
alleged (yet inauthentic) objectivity and its misleading oversimplification.4 Bainton's 
approach falls under the same condemnation by Hauerwas: 
Equally problematic from this perspective are typologies—crusade, pacifism and 
just war—developed by Roland Bainton in Christian Attitudes Toward War and 
Peace. The heuristic value of such typologies hides from us the complexity of 
Christian nonviolence (as well as the multivalence of violence). This 
concealment is not only because Bainton held to the kind of Constantinian liberal 
pacifism that I think is so doubtful, but more significantly such typologies result 
in a peculiarly ahistorical reading of Christian nonviolence. For the typology 
makes it appear that the three types are simply "there." Each, it seems, 
necessarily exemplifies how Christians can, have, or should think about war 
and/or violence. Yet that very assumption relies on the notion that we have a 
clear idea of what war and/or nonviolence may be, apart from the practices of a 
community of nonviolence.5  
Hauerwas's unease with Bainton is inherited from Yoder, who—realizing that 
Bainton's work could hardly be ignored or dismissed—prepared a 602-page tome 
transcribed from his classroom lectures titled Christian Attitudes to War, Peace, and 
Revolution: A Companion to Bainton aimed at supplementing and correcting Bainton's 
treatment.6 This is not the place to take up in detail Yoder's and/or Hauerwas's critique 
of Bainton, but it could be argued that their concerns make it even more appropriate and 
necessary to begin by familiarizing ourselves with the typological approaches used by 
Bainton and (in some form or another) by nearly all other ethicists, theologians and 
4 Hauerwas and William H. Willimon, Resident Aliens [RA] (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), 41-42; cf. 
also Yoder's more extended critique in Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 31-90. 
5 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 118-119. 
6 Yoder, Christian Attitudes to War, Peace and Revolution: A Companion to Bainton (Elkhart, Indiana: 
Distributed by Co-op Bookstore, 1983). [CA] 
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historians who address this topic. This will put us in a position to better understand and 
evaluate Hauerwas's concerns, even as we attempt to present as fairly as possible the 
various historical views typically grouped under these headings. 
In the introduction to his book Bainton provides, in capsule form, a summary of 
the three basic Christian attitudes toward war and peace and their emergence in Christian 
history: 
The early Church was pacifist to the time of Constantine. Then, partly as a result 
of the close association of Church and state under this emperor and partly by 
reason of the threat of barbarian invasions, Christians in the fourth and fifth 
centuries took over from the classical world the doctrine of the just war, whose 
object should be to vindicate justice and restore peace. The just war had to be 
fought under the authority of the state and must observe a code of good faith and 
humanity. The Christian elements added by Augustine were that the motive must 
be love and that monks and priests were to be exempted. The crusade arose in the 
high Middle Ages, a holy war fought under the auspices of the Church or of some 
inspired religious leader, not on behalf of justice conceived in terms of life and 
property, but on behalf on an ideal, the Christian faith. Since the enemy was 
without the pale, the code tended to break down.' 
These varying perspectives, Bainton argues, "were not rooted in different views of God 
and only to a degree in different views of man, because all Christians recognized the 
depravity of man."8 Rather, the basis for the emergence of these very different views was 
how to deal with the reality of sin and its consequences as manifested in relationships 
between individuals, groups and nations, and thus "the problem came to be an aspect of 
the relationship of the Church and the world:" 
Pacifism has commonly despaired of the world and dissociated itself either from 
society altogether, or from political life, and especially from war. The advocates 
of the just war theory have taken the position that evil can be restrained by the 
coercive power of the state. The Church should support the state in this endeavor 
and individual Christians as citizens should fight under the auspices of the state. 
The crusade belongs to a theocratic view that the Church, even though it be a 
minority, should impose its will upon a recalcitrant world. Pacifism is thus often 
7 Bainton, 14. 
8 Ibid., 14-15. 
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associated with withdrawal, the just war with qualified participation, and the 
crusade with dominance of the Church over the world.9 
Our primary concern in this study is with pacifism and the just war tradition since these 
are the dominant theological views in existence today and those with which Hauerwas is 
most frequently in dialogue and debate. But the crusade merits at least brief treatment 
here, not only for the sake of historical completeness (and contemporary relevance) but 
also because of Hauerwas's frequent allegation that contemporary just war arguments and 
rhetoric often masquerade a crusading attitude and approach. 
The Crusade 
Most historical and theological treatments of the crusade begin, as Bainton does, 
with a discussion of the Old Testament concept of the "holy war:" "The crusade 
stemmed out of the holy war which sought to ensure the favor of Yahweh by observing 
the conditions conducive to his good pleasure."1° Whereas "primitive" holy wars in the 
Old Testament (e.g. Deborah leading the Israelites against Sisera and the Canaanites) 
were characterized by an appeal to God for divine assistance, "the crusade went beyond 
the holy war in the respect that it was fought not so much with God's help as on God's 
behalf, not for a human goal which God might bless but for a divine cause which God 
might command."11 Bainton offers as examples of ancient crusades the wars of conquest 
for the possession of the land of Canaan, battles fought under Saul and David, and the 
revolts of the Maccabees in the inter-testamental period. 
As even Israel learned, however, it is dangerous for God's people to assume in 
9 Ibid., 15. 
1° Bainton, 44. 
11 Ibid., 44-45. 
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some simplistic or automatic way that God is on "our side" when engaged in battle, or 
that he guarantees victory to those who fight in his name. It also dangerous to try to 
apply these holy war or crusade texts from the Old Testament directly or simplistically to 
situations beyond the biblical context in which they occur. Robert Clouse's word of 
caution, though in itself somewhat simplistic, is (properly understood) in order: 
Such passages as the war texts of the Old Testament remind the reader that some 
laws given to ancient Israel cannot be used today. The war regulations were 
specifically applicable to the Hebrew kingdom of God. In the teachings of Jesus 
the kingdom takes on a different emphasis. It is no longer confined within the 
boundaries of a single state but exists wherever Christ is accepted and 
acknowledged as Lord. The change in the form of the kingdom means that care 
must be taken in applying Old Testament laws to the new situation.12 
Ultimately, of course, there is a dual danger involved in the interpretation of these texts: 
the danger of "spiritualizing" them in a way that virtually eliminates the possibility of 
any meaningful theological application to the church's past and present warfare 
(involving soul and body) against the enemies of God's kingdom (cf. Ephesians 6), and 
the danger of applying them too literalistically, without proper consideration of crucial 
"church-state" distinctions in both testaments. 
If we remember that Old Testament Israel was a political as well as a spiritual 
unit, we will neither think that it can be used as a direct model for the political 
action of the "church militant," nor will we spiritualistically imagine that it would 
have been possible for Israel to conquer Canaan only in some realm of the 
Spirit." 
It was the failure to recognize and guard against the former danger that resulted in the 
adopted of the crusade in the Middle Ages as an acceptable—and even necessary—form 
of carrying out God's will and doing battle against his "enemies." 
12 Robert G. Clouse, ed., War: Four Christian Views (Downer's Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1981), 10-11. 
13 Horace D. Hummel, The Word Becoming Flesh (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1979), 111. 
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The emergence of the crusade as a recognizable and persistent religious and 
historical phenomenon in the Christian era occurred in the eleventh century. The first 
officially sanctioned crusade came as a result of Pope Urban II's call in 1095 to liberate 
the Holy Land from the Turks. 
He stirred his audience by describing how the Turks had disemboweled Christian 
men, raped women and desecrated churches. Urban appealed for unity in the face 
of the enemy and promised forgiveness of sins for anyone who would fight to free 
the Holy Land. The crowd responded enthusiastically to his sermon shouting: 
"God wills it! God wills it!" to 
Few would deny that the medieval theories regarding just war helped lay the theological 
groundwork for the acceptance, or at least tolerance, of the crusades in the Middle Ages. 
"A Christian pacifist would find little comfort in the medieval theories, for Christian 
dogma was used as a rationalisation for legal killing, even of the most indiscriminate sort 
that consecrated war and its bloody martyrdom, the crusade."I5 Yet care should be taken 
not to overstate the church's support for or defense of the crusade on theological grounds, 
nor—in view of loose allegations of "crusading attitudes" present today—to understate 
the historical uniqueness of this phenomenon. As Frederick Russell points out in his 
comprehensive study The Just War in the Middle Ages: 
The crusade as a juridical institution existed only in the Middle Ages, and was a 
sui generis synthesis of the pilgrimage, the vow, the holy war and the just war that 
has continued to defy attempts at neat analysis. Within the just war the crusade 
existed uneasily at best, partly because there was no precedent to serve as an 
unambiguous guide. There were, after all, no crusades before 1095, and the 
medieval Romanists were not about to incorporate the crusade into their debate.I6 
Even in the Middle Ages, ecclesiastical writers "were reluctant to consider the 
crusading movement explicitly in legal or theological commentaries," due to a "nagging 
14 Clouse, 16. 
15 Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975), 304. 
16 Ibid., 294. 
18 
suspicion that the crusade was an unsuitable means to ecclesiastical and religious ends."17 
Even those who considered the crusades appropriate and necessary "seldom devoted too 
much attention to the theoretical bases or practical consequences of such crusades."18 
Moreover, 
In spite of their endless repetition of the Augustinian justification of legal 
violence on evangelical grounds, [ecclesiastical scholars] continued, at least 
unconsciously, to consider Christian pacifism seriously, as witnessed by the peace 
movements. The moral suspicion attached to warfare or at least killing in the 
early medieval penitential literature went underground but did not cease to exist in 
the high Middle Ages, where it re-emerged as the scholastic hesitation to 
assimilate the crusades wholly into the just war theories.I9 
Robert Clouse makes the same point, and suggests that cultural and political 
realities, perhaps even more so than theological ones, formed the soil out of which the 
medieval crusades sprouted and grew. 
Despite the just war theories advanced by Augustine which seemed to harmonize 
participation in conflict with Christian values, the pacifism of the early church 
remained a living force within the community of faith. Those who killed in war 
were forced to do long terms of penance, and there was no glorification of the 
holy Christian knight until the eleventh century. The situation in Europe changed 
due to the break-up of the Empire and the influx of the Germanic peoples. A new 
militant attitude was formed in the church. The Germans...placed a great 
emphasis on warfare. Their greatest virtues, such as devotion to gods of battle 
and the desire to die in conflict, were those of the warrior. A fusion of the 
Germanic religion of war and the religion of peace took place among the 
Christians of Western Europe.2°  
"It is clear from the Crusades," says Clouse, "that what finally overpowered the early 
Christian teaching against violence was not merely a just war theory but rather a merger 
of violence and holiness at all levels of Christian life."21 Church liturgies blessed 
17 Ibid., 295. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 294. 
20 Clouse, 16. 
21  Ibid., 18. 
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weapons of war. Knights were consecrated for holy battle. New religious orders were 
formed—such as the Templars—that vowed to defend "God's cause" at all costs. And 
"when violence became sacred, the enemy was believed to be diabolical;" it was 
"considered wrong to show mercy" to enemies of God such as the Turks: 
The code of the just war...was largely in abeyance in fighting the infidel. 
Crucifixion, ripping open those who had swallowed coins, mutilation—
Bohemond of Antioch sent to the Greek Emperor a whole cargo of noses and 
thumbs sliced from the Saracens—such exploits the chronicles of the crusades 
recount without qualm. A favorite text was a verse in Jeremiah, "Cursed be he 
that keepeth back his hand from blood."22 
Joseph Allen notes the similarities and—more significantly—the differences 
between a crusade mentality and the just war tradition: 
In the Christian tradition, there is agreement between a crusade approach and just-
war teaching in certain limited respects. In both, it can sometimes be justifiable to 
resort to war. Further, both believe that in a particular case resort to war may be 
an obligation before God: that is, both approach the issue of war, like all moral 
questions, as a matter of religious and not merely secular morality. Beyond those 
points, however, the two diverge so sharply as to constitute virtually opposite 
ways of thinking about war.23  
Allen lists three characteristics of a crusade approach to war that sharply distinguish it 
from the just war tradition. First, "Crusaders see a justifiable war as a conflict between 
forces of good and forces of evil."24 God himself has called them to war, he is 
unquestionably on their side, and he promises victory to those who are faithful in fighting 
for his cause. As a result, secondly, "Crusaders characteristically pursue absolute and 
unlimited goals:" 
In a crusade spirit the goal of war becomes an undefined "victory"—utter and 
unqualified destruction of the enemy military forces and often of the enemy's 
22 Bainton, 112. 
23 Joseph L. Allen, War: A Primer for Christians (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), 8-9. 
24 Ibid., 9. 
20 
government and even whole society—rather than specific limited goals in the 
interests of one's own side.25  
Third, when war is seen purely in terms of good and evil and the goals of war are framed 
in absolute terms, little room is left for restraint in the conduct of war. Since "God is on 
our side" and the enemy is "utterly evil," any means useful or necessary for the total 
extermination of the enemy is justified. "Crusaders believe that they have no moral 
responsibility for those who, whether in uniform or not, willingly support the evil against 
the good."26 
Are there Christians today who support and defend the notion of war as crusade? 
This is not as simple a question to answer as it may seem to be. Few if any Christians, 
one suspects, would be willing to identify fully (or at least openly) with the attitudes 
characteristic of a crusade mentality listed by Allen. Yet Allen suggests that one can find 
evidence of "crusading tendencies" and "crusading attitudes" in our day and age. He 
argues that 
Leaders sometimes intentionally encourage crusade attitudes on the part of the 
public. They do so by propaganda that pictures citizens of the other country as all 
alike, as morally depraved, as equally responsible for their government's 
injustices, even as all deserving death. To the extent that the public accepts this 
picture, it is more inclined to accept unlimited goals and unrestrained means.27 
Allen expresses concern about the use of terms such as "good and evil" when describing 
hostile nations and their leaders, which—he fears—contributes to a crusading attitude. 
For example: 
In the [1991] Persian Gulf War, a presumption about absolute good and evil was 
present in the pronouncements of President Saddam Hussein, as when he 
described his adversaries as forces of evil and portrayed the war as one of Moslem 
faith against infidels. Although President Bush's language about the war was not 
" Ibid., 10. 
" Ibid, 11. 
27 Ibid., 12-13. 
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always that of a crusade, it did sometimes evoke that spirit, as when he described 
the Iraqi president as another Hitler. Whatever his intention, such a term tends to 
encourage people to think one side simply good and the other simply evil, and to 
disregard matters of degree. On the other hand, he said repeatedly that the war 
was not with the Iraqi people but with their leaders—a comment that tends to 
undermine a crusade spirit.28  
Complicating matters further is that not everyone would agree with the rather 
narrow definition of a crusade employed by scholars such as Bainton and Allen. In the 
book War: Four Christian Views, for example, discussion of the crusade is linked 
together with "preventive war," and is strongly defended by Harold 0. J. Brown as a 
legitimate Christian option. Brown defines a crusade as "a war that is begun not in 
response to a present act of aggression, but as the attempt to set right a past act." It is a 
war "waged to remedy a past atrocity, especially one recognized as such for spiritual or 
religious reasons."29 On the basis of this definition, Brown labels America's effort to 
help overthrow Hitler and the Nazis as a "crusade," since "Nazism was a pagan ideology, 
with at least a latent militancy against Christianity and an active religious-racial 
persecution of God's Old Testament people, the Jews." "Curiously," he writes, "this 
definition of a crusade means that the closest modern parallel to the Christian reconquest 
of the Holy Land in 1098 is the Jewish land-taking in Palestine, beginning in 1948 and 
culminating with the reconquest of Jerusalem in 1967."30 Brown bemoans the 
demonizing of the term "crusade" and argues for its redemption: 
The term crusade, which implies fighting for one's faith, has become a bad word 
in modern English—it even sounds a little awkward when applied to evangelistic 
efforts. Non-Christians repudiate the idea of a military crusade as a matter of 
course, and most Christians hasten to announce that under no circumstances 
would they endorse or defend the historic Crusades of the Middle Ages. Rather 
than simply reject the term outright, we may put matters into perspective a bit if 
28 Ibid., 9-10. 
29 Clouse, 155-156. 
"ibid., 156. 
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we observe the way in which what the Jews did in 1948 resembles what the 
Christian Franks did in 1098.31  
Whether or not one finds Brown's arguments persuasive, they are helpful in cautioning 
against the kind of oversimplification and generalization that Hauerwas fears so often 
accompanies the use of "types" in doing history and theology. The concept of the 
crusade, like that of the just war and pacifism, ought not be pigeon-holed in ways that 
distort the historical evidence or caricature carefully articulated views. We will have 
opportunity later in the study to discuss both Hauerwas's and Luther's attitudes toward 
crusading tendencies present in the church and world of their day. 
The Just War Tradition 
Is it possible to define "just war" or describe the just war tradition in a clear, 
coherent and historically responsible way? We begin with this question in view of 
Hauerwas's frequent allegation that there is, in fact, no cohesive historical tradition or 
coherent theological doctrine of just war thinking. "The attempt to label just war a 
doctrine is of very recent vintage and mistakenly gives the impression that the historical 
development of just war reflection is much more coherent than in fact it was and is."32 
Yoder argues that "the so-called 'just war theory,'" which "is the official teaching of 
most Christian traditions... is not taught very carefully and not applied very carefully." 
Because of this lack of care and consistency in explication and application, just war 
theory—"the standard moral guidance given by most Christian churches to their members 
31 Clouse, 156. 
32 Hauerwas and J. Alexander Sider, "Pacifism Redux," FT 128 (Dec 2002), 3. 
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since the fourth century"—offers in reality (according to Yoder) little or no guidance at 
all.33  
Nearly all historians and analysts of the just war tradition—regardless of their 
personal convictions—acknowledge that, as with pacifism, there have been and are 
distinct varieties of just war thinking, and that the just war tradition has evolved and 
developed in significant ways over the years (and continues to do so). Yet most would 
agree with James Turner Johnson's assessment: 
The term just war is, ...of course, imprecisely used; yet it is possible to define just 
war tradition in a meaningful way through the various concepts of the jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello that center discussion on restraining war in Western 
culture from the Middle Ages on. Such terms as just cause, right authority, right 
intention, last resort, and end of peace, proportionality of good to evil, and 
noncombatant immunity thus operate, in the just war tradition, as focal points 
about which thought and argument revolve. But...these terms are more than mere 
empty focal points; they have a content, more or less well specified and agreed 
upon at different moments in history but persistent nonetheless, that normatively 
defines the boundaries to initiating and waging war for the heirs of that tradition.34 
Bainton begins his treatment of the just war tradition by giving attention to its 
classical roots. Without using the actual term, Plato "first gave formulation to the code 
which came to be called that of the 'just war,'" while Aristotle coined the expression 
itself and applied it to the efforts of a state to vindicate justice in the hopes of restoring 
peace between feuding political entities.35 It was Cicero, during the days of the Roman 
empire, who "transform[ed] the just war into a code for conquerors—an ethic for an 
empire."36 Classical views of justice were rooted in an understanding of "natural law" 
which was accommodated without great difficulty by Christian thinkers: 
33 CA,13. 
34 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 190. 
35 Bainton, 38-39. 
36 Ibid., 41. 
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The concept of natural law...was adopted and adapted by the Christian Church to 
undergird the political ethic alike to the Scholastic theologians and of the 
Protestant reformers. It was to enjoy an enormous vogue in the age of the 
enlightenment. Though obscured in the nineteenth century by the romantic 
movement, it continues today in large measure to provide the presuppositions of 
the Western democracies. In content it is vague and therein may lie, in part, the 
secret of its popularity. To be applied it must be rendered concrete, and 
concretion produces divergent interpretations. Its value lies in the assumption that 
a universal moral code exists. Such a faith inspires the quest in our day for an 
international ethos.37 
The initial response of the early Christian church to the classical just war 
tradition, however, "was at best equivocal," says Russell: 
Before Constantine's conversion churchmen tended to condemn warfare in 
general and Roman wars in particular. On New Testament grounds they 
concluded that wars violated Christian charity and that Roman wars only resulted 
in violence and bloodshed. Even while employing military metaphors to describe 
proper Christian conduct, many Christians rejected worldly military service in 
favor of the militia Christi, a pacific expression of their struggle against evi1.38  
After Constantine's conversion, however, things soon began to change. "The Emperor's 
benefactions to the Church and the peace he achieved exerted a subtle but powerful 
pressure on Christian theologians to accommodate Christian citizenship to Roman 
wars."39 Eusebius of Caesarea introduced a distinction between two types of Christian 
vocation: "The laity was to shoulder the burdens of citizenship and wage just wars, 
while... the clergy was to remain aloof from society in total dedication to God."4°  
Ambrose, the "Christian Cicero," produced a diffuse but attractive amalgam of the "fides 
Romana" and the 'fides catholica" that, while lacking theoretical and systematic 
grounding, exerted "a powerful influence over medieval theory and practice."'" 
37 Ibid., 39. The issue of "natural law" and its place in the development of Christian just war thinking is a 
major one, and it plays a significant role in Hauerwas's critique of the just war tradition. We will return to 
this topic at various points in the course of our examination. 
38 Russell, 11. 
39 Ibid., 12. 
4° Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 13-15. 
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The principal architect of medieval just war theory, however, was Augustine. 
Russell's summary helpfully highlights Augustine's primary theological presuppositions 
and argumentation: 
The die for the medieval just war was cast by St. Augustine, who combined 
Roman and Judaeo-Christian elements in a mode of thought that was to influence 
opinion throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. The just war served as 
Augustine's means of reconciling the evangelical precepts of patience and the 
pacifistic tendencies of the early Church with Roman legal notions. Central to his 
attitude was the conviction that war was both a consequence of sin and a remedy 
for it. The real evils in war were not war itself but the love of violence and 
cruelty, greed and the libido dominandi or lust for rule that so often accompanied 
it. Although the sin originated in man's wounded will rather than in his actions, 
when man's evil volition led him to sinful acts, war provided a rough punishment. 
Inspired by the Old Testament Augustine argued that by divine judgment wars 
punished peoples for sins and crimes, even those unrelated to the war. Even 
wicked men could serve God's providence by punishing the sins of other peoples. 
Every war had peace as its goal, hence war was an instrument of peace and should 
only be waged to secure peace of some sort.42 
Augustine helped to systematize just war theory by providing a Christianized version of 
Cicero's "code of war."43 First, he insisted, war must have a just intent, namely, to 
restore peace. Second, it must seek to vindicate justice, to "avenge injuries" threatening 
the existence of a state and the welfare of its citizens. Third, it must be just in 
disposition—in other words, it must be motivated by Christian love. Augustine writes: 
If it is supposed that God could not enjoin warfare because in after times it was 
said by the Lord Jesus Christ, "I say unto you, Resist not evil...," the answer is 
that what is here required is not a bodily action but an inward disposition.... 
Moses in putting to death sinners was moved not by cruelty but by love. So also 
was Paul when he committed the offender to Satan for the destruction of his flesh. 
Love does not preclude a benevolent severity, nor that correction which 
compassion itself dictates. No one indeed is fit to inflict punishment save the one 
who has first overcome hate in his heart. The love of enemies admits of no 
dispensation, but love does not exclude wars of mercy waged by the good.44 
42 Ibid., 16. 
43 The following summary is based primarily on Bainton, 95-100. 
44 Sermo Dom., I, xx, 63, 70: J. P. Migne, Patrologia Latina XXXII, 1227. Cited in Bainton, 97. 
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A fourth principle for Augustine is that of just auspices—war may be waged only 
by a legitimate ruler or authority, one to which God himself has entrusted the use of the 
sword. Finally, the conduct of the war must be just: "Faith must be kept with the enemy. 
There should be no wanton violence, profanation of temples, looting, massacre, or 
conflagration. Vengeance, atrocities, and reprisals were excluded, though ambush was 
allowed."45 Self-defense by individuals was ruled out by Augustine, since this could not 
be done without self-seeking passion and was not motivated by love for the neighbor. 
Clergy were not to engage in battle, and even laity were to do so with a sense of sadness 
and mournfulness, couched in the prayer: "From my necessities deliver me." But "the 
distinctive points in Augustine's theory were these: that love should be the motive in war, 
and that justice should lie on one side only."46 
Augustine's arguments were adopted and adapted by Christians through the 
centuries, but not radically altered. "In the thoughts on war scattered throughout his 
works," for example, Thomas Aquinas "fused the Aristotelean political theory to the 
traditional Augustinian outlook of his predecessors."47 Luther "reworked the theory of 
the just war of Augustine and the early Middle Ages and stoutly rejected the crusading 
idea."'" In fact, 
The churches of the Reformation, with the exception of the Anabaptist, all 
endorsed the theory of the just war as basic. The Thirty-nine Articles of the 
Church of England affirmed that "it is lawfull for Christian men, and the 
commandment of the Magistrate, to weare weapons and serve in the wanes."'" 
45 Bainton, 97. 
46 Ibid, 98. 
47 Russell, 258ff. 
48 Bainton, 136. 
49 Ibid., 142-3. 
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Although variations exist in number, order, emphasis and terminology, the 
classical Christian tradition as formulated by Augustine and developed over the years 
consists of certain basic criteria, under the twofold heading ofjus ad bellum (factors that 
justify engaging in war) and jus in bello (the means by which a just war is to be 
conducted). Criteria in both categories must be carefully considered, met and upheld for 
a war to be considered just. We follow here the list of criteria as summarized by Allen 
because it is a bit more comprehensive than most. 
1. Justifiable cause. This is the most basic and fundamental of ad helium criteria, 
though it is by no means the simplest to apply. Allen lists three traditional types of just 
cause, all of which are rooted in the principle that a just war is necessarily defensive in 
nature: it seeks to "protect people from unjust attack," to "restore rights that have been 
wrongly taken away," and/or to "defend or reestablish a just political order."5° Especially 
in recent years, the question has been raised whether a "preemptive strike" can ever be 
justified and harmonized with this first essential criterion. While some answer this 
question with an unqualified no, others (like Allen, a former pacifist who converted to 
just war thinking) argue that "protecting people from unjust attack may sometimes justify 
a preemptive strike—attacking first in the face of an imminent enemy invasion."51 He 
gives as examples Israel's 1967 attack on Egypt and Syria based on reports of a clear and 
imminent danger posed by Arab forces, and also the 1991 Persian Gulf War: 
One could say that the Persian Gulf War began when the coalition launched an 
attack, and that Iraq was at that point fighting a defensive war. Yet whether the 
coalition had just cause would depend upon other grounds, such as whether it 
should have attacked to restore the rights of Kuwait, which Iraq had unjustly 
invaded; and whether attacking Iraq was essential to reestablish a more just order 
in the region and to protect it from further Iraqi military action. People of good 
5° Allen, 36. 
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will have argued on both sides of those questions, but questions like those are 
crucial and not simply who initiated the shooting.52 
2. Legitimate authority. This was an essential criterion of the Augustinian code, 
but it is sometimes downplayed in contemporary discussions because of the difficulties of 
applying it meaningfully in today's complex world of national and international politics. 
The basic question here is who has the right or "authority" to decide whether or not a war 
is necessary and just. Especially in democratically constituted governments, there will 
always be some tension here: 
Those in legitimate authority must decide for the country. At the same time 
citizens must decide for themselves—decide whether they are prepared to support 
the government's decision as right. Private citizens are usually not in as good a 
position to decide. They lack adequate information about the wider context, they 
will not be held responsible in the same way, and they may be preoccupied by the 
impact of the decision on their private pursuits. For such reasons, the just-war 
tradition has held that citizens should presume that legitimate authorities, if they 
have followed proper procedures, have decided rightly. There may, however, be 
good reason to conclude otherwise. Before private citizens reach that conclusion, 
however, they should try to imagine themselves in the situation of the 
authorities—look at the wider picture, ask what would happen if this or if that, 
and imagine that they will be held responsible by the public for their judgments. 
Justifiable decisions about war are decisions about the public good, within and 
beyond one's own country.53  
3. Last resort. War is justified only "when it is reasonably determined that there 
are not alternate ways to resolve the conflict,"54 when all peaceful means have been 
considered, attempted or exhausted. Pacifists like Yoder and Hauerwas often critique just 
war thinkers for their lack of "imagination," hope and effort in this regard. Just war 
defenders, however, would no doubt sympathize with Allen's point: 
If a government literally tried every imaginable possibility before resort to war, it 
would often make it impossible...to serve its just cause. When Neville 
Chamberlain accepted Hitler's terms at Munich in 1938, he supposed that Hitler 
52 /bid., 36-37. 
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was acting in good faith and that the agreement could prevent war. Others judged 
at the time that Hitler's promises were worthless and that last resort had already 
been reached. Hindsight has supported those judgments. Last resort requires a 
considered judgement about whether some imagined alternative has a good 
chance of avoiding war. It does not require that every idea actually be pursued to 
the end of the line. That would only play into the hands of a skillful and 
determined adversary.55  
4. Declaration of war. This point is sometimes combined with other criteria 
(e.g., the concern that war be waged by a legitimate authority and not merely as an act of 
personal vengeance), and its status as a necessary criterion is sometimes disputed (e.g., 
by those who would argue for the possible legitimacy of a preemptive strike that might 
well preclude warning the enemy in advance). Some, like James Childress, include 
it as an extension of the "last resort" criteria, "because it is the last opportunity short of 
war to persuade the enemy to come to terms."56 In a democracy, Allen notes, "declaring 
war brings the public intentionally into the deliberative process, and it creates a stated 
commitment to the declared aims."57 
5. Proportionality. This criterion attempts to "count the costs" of a potential war, 
and to calculate (as far as possible) whether the means employed are proportionate to the 
ends sought. This is, to a certain extent, simply common sense: "not only is it morally 
wrong to make matters worse; it also makes no sense."58 Once again, the ambiguities 
involved in such calculations make this criterion a frequent target for pacifist critics: 
Sometimes we are told that because it is impossible to calculate consequences 
adequately, we ought to put this criterion aside. In response, just-war thinkers 
grant that we cannot calculate consequences well. They also hold that this 
criterion is perhaps not the foremost limit on resort to war. Yet, they continue, it 
is better to calculate consequences the best we can, however imperfectly, than not 
55 
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to do so at all. People are apparently guided by that belief in private life. We 
often ask of an act, like changing jobs, or buying a car, or enlisting in the military, 
"What might happen if we do that?" Best that we do ask that, even though our 
forecasts are far from perfect.59 
6. Reasonable chance of success. This could be viewed as an extension or 
implication of the principle of proportionality. War is not worth waging and cannot be 
justified if there is no reasonable hope or expectation that the intended ends can actually 
be achieved. This criterion also serves, therefore, to help crystallize and specify those 
goals: what exactly are we trying to accomplish? Just war involves clearly articulated 
and limited aims: not the total destruction of the enemy, but the re-establishment of peace 
and stability in a particular region or country or the restoration of lost or threatened rights 
and freedoms. 
7. Right intention. The term "intention" refers not only to outward objectives, 
which must be just (e.g., the restoration of peace, not territorial conquest or financial 
gain), but also (at least for the Christian) the motivation for action: "Even if there is a 
just cause, the war must not be waged out of hatred for the enemy, nor for the desire for 
revenge. Rather, when Christians go to war, they are to do so out of love for their 
enemies, as well as for the victims involved."60 
The criteria for the conduct of war, jus in hello, are usually listed as twofold: 
discrimination and proportionality. Just war thinkers insist that this second set of criteria 
is "quite distinct" from the first "and must be kept so."61 They often complain that critics 
of the just war theory typically focus on in hello considerations that are, by their very 
nature, less certain, predictable and controllable than ad helium factors, and on that basis 
59 Ibid. 
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reach a negative verdict on the justifiability of virtually any and every war. On the other 
hand, just war thinkers like Paul Ramsey persuasively argue that in today's world of 
(nuclear) "weapons of mass destruction," the in bello factors of discrimination and 
proportionality are, in fact, inseparable from ad bellum considerations. If we know in 
advance that the means of conducting war will inevitably be at odds with the limitations 
imposed by in bello restraints upon just war, then it is impossible to justify fighting on 
the basis of ad bellum considerations, no matter how compelling they may be. 62 
The principle of discrimination "forbids direct and intentional attack upon 
noncombatants in war."63 Clearly identifying noncombatants, distinguishing 
"intentional" from "unintentional" attacks, and judging the degree to which military 
strategies take care to avoid possible injury to innocent civilians are some of the difficult 
but crucial problems encountered when debating the application of this criterion. 
"Proportionality" in this in bello context refers to the use of limited force in 
accomplishing the "just goals" of a war. This requires constant assessment and re-
assessment during the war itself, and is obviously subject to a great deal of (fallible) 
human judgment. Considered hand in hand with right intention, "proportionality requires 
more than merely achieving one's objectives at the lowest cost in lives and resources for 
one's own side." Rather, it "calls for the least destruction possible for all concerned," 
since the war is being waged in pursuit of goals that will ultimately benefit even citizens 
of the nation against which one is fighting.64 Allen summarizes: 
These then are the just-war criteria. Applying them, it may be possible to judge 
some wars justifiable. By the same logic, some wars—probably most—will be 
judged unjustifiable in various respects. In the judging, both sets of criteria are 
62 See War and the Christian Conscience (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961). 
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obligatory. Justifiable resort to war does not license the use of unlimited means, 
nor do permissible means make a war right that should never have been fought at 
all. From the Christian faith one knows that limits are required in war because all 
those on both sides are one's neighbors in Christ. They very existence of such a 
serious and unavoidable conflict is a matter of deep regret. Therefore one seeks at 
every point to restrain the destruction in behalf of a more just peace.65  
Certain basic convictions underlie the acceptance and use of these criteria in 
Christian just war thinking. The first is a conviction regarding the sanctity of human life, 
a recognition that all people—even one's enemies—are God's creatures and are to be 
valued and respected as such. Here pacifists and just war thinkers share common ground, 
in contrast to the attitude of most "crusaders," who tend to view whole nations or peoples 
as good or evil on the basis of ethnic, cultural, national, religious or ideological 
differences. The second conviction involves a sober realism about the nature of sin and 
its consequences in a fallen world. It recognizes the inevitability of conflict between 
individuals and groups, and the impossibility and irresponsibility of ignoring these 
conflicts or hoping that they can be overcome without resorting to any kind of force or 
coercion. The third conviction, emphasized by Augustine and those that followed him in 
both the Reformation and Roman Catholic traditions, is that nothing less than Christian 
love compels the believer to accept the necessity of the use of force in certain 
circumstances to protect those whose lives or safety are in danger. This use of force, 
therefore, while regrettable, is not inherently evil. Rightly motivated and used, it can 
even be described as a "good deed" performed in the service of one's neighbor in a sin-
sick, violent world. Ramsey, one of the foremost contemporary Christian expositors and 
defenders of the just war theory, goes to great lengths to emphasize that "the western 
65 Ibid., 47. 
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theory of the just war originated, not primarily from considerations of abstract or 
`natural' justice, but from the interior ethics of Christian love." 
While Jesus taught that a disciple in his own case should turn the other cheek, he 
did not enjoin that his disciples should lift up the face of another oppressed man 
for him to be struck again on his other cheek. It is no part of the work of charity 
to allow this to continue to happen. Instead, it is the work of love and mercy to 
deliver as many as possible of God's children from tyranny, and to protect from 
oppression, if one can, as many of those for whom Christ died as it may be 
possible to save. When choice must be made between the perpetrator of injustice 
and the many victims of it, the latter may and should be preferred—even if 
effectively to do so would require the use of armed force against some evil power. 
This is what I mean by saying that the justice of sometimes resorting to armed 
conflict originated in the interior of the ethics of Christian love.66 
Although this is not the place to investigate or evaluate these issues and 
arguments, Ramsey's words highlight some of the questions that consistently surface in 
debates between pacifists (such as Yoder and Hauerwas) and Christian just war thinkers, 
and even among just war thinkers themselves. One of these questions is whether war is 
to be viewed as the consequence of sin or as evil in and of itself. Arthur Holmes, who 
has written and edited several scholarly books on war from a Christian perspective, and 
who speaks as a representative of the just war tradition in the book War: Four Christian 
Views edited by Robert Clouse, begins his treatment of the just war tradition in this work 
by stating bluntly: "War is evil." "To call war anything less than evil," he says, "would 
be self-deception." "The issue that tears the Christian conscience is not whether war is 
good, but whether it is in all cases entirely avoidable."67 Given this presupposition, 
Holmes has no choice but to defend just war on so-called "lesser evil" grounds. Since 
66 Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
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"not all evil can be avoided," it is necessary to ask: "Could participation in war perhaps 
be a lesser evil than allowing aggression and terror to go unchecked and unpunished?"68 
In Holmes' just war scheme, justice, not love, is the basic consideration: "The just war 
theory does not try to justify war. Rather it tries to bring it under the control of justice so 
that, if consistently practiced by all parties to a dispute, it would eliminate war 
altogether."69 
Other Christian just war thinkers flatly reject this view. "Just war," writes 
Richard John Neuhaus and the editors of First Things, "although occasioned by evil, is 
not itself an evil; nor is it even, as is commonly said today, a necessary evil. It is, if just, 
a positive duty, the doing of which, while it may entail much suffering, is to be counted 
as good."7° Darrell Cole agrees: 
Classical just war advocates (those who rely upon the tradition as formulated by 
the likes of Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin) deny that the just war 
criteria allow us to do evil—even prima facie evil—that good might come. They 
hold in fact that the just war criteria rule out evil altogether and help us determine 
when we must refrain from certain proposed acts of force. Just warriors refuse to 
restrain evil with evil. If we cannot prevent an evil without doing evil ourselves, 
then we throw ourselves on God's mercy and trust in His will for us, even if it 
means dying; for such dying is a noble death, and noble dying always beats 
ignoble living.71 
Cole singles out Reinhold Niebuhr as the theologian most responsible for spawning 
"lesser evil" views of just war. Since Niebuhr is a frequent target of both Yoder and 
Hauerwas, we will have occasion to discuss his views in more detail later in our study. 
At this point, however, we simply note Cole's basic concern and critique: 
The idea that Christians ought to play the lesser-evil game is the product of 
Christian Realism. Reinhold Niebuhr is the most famous and compelling of the 
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Christian realists and is often referred to as the "father" of the movement. 
Christian messianic pacifists such as Yoder and Hauerwas have rightly attacked 
Niebuhr for transforming Jesus' teaching into an "otherworldly" ethic. By 
contrast, the sort of theology we see at work in figures such as Aquinas and 
Calvin insists that Jesus' ethic be harmonized with God's "this worldly" ethic as 
revealed in the Old Testament. Those adhering to classical just war doctrine 
should, I suggest, make common cause with Hauerwas and Yoder in rejecting 
Niebuhr's position. But they part company on how to remedy the mistake.72 
Closely related to the question of whether war is inherently evil is the question of 
whether the just war tradition, properly understood and applied, begins with a 
"presumption against war and violence." This, too, is an issue that surfaces frequently in 
the writings of Yoder and Hauerwas, and (therefore) one that calls for further 
examination. We note already here, however, the caution of some just war thinkers 
against confusing the fact that peace is the goal of just war with the idea that honest and 
consistent just war thinking necessarily begins with a "presumption against war." George 
Weigel writes: "The claim that a 'presumption against violence' is at the root of the just 
war tradition cannot be sustained historically, methodologically, or theologically."73  
Keith Pavlischek, reviewing James Turner Johnson's most recent work, Morality and 
Contemporary Warfare, affirms Johnson's thesis that "the concept of just war...does not 
begin with a 'presumption against war' focused on the harm war may do, but with a 
presumption against injustice focused on the need for responsible use of force in response 
to wrongdoing." According to Johnson, "the presumption-against-war position...is 
simply not to be found in classic just war teaching, 'even in the specifically churchly 
theorists Augustine and Aquinas to whom Catholic just war theorists generally refer for 
authority.'"" 
72 Ibid. 
73 Weigel, 23. Cf. "Just War: An Exchange" FT 122 (April 2002), 31-37. 
74 Keith J. Pavlischek, "The Justice in Just War," FT 103 (May 2000), 43. 
36 
A third question is whether war, in any sense, can be seen or described by a 
Christian as "an act of love," or whether the best Christians can do in defending just war 
thinking is to appeal to the necessity of justice in the face of acts and threats of violence 
and oppression. Hauerwas's critiques of just war thinking tend to focus on issues of 
"justice," while prominent just war thinkers like Ramsey emphasize Augustine's appeal 
to love. Luther, following Augustine, clearly sees love as a necessary criterion for 
Christian participation in or support of war. We will have opportunity to consider 
Luther's views on this issue more fully in chapter three. 
The fact that Ramsey and Hauerwas (both Methodists) collaborated on the book 
Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism (a critique of the United Methodist Bishops 1986 
Pastoral Letter "In Defense of Creation," with Hauerwas supplying an "epilogue") is 
clear evidence of the seriousness with which they regard each other's work, the desire for 
dialog, and the search for some kind of "common ground" or "common cause" that might 
be claimed by both pacifists and just war thinkers despite significant differences in 
conviction, emphasis and argumentation.75 We will explore some of these possibilities 
for dialog from a Lutheran perspective later in the study. In this connection, however, it 
is interesting to note that Allen concludes his discussion of the just war tradition by 
referring to Yoder's hopeful appeal to just war thinkers, which serves well as a transition 
to a brief discussion of Christian pacifism: 
John Howard Yoder, a witnessing pacifist, has said that if he cannot persuade 
others to be pacifists, then he would like for them to be good just war thinkers. At 
least they would then be disposed to impose moral restraints on violence. And 
many just-war thinkers believe that their closest allies over the morality of war are 
not the crusaders, who agree with them that it can sometimes be justifiable to go 
75 Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism: A Critique of the United Methodist Bishops ' Pastoral Letter "In 
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to war. Rather they are witnessing pacifists, who recognize the universal rule of 
God, Christians' obligation to all God's children, and the persistence of 
destructive conflict.7' 
Pacifism 
Dale Brown, professor at Bethany Theological Seminary in Richmond, Indiana, 
begins his book on Biblical Pacifism with a striking quotation from Mohandas Gandhi: 
"The only people on earth who do not see Christ and His teachings as nonviolent are 
Christians."77 Nearly all Christian pacifists would sympathize with this observation by 
Gandhi, acknowledging (with deep regret) the "minority position" occupied by pacifism 
in the Christian tradition. They would also insist, however, that it was not always so. 
Virtually no one disputes the assertion of Bainton that "the early Church was pacifist to 
the time of Constantine."78 Most Christian pacifists, like Yoder, see this historical fact as 
having clear implications about the teaching of the New Testament: "If... the pre-
Constantinian church was pacifist, this also obviously means that the New Testament was 
pacifist."79 One of the primary goals of (and challenges for) Christian pacifists, therefore, 
is to help non-pacifists see how they and the church at large have strayed from this basic 
New Testament teaching. 
With pacifism, however, as with the crusade and the just war positions, one 
immediately encounters significant problems when it comes to defining terms and 
classifying types. Most scholars, like Yoder himself, define pacifism as the position that 
"war is always morally wrong."780 We will work with this definition here, even though- 
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as we will see—not all who describe themselves as pacifists necessarily hold that war is 
morally wrong for everyone or in every sense or in every situation. This inconsistency in 
definition contributes to the difficulty in classifying types of pacifism. After providing 
the seemingly absolute definition of pacifism noted above, Yoder himself goes on to say 
that pacifism is "not just one position, but a set of positions" which "has a great variety of 
sub-definitions and mediating forms."8I In his book Nevertheless: The Varieties of 
Religious Pacifism,  Yoder identifies, describes and evaluates no less than twenty-five 
distinct types of religious (as distinct from secular) pacifism. The second type of 
pacifism discussed in his book is somewhat euphemistically titled "The Pacifism of the 
Honest Study of Cases," later described as "just war pacifism."82 In Christian Attitudes 
to War, Peace and Revolution Yoder notes: 
There will be borders and mixtures....Sometimes the term "pacifism" is used to 
include a kind of reasoning and deciding which uses the just war theory, and by 
measuring clearly the particular cause or particular weapons or particular situation 
comes to the conclusion that in this situation a war cannot be commanded, 
although it might be elsewhere.83 
When just war theory becomes subsumed under the general heading of "pacifism," 
however, one might question either the consistency and clarity of the definition of 
pacifism or the accuracy and objectivity of the depiction of the just war theory (or both). 
There is no simple solution to this problem of definition, but it is important to be aware of 
it and keep it in mind, not only in connection with this survey of Christian perspectives 
on war and peace but also in the context of our examination and evaluation of 
Hauerwas's pacifism. 
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Allen summarizes the pacifist attitude and lifestyle of the early church as follows: 
Prior to 312 C.E. no Christian writer approved of Christians' going to war, and 
very few Christians served in the military. There were several reasons for this, 
including expectation of the end of the world, reluctance to join the army of their 
persecutors, and the danger that in the Roman army, Christians might be asked to 
commit idolatry—to sacrifice to the emperor or at least to approve of doing so.84 
Nonpacifists emphasize these historical and practical considerations cited by Allen as the 
primary reasons for the pacifist attitude and approach of the early church. This enables 
them to explain the change in attitude that gradually took place after Constantine in a way 
that does not conflict with the essential theological convictions of the early church. 
Pacifists argue that the pacifism of the early church was, in fact, firmly grounded in 
moral and theological convictions inherent in the teaching of Jesus and of the New 
Testament, specifically his commands to love one's enemies and to refuse to resist those 
who do evil (Matt. 5:39, 44). These teachings were not seen as contradicting the Old 
Testament but as superceding its theocratic constraints and limitations and bringing to 
more complete fruition its prohibitions against killing (Ex. 20:13, etc.), its own "love 
ethic" (e.g., Lev. 19:17-18), and its vision of a kingdom of peace ushered in by the 
Messiah (Isaiah 2:4; 9:4-6; 11:6-9; Micah 4:3-4, etc.). 
It is not difficult to collect and cite, as Bainton does, numerous quotations from 
the early fathers underscoring the serious, even radical, nature of Christ's injunctions in 
this regard: 
Tertullian asked, "If we are enjoined to love our enemies, whom have we to hate? 
If injured we are forbidden to retaliate. Who then can suffer injury at our hands? 
Clement of Alexandria said to the heathen: "If you enroll as one of God's people, 
heaven is your country and God your lawgiver. And what are his laws?....Thou 
shalt not kill....Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. To him that strikes thee 
on the one cheek, turn also the other. Cyprian reminded his brethren of Paul's 
hymn of love, "And what more—that...when buffeted you should turn the other 
84 Allen, 16. 
40 
cheek; and forgive not seven times but seventy times seven....That you should 
love your enemies and pray for adversaries and persecutors?" Dionysiuis of 
Alexandria declared: "Love is ever on the alert to do good even to him who is 
unwilling to receive it." Tertullian called love of enemies the "principal precept." 
Justin inquired: "If you love merely those who love you, what do you do that is 
new?"85 
Even among the church fathers, however, one can discern certain varieties of pacifism. 
Bainton distinguishes between the "legalistic and eschatological" pacifism of Tertullian, 
the "Gnostic" pacifism of Marcion, and the "pragmatic or redemptive" pacifism of 
Origen, Irenaeus and Justin Martyr.86 In each case, however, the fundamental appeal was 
to the teaching and example of Christ and his command to love others unconditionally 
and indiscriminately, just as he had loved them and the whole world (cf. John 15:12). 
Despite the gradual embrace of just war theory after the rise of Constantine, one 
finds evidence of pacifist convictions and sympathies throughout Christian history. 
In the fourth century, the theologians who believed that some wars could be 
justifiable for the laity also taught that the clergy could not go to war. Their 
nonviolence was considered a higher way. A similar belief was present in the 
monastic movement. In the Middle Ages there were pacifist tendencies among 
the Franciscans. Other groups, like the Waldensians, the Cathari, and one branch 
of Hussites, were pacifist. During the Reformation and afterward there arose 
several peace churches—Mennonites and Hutterites, and during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the Quakers and the Brethren. In the twentieth century, 
in addition to the peace churches, strong pacifist movements have arisen within 
other Protestant denominations and among Catholics.87 
Obviously, we cannot consider here all the varieties of pacifism that have existed or that 
currently exist in the Christian tradition, nor even attempt to discuss the many and 
various classifications of types suggested by both contemporary pacifists and 
nonpacifists. Even a summary of Yoder's twenty-five "distinct types" of pacifism would 
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take us too far afield.88 Keeping in view our interest in the pacifism of Hauerwas, we 
will attempt a more modest twofold task: first, to identify some of the questions regarding 
pacifism often discussed and debated by contemporary pacifists and just war thinkers, 
especially those that arise frequently in the writings of Hauerwas; second, to offer a brief 
summary of the type of pacifism espoused by John Howard Yoder, "The Pacifism of the 
Messianic Community," as background for our inquiry into the pacifist views of 
Hauerwas. 
The most basic question regarding pacifism is the question of defmition referred 
to above. Even if it is granted that there are "varieties" and "mixtures" and "mediating 
forms" of pacifism, is it possible to locate a border or limit beyond which certain 
positions, even though they might claim to be pacifist, fall outside the pale of a consistent 
and meaningful definition? Is it possible to distinguish clearly and consistently between 
pacifists and nonpacifists on the basis of one or more sine qua non characteristics? Allen 
insists that this is not only possible but also necessary if pacifists and nonpacifists have 
any hope of understanding each other and communicating meaningfully with each other. 
For him, the sine qua non is that "pacifists believe that war is always wrong:" 
One is not a pacifist simply because one believes that this war or that is 
unjustifiable, or that most wars are unjustifiable, or even that it is unlikely that 
there could be a justifiable war today. Just-war thinkers could come to any of 
those conclusions, since they believe that using the just-war criteria might lead 
one either to approve or disapprove morally of a particular war. In contrast, a 
pacifist...does not recognize any conditions under which it would ever be right to 
go to war.89 
For this reason, argues Allen, terms or categories such as "nuclear pacifism" or "selective 
88 For a somewhat simpler survey of eight types of representative pacifist views, see Brown's chapter on 
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pacifism" are unhelpful and misleading, since they qualify "pacifism" in a way that 
makes it virtually indistinguishable from nonpacifist positions. 
One must then be either a pacifist or nonpacifist; there are no mixtures or middle 
possibilities. Either all wars everywhere under all conditions are wrong, as 
pacifists hold, or some wars might be justifiable, as just-war thinkers hold. There 
is good reason for using the term "pacifist" this way. The argument that some 
wars might be justifiable presupposes some different beliefs and makes use of 
different criteria from the argument that no war could ever be justifiable." 
When the positions are mixed or merged, the discussion becomes hopelessly confused. 
This issue is important because (as noted earlier) pacifists like Yoder and Hauerwas—
while holding personally to an "absolute" definition of pacifism—seem to want to argue 
that even the just war tradition is actually based (historically and theologically) on 
pacifist presuppositions. Just war thinkers, from their perspective, are really half-hearted 
pacifists who (if they are honest) are willing to acknowledge the moral and 
biblical superiority of consistent pacifism but are also (unfortunately) willing to 
compromise Christ's radical demands because of the difficulty or even seeming 
impossibility of following them in the "real" (sinful) world. 
A second question, following from the first, is whether there is any basis at all for 
conversation and cooperation between pacifists and nonpacifists, beyond simply seeking 
to better understand each other's mutually exclusive positions. Even if there is no middle 
ground between the two positions, is there any common ground? Allen says: 
Christian pacifists and just war thinkers do...hold some basic theological beliefs 
in common. One shared belief of special significance for war is that all people are 
of worth in God's sight and that therefore we ought to recognize that worth, 
among enemies as well as allies. On this they contrast sharply with crusaders' 
absolute distinction between good and evil....Shared regard for the worth of all 
means that there is a sense in which the disagreements between pacifists and just- 
9° Ibid. 
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war thinkers, however deep and enduring, are "within the family." This is far less 
the case in the relation of both positions to crusade ethics.91  
We will want to explore the issue of common ground further without diminishing the 
distinctiveness of these positions or downplaying their basic disagreements. We also 
want to examine possible ways in which each position can test and challenge the other 
constructively despite those disagreements. 
A third question that frequently arises in discussions of pacifism is whether it is 
helpful, or even legitimate, to distinguish between "non-violent resistance" and "non-
resistance" as valid types of Christian pacifism. Although this distinction is readily 
accepted in most pacifist circles as denoting two different strategies for giving expression 
to a common pacifist conviction, it has been called into question (in radically different 
ways) by both pacifists (like Yoder and Hauerwas) and by nonpacifists—most famously, 
by the (former pacifist) Reinhold Niebuhr. In response to the pacifist charge that 
nonpacifists fail to take seriously the radical "love ethic" of Jesus, Niebuhr writes: 
Curiously enough the pacifists are just as guilty as their less absolutist brethren of 
diluting the ethic of Jesus for the purpose of justifying their position. They are 
forced to recognize that an ethic of pure non-resistance can have no immediate 
relevance to any political situation; for in every political situation it is necessary 
to achieve justice by resisting pride and power. They therefore declare that the 
ethic of Jesus is not an ethic of non-resistance, but one of non-violent resistance; 
that it allows one to resist evil provided the resistance does not involve the 
destruction of life or property. 92 
However, says Niebuhr, "there is not the slightest support in Scripture for this doctrine of 
non-violence. Nothing could be plainer than that the ethic uncompromisingly enjoins 
non-resistance and not non-violent resistance."93 It is on this basis that Niebuhr alleges 
91 Ibid.,19-20. 
92 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," in War and Christian Ethics, ed. Arthur 
C. Holmes (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 306. 
93 Ibid. 
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that "most modern forms of Christian pacifism are heretical"—because they 
disingenuously reject Jesus' ethic of nonresistance and embrace instead, under the guise 
of "Christian pacifism," a humanistic ethic of "non-violent resistance."94 Yoder is well 
aware of Niebuhr's critique of pacifism and summarizes it as follows: 
Pacifism commits an error in both exegesis and ethics when it argues that 
nonviolent resistance is the practical application of New Testament love in 
politics. Niebuhr insists that the New Testament teaches nonresistance, not 
nonviolence. Nonviolence is a pragmatic method, and on certain occasions may 
be preferable to violence. In Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr argues 
extensively in favor of nonviolence as a strategy "which offers the largest 
opportunities for a harmonious relationship with the moral and rational factors in 
moral life." But nonviolent resistance remains a means of coercion and of 
conflict, and is far from being a faithful translation of nonresisting love into social 
action.95  
According to Niebuhr, however, not all forms of Christian pacifism are heretical. 
In medieval ascetic perfectionism and in Protestant sectarian perfectionism (of the 
type of Meno Simons, for instance) the effort to achieve a standard of perfect love 
in individual life was not presented as a political alternative. On the contrary, the 
political problem and task were specifically disavowed. This perfectionism did 
not give itself to the illusion that it had discovered a method for eliminating the 
element of conflict from political strategies. On the contrary, it regarded the 
mystery of evil as beyond its power of solution. It was content to set up the most 
perfect and unselfish individual life as a symbol of the Kingdom of God. It knew 
that this could only be done by disavowing the political task and by freeing the 
individual of all responsibility for social justice.96 
This is the (rare and radical) type of pacifism, says Niebuhr, that is not a heresy. 
It is rather a valuable asset for the Christian faith. It is a reminder to the Christian 
community that the relative norms of social justice, which justify both coercion 
and resistance to coercion, are not final norms, and that Christians are in constant 
peril of forgetting their relative and tentative character and of making them too 
completely normative.97  
94 Ibid., 303. 
95 Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism (Washington, D.C.: The Church Peace Mission, 1966), 13-14. 
" "Why the Christian Church is Not Pacifist," 303. 
97 Ibid. 
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This seemingly obscure distinction and debate is actually quite significant as 
background for our study of Hauerwas and for an understanding of contemporary 
Christian pacifism in general. It explains why, for example, the widely-used historical 
survey edited by Robert Clouse presents four basic "Christian views" regarding war 
rather than the classic "three" sketched out by Bainton. In War: Four Christian Views 
"Nonresistance" and "Christian pacifism" are distinguished as two different and (for 
some) irreconcilable perspectives. Herman Hoyt strongly argues that nonresistance, not 
nonviolence, is the only valid biblical position, emphasizing that "the doctrine of 
nonresistance is not a plank in some political platform" or "a part of some merely social 
program."98 He criticizes most so-called "Christian pacifists" for their view that war is 
forbidden not just for Christians but that "it is wrong even for the nations of this world 
and therefore they should oppose the war effort in their own nation."99 Biblical 
nonresistance, on the contrary, affirms "patriotism and obedience to the government."1°° 
It recognizes that "God permits human governments to exercise force for the protection 
of lives and property. War is wrong, but armed might is the one final argument 
understood by sinful men and the one to which they ultimately bow."1°1 While Christians 
are forbidden to kill or do physical harm, they are at liberty to serve in the armed forces 
or in other governmental capacities in ways that do not involve them directly in actual 
acts of violence. "Christians can therefore perform their responsibilities to the 
" Clouse, 38. 
" Ibid., 47. 
lc* Ibid., 46-47. 
10I Ibid, 48. 
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government in everything except participation in armed conflict and let war take its 
course knowing that shortly Christ will come and user in the age of peace."1°2 
Hoyt's position is similar to, though not identical with, the position of the 
"Second Wind" Mennonites described in Yoder's book Nevertheless. Embracing the 
term "nonresistance" in favor of "nonviolence," these Mennonites 
...since 1940 have thus invested as much concern in keeping their distance from 
"pacifism" as they have in denouncing militarism; in fact the military have their 
place in the non-Christian world, and some Mennonites commend the violence of 
the state, as long as they need not be a part ofit.103 
Such a position, in Yoder's view, does not (strictly speaking) merit the title "pacifism." 
Even though he includes it among the various types of religious pacifism, he 
disparagingly dubs it "The Non-Pacifist Nonresistance of the Mennonite 'Second 
Wind,' and criticizes it rather harshly for accepting what he terms the "Niebuhrian 
compliment:" 
The unspoken axiom underlying this position would seem to be double; socially, 
it assumes that if you are complimented on your integrity, you should accept the 
compliment. The Niebuhrian analysis, while rejecting the "sectarian" position as 
proud and irresponsible, concedes to it both consistency and that it understands 
Jesus aright. Rather than look twice to test the sincerity or the hidden 
assumptions of such a backhanded compliment, dualistic Mennonites, gratified 
for a place in the sun even if it be under a shadow, accepted the challenge and set 
out trying to be consistently "apolitical....It accepts as it were a compliment the 
judgment of political irrelevance pronounced not only on "sectarians" but also 
thereby on Jesus by mainstream theologians.104 
Yoder's comments raise a fourth and more fundamental question: can one be an 
authentic, "absolutist" pacifist and still have a legitimate voice and an active role in the 
politics of this world? Or, to put it another way, are "sectarianism" and complete 
1°z /bid., 44-49. 
1°3 Nevertheless, 111. 
104 /bid., 111-112. 
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withdrawal from politics necessary implications of a true, consistent Christian pacifism? 
In War: A Primer for Christians, Allen takes up this question by distinguishing between 
two basic types of pacifists, "pragmatic pacifists" and "witnessing pacifists." The former 
take a pacifist position because they are firmly convinced "that a nonviolent method 
`works'—it resists wrongdoing in the world in a much more effective way and at less 
cost in human life than does war." Pragmatic pacifists emulate the example of such 
leaders as Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., who demonstrated "the power 
of nonviolence" in the real world of history and politics.105 
"Witnessing pacifists" put arguments about pragmatics aside. They insist that 
"whether nonviolence produces better consequences or not, war is always wrong for a 
more basic reason: it is incompatible with a Christian understanding of God—
incompatible with what it means to be a follower of Jesus."1°6 The primary 
representatives of this position singled out by Allen are Yoder and Hauerwas. As Allen 
rightly indicates, however, as a "witnessing pacifist" 
Yoder does not call for Christians to withdraw from the world of political life. 
Nor does he reject the use of all power....Rather, Christians must refuse to use 
power violently, and they must refuse to collaborate with political structures that 
in their violence are rebellious against God. They must refuse "to use unworthy 
means even for what seems to be a worthy end."1°7 
Yoder, in other words, rejects Niebuhr's argument that nonresistance is the only valid and 
consistent form of Christian pacifism. He also rejects, therefore, the "Niebuhrian 
compliment" that "pure pacifism"—i.e., nonresistance—is to be greatly admired and 
respected as the most authentic testimony to the person and work of Jesus, as long as it is 
1°5 Allen, 20. 
1°6 Ibid., 21. 
107 Ibid., 21-22. 
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willing to acknowledge its irrelevance for social and political life in the real.world. This 
is a primary theme and concern also in the writings of Hauerwas, and one to which we 
will return in our examination of Hauerwas's pacifism. First, however, we offer a brief 
summary of Yoder's position based primarily on his own description of it in the closing 
chapters of his book Nevertheless. 
The most consistent form of pacifism, the stance which grants the church the 
"radical moral independence" that it needs to be the church which God has called it to be, 
is described by Yoder as "The Pacifism of the Messianic Community." This pacifism is 
"Messianic" because it is "in the person and work of Jesus, in His teachings and His 
passion, that this kind of pacifism finds its rootage, and in His resurrection that it finds its 
enablement."1" The true nature of this position, argues Yoder, "can be known only in 
relation to Jesus Christ"—this is what makes this form of pacifism utterly unique: 
...whereas all of the positions reviewed above are held by Christians, this is the 
only position for which the person of Jesus Christ is indispensable. It is the only 
one of these positions which would lose its substance if Jesus were not Christ and 
its foundation if Jesus Christ were not Lord.109 
This form of pacifism, says Yoder, is not mere moralism, "a stuffy preoccupation with 
never making a mistake:" 
The question put to us as we follow Jesus is not whether we have successfully 
refrained from breaking any rules, but whether we have been participants in that 
human experience, that peculiar way of living for God in the world, of being used 
as instruments of the living of God in the world, which the Bible calls agape or 
cross. 
lo 
This is pacifism of the "Messianic Community" because the focus is not on "the 
individual asking himself about right and wrong in his concern for his own integrity," but 
1°8 Nevertheless,123. 
1139 Ibid., 125. 
11° Ibid. 
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on "the human community experiencing in its life a foretaste of God's kingdom."111  
Most historic forms of pacifism, Yoder observes, have taken their cue from "powerful 
individuals" seeking (usually unsuccessfully) to create a "movement" for peace. The 
pacifism of the Messianic community 
...is communal in that it is not a life alone for heroic personalities but for a 
society. It is communal in that it is lived by a brotherhood of men and women 
who instruct one another, forgive one another, bear one another's burdens, 
reinforce one another's witness.112 
The witness given by this community, according to Yoder, has real and practical 
significance for this world. To label it "sectarian" or "monastic" or "separatistic" or 
"socially irresponsible" is to misunderstand and misrepresent its true nature. 
The existence of a human community dedicated in common to a new and publicly 
scandalous enemy-loving way of life is itself a new social datum. A heroic 
individual can crystallize a widespread awareness of need or widespread 
admiration: only a continuing community dedicated to a deviant value system can 
change the world. 113 
Ironically, however, one of the serious disadvantages of this form of pacifism—
which alone has the power to "change the world"—is that "it does not promise to work." 
It does not contain "a strategy for resolving the urban crisis tomorrow." "It is not a 
position which can be institutionalized to work just as well among those who do not quite 
understand it or are not sure how much they believe in it."114 
The resurrection is not the end product of a mechanism which runs through its 
paces wherever there is a crucifixion. There is about the Christian hope in the 
kingdom that peculiar kind of assurance which is called faith, but not the 
preponderant probability of success which is called for by the just war theory or 
by a prudential ethic.'" 
111 Ibid., 124. 
112 mid  
113 Ibid., 125. 
114 Ibid., 126. 
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"Nevertheless," concludes Yoder, "this position is closer than the others to the idiom of 
the Bible and to the core affirmations of the Christian faith:" 
It reckons seriously with the hopelessness of the world as it stands and yet affirms 
a gospel of hope. It shares the integrity of the "absolutist" views...without their 
withdrawal from history, and the practical concern of the programmatic views... 
without placing its hope there.116  
As for the (anticipated) charge that this form of pacifism is simply another form of 
radical "messianism" conceived by a self-appointed remnant convinced that they alone 
have the message and means to save the world, Yoder responds by attempting to turn the 
tables on nonpacifists: 
After all, the invocation of violence to support any cause is implicitly a 
messianism; any national sense of mission claims implicitly to be a "saving 
community." You cannot avoid either messianism or the claim to chosen 
peoplehood by setting Jesus or His methods aside; you only cast the aura of 
election around lesser causes.117 
The final turning of tables comes in the conclusion, where Yoder once again 
observes that "academic Protestant thought in the past generation has been largely 
dominated by the social-responsibility models of the Brothers Niebuhr," with the result 
that "the post-Niebuhrian non-pacifist will see all pacifism, as he rejects it, as utopian 
purism... or as withdrawal, rather than recognize a respectable pacifist argument when 
presented in his own terms [e.g., so-called "just war pacifism"]."118 In the end, however, 
argues Yoder, all sound and honest ethical thinking must grant the superiority of pacifism 
as the most "morally responsible Christian stance." 
It could be claimed, after analysis of the entire assortment, that any ethical 
system, if taken seriously, as more than self-justification, can, and that some 
ethical systems must, lead to one kind of pacifism or another. These various 
pacifisms are sometimes compatible with one another, sometimes even mutually 
116 Thid., 127. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.,129. 
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reinforcing, sometimes directly contradictory in their assumptions. Yet they are 
no more so than the various reasons men have for participating in war. In their 
denunciation of war, however it be explained, the moral commonality of all of 
them is greater than their systematic diversity. There is no ethical system, no 
morally responsible stance a Christian can take, to which one form or another of 
the pacifist appeal cannot be addressed. There is no serious critique one can 
address to the pacifist which does not, if taken honestly... turn back with greater 
force upon the advocate of war.119  
119 Ibid.,132. 
Chapter Two 
The Pacifism of Stanley Hauerwas 
Introduction 
The question laid before John [of the book of Revelation] by his vision of 
the scroll sealed with seven seals is precisely the question of the meaningfulness 
of history. This is a question that, the vision says dramatically, cannot be 
answered by the normal resources of human insight. Yet it is by no means a 
meaningless question or one unworthy of concern. It is worth weeping, as the seer 
does, if we do not know the meaning of human life and suffering. 
Speaking more generally, let us affirm, as numerous historians of 
philosophy are arguing, that to be concerned about history, to assume that history 
is meaningful, is itself a Judeo-Christian idea. The concern to know where 
history is going is not an idle philosophical curiosity. It is a necessary expression 
of the conviction that God has worked in past history and has promised to 
continue thus to be active among men. If God is the kind of God-active-in-history 
of whom the Bible speaks, then concern for the course of history is itself not an 
illegitimate or an irrelevant concern. No mystical or existential or spiritualistic 
depreciation of preoccupation with the course of events is justified for the 
Christian. 
But the answer given to the question by the series of visions and their 
hymns is not the standard answer. "The lamb that was slain is worthy to receive 
power!" John is here saying, not as an inscrutable paradox but as a meaningful 
affirmation, that the cross and not the sword, suffering and not brute power 
determines the meaning of history. The key to the obedience of God's people is 
not their effectiveness but their patience (13:10). The triumph of the right is 
assured not by the might that comes to the aid of the right, which is of course the 
justification for the use of violence and other kinds of power in every human 
conflict; the triumph of the right, although it is assured, is assured because of the 
power of the resurrection and not because of any calculation of causes and effects, 
nor because of the inherently greater strength of the good guys. The relationship 
between the obedience of God's people and the triumph of God's cause is not a 
relationship of cause and effect but one of cross and resurrection.1  
These words of Yoder from the closing pages of his book The Politics of Jesus 
serve as the preface to Hauerwas's essay "Can a Pacifist Think about War?" and as a 
summary of Hauerwas's conviction, learned from Yoder, "that the Christian commitment 
Yoder, The Politics ofJesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 237-238. [Pi] 
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to nonviolence is not separable from the very structure of Christian theology and, even 
more, Christian practice." Yoder's words, says Hauerwas, show clearly "to what extent 
Christian nonviolence involves extraordinary claims about the nature and telos of 
history—or as I would prefer, providence."2 Yoder would undoubtedly agree with 
Keegan's observation (page 12 above) that "the written history of the world is largely a 
history of warfare." The mission of the church, however, is to help the world see what a 
hollow, false, tragic, hopeless story that is, and to bear witness to the true meaning of 
history by embodying in its life and worship "His story"—God's story, the story of God's 
peaceable kingdom in Jesus Christ. At the heart of that story is the cross, which for 
Yoder and Hauerwas "determines the meaning of history." Thus Hauerwas prefaces his 
book With the Grain of the Universe with another quotation from Yoder: 
The point that apocalyptic makes is not only that people who wear crowns and 
who claim to foster justice by the sword are not as strong as they think—true as 
that is: we still sing, "0 where are Kings and Empires now of old that went and 
came?" It is that people who bear crosses are working with the grain of the 
universe. One does not come to that belief by reducing social processes to 
mechanical and statistical models, nor by winning some of one's battles for the 
control of one's own corner of the fallen world. One comes to it by sharing the 
life of those who sing about the Resurrection of the slain Lamb.3  
"There can be no deeper reality-making claim," says Hauerwas, "than the one that Yoder 
makes [here]: those who bear crosses work with the grain of the universe." 
Christians betray themselves as well as their non-Christian brothers and sisters 
when in the name of apologetics we say and act as if the cross of Christ is 
incidental to God's being. In fact, the God we worship and the world God created 
cannot be truthfully known without the cross, which is why the knowledge of God 
and ecclesiology—or the politics called church—are interdependent.4 
2 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 118. 
3 Yoder, "Armaments and Eschatology," Studies in Christian Ethics 1, no. 1 (1988), 58. 
4 With the Grain of the Universe (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), 17. 
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We seek in this chapter to set forth the basic logic and structure of Hauerwas's 
Christological and ecclesial pacifism, but first we offer some essential background 
regarding the formative influence of Yoder and Hauerwas's larger project for reforming 
Christian ethics. 
Background: Hauerwas's "Yoderian Conversion" and His "Reformation Project" 
"John [Yoder] changed my life," says Stanley Hauerwas in a tribute written 
shortly after Yoder's death in 1998. "Reading Yoder made me a pacifist. It did so 
because John taught me that nonviolence was not just another 'moral issue' but 
constitutes the heart of our worship of a crucified messiah."5 Hauerwas describes his 
"reluctant conversion" to Yoder's pacifism in the introduction to The Peaceable 
Kingdom: 
Yoder was a pill I had no desire to swallow. His ecclesiology could not work 
apart from his understanding of Jesus and the centrality of nonviolence as the 
hallmark of the Christian life. The last thing I wanted to be was a pacifist, mainly 
because I longed to do ethics in a way that might be widely influential. Moreover 
by disposition I am not much inclined to nonviolence. But the more I read of 
Yoder the more I was convinced that the main lines of his account of Jesus and 
the correlative ethic of nonviolence were correct. I was also slowly coming to see 
that there was nothing very passive about Jesus' form of nonviolence, rather his 
discipleship not only allowed but required the Christian to be actively engaged in 
the creation of conditions for justice and peace.6 
Even in this brief paragraph the key features of Yoder's (and therefore 
Hauerwas's) pacifism are highlighted: the trinity-like centrality of ecclesiology, the 
person and work of Jesus Christ, and nonviolence itself as "the hallmark of the Christian 
life." "What Yoder made me see," writes Hauerwas, "is that the Christian commitment 
to nonviolence is not separable from the very structure of Christian theology and, even 
5 "Remembering John Howard Yoder," FT 82 (April 1998), 15. 
6 PK, xxiv. 
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more, Christian practice...nonviolence cannot be isolated or abstracted from fundamental 
theological claims."7 Also highlighted in this paragraph is the conviction shared by both 
Yoder and Hauerwas regarding the necessarily activist nature of Christian pacifism as 
nonviolent resistance. Hauerwas recollects his first reading of Yoder's most famous 
work in the ironically-titled "Why The Politics of Jesus is Not a Classic:" 
The more I read it...the more I was frightened. Here was a position I was sure 
implied withdrawal from the world, but that certainly did not seem to be what 
Yoder was about. Indeed, his Christian Witness to the State was an extraordinary 
attempt to convince Mennonites not to accept Niebuhrian characterizations of 
them as morally necessary but politically irrelevant. Yoder simply challenged all 
the neat intellectual and theological classifications with which I had been so 
carefully educated.8 
Hauerwas's pacifism must be viewed not only in the light of Yoder's theology, 
but also within the context of Hauerwas's own broader project for reforming Christian 
ethics. Dissatisfied with traditional ethical approaches focusing either on duty (Kant's 
"deontological" ethics) or on the consequences of one's actions or decisions (John Stuart 
Mill's "utilitarian" approach), Hauerwas advocates a "virtue ethics" (similar in some 
ways to that proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre) that focuses not on specific ethical 
"decisions" but on the character of the one making those decisions and the development 
of the virtues that constitute and cultivate such a character.9 In an early essay Hauerwas 
writes: 
I have tried to reclaim and develop the significance of character and virtue for the 
moral life. Character is the category that marks the fact that our lives are not 
constituted by decisions, but rather the moral quality of our lives is shaped by the 
ongoing orientation formed in and through our beliefs, stories and intentions.t°  
"Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 118. 
s In A Better Hope (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2000), 134. 
9 See Hauerwas's A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Ethic (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1981). See also Joel D. Biermann, Virtue Ethics and the Place of Character Formation 
within Lutheran Theology (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, May 2002). 
10 "The Ethicist As Theologian," The Christian Century 92 (April 1975), 411. 
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In his book A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social 
Ethic, Hauerwas spells out this "program" in more detail. Chapter one begins by 
invoking Luther and his ninety-five theses and continues by offering ten Hauerwasian 
theses for reforming Christian ethics. Key emphases in these theses include the narrative 
structure of Christian convictions, the social nature of Christian ethics, the oft-repeated 
Hauerwasian dictum that "the church does not have a social ethic, but is a social ethic," 
the caution against seeking to "control national or world history," and the need for 
cultivation of Christian practices that will instill the virtues necessary for Christians to be 
and become the kind of people they need to be to bear witness to God faithfully in and to 
the world." All of these emphases surface in significant ways also in Hauerwas's 
discussions of pacifism. 
Indeed, one of the reasons—if not the primary reason—Hauerwas wrote The 
Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics was to explain and demonstrate more 
fully and clearly how his views on pacifism are central to his entire understanding of 
theology and ethics. He writes: 
Many have viewed my pacifism with a good deal of suspicion, seeing it as just 
one of my peculiarities. Such an interpretation is not unjust, since I have not 
written in a manner that exposes its centrality. I hope this book will make it clear 
why it is so methodologically crucial as I try to show why a position on 
nonviolence entails, for example, a different understanding of the significance of 
Jesus' life, death and resurrection than that offered in other forms of Christian 
ethics. Indeed, nonviolence is not just one implication among others that can be 
drawn from our Christian beliefs; it is at the very heart of our understanding of 
God.12 
Since The Peaceable Kingdom is the closest Hauerwas comes to presenting his views on 
11 A Community of Character (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 9-12. 
12 PK, xvii. 
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pacifism in a somewhat systematic format that demonstrates its centrality and inter-
relatedness to the other major themes of his "ecclesial ethics,"13 this work will be used as 
a primary resource in setting forth the major features of his pacifist convictions. Other 
pertinent books and essays will also, of course, be utilized along the way.14 
A Particular Peace: Biblical Pacifism As a "Qualified Ethic" 
For Hauerwas, theology embraces ethics and ethics is an essential, integral 
component (or even mode) of theology itself. Indeed, to begin any theological or ethical 
inquiry "by asking what is the relation between theology and ethics is to have already 
made a mistake. Christian convictions are by nature meant to form and illumine human 
lives" (xvii). Hauerwas strongly rejects the notion, therefore, that Christian pacifism is 
merely a theory (comparable, for example, to the "just war theory") based on certain 
moral, doctrinal and/or rational "truths" or "principles" that require "application" to 
specific, ever-changing circumstances resulting in various right or wrong decisions or 
actions. The very notion of abstract, systematic, self-existing doctrinal truths or 
principles is itself very troublesome for Hauerwas: 
Because truth is unattainable without a corresponding transformation of self, 
"ethics," as the investigation of that transformation, does not follow after a prior 
systematic presentation of the Christian faith, but is at the beginning of Christian 
theological reflection. (16) 
All ethics, furthermore, is "qualified ethics" for Hauerwas. "Ethics always 
requires an adjective or qualifier—such as, Jewish, Christian, Hindu, existentialist, 
pragmatic, utilitarian, humanist, medieval, modern—in order to denote the social and 
historical character of ethics as a discipline" (1). Hauerwas rejects the search for an 
13 See PK, xvi. 
14 Page numbers referenced in the text in this chapter are from PK. 
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"absolute ethic" based on universal truths or principles accessible to all people. Such 
"foundationalist" approaches to Christian ethics, rooted primarily in Kantian 
presuppositions, are understandable but misguided and ultimately counter-productive: 
Confronted by the fragmentary character of our world, philosophers have 
undoubtedly tried to secure a high ground that can provide for security, certainty, 
and peace. It is a worthy effort, but one doomed to fail, for such ground lacks the 
ability to train our desires and direct our attention: to make us into moral people. 
(11) 
Hauerwas has no interest, therefore, in defending pacifism "in general" (as if such 
a thing exists or could exist). His interest is in "pacifism with a qualifier"—a specifically 
Christian pacifism rooted in specifically Christian convictions and practices. Like 
Yoder, Hauerwas wants to "make it clear that for Christians peace is not an ideal known 
apart from our theological convictions; rather the peace for which we hunger and thirst is 
determined and made possible only through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ" (xvii). For this reason, it is impossible for Hauerwas to view this pacifism as one 
position or opinion among many: "I do not intend to present just my 'personal views,' 
but want to argue that the position I develop should be any Christian's" (xvi). He 
presents his views on pacifism, therefore, with an evangelical zeal, seeking not just to 
explain or even defend, but also to persuade and convert others to his position. 
Hauerwas recognizes that some, if not many, will view this commitment to a 
specifically Christian pacifism as a capitulation to the ever-increasing moral 
fragmentation and confusion in today's world—a state of affairs that all those who value 
peace are seeking to remedy or at least ameliorate. 
We need instead, they say, to reformulate a universal morality that is able to bring 
order to our fragmentary world, securing peace between and in ourselves. Yet 
such universality will not come if Christians fail to take seriously their 
particularistic convictions. We Christians who...are inextricably committed to a 
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peaceable world, believe that peace is possible only as we learn to acknowledge 
and serve the Lord of this world, who has willed to be known through a very 
definite and concrete history. Therefore, Christian ethics holds to the importance 
of its qualifier, because the peace Christians embody, and which they offer to the 
world, is based on a kingdom that has become present in the life of Jesus of 
Nazareth. (7) 
Indeed, from Hauerwas's perspective the greatest danger and fatal flaw of all attempts to 
secure peace on the basis of universal morality or natural law is that they ultimately 
succumb, in one way or another and to some degree or another, to the use of coercion or 
violence that undermines the very peace they want to achieve. "When the particularity of 
Christian convictions is made secondary to an alleged more fundamental 'morality,' we 
lose the means to be a peaceable people. For the attempt to secure peace through 
founding morality on rationality itself, or some other 'inherent' human characteristic, 
ironically underwrites coercion." As Christians, says Hauerwas: 
We must maintain day in and day out that peace is not something to be achieved 
by our power. Rather peace is a gift of God that comes only by our being a 
community formed around a crucified savior—a savior who teaches us how to be 
peaceful in a world in rebellion against its true Lord. God's peaceful kingdom, 
we learn, comes not by positing a common human morality, but by our 
faithfulness as a peaceful community that fears not our differences. (12) 
A Storied Peace: The Narrative Character of Christian Pacifism 
The first two theses of Hauerwas's "Ten Theses for Reforming Christian Ethics" 
underscore the crucial role of narrative in Hauerwas's ethical scheme. Thesis one reads: 
"The social significance of the Gospel requires the recognition of the narrative structure 
of Christian convictions for the life of the church." Thesis two asserts: "Every social 
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ethic involves a narrative, whether it is concerned with the formulation of basic principles 
and/or with concrete policy alternatives."15 And yet as critical as narrative is 
as a framework for properly understanding Hauerwas's approach to ethics, it would be a 
mistake to see it as the central focus of his theology or as part and parcel of what he 
describes as another recent fad in theology. Hauerwas claims that he "honestly does not 
know" where this emphasis in his theology originated, though he notes that "my first 
interest in narrative was sparked by the realization that the early church thought that 
narrative was the appropriate mode of expression for what they took to be the 
significance of Jesus" (xxi, xxv). Hauerwas is certainly aware of the work of narrative 
theologians such as Hans Frei and Julian Hartt, though he insists that "it has never been, 
nor is it now, my intention to develop a narrative theology or a theology of narrative." 
Theology itself does not tell stories; rather it is a critical reflection on a story; or 
perhaps better, it is a tradition embodied by a living community that reaches back 
into the past, is present, and looks to the future. Hence, it is a mistake to assume 
that my emphasis on narrative is the central focus of my position—insofar as I can 
be said even to have a position. Narrative is but a concept that helps to clarify the 
interrelation between the various themes I have sought to develop to give a 
constructive account of the Christian moral life. (20)16 
One might say that for Hauerwas narrative is the preferred biblical and ecclesial 
alternative to systematics as a way of "doing theology." While systematics tends to 
"distort the ad-hoc character of theology as a discipline of the church" (xx), narrative 
allows for the challenges, struggles, freedom of movement and organic growth that 
Hauerwas sees as so critical for the theological task while also affirming the historical 
reality of the story of God's journey with his people. 
15 "Reforming Christian Social Ethics: Ten Theses," in The Hauerwas Reader [HR], ed. John Berkman and 
Michael Cartwright (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001), 111-112. 
16 See, e.g., "Story and Theology" in Truthfulness and Tragedy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1977), 71-81. 
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Obviously, the Bible plays a crucial role in helping Christians to understand the 
narrative structure of Christian ethics. Hauerwas warns repeatedly against viewing the 
Bible as a "set of rules" for determining what is "right and wrong." Rather "the Bible is 
fundamentally a story of a people's journey with their God" (24). Even those sections of 
the Bible that appear to be most "rule-oriented," such as the Ten Commandments or the 
Sermon on the Mount, must be read as part of the larger Biblical narrative—they "make 
sense only within the particularity of the story of God's dealing with Israel" (23). 
The nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian convictions 
take the form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories that constitutes a 
tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community. Christian ethics does not 
begin by emphasizing rules or principles, but by calling our attention to a 
narrative that tells of God's dealing with creation. (24-25) 
To speak of Christian ethics as "narrative" is not to call into question its reliability, 
truthfulness, or trustworthiness. In fact, 
There is no more fundamental way to talk of God than in a story. The fact that we 
come to know God through the recounting of the story of Israel and the life of 
Jesus is decisive for our truthful understanding of the kind of God we worship as 
well as the world in which we exist. Put directly, the narrative character of our 
knowledge of God, the self, and the world is a reality-making claim that the world 
and our existence in it are God's creations; our lives, and indeed, the existence of 
the universe are but contingent realities. (24) 
Other ways of talking about God, such as doctrinal formulations, creeds and (especially) 
the liturgy with its built-in quality of "re-enactment," may serve as outlines of the story or 
as tools to help us tell the story better. But it is the story itself that is crucial to our 
understanding of God, ourselves and the world. 
While the Gospels most obviously and explicitly bear this narrative form, the 
entire Bible in one way or another "tells the story of the covenant with Israel, the life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus, and the ongoing history of the church as the 
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recapitulation of that life" (29). Scripture's story continues in the church through the 
baptism, training, and transformation of believers: 
...we cannot be brought to understanding without training, for we resist at least 
the part of the narrative which describes us as sinful creatures. We can only know 
God by having our lives transformed through initiation into the kingdom. Such a 
transformation requires that we see the world as it is, not as we want it to be—that 
is, as sinful and ourselves as sinners. Thus the story requires transformation as it 
challenges the presumption of our righteousness and teaches us why we so badly 
need to be reborn through the baptism offered by this new community. (29) 
The very shape and character of this narrative teach us that "Christian ethics is concerned 
more with who we are than what we do" (33). This does not mean, of course, that "our 
actions, decisions and choices are unimportant, but rather than the church has a stake in 
holding together our being and behaving in such a manner that our doing only can be 
reflection of our character" (33). 
As we will explore in more detail, Hauerwas's radical pacifism is inextricably tied 
to this understanding of the narrative structure of Christian ethics, since he is convinced 
that the "Christian story" by its very nature reflects and requires an absolute commitment 
to nonviolence. Consider his personal testimony in "Whose 'Just' War? Which 'Peace?'" 
I am a Christian pacifist. From my perspective that is an unhappy description, 
since I believe the narrative into which Christians are inscribed means we cannot 
be anything other than nonviolent. In other words, Christians do not become 
Christians and then decide to be nonviolent. Rather, nonviolence is simply one of 
the essential practices that is intrinsic to the story of being a Christian. "Being a 
Christian" is to be incorporated into a community constituted by the stories of 
God, which, as a consequence, necessarily puts one in tension with the world that 
does not share those stories.17 
Only as we are incorporated into God's story as Christ's disciples within the community 
of believers do we come to learn what it means to be "at peace" with God and with 
others, and with that knowledge and experience comes responsibility: 
17 In Dispatches, 137. 
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As Christians we believe that peace is most perfectly realized as we learn to find 
our role in God's story. That is, the peremptory story of peace as peace, the sense 
of being at home, comes only as we learn to live true to our nature as God's 
creatures. Moreover God has charged us with the particular responsibility of 
being his representatives to attract others to that story of peace by manifesting it 
in our common life. That is why Christians feel such an urgency to witness, to 
offer the stranger hospitality, so that God's peace might be possessed by all. (44) 
A Truthful Peace: Coming to Terms with the Vice of Violence 
The primary purpose of "God's story" as related in Scripture and in the life of the 
church is not to teach us "what to do and what not to do" but to help us to see the truth 
about "how things really are." This is what Hauerwas means when he insists, again and 
again, that the Christian narrative is first and foremost "a reality-making claim."I8 And 
the first lesson we need to learn about "how things really are" is a disconcerting one: 
The story Christians tell of God exposes the unwelcome fact that I am a sinner. 
For without such a narrative the fact and nature of my sin cannot help but remain 
hidden in self-deception. Only a narrative that helps me place myself as a 
creature of a gracious God can provide the skills to help me locate my sin as 
fundamental infidelity and rebellion. As a creature I have been created for 
loyalty—loyalty to the truth, to the love that moves the sun and the stars and yet is 
found on a cross—but I find myself serving any powers but the true one in the 
hopes of being my own lord. (31) 
Instead of recognizing and accepting God's role as Creator and Lord and Giver, 
we seek to create our own "story," a false story, by means of which we seek to take 
control of our own lives and also the lives of others who would (actually or potentially) 
seek to expose our self-deception and rob us of the control we so desperately crave. 
According to Hauerwas, "our sin—our fundamental sin—is the assumption that we are 
the creators of the history through which we acquire and possess our character. Sin is the 
form our character takes as a result of our fear that we will be 'nobody' if we lose control 
18 See, e.g., PK, 29ff. 
64 
of our lives" (47). It is this fear and craving that lead to the perceived need to use 
violence: 
Our need to be in control is the basis for the violence of our lives. For since our 
"control" and "power" cannot but help but be built on an insufficient basis, we 
must use force to maintain the illusion that we are in control. We are deeply 
afraid of losing what unity of self we have achieved. Any idea or person 
threatening that unity must either be manipulated or eliminated. We fear others 
because they always stand as an implicit challenge to our deceptions. Thus it 
seems the inherent necessity of all people to have or create an enemy. (47) 
As we embrace God's gracious invitation to become a part of his kingdom and 
learn to make his story our own story, we are freed from the lie that we can be or need to 
be in control of our lives and the lives of others, and we are also freed, therefore, from the 
need to use violence to maintain control. 
This does not mean that tragedy is eliminated from our lives; rather we have the 
means to recognize and accept the tragic without turning to violence. For finally 
our freedom is learning how to exist in the world, a violent world, in peace with 
ourselves and with others. The violence of the world is but a mirror of the 
violence of our lives. We say we desire peace, but we have not the souls for it. 
We fear the boredom peace seems to imply. Even more we fear the lack of 
control a commitment to peace would entail. As a result the more we seek to 
bring "under our control," the more violent we have to become to protect what we 
have. (48-49) 
This sinful and deceptive craving for control applies not only to individuals but 
also to communities—religious groups, ethnic groups, economic "castes," and entire 
nations. It is a special temptation for the church, especially since the days of Constantine, 
when the church slipped comfortably but dangerously into the role of protector and 
preserver of a (distorted) version of "God's story" in which the church, rather than God 
(but always in the name of God), would assume the responsibility for making the world 
"safe" and "secure" and "peaceful," and would ensure that "everything would come out 
all right in the end." Thesis six of Hauerwas's "Ten Theses," therefore, asserts that 
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"Christian social ethics can only be done from the perspective of those who do not seek 
to control national or world history but who are content to live 'out of control."' He 
explains: 
To do ethics from the perspective of those "out of control" means Christians must 
find the means to make clear to both the oppressed and the oppressor that the 
cross determines the meaning of history. Christians should thus provide 
imaginative alternatives for social policy as they are released from the 
"necessities" of those that would control the world in the name of security. For to 
be out of control means Christians can risk trusting in gifts, so they have no 
reason to deny the contingent character of our existence.I9 
If seeking to control national and/or world history (in God's name and for his 
sake) is a special temptation for Christians, it is an especially dangerous temptation for 
Christians in America, not only because of the dominant influences of its Constantinian-
affirming Puritan-Reformed history, but also because the ideals and values which it 
purports to uphold in a democratic system (freedom, justice, human rights, equality, etc.) 
seem so necessary, so virtuous and so amenable to "God's agenda" for the world. 
Democracy, says Hauerwas, 
...has been a particularly subtle temptation to Christianity. Christians have never 
killed as willingly as when they have been asked to do so for "freedom." I take it, 
therefore, that one of the most important challenges facing Christians today is to 
remember that the democratic state is still a state that would ask us to qualify our 
loyalty to God in the name of some lesser loyalty.20 
According to Hauerwas, however, "the only freedom worth having" is the freedom to 
learn how to live as people who are not in control, the freedom to live in peace with 
ourselves and with one another. We learn this freedom as we sit at the feet of a very 
different kind of political leader, one who bears the title "Prince of Peace." 
19 The Hauerwas Reader, ed. John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2001) [HR], 113. 
20 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" in Dispatches, 134. Cf. PK, 12. 
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A Christ-Centered Peace: Jesus As the Presence of God's Peaceable Kingdom 
Hauerwas's pacifism is nothing if not Christ-centered. We noted earlier Yoder's 
claim that what makes "The Pacifism of the Messianic Community" unique is its 
inseparability from the unique person and work of Jesus—his teachings, passion and 
resurrection.21 It is not surprising, therefore, that Hauerwas introduces chapter five of 
The Peaceable Kingdom (titled "Jesus: The Presence of the Peaceable Kingdom") by 
emphasizing that the first half of the book has merely been "preparation" for this central 
and pivotal chapter. 
The emphasis on the qualified nature of Christian ethics, the significance of 
narrative, the historic nature of human agency, the character of our sinfulness 
have been attempts to establish a framework that can help us understand the moral 
significance of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. That such preparation was 
necessary may seem odd, for it would be natural to assume that what makes 
Christian ethics Christian is the overriding significance of Jesus. But how that 
significance is understood has varied, and the ways in which Jesus is claimed to 
be morally significant often bear little likeness to the Jesus we find portrayed in 
the Gospels. (72) 
Hauerwas is critical of traditional approaches to Christian ethics that focus on 
"Christology" as a set of doctrinal truths rather than attending to the actual story of Jesus 
as recorded in the Gospels. Only by attending to the story of Jesus—rather than to 
doctrinal truths about Jesus—do we learn what it means to be followers of Jesus and 
citizens of God's kingdom. 
Hauerwas summarizes the ethical teaching of Jesus by pointing to Matthew 5:38-
48, a portion of the Sermon on the Mount that includes Jesus' words about not resisting 
evildoers, turning the other cheek, loving one's enemies and praying for them. He 
comments: 
21 Nevertheless, 123-125. 
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We are called to be like God: perfect as God is perfect. It is a perfection that 
comes by learning to follow and be like this man whom God has sent to be our 
forerunner in the kingdom. That is why Christian ethics is not first of all an ethics 
of principles, laws, or values, but an ethic that demands that we attend to the life 
of a particular individual—Jesus of Nazareth. It is only from him that we can 
learn perfection—which is at the very least nothing less than forgiving our 
enemies. (75-76) 
"Imitating Jesus" does not, for Hauerwas, consist in asking questions like "What Would 
Jesus Do?" or seeking to duplicate his life "point by point." "We are called upon to be 
like Jesus, not to be Jesus" (76). But it does mean taking his words and actions utterly 
seriously, especially the climactic act of nonviolent submission that summarizes all that 
he came to accomplish and teach: 
It involves seeing in his cross the summary of his whole life. Thus to be like 
Jesus is to join him in the journey through which we are trained to be a people 
capable of claiming citizenship in God's kingdom of nonviolent love—a love that 
would overcome the powers of this world, not through coercion and force, but 
through the power of this one man's death. (76) 
The Old Testament—the story of God's dealings with Israel—is crucial for 
understanding the life and work of Jesus, since Jesus' activity in the Gospels is presented 
as the recapitulation of theIsrael's life. "We cannot understand what it means to learn to 
follow Jesus without understanding what it means for Israel to be on a journey with the 
Lord" (83). For Hauerwas, the crucial aspect of God's journey with Israel is that he "does 
not impose his will upon her. Rather he calls her time and time again to his way, to be 
faithful to the covenant, but always gives Israel the possibility of disobedience" (81). 
This "refusal to coerce" is seen as the key to Jesus' life as well. Quoting from Donald 
Mickie and David Rhoads' commentary on Mark, Hauerwas observes that 
Jesus confronts the authorities with the nature of God's rule and the seriousness of 
their offenses against it, but he does not impose his authority on them. After each 
confrontation, he moves on, leaving the authorities to choose their response. He 
is not a military messiah who uses a sword or manipulates the crowds to impose 
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his authority. He does not even fight to defend himself, and he endures the 
consequences of his opponent's scorn.22 (81) 
The non-coercive and non-violent nature of Christ's life and work comes to a 
climax in the cross, where we see how God "deals with the world" and where we learn 
how to become participants in the creation and extension of God's "peaceable kingdom:" 
It is thus in the cross that Christians see the climax of God's way with the world. 
In his cross we see decisively the one who, being all-powerful, becomes 
vulnerable even to being a victim of our refusal to accept his Lordship. Through 
that cross God renews his covenant with Israel; only now the covenant is with the 
"many." All are called to be his disciples through this one man's life, death and 
resurrection, for in this cross we find the very passion of God. We are therefore 
invited to drink this drink, and to be baptized with this baptism (Mark 10:39), and 
in doing so we believe that we become participants in God's very life. In short, 
we begin to know what it means to imitate God. (81) 
"Imitating God" in this way is not "an end in itself;" it is rather God's divinely-designed 
means of making present in this world his "peaceable kingdom." The message of the 
cross is that "the kingdom of God is present insofar as his life reveals the effective power 
of God to create a transformed people capable of living peaceably in a violent world" 
(83). "Living peaceably" as Christians means embracing nonviolence and rejecting the 
temptation to coercion and control: 
Through Jesus' life and teachings we see how the church came to understand that 
God's kingship and power consists not in coercion but in God's willingness to 
forgive and have mercy on us. God wills nothing less than that men and women 
should love their enemies and forgive one another; thus we will be perfect as 
God is perfect. Jesus challenged both the militaristic and ritualistic notions of 
what God's kingdom required—the former by denying the right of violence even 
if attacked, and the latter by his steadfast refusal to be separated from those 
"outside" (85; emphasis in original). 
The resurrection—as historical fact, not as symbol or myth—is crucial for Hauerwas as 
well, since it gives us the confidence to forgive our enemies and the freedom to act in the 
certainty that it is God, not me or we, who is really "in control" of human history. 
22 Donald Mickie and David Rhoads, Mark As Story (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), 109. 
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Hauerwas is sensitive to the fact that this way of understanding Jesus' life and 
work may seem strange to those familiar with more traditional theological vocabulary 
and categories, and may also strike some as dangerously moralistic or legalistic: "Has 
not the talk of peace and the necessity of our becoming peaceful members of God's 
kingdom come perilously close to turning the gospel into a moral ideal rather than the 
good news of salvation?" Quite specifically, "what are we to make of such a classical 
text as Romans 3:21-26?" (92). Although Hauerwas does not specifically cite or 
reference Yoder's work in responding to these questions, his answer is essentially the 
same as that given by Yoder in chapter 11 of The Politics of Jesus ("Justification by 
Grace Through Faith"). Like Yoder, Hauerwas expresses concern that Paul's emphasis 
on justification "has sometimes been interpreted in a manner that amounts to a denial of 
the ethical. What is important is not that we are good or bad, that we do the right or 
wrong thing, but that we have faith." It is clear from Paul's epistles, says Hauerwas, that 
faith is "fundamentally a moral response and transformation." "Faith for Paul is not 
some mystical transformation of the individual; rather it is to be initiated into a kingdom. 
Faith is not belief in certain propositions," it is rather faithfulness to a person and his 
radically new way of life. Faith is "simply fidelity to Jesus, the initiator of God's 
kingdom of peace" (92-93). 
Furthermore, the new life to which Jesus calls us "is fundamentally a social life. 
We are 'in Christ' insofar as we are part of that community pledged to be faithful to this 
life as the initiator of the kingdom of peace" (93). "Justification," therefore, "is only 
another way of talking about sanctification, since it requires our transformation by 
initiation into the new community made possible by Jesus' death and resurrection" (94). 
70 
Whether one prefers the term "justification" or "sanctification," both are meant to 
describe a journey, a process of communal discipleship by which we learn and "unlearn" 
our tendency toward violence: "Through the story of Jesus I can increasingly learn to be 
what I have become, a participant in God's community of peace and justice. Only by 
growing into that story do I learn how much violence I have stored in my soul, a violence 
which is not about to vanish overnight, but which I must continually work to recognize 
and lay down" (94). This requires skills learned from others and practiced together with 
others, which is part of the reason why "the question of the nature and form of the church 
is the center of any attempt to develop Christian ethics" (95). To this next "central" 
subject, therefore, we now turn. 
A Political and Ecclesial Peace: The Church As Social Ethic  
"The first word we as Christians have to say to the world about war is 'church.' 
In other words, we do not so much have an alternative ethic to the world's way of war—
we are the alternative."23 This statement of Hauerwas from the epilogue to Ramsey's 
book Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism both anticipates and serves as the foundation for 
our discussion in the next and final section of Hauerwas's views regarding the church's 
necessary and "peaceable" witness to the world. We begin with it here to underscore the 
point that, for Hauerwas, one simply cannot separate "what the church says or does" from 
"what the church is." As is true for Christians as individuals, the character of a 
community counts as much or more than its specific actions, positions, or decisions. 
Thus it would be a mistake to think that we could present in this section a general or 
23 Speak Up, 429. 
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theoretical discussion of Hauerwas's views on the "peaceable nature of the church," and 
then turn in the next section to a practical discussion of the church's witness to the 
world. Even if this were possible, it would inevitably involve a serious distortion of 
Hauerwas's understanding of the church, and would run directly contrary to his "famous 
and oft-repeated programmatic statement:" "the church does not have a social ethic; the 
church is a social ethic."24 
The division between these two last sections, therefore, should be seen merely as 
a division of emphasis or focus. In this section we seek to set forth in broad strokes 
Hauerwas's view of the church as a "peaceable polis," as a social and political alternative 
to the world's way of ordering and organizing itself through coercion and violence. In 
the next section we will focus specifically on questions, challenges and 
misunderstandings that often arise regarding Hauerwas's understanding of the church's 
role as "witness" in and to society and Hauerwas's responses to those questions and 
challenges. 
One of Reinhold Niebuhr's primary criticisms of most forms of pacifism in his 
day was that they stemmed from a false optimism about humankind rooted more in the 
Renaissance than in Scripture. This led, in turn, to a false optimism about human history 
itself, a false hope about the possibility of ushering in God's kingdom on earth by human 
efforts. However, says Niebuhr: 
The New Testament does not...envisage a simple triumph of good or evil in 
history. It sees human history involved in the contradictions of sin to the end. 
This is why it sees no simple resolution of the problem of history. It believes that 
the Kingdom of God will finally resolve the contradictions of history; but for it 
the Kingdom of God is no simple historical possibility. The grace of God for man 
24 Introduction to "Ten Theses" in HR, 111. 
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and the Kingdom of God for history are both divine realities and not human 
possibilities.25  
From Niebuhr's perspective, the problem of sin is even more evident and intractable on 
the social level than it is on the individual level, as the title of his classic work Moral 
Man and Immoral Society conveys. 
Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests 
other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on 
occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own. They are endowed 
by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind, the 
breadth of which may be extended by an astute social pedagogy....But all these 
achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social 
groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and check impulse, 
less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others 
and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the 
group, reveal in their personal relationships.26 
Niebuhr's work is therefore directed against those "moralists, both religious and secular," 
...who imagine that the egoism of individuals is being progressively checked by 
the development of rationality or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill and 
that nothing but the continuance of this process is necessary to establish social 
harmony between all the human societies and collectives....They do not recognize 
that when collective power, whether in the form of imperialism or class 
domination, exploits weakness, it can never be dislodged unless power is raised 
against it.27 
This regrettable need for the use of power—even violence— to maintain some degree of 
order and justice stems from a realistic assessment of man's sinful condition, especially 
as manifested in the social realm and in the political order: 
To look at human communities from the perspective of the Kingdom of God is to 
know that there is a sinful element in all the expedients which the political order 
uses to establish justice. That is why even the seemingly most stable justice 
degenerates periodically into either tyranny or anarchy. But it must also be 
recognized that it is not possible to eliminate the sinful element in the political 
expedients. They are, in the words of St. Augustine, both the consequence of, and 
the remedy for, sin. If they are the remedy for sin, the ideal of love is not merely 
25 "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," 307. 
26 Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), 
27 Ibid., xii. 
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a principle of indiscriminate criticism upon all approximations of justice. It is 
also a principle of discriminate criticism between forms of justice.28  
Both Yoder and Hauerwas commend Niebuhr for the seriousness with which he 
approaches and addresses the problem of sin, both on an individual and even (as pertains 
to the structures of the world) on a communal level. From their perspective, however, 
Niebuhr's greatest deficiency is his failure to recognize the significance and uniqueness 
of the church as a real, historical, social, political, and moral community within the world 
bearing witness, here and now, to the very presence of the Kingdom of God, the 
"peaceable kingdom." Yoder writes: 
This omission is highly significant for understanding what is wrong with 
Niebuhr's social ethics. For the body of Christ differs from other social bodies in 
that it is not less moral than its individual members. If being a perfectly loyal 
American, a freemason, or a bourgeois, identifies a man with that group egoism in 
such a way as to make him less loving than he would be as an individual, the 
contrary is true of being a member of Christ. Thus the thesis of Moral Man and 
Immoral Society falls down in the crucial case, the only one which is really 
decisive for Christian ethics.29 
This is critical also for the Christian's view of history as a whole, since "in the Bible, the 
bearer of the meaning of history is not the United States of America, nor Western 
Christendom, but a divine-human society, the church, the body of Christ." 30 
The reason Niebuhr sees Jesus' ethic of love as an "impossible possibility," says 
Hauerwas, is that (unlike Yoder) he separates Jesus' radical ethic from the radically 
unique community that gives historical expression to that ethic. "Yoder does not need to 
follow Niebuhr's withdrawal from Jesus, because, unlike Niebuhr, he does not separate 
28 
 "Why the Christian Church Is Not Pacifist," 308. 
29 Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism, 21. 
3° Ibid., 20-21. 
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Jesus from the church. For Yoder, contrary to Niebuhr, a society exists that is more 
moral than the individual." It is this very society, the church, that makes a radical 
commitment to nonviolence both necessary and a practical possibility: 
When we speak of the pacifism of the messianic community, we move the focus 
of ethical concern from the individual asking himself about right and wrong in his 
concern from his own integrity, to the human community experiencing in its life a 
foretaste of God's kingdom. The pacifistic experience is communal in that it is 
not a life alone for heroic personalities but for a society. It is communal in that it 
is lived by a brotherhood of men and woman who instruct one another, forgive 
one another, bear one another's burdens, reinforce one another's witness.31  
As Hauerwas makes clear in his exposition of the church as "The Servant 
Community" (chapter six in The Peaceable Kingdom), the story of Scripture plays a 
crucial and fundamental role in the peaceable life and witness of the church. On the one 
hand, says Hauerwas, "the Bible without the community, without expounders, and 
interpreters, and hearers, is a dead book." On the other hand, "Scripture has authority in 
the church" and "stands over the community exerting a critical function....Scripture is the 
means the church uses to constantly test its memory," to remember, re-tell, and re-live the 
story of Israel, Christ and the community of believers (98). Hauerwas anticipates and 
appreciates the frustration of those who were hoping to find in this chapter—subtitled 
"Christian Social Ethics"—specific "answers for" or "positions on" on troubling social 
and political problems. 
This chapter is supposed to be about Christians' social responsibility in the world, 
but it does not seem we have been addressing that. What does this emphasis on 
the church tell us about what we should be doing in third-world countries? Or 
what we ought to be doing in this country to ensure social justice? What should 
the Christian's stance be about the women's liberation movement? What should 
be our response to war? These are the kinds of questions that are most often 
thought to comprise social ethics, not questions about the place of Scripture in the 
church's life. (99) 
31 The Original Revolution (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1971), 121. 
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From Hauerwas's perspective, however, these are precisely the wrong questions to ask, 
since they invariably lead to attempts, based on "natural law" reasoning and strategizing, 
to do the very things that the church is not called to do (i.e., "control history" and "police 
society"), and in so doing to use or condone coercive means that the church of Jesus 
Christ must not use or condone. 
I am in fact challenging the very idea that Christian social ethics is primarily an 
attempt to make the world more peaceable or just. Put starkly, the first social 
ethical task of the church is to be the church—the servant community. Such a 
claim may sound self-serving until we remember that what makes the church the 
church is its faithful manifestation of the peaceable kingdom in the world. As 
such the church does not have a social ethic; the church is a social ethic. (99) 
The church's primary responsibility to the world is not to change the world but to 
help the world see itself for what it really is. By being the kind of community God has 
called it to be—a community that cares for the weak and helpless, forgives offenders and 
enemies, and refuses to use or condone violence of any kind—"the church helps the 
world understand what it means to be the world." 
How could the world ever recognize the arbitrariness of the divisions between 
people if it did not have a contrasting model in the unity of the church? Only 
against the church's universality can the world have the means to recognize the 
irrationality of the divisions resulting in violence and war, as one arbitrary unit of 
people seek to protect themselves against the knowledge of their arbitrariness. 
(100) 
Thus the scandal of the church's disunity is a most painful one for Hauerwas—
particularly disunity that reflects the sinful divisions of the very world to which it is 
called to witness, divisions based on such things as race, class and nationality. Therefore, 
Hauerwas repeatedly hammers home the point that: 
...the first social task of the church—the people capable of remembering and 
telling the story of God we find in Jesus—is to be the church and thus help the 
world understand itself as world. That world, to be sure, is God's world, God's 
good creation, which is all the more distorted by sin because it is still bounded by 
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God's goodness. For the church to be the church, therefore, is not anti-world, but 
rather an attempt to show what the world is meant to be as God's good creation. 
(100) 
Because God's work and presence are not limited to the church (the church does not 
"possess" God), we should not be surprised to find that, at times, "people who are not 
Christians manifest God's peace better than we ourselves." In fact, 
It is to be hoped that such people may provide the conditions for our ability to 
cooperate with others for securing justice in the world. Such cooperation, 
however, is not based on "natural law" legitimization of a generally shared 
"natural morality." Rather it is a testimony to the fact that God's kingdom is wide 
indeed. As the church we have no right to determine the boundaries of God's 
kingdom, for it is our happy task to acknowledge God's power to make his 
kingdom present in the most surprising places and ways. (101) 
In view of Hauerwas' convictions about the crucial role played by the church in 
helping the world to see itself truthfully, he is particularly sensitive about the charge that 
his church-centered ethic is in any way "sectarian" or "utopian:" 
...calling for the church to be the church is not a formula for a withdrawal ethic; 
nor is it a self-righteous attempt to flee from the world's problems; rather it is a 
call for the church to be a community which tries to develop the resources to 
stand within the world witnessing to the peaceable kingdom and thus rightly 
understanding the world. The gospel is a political gospel. Christians are engaged 
in politics, but it is a politics of the kingdom that reveals the insufficiency of all 
politics based on coercion and falsehood and finds the true source of power in 
servanthood rather than dominion. (102) 
Thus, faith, hope, and love—and perhaps above all, patience—are the cardinal virtues 
needed by the church as it pursues its task of making God's peaceable kingdom visible to 
the world. 
The church must learn time and time again that its task is not to make the world 
the kingdom, but to be faithful to the kingdom by showing to the world what it 
means to be a community of peace. Thus we are required to be patient and never 
lose hope...hope in the God who has promised that our faithfulness to the 
kingdom will be of use in God's care for the world. Thus our hope is not in this 
world, or in humankind's goodness, or in some sense that everything always 
works out for the best, but in God and God's faithful caring for the world. (104) 
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This is what Hauerwas means by "living out of control"—refusing to resort to 
strategies for solving the world's problems through means (coercion, violence, war) that 
contradict the nature of God's kingdom, and choosing instead to trust that "God will use 
our faithfulness to make his kingdom a reality in the world" (105). This does not mean 
that there is no place for planning and "strategizing" to promote causes like justice and 
peace, but Christians must resist and reject any strategizing that involves "the self-
deception that justice can be achieved through a power and a violence that seeks to assure 
its efficacy" (105). In short, "to live out of control means that we do not assume that our 
task as Christians is to make history come out right." "The task of the Christian people is 
not to seek to control history, but to be faithful to the mode of life of the peaceable 
kingdom" (106). 
Although Christians can never participate in violence, they are called to resist 
those who are violent or who support the use of violence. Hauerwas therefore 
categorically rejects Niebuhr's assertion that there is no essential difference between 
violent and nonviolent resistance, and that true biblical pacifism involves absolute 
nonresistance: "Those who are violent, who are also our neighbors, must be resisted, but 
resisted on our own terms, because not to resist is to abandon them to sin and injustice." 
Such resistance may appear to the world as foolish and ineffective for it may 
involve something so small as refusing to pay a telephone tax to support a war, 
but that does not mean that it is not resistance. Such resistance at least makes it 
clear that Christian social witness can never take place in a manner that excludes 
the possibility of miracles. (106) 
The book Resident Aliens, co-authored by Hauerwas and William Willimon in 
1989, was a popular attempt to expose the "Constantinian" mindset of the mainline 
church in America and present Hauerwas's and Willimon's vision for restoring the 
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church to its true and original character and mission. In 1996 Hauerwas and Willimon 
prepared a sequel to Resident Aliens titled Where Resident Aliens Live: Exercises for 
Christian Practice. They explain the purpose of the book: 
This book signifies our response to those who wondered, "Where is this church of 
which you speak?" The heart of the present book is found in the examples we 
use. These examples are meant to serve as reminders that the church has not been 
forsaken by God. The church is still visible, if we take the trouble to look for it in 
the right places. We still have practices in place, in your church and ours, which 
can be resources for faithful renewal. But it is crucial that they be understood as 
practices and not simply "beliefs." Finally, it is a matter of truth, and the truth is 
that the gospel is known only through practices such as preaching, baptism, 
eucharist—in short, worship.32  
In The Peaceable Kingdom, these practices are described as "The 'Marks' of the 
Church." They make the church visible: "There is no ideal church, no invisible church, 
no mystically existing universal church more real than the concrete church with parking 
lots and potluck dinners" (107). While these threefold marks do not "guarantee the 
existence of the church," they are "the means that God has given us to help us along the 
way:" 
The church is known where the sacraments are celebrated, the word is preached, 
and upright lives are encouraged and lived. Certainly some churches emphasize 
one of these "marks" more than others, but that does not mean that they are 
deficient in some decisive mariner. What is important is not that each particular 
body of Christians does all of these things, but that these "marks" are exhibited by 
all Christians everywhere. (107) 
Baptism initiates believers into God's story and Christ's peaceable kingdom. The 
eucharist "is the eschatological meal of God's continuing presence that makes possible a 
peaceable people"(108). These sacraments, for Hauerwas, are not "motives or causes for 
effective social work on the part of Christian people;" rather, "these liturgies are our 
effective social work. For if the church is rather than has a social ethic, these actions are 
32 Where Resident Aliens Live (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996), 18. 
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our most important social witness. It is in baptism and eucharist that we see most clearly 
the marks of God's kingdom in the world," the real and possible possibility of people 
living together peaceably. The preaching and teaching of God's Word is just as essential, 
since these are the means by which we "extend hospitality to God's kingdom by inviting 
the stranger to share our story," and to share with us his story. "Without the constant 
challenge of the stranger—who often, interestingly enough, is but one side of ourselves—
we are tempted to lose the power of Jesus' story because we have so conventionalized it" 
(109). 
None of these marks, however, would suffice "if the church was not also called to 
be a holy people—that is, a people who are capable of maintaining the life of charity, 
hospitality and justice"(109). Nonviolence is frequently identified by Hauerwas as the 
central and fundamental practice and virtue of the church in its striving to emulate the 
holiness of Jesus: "Jesus makes nonviolent resistance not only a possibility but a reality 
for those who are called to be his disciples. We are called to follow him to the cross."33  
Christian pacifism, therefore, is not merely a political or even theological "position," but 
"it denotes a set of convictions and corresponding practices of a particular kind of 
people."34 Ultimately, the church is known by the character of those who constitute it, 
"and if we lack that character, the world rightly draws the conclusion that the God we 
worship is in fact a false God" (109). For Hauerwas, therefore, the church's commitment 
to nonviolence is tantamount to its worship of and confession of the one true God before 
the world. God is a God of peace; and when the church actively supports or passively 
condones any use of violence, it bears witness to a false god and betrays its worship of a 
33 "Can A Pacifist Think About War?" 119. 
34 Ibid., 120. 
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false god—most often and most likely, the false god of the state with its uncompromising 
demands for loyalty and its illusory promises of freedom, safety and security. 
A Disturbing Peace: The Activist Pacifism of the Church As Polis 
The first thing that needs to be said (or reaffirmed) about Hauerwas's view of the 
church's pacifist witness in and to society is that he rejects any notion that the pacifist 
ethic he espouses is a "withdrawal" ethic, a quietist or "passivist" pacifism. Not only 
does Hauerwas repeatedly and passionately deny that this is his position, he continually 
resists and rejects what he sees as persistent attempts by others to make this his position. 
Nothing is as maddening to Hauerwas as the charge—based primarily, from his 
perspective, on some version of the Niebuhrian compliment discussed earlier—that a 
consistent Christian pacifism is necessarily equivalent to "sectarianism" or "tribalism" or 
"ghettoism" or any number of other "isms" used by those who disagree with his position 
to dismiss it as socially and politically irrelevant and irresponsible. In Resident Aliens, it 
is H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture (rather than Reinhold Niebuhr's collection of 
anti-pacifist writings) that gets the brunt of Hauerwas's attack: 
It was Niebuhr who taught us to be suspicious of this kind of talk as "sectarian." 
The church should be willing to suppress its peculiarities in order to participate 
responsibly in the culture. One again, this is the same culture that gave us 
Hiroshima. Ours sounds like an unduly harsh judgment on the thought of a great 
Christian like Niebuhr—a man who would have abhorred the violence of 
Hiroshima, a man who tried to fmd in his theology a place to affirm the unique 
witness of the church. Yet the problem remains with the structure of his 
categories—the temptation to believe that Christians are in an all-or-nothing 
relationship to the culture—that we must responsibly choose to be "all," or 
irresponsibly choose to be sectarian nothing. i5  
Hauerwas's response to this charge is worth quoting at length: 
35 Resident Aliens (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989) [RA], 41. 
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When the church confronts the world with a political alternative the world would 
not otherwise know, is this being "sectarian"? The early Anabaptists had no 
desire to withdraw from the world, nor do we. They were murdered by Calvinist, 
Lutheran and Roman Catholic societies because they attempted to be the church. 
Their withdrawal came in an attempt to prevent people opposed to them (most of 
whom also call themselves Christian), from killing their children. The 
Anabaptists did not withdraw. They were driven out. 
The worst that the Constantinian church can say, in its last gasp for life in a post-
Constantinian situation, is that what we are calling for here is something that 
sounds suspiciously "tribal." If we are going to live in a world of the bomb, say 
the Constantinians, we Christians must be willing to suppress our peculiarities, 
join hands with whoever will join hands with us, and work for peace and justice. 
Under this argument, to the extent that Christians (or Jews, or Muslims) refuse to 
take the modern state more seriously than they take the peculiarities as Christians 
(or Jews, or Muslims), they are accused of being "tribal," hindrances to the 
creation of a new world order based on international cooperation.... 
We reject the charge of tribalism, particularly from those whose theologies serve 
to buttress the most nefarious brand of tribalism of all—the omnipotent state. The 
church is the one political entity in our culture that is global, transnational, 
transcultural. Tribalism is not the church determined to serve God rather than 
Caesar. Tribalism is the United States of America, which sets up artificial 
boundaries and defends them with murderous intensity. And the tribalism of 
nations occurs most viciously in the absence of a church able to say and to show, 
in its life together, that God, not nations, rules the world. 
We must never forget that it was modern, liberal democracy, in fighting to 
preserve itself, that resorted to the bomb in Hiroshima and the firebombing of 
Dresden, not to mention Vietnam. This is the political system that must be 
preserved in order for Christians to be politically responsible?36 
It seems natural and fair to ask at this point (whether one is a Lutheran or not!), 
"But what does this mean?" What does this mean in practical terms for the church's 
witness to society? Does it mean, for example, that Christians can never, under any 
circumstances, condone the use of coercion or violence in defense of national security or 
in the interest of national or international political values like justice, freedom, peace or 
human rights? What are the practical implications of this position for a biblical 
36 Ibid., 33. 
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understanding of Christian citizenship? Is it possible for the church to support and 
espouse patriotism of any kind? In what sorts of activities in the secular and political 
realm can Christians be involved without compromising their witness for Christ and the 
church? 
Hauerwas's standard answer to such questions is, once again, that they are 
precisely the wrong questions. They are not the kinds of questions Christians properly 
formed by God's story in the Scriptures and rightly schooled in God's peaceable 
community, the church, will be asking. Christians who ask such questions simply expose 
themselves, more often than not, as those who have been formed more by the world's 
story than by God's story and by the Constantinian church's assumption that "what really 
counts" in the world of Christian ethics is "How am Ito decide what I must do?" In the 
realm of traditional "church and society" ethics this question becomes, "How am Ito 
decide what I must do to make the world a better place to live?" In the foreword to The 
Peaceable Kingdom, David Burrell anticipates such questions at the outset and 
summarizes Hauerwas's enigmatic "answer:" 
Who will help me decide what to do? And if ethicists are too busy building 
coherent systems to do so, at least Christian ethicists will respect our need for 
"concrete guidance in making and justifying a decision." Yet Stanley Hauerwas 
eschews such a responsibility from the outset. Or does he? Is it rather that the 
one who puts me through rigorous paces, helping me to think out my life as a 
Christian in our fragmented and violent world—that such a one is training me, as 
well as anyone can, to take the small steps which will culminate in large 
decisions? And if that's not the way it works, it won't work at all, for decisions 
are not so much the sorts of things we do (or make) as they are more nearly made 
for us, yet in the end they make us by shaping our subsequent lives. 
So Hauerwas has long challenged our propensity to link ethics with "difficult 
decisions." Instead, he reminds us, what we can do is to help create a context 
more conducive to our deciding one way or another. Church promises to be that 
context: the social institution seeking to embody a specific configuration of 
virtues in its members. Christian ethicists can say what that configuration ought 
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to look like and why. So their arguments will direct us to the sort of lives to 
which we would aspire, and the work that ought characteristically be ours. In this 
roundabout yet organic way, then, these ethicists will most certainly have helped 
us decide what to do—with our lives. Such is the art of Hauerwas's extended 
argument. (ix) 
From Hauerwas's perspective, attempting to give "specific answers" to "specific 
questions" can actually become (and often is) subversive to the true cause of Christian 
ethics. It too often and easily shortcuts in an unhealthy way the organic process of 
thinking through one's life and being formed and shaped in that life by God's story in the 
context of the church. "Again, it is not rules so much as practices which will guide us 
here: practices embodied in a community and justified through the continuing efforts of 
such a group to live up to its convictions" (x). Nor is the world generally helped by 
ecclesial attempts to explain to it "what it must do" in this or that situation, or to persuade 
or coerce it to adopt specific "actions" or "decisions." "The primary task of those who 
would make Jesus' story theirs is to stand within that world—their world—witnessing to 
a peaceable Kingdom which reflects the right understanding of that very world" (x). 
"It may be objected," says Hauerwas, "that all this still remains very abstract." 
Even if it is true that the church itself is a social ethic, surely it must also have a 
social ethic that reaches out in strategic terms in the societies in which it finds 
itself That is most certainly the case, but a social ethic in this latter sense cannot 
be done in the abstract. For there is no universal social strategy of the church that 
applies equally to diverse social circumstances. Indeed, different circumstances 
and social contexts bring different needs and strategies. (111) 
Hauerwas warns constantly against so-called "Christian theories of government" that 
simplistically view one form of government as inherently superior to another on biblical 
grounds, with the presumption that—therefore—Christians have a God-given duty to 
promote, defend and support this particular "God-pleasing" form of government. 
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The contemporary church has too often assumed that we must naturally favor 
"democratic" societies because such societies have institutionalized the freedom 
of religion through legal recognition of the freedom of conscience. As Christians 
we should be particularly sensitive to the misleading assumption that democracies 
are intrinsically more just because they provide more freedom than other kinds of 
societies. (111) 
If his program for reforming Christian ethics seems abstract, says Hauerwas, it is not 
nearly as abstract as political ideals such as freedom and justice, which are used—
especially in democratic societies—to mask endless self-serving attempts to coerce 
people and control resources, and are used at the same time as a "rallying cry" for 
Christian loyalty to an "ideal" form of government. 
Once "justice" is made a criterion of Christian social strategy, it can too easily 
take on a meaning and life of its own that is not informed by the Christian's 
fundamental convictions. It can, for example, be used to justify the Christian's 
resort to violence to secure a more "relative justice." But then we must ask if this 
is in fact the justice we are to seek as Christians. (112-113) 
Once again, the issue of violence surfaces here as a, if not the, central concern of 
Hauerwas's attempt to provide an "alternative ethic" for the church—or, better, to present 
the church as "alternative ethic" to the world. "When freedom and equality are made 
ideal abstractions," observes Hauerwas, "they become the justification for violence, since 
if these values are absent or insufficiently institutionalized some conclude they must be 
forced into existence." 
As [Enda] McDonagh points out, "most political orders are established by 
violence and certainly use violence to maintain themselves." This is not without 
ethical justification, since, as McDonagh suggests, the state's hegemony of 
violence is at least in principle rooted in the just war rationale. The state uses 
violence to restrain those who have no respect for the lives and rights of other 
people in that society. Thus it seems the state can claim to use violence as the 
necessary means to preserve freedom and justice. And by further inference of this 
reasoning, when freedom and justice are missing the Christian can resort to 
violence so that they may be achieved. (114) 
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Hauerwas admits that this position must be taken seriously and he acknowledges 
the compelling nature of its logic. At the very least, he says, this position "certainly 
makes it clear that the question of violence is the central issue for any Christian social 
ethic." 
Can Christians ever be justified in resorting to arms to do "some good?" Are 
Christians not unjust if they allow another person to be injured or killed if they 
might prevent that by the use of violence? Indeed should not Christians call on 
the power of the state to employ its coercive force to secure more relative forms 
of justice? Such action would not be a question of using violence to be "in 
control," but simply to prevent a worse evil. (114) 
Hauerwas claims to have "sympathy" with this perspective and admits that "it certainly 
cannot be discounted as a possibility for Christians." And yet, he says: 
...the problem with these attempts to commit the Christian to limited use of 
violence is that they too often distort the character of our alternatives. Violence 
used in the name of justice, or freedom, or equality is seldom simply a matter of 
justice—it is a matter of the power of some over others. Moreover, when 
violence is justified in principle as a necessary strategy for securing justice, it 
stills the imaginative search for nonviolent ways of resistance to injustice. For 
true justice never comes through violence, nor can it be based on violence. It can 
only be based on truth, which has no need to resort to violence to secure its own 
existence. Such a justice comes at best fitfully to nation states, for by nature we 
are people who fear disorder and violence and thus we prefer order (even if the 
order is built on the lies inspired by our hates, fears, and resentments) to truth. 
The Church, therefore, as a community based on God's kingdom of truth cannot 
help but make all rulers tremble, especially when those rulers have become "the 
people." (114-115) 
It is clear that Hauerwas wants to remain in dialogue with Christian just-war 
thinkers: "just because Christians are committed to the practice of nonviolence does not 
mean that the conversation is at an end.... Nonviolent and just war Christians alike, as 
well as those committed to subjecting violence to some moral reflection, cannot avoid 
providing some account of what peace, as well as war, might look like."37 
37 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 123. 
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Many use the radical nature of [my] stance to disqualify the pacifist from political 
involvement. We are dismissed as hopelessly naive or idealistic. Such would be 
the case if pacifism were a theory about society and/or state power. But as I have 
tried to make clear, it is not a theory but rather the form of life incumbent on those 
who would worship Jesus as the Son of God. Given that stance, I can see no 
reason why Christians cannot try to serve in the many activities in societies and 
states that do not involve violence.38  
Hauerwas can even say that he does not see that there is such a "deep difference between 
adherence to just war and pacifism." 
After all, just war theory surely requires its adherents to contemplate the 
possibility that they will find themselves in deep tension with the warmaking 
policies of their governments. The criteria that war be declared by "legitimate 
authority" does not in itself entail any account of what constitutes legitimacy.... 
I suspect that those who employ just war thinking as Christians are able to do so 
with integrity exactly to the extent that they assume a position of resistance to the 
state not unlike that of their pacifist sister and brother. i9  
His main concern is that adherents to the just war tradition be completely honest 
and consistent in the use and application of just war principles. One may get the 
impression, however, that for Hauerwas "complete honesty" would necessarily involve 
an admission of the glaring systemic deficiencies and the inherent inconsistencies within 
the just war theory itself, thus compelling any truly honest just war thinker to embrace a 
pacifist outlook. This suspicion seems especially justifiable in view of Hauerwas's 
presupposition that not only pacifism but also "any account of just war in the Christian 
tradition owes its intelligibility to the presumption of the practice of Christian 
nonviolence in the church."4° One is reminded here of Yoder's comment that Reinhold 
Niebuhr himself would certainly have embraced Christian pacifism 
...if it were not for his un-Biblical assumption of responsibility for policing 
society and for preserving Western civilization. This way in which a 
presupposition as to what is to be defended leads him pragmatically to militarist 
38 Ibid., 134. 
39 Mid. 
4° Ibid., 122. 
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conclusions is a further reminder, valid for Niebuhr as well as for ourselves, that 
militarists and pacifists alike share the risk of identifying the kingdom of God 
with a particular social order, a particular strategy, or a particular peace.41  
At this point, questions arise about Hauerwas's (Yoder-based) understanding of 
the just war tradition itself and its alleged "pacifist presuppositions;" this will require 
further attention later on. It should be noted, however, that Hauerwas often saves his 
harshest criticism for fellow pacifists who ground their position in pragmatic, 
"preservationist" hopes and strategies: 
Christians, we have been told recently, should work for peace. But what good is a 
peace movement that works for peace for the same idolatrous reasons we build 
bombs—namely, the anxious self-interested protection of our world as it is? 
Christians are free to work for peace in a nonviolent, hopeful way because we 
already know something about the end. We do not argue that the bomb is the 
worst thing humanity can do to itself. We have already done the worst thing we 
could do when we hung God's Son on a cross. We do not argue that we must do 
something about the bomb or else we shall obliterate our civilization, because 
God has already obliterated our civilization in the life, teaching, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus. We do not argue against the bomb under the supposition 
that our millions we now spend for bombs will then be spent on food for the 
hungry. Apparently, peace sustained by the necessarily larger, non-nuclear 
armies will be more expensive than nuclear peace is now. The world of nations 
has no means of being at peace other than means that are always violent, or at 
least potentially violent. Nor do we argue for peace because, if we do not get 
peace, we have no hope. Our hope is based not on Caesar's missiles or Caesar's 
treaties, but on the name of the Lord who made heaven and earth. People often 
work for peace out of the same anxieties and perverted views of reality that lead 
people to build bombs.42 
In view of our discussion in this section, it is not difficult to understand Joseph 
Allen's comment that "the relation of Hauerwas's witnessing argument to the pragmatic 
argument is not fully clear."43 No one familiar with Hauerwas's work could possibly 
describe him as a (professing) "pragmatic pacifist"—he strongly criticizes pacifist efforts 
41 Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Pacm, 23. 
42 RA, 89-90. 
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that are based on actual or hoped-for "results" or "effectiveness." There is an 
unmistakable eschatological character to Hauerwas's pacifism: a consistent emphasis on 
trust in the power and mercy of God "that sustains the vast depths of the universe" to 
bring about, in God's own way and time, the fullness of his "peaceable kingdom." The 
church does what it does, therefore, "not because it is effective, but simply because it is 
true" (151). At the same time, the faithful church has no choice but to do what God has 
called it to do, and the witness it is called to give is by no means a silent, passive or 
nonresistant witness. In fact, "the peace Christians desire, pray for, and receive cannot 
help but create instability in a world based on the assumption that violence is our ultimate 
weapon against disorder. Such a peace may often appear 'to do nothing' exactly because 
it so radically challenges the presuppositions of our social order" (144). The church's 
task, in a word, is to worship the true God who controls all of history. In so doing it 
challenges and exposes all the false gods of the world—and of the church—who seek to 
assume such control for themselves. 
Yoderian-Hauerwasian Christological and Ecclesial Presuppositions 
 
The overview provided above makes it clear that Hauerwas's pacifism is rooted in 
specifically theological convictions and concerns. As the very title of this dissertation 
indicates, however, it is not sufficient to describe Hauerwas' pacifism merely as 
theological in nature and orientation. Rather, the pacifism of Stanley Hauerwas is a 
"Christological and ecclesial pacifism"—it is rooted in particular Christological and 
ecclesial presuppositions. Indeed, from the perspective of Hauerwas and Yoder, this is 
what makes the "pacifism of the Messianic community" unique. As Yoder puts it, "this 
is the only position for which the person of Jesus Christ is indispensable. It is the only 
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one of these positions [of the twenty-five types of "religious pacifism" summarized in his 
book Nevertheless] which would lose its substance if Jesus were not Christ and its 
foundation if Jesus Christ were not Lord."44 In the final section of this chapter, 
therefore, we seek to identify more explicitly and systematically the specific 
Christological and ecclesial presuppositions underlying Hauerwas's pacifism. 
As we have discussed, Hauerwas (by his own admission and grateful testimony) 
was converted to pacifism by Yoder's work—particularly by his provocative yet 
compelling account of the revolutionary work of Christ and the radical, non-conformist 
nature and calling of Christ's church. "No one has helped us see better than Yoder," says 
Hauerwas, "why questions of the truthfulness of Christian convictions are inseparable 
from the witness that the church is, as well as why that witness must be nonviolent."45  
Nowhere in Yoder's writings are his Christological and ecclesial assumptions spelled out 
so clearly and confessionally as in his foundational theological work The Politics of 
Jesus, to which Hauerwas frequently refers and which he repeatedly cites in his own 
writings on war and peace. The following summary of "Yoderian-Hauerwasian 
Christological and Ecclesial Presuppositions" draws rather extensively, therefore, on this 
formative work of Yoder's, while Hauerwas's commitment to these presuppositions is 
documented and demonstrated primarily (once again) on the basis of his most systematic 
pacifist work, The Peaceable Kingdom. These presuppositions are summarized below 
under five headings: the meaning and purpose of Christ's life, suffering and death on the 
cross; the significance of Christ's cross for Christian faith and life; the relationship 
" Nevertheless, 125. 
45 Grain, 219. 
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between Christology and ecclesiology; the mission of the church in and to the world; and 
Christ's cross and resurrection as the meaning of history (Christology and eschatology). 
The Meaning and Purpose of Christ's Life, Suffering, and Death on the Cross 
Although Yoder and Hauerwas unambiguously affirm both the divinity and 
humanity of Christ, they frequently raise questions about the value of (past and present) 
doctrinal debates and formulations that focus on the ontological nature of Christ's 
divinity and its relationship to his humanity. They also emphasize that they are not 
primarily concerned with what they regard as abstract, theoretical, systematic 
explanations of the work of Christ as "Savior" and "Redeemer" (e.g., atonement 
theories), which tend to form the bulk of traditional Christian teaching under the locus of 
"Christology." Unfortunately, says Hauerwas, 
Christian ethics has tended to make "Christology" rather than Jesus its starting 
point. His relevance is seen as resting in more substantive claims about the 
incarnation. Christian ethics then often begins with some broadly drawn 
theological claims about the significance of God becoming man, but the life of the 
man who God made his representative is ignored or used selectively....Or even 
Jesus' death and resurrection are secondary to claims concerning Jesus as very 
God and very man—for it is God taking on himself our nature that saves, rather 
than the life of this man Jesus.46 
For Yoder and Hauerwas, a proper approach to Christology means giving primary 
attention to the actual, historical story of Christ and his life and death as it is conveyed in 
Scripture (especially in the Gospels), and coming to terms with the significance of that 
story for our lives and for the life of the church. The Christology of the early church, 
says Hauerwas, 
...did not consist first in claims about Jesus' ontological status, though such 
claims were made; their Christology was not limited to assessing the significance 
of Jesus' death and resurrection, though certainly these were attributed great 
46 PK, 72. 
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significance; rather their "Christology," if it can be called that, showed the story 
of Jesus as absolutely essential for depicting the kind of kingdom they now 
thought possible through his life, death, and resurrection.47  
No account of the work of Christ, of course, makes sense apart from a specific 
understanding and explanation of the purpose of Christ's coming—the fundamental 
"problem" of human existence that Christ came to earth to resolve or address. In other 
words, implicit in every Christology is a particular understanding of "sin" or the "fall." 
In the writings of Yoder and Hauerwas, sin is not viewed primarily (as is the case with 
most traditional Christologies, including Lutheran Christology) as separation or 
alienation from God, the failure to keep God's law, or the inability to have true fear of 
God or faith in God's grace and goodness.48 Rather, "the lostness of man consists of his 
subjection to the rebellious powers of a fallen world"49 which claim a sovereignty and 
authority that they do not possess, and which exercise control over human beings by 
falsely convincing them of their need to "be in control" through complicity in violence 
and coercion with the fallen structures of God's (originally good) creation.5° Says 
Hauerwas: 
Our sin—our fundamental sin—is the assumption that we are the creators of the 
history through which we acquire and possess our character. Sin is the form our 
character takes as a result of our fear that we will be 'nobody' if we lose control 
of our lives. Moreover, our need to be in control is the basis for the violence of 
our lives.51  
The primary, central and essential reason for Christ's coming, therefore, was not 
to "propitiate God's wrath against sinners" by his "sacrificial death on the cross," but to 
47 Ibid., 73-74. 
48 Cf., e.g., AC II. 
49 PJ, 147. 
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51 PK, 47. 
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confront the tragic results of sin as manifested in the rebellious "powers" and the control 
they exercise over us and among us in and through the fallen structures of this world. 
"Victory over the powers constitutes the work of Christ."52 Christ's cross is a victory in 
the sense that it "is the confirmation that he was free from the rebellious pretensions of 
the creaturely condition." His work is unique: "Here we have to do for the first time with 
a man who is not the slave of any power, of any law or custom, community or institution, 
value or theory. Not even to save his own life will he let himself be made a slave of these 
Powers."53  
Jesus broke the power of the powers by confronting and rejecting the ultimate 
temptation: the temptation of the crusade, the arrogant, faithless use of power, coercion 
and violence to defend, promote, maintain or establish the "kingdom of God." 
Nonviolence and non-resistance, therefore, are at the very heart of the meaning and 
significance of the work of Christ on the cross. In his death, Christ was not concerned to 
meet the demands of some "doctrine of atonement," but to show that "God's will for 
God's man in this world is that he should renounce legitimate defense."54 
It is thus in the cross that Christians see the climax of God's way with the world. 
In his cross we see decisively the one who, being all-powerful, becomes 
vulnerable even to being a victim of our refusal to accept his Lordship. Through 
that cross God renews his covenant with Israel; only now the covenant is with the 
"many." All are called to be his disciples through this one man's life, death and 
resurrection, for in this cross we find the very passion of God. We are therefore 
invited to drink this drink, and to be baptized with this baptism (Mark 10:39), and 
in doing so we believe that we become participants in God's very life. In short, 
we begin to know what it means to imitate God.55  
52 PJ, 150. 
53 Ibid., 148. 
54 Ibid., 100. 
55 PK, 81. 
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The Significance of Christ's Cross for Christian Faith and Life 
It follows from the central meaning and purpose of Christ's suffering and death 
that, for Yoder and Hauerwas, "the central theme of Christology [is] that Jesus' suffering 
is the law of his disciples' life."56 Christians are called to "imitate Jesus," not by 
attempting to mimic every aspect of his life and personality, but by being faithful to his 
central and climactic act of resistance and non-resistance on the cross. "Only at one 
point, only on one subject—but then consistently, universally—is Jesus our example: in 
his cross."57 The cross is "the price of his social nonconformity"—and ours. We must be 
willing to die rather than to succumb to the threefold temptation of "quietism, 
`establishment responsibility,' or [the greatest temptation of all] the crusade"—the use of 
violence in subservience to the world's fallen structures.58 "The cross," says Hauerwas, 
"is Jesus' ultimate dispossession through which God has conquered the world." Because 
of what Jesus accomplished on the cross, "we believe that forgiveness and love are 
alternatives to the coercion the world thinks necessary for our existence."59 The kingdom 
of God is present, therefore, "insofar as [Jesus'] life reveals the effective power of God to 
create a transformed people capable of living peaceably in a violent world."60 In his book 
With the Grain of the Universe, Hauerwas quotes the following words from Yoder's work 
The Original Revolution as offering the quintessential summary of the essential meaning 
of Christ's person and work and its implications for a radically pacifist Christian witness: 
Christ is agape; self-giving, nonresistant love. At the cross this nonresistance, 
including the refusal to use political means of self-defense, found its ultimate 
revelation in the uncomplaining and forgiving death of the innocent at the hands 
56 PJ, 178. 
57 Ibid., 97. 
58 Ibid., 98. 
59 PK, 87. 
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of the guilty. This death reveals how God deals with evil; here is the only valid 
starting point for Christian pacifism or nonresistance. The cross is the extreme 
demonstration that agape seeks neither effectiveness nor justice, and is willing to 
suffer any loss or seeming defeat for the sake of obedience.61  
The Relationship between Christology and Ecclesiology 
Since sin is primarily a social and political problem and reality—a reality that is 
irreparably ingrained into the fallen structures of this world due to their captivity to the 
rebellious powers—the work of Christ in exposing and undoing those powers on the 
cross also has profound and necessary social and political implications. What this means 
for Yoder and Hauerwas is that Christology and ecclesiology are inseparable. We repeat 
once again Hauerwas's affirmation of Yoder's dual assertion that "questions of the 
truthfulness of Christian convictions are inseparable from the witness that the church is," 
and that "that witness must be nonviolent."62 
Jesus came not just to "save sinners" or to "call people to repentance" or to make 
it possible for people to be restored to a "right relationship with God;" he came to 
inaugurate, through the cross, "a vision of an order of social human relations more 
universal than the Pax Romana:" the healing, forgiving, non-violent community of the 
church.63 Jesus was "not just a sacrificial lamb preparing for his immolation," he was 
"the bearer of a new possibility of human, social, and therefore political relationships. 
His baptism is the inauguration and his cross is the culmination of that new regime in 
which his disciples are called to share."64 Christ's death on the cross is "the punishment 
61 Grain, 219; cf. The Original Revolution, 59. 
62 Ibid., 219. 
63 PJ, 148. 
" Ibid., 62-63. 
95 
of a man who threatens society by creating a new kind of community leading a radically 
new kind of life."65  
Yoder puts it this way in the fmal sentence of The Politics of Jesus, which 
succinctly summarizes the central thesis of the book and the entire rationale for "the 
pacifism of the Messianic community" to which he and Hauerwas are uncompromisingly 
committed: "A social style characterized by the creation of a new community and the 
rejection of violence of any kind is the theme of New Testament proclamation from 
beginning to end, from right to left. The cross of Christ is the model of Christian social 
efficacy, the power of God for those who believe."66 When Hauerwas says, therefore, 
that "the gospel is a political gospel," he has in mind the church as polls: a radically 
distinct and "deviant" social and political entity on earth. "Christians are engaged in 
politics, but it is the politics of the kingdom that reveals the insufficiency of all politics 
based on coercion and falsehood and finds the true source of power in servanthood rather 
than dominion."67 
The Mission of the Church in and to the World 
The mission of the church, therefore, is not to ignore the problems of this world 
by focusing narrowly on converting sinners and preparing them for entry into eternal life 
in heaven (conversionist quietism), nor is it to focus on transforming the world by 
assuming responsibility for the structures of the world (Constantinian activism). Rather, 
the purpose of the church is to bear witness to the non-violent love of Jesus in and to the 
world by modeling this love in every aspect of its communal life. The church is to serve 
65 Ibid., 62. 
66 Ibid., 250. 
67 PK, 102. 
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as a real, historical, social, political "contrasting model" within the world of how God 
intends and empowers people to live in relationship with one another. Thus, "the very 
existence of the church is her primary task. It is in itself a proclamation of the Lordship 
of Christ to the powers from whose dominion the church has begun to be liberated."68  
By being that kind of community we see that the church helps the world 
understand what it means to be the world. For the world has no way of knowing 
it is world without the church pointing to the reality of God's kingdom. How 
could the world ever recognize the arbitrariness of the divisions between people if 
it did not have a contrasting model in the unity of the church? Only against the 
church's universality can the world have the means to recognize the irrationality 
of the divisions resulting in violence and war, as one arbitrary unit of people seek 
to protect themselves against the knowledge of their arbitrariness.69 
The world still remains God's creation, though its fallenness is so deeply 
ingrained into the existing social and political structures and its subjection to the powers 
is so complete that Yoder can say that "we have no access to the good creation of God." 
Man and his world are fallen, and in this the powers have their own share. They 
are no longer active only as mediators of the saving creative purpose of God; now 
we find them seeking to separate us from the love of God (Rom. 8:38); we find 
them ruling over the lives of those who live far from the love of God (Eph. 2:2); 
we find them holding man in servitude to their rules (Col. 2:2); we find them 
holding men subject under their tutelage (Gal. 4:3). These structures which were 
supposed to be our servants have become our masters and our guardians." 
In his wisdom and sovereignty, God is still able to use the fallen structures of this world 
for his purposes, and it is part of the church's responsibility to "discern definitively" how 
he is doing this.7I One thing Christians can know for sure, however (by virtue of Christ's 
definitive work on the cross), is that they can never "serve God" or "love their neighbor" 
through the use of violence at the behest of the "powers that be."72 For this very reason, 
68 PJ, 153. 
69 PK, 100. 
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Christians need to be especially on guard against temptations to "serve the structures of 
creation" (rather than serving God) through the use of violence, whether that temptation 
comes through some form of "fascism" or (much more likely for American Christians) 
through some form of "Western totalitarianism"—both of which seek to control history 
for their own self-centered ends.73 "Christ renounced the claim to govern history. The 
universal testimony of Scripture is that Christians are those who follow Christ at just this 
point."74 This is what Hauerwas means when he says—in thesis six of his "Ten Theses 
for Reforming Christian Social Ethics"—that "Christian social ethics can only be done 
from the perspective of those who do not seek to control national or world history but 
who are content to live 'out of control:" 
To do ethics from the perspective of those "out of control" means Christians must 
find the means to make it clear to both the oppressed and the oppressor that the 
cross determines the meaning of history. Christians should thus provide 
imaginative alternatives for social policy as they are released from the 
"necessities" of those that would control the world in the name of security.75  
Christ's Cross and Resurrection As the Meaning of History (Christology and 
Eschatology) 
Christ's resurrection is the confirmation that the non-violent way of the cross, as 
weak and foolish as it seems, is God's divinely appointed way of dealing with the violent 
and power-hungry structures of this world. "Between the absolute agape which lets itself 
be crucified, and effectiveness (which it is assumed will usually need to be violent), the 
resurrection forbids us to choose, for in the light of resurrection crucified agape is not 
folly (as it seems to the Hellenizers to be) and weakness (as the Judaizers believe) but the 
73 Ibid., 159. 
74 Ibid., 241. 
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wisdom and power of God (1 Cor. 1:22-25)."76 It is the resurrection, therefore, that gives 
us the confidence to "live out of control" and to resist the temptation to assume a god-like 
responsibility for the world in an effort to "make things turn out right." 
The task of the Christian people is not to seek to control history, but to be faithful 
to the mode of life of the peaceable kingdom. Such a people can never lose hope 
in the reality of that kingdom, but they surely also must learn to be patient. For 
they must often endure injustice that might appear to be quickly eliminated 
through violence. Moreover they can never acquiesce in the injustice, for to do so 
would only leave the neighbor to his or her own devices. Those who are violent, 
who are also our neighbors, must be resisted, but resisted on our own terms, 
because not to resist is to abandon them to sin and injustice.77  
For Yoder and Hauerwas, therefore, Christ's cross and resurrection are "the 
meaning of history"—and the relationship between the two (they repeatedly stress) is not 
one of cause and effect. Pragmatic concerns about effectiveness were not at the heart of 
Christ's non-violent resistance of the powers, nor are they at the heart of the church's 
cross-centered mission and calling. The church is not to assume responsibility for 
"managing society" any more than Christ assumed this responsibility. The church's only 
responsibility is to be faithful to Christ and to the non-violent way of the cross, and to 
wait patiently and trustingly on God, the Lord of history (including the history that took 
place at Calvary!), who promises to "make things turn out right" in his own time and 
way. Although it is difficult to find in either the writings of Yoder or Hauerwas an 
explicit discussion of the "last things" in the sense that this locus of theology has been 
traditionally understood (e.g., the parousia, the final judgment, heaven and hell, etc.), a 
strong eschatological current runs through their Christology and ecclesiology in the form 
of a strong emphasis on the importance of hope in the God who is not only the God of the 
past and the present but also of the future. 
76 PJ, 114. 
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In light of the summary provided above, it is important to understand that many 
familiar-sounding theological terms are given new meanings by Yoder and Hauerwas. 
For example, justification is defined not as being "set right with God" but as being "set 
right in and for relationships with others."78 "Faith" is defined not as "trust in God's 
grace and forgiveness" but primarily as "faithfulness" to God's call to live peaceably 
with others on the basis of what Christ has done.79 ("Faith" in the sense of "trust" 
typically refers to faith in God's providential care and power as "controller" of history.) 
The Gospel is "the Good News that my enemy and I are united, through no merit or work 
of our own, in a new humanity that forbids henceforth my ever taking his life in my 
hands."8°  
Both Yoder and Hauerwas claim that they do not wish to reject completely what 
they refer to as the "traditional" elements of Christology, ecclesiology and cosmology, 
such as "Jesus as sacrifice, God as creator, faith as subjectivity."81 Instead, as Yoder puts 
it, the goal is to correct the "one-sided" nature of traditional treatments of these topics, 
and to "defend the New Testament against the exclusion of the 'messianic' element,"82 
which is its central theme from beginning to end, and which is rightly understood only in 
the light of the revolutionary yet non-violent social and political mission and message of 
Jesus as summarized above. Following our summary (in the next chapter) of the 
"peaceable witness" of Martin Luther—including the Christological and ecclesial 
presuppositions underlying Luther's approach to the issue of war and peace—we will 
77 PK, 106. 
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address the question of the compatibility of Yoder and Hauerwas's presuppositions with 
those of traditional Lutheran theology, and the implications of the answer to this question 
for the possibility of meaningful dialog. 
Chapter Three 
The Peaceable Witness of Martin Luther 
Introduction 
John Howard Yoder's book When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War 
Thinking is dedicated "in gratitude for the witness of five "Martins," two of whom are 
Lutheran: Luther himself, "theologian who called soldiers to refuse to serve in unjust 
wars," and Martin Niem011er, "spokesman of the 'Confessing Church' in resistance to 
Nazification."1 The book is published by a Lutheran publishing house (Augsburg) and its 
introduction is written by a Lutheran, Charles P. Lutz (forMer director of the Office of 
Church and Society for the American Lutheran Church). Lutz begins his introduction as 
follows: 
John Howard Yoder has done a good deed for all of us who are part of the just-
war tradition. The essence of his contribution is a simple challenge. As one who 
stands outside that tradition (but knows it as well as its best inside theorists), 
Yoder is saying: If you want me to take you seriously, show me that you take your 
tradition seriously. And it is certainly beyond doubt that those communities 
which subscribe to the just-war ethic have done little to (a) teach it to their people, 
(b) apply it in public policy discussions, (c) follow its leading when it leads to a 
conflict with political authority. So the first point I make in this introduction is 
one of gratitude to Dr. Yoder, for helping us to see afresh the implications of the 
just-war tradition and for challenging us who claim it to live in it more faithfully.2 
Lutz continues by acknowledging and bemoaning contemporary Lutheranism's sad 
"record of neglect" in this regard: the lack of serious debate regarding the application of 
the just war theory to modem wars, the lack of sustained support for policy issues like 
selective conscientious objection, the spotty record of denominational studies and 
John Howard Yoder, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1984), 2. 
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statements conceived in moments of military crisis but soon forgotten and discarded. 
"We have not learned how to sustain a concern for our ethical tradition on war and peace 
during the times between global crises," says Lutz. "We have yet to commit ourselves to 
consistent peace education among our children, youth, and adults at all times and places 
in the church's nurturing ministry. He expresses deep gratitude, therefore, for Yoder's 
effort to assist those within the just war tradition who desire to be taken seriously and to 
take their own tradition more seriously. 
In order for honest and meaningful dialogue to take place between Lutherans 
committed to taking the just war tradition seriously and pacifists like Yoder and 
Hauerwas, there needs to be a clear and common understanding of the essential 
characteristics, convictions and presuppositions of the positions on both sides. In the 
previous chapter, we attempted to present as fairly and objectively as possible the key 
features of Hauerwas's pacifism. In this chapter, we will attempt to present the Lutheran 
perspective on war and peace. Immediately, however, we are presented with a number of 
difficulties and challenges. 
The first is the relative paucity of material on this topic in the Lutheran 
Confessions as representative of "official" Lutheran theology. Article XVI of the 
Augsburg Confession affirms the concept of "just war," but nowhere in this article or in 
the Confessions as a whole is this concept defined or discussed in any detail. Moreover, 
relatively few contemporary Lutheran theologians have written extensively on the topic 
of war and peace, and those who have (e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain) do not typically draw 
explicitly or extensively from the Lutheran theological tradition in doing so. 
3 Ibid., 7. 
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A second problem is that when Lutheran theologians do attempt in a more modest 
way to approach the problem of war and peace from a Lutheran perspective, there is 
seldom agreement about what that perspective is. As Gottfried Niemeier writes: 
The records of church history show that Christians have assumed highly divergent 
attitudes with reference to the problems connected with war, all the way from 
total condemnation to the highest glorification of war and the soldier. This wide 
divergence is due to theological differences concerning the Scriptures and their 
interpretation, particularly the commandments of God and the Sermon on the 
Mount, also concerning the meaning of Law and Gospel, the nature of the state 
and its functions, and the manner of realizing a Christian existence within the 
orders of this world. These divergences, however, do not by any means coincide 
with confessional boundary lines but are often found within the same confession 
or denomination. Within Lutheranism it is particularly the difference in the 
interpretation of the doctrine of the two kingdoms that has led to quite contrary 
positions on the problem of war.4 
A good example of these "quite contrary positions" stemming from different 
interpretations of the content and application of the Lutheran doctrine of the two 
kingdoms can be found in the LCUSA-sponsored book Peace and the Just War 
Tradition: Lutheran Perspectives in the Nuclear Age. In the introduction to this book 
Carter Lindberg asks: 
Do we as Lutherans... have anything to contribute positively to this most pressing 
issue of the nuclear age—peace and just war theory? Obviously, the Lutheran 
Council in the USA and the contributors to this volume think so. But the reader 
will soon note that the following essays are not unanimous on a range of issues, 
including the viability of the just war theory itself in an age of nuclear weapons.5  
"The fact that they do not equally appreciate the tradition nor always agree," says 
Lindberg, "should encourage our own reflections."6 But such reflections are meaningful 
as "Lutheran reflections" only to the extent that they take seriously the 
4 Gottfried Niemeier, "War" in The Encyclopedia of the Lutheran Church, vol. 3, ed. Julius Bodensieck 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1965), 2456. 
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Lutheran theological tradition—which means, at the very least, engaging seriously the 
implications of the clear teaching (however limited) of the Lutheran Confessions and the 
more extensive writings of Martin Luther himself on this issue. 
It is somewhat disconcerting to note that of the six essays in Peace and the Just 
War Tradition, several make no mention at all of Luther or the Lutheran Confessions, and 
only one—Gilbert Meilaender's "Whether (in This Nuclear Age) Soldiers, Too, Can Be 
Saved"—draws substantively on the work of Luther in re-evaluating the validity and 
usefulness of the just war tradition in today's political and military context. Many 
Lutheran theologians today would no doubt affirm Eckehart Lorenz's observation (cited 
by Paul Jersild in his essay "On the Viability of the Just War Theory") that "there is a 
new 'Lutheran peace ethic' emerging in our time" that holds that—despite the teaching of 
Luther and the Lutheran Confessions—"war is no longer an acceptable way of defending 
our rights and our freedoms" and the just war theory, therefore, is no longer a viable set 
of criteria for justifying any particular war.7 Ironically, as illustrated by his repeated 
commendations of Luther in When War is Unjust (and elsewhere), the Anabaptist pacifist 
Yoder seems to be more optimistic than many Lutheran theologians about the possibility 
of finding in the writings of Luther helpful resources for reviving the just war tradition 
and applying it in an authentic and consistent way. 
In spite of the skepticism evident in many Lutheran circles today regarding the 
usefulness and applicability of Luther's observations on war and peace, we share Yoder's 
optimism that Luther's insights on this topic still have relevance for the problems and 
challenges we face today. Indeed, insofar as Luther's insights on war and peace consist 
Ibid., 76-77. 
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of theological truths rooted in God's Word, it is difficult to see how those who take 
God's Word seriously can ignore them or simply dismiss them as irrelevant. Unlike the 
Lutheran Confessions, furthermore, Luther's writings do contain a rather extensive 
treatment of issues related to war and peace, and Luther (like Hauerwas) addresses these 
issues from a distinctively theological perspective. Also like Hauerwas, his treatment of 
this topic is less systematic than it is occasional and practical: Luther addresses the issue 
of war and peace primarily in treatises written in response to specific historical and 
theological questions and problems arising out of the context of the "real world" and 
church in which he lived and worked. For these reasons, it seems justifiable and 
potentially fruitful to focus on the writings of Luther himself on the topic of war and 
peace, and to draw on his views in the attempt (in part two of our study) to engage in 
conversation with Hauerwas on this topic. For the sake of historical context and 
completeness, however, we first offer a very brief summary of what the Lutheran 
Confessions have to say about public order, temporal government, and war. 
The Lutheran Confessions on Public Order and Just War 
Wilhelm Maurer says plainly: "The [Augsburg] Confession adopts the 
Augustinian doctrine of the just war."8 The pertinent article is XVI (on "Civil Affairs" or 
"Public Order and Secular Government") and reads as follows: 
Concerning public order and secular government it is taught that all political 
authority, orderly government, laws, and good order in the world are created and 
instituted by God and that Christians may without sin exercise political authority; 
be princes and judges; pass sentences and administer justice according to imperial 
and other existing laws; punish evildoers with the sword; wage just wars; serve as 
soldiers; buy and sell; take required oaths; possess property; be married; etc. 
Wilhelm Maurer, Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, trans. H. George Anderson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 132. 
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Condemned here are the Anabaptists who teach that none of the things 
indicated above is Christian. 
Also condemned are those who teach that Christian perfection means 
physically leaving house and home, spouse and child, and refraining from the 
above-mentioned activities. In fact, the only true perfection is true fear of God 
and true faith in God. For the gospel teaches an internal, eternal reality and 
righteousness of the heart, not an external, temporal one. The gospel does not 
overthrow secular government, public order, and marriage but instead intends that 
a person keep all this as a true order of God and demonstrate in these walks of life 
Christian love and true good works, according to each person's calling. 
Christians, therefore, are obliged to be subject to political authority and to obey its 
commands and laws in all that may be done without sin. But if a command of the 
political authority cannot be followed without sin, one must obey God rather than 
any human beings (Acts 5 [:29]).9 
As George Forell notes, the argument in this article "is directed against two 
fronts:" 
On the one hand, it opposes the perfectionism of the Anabaptists, who withdrew 
into the wilderness and created their own isolated communities to avoid sin. On 
the other hand, it rejects the stance of the monk who abandons participation in the 
secular world and hopes to please God with his vows of obedience, chastity and 
poverty. I°  
Only the Anabaptists are explicitly condemned, however, which may explain (at least in 
part) why this article was accepted "with pleasure" and "without qualification" by the 
Roman Confutation." In the Apology, therefore, Melanchthon not only expounds more 
fully the theological basis for this article—namely, Luther's distinction between the "two 
realms"—but also reminds the authors of the Confutation why Luther felt the need to 
write so extensively on this topic: 
This entire topic on the distinction between Christ's kingdom and the civil realm 
has been helpfully explained in the writings of our theologians. Christ's kingdom 
is spiritual, that is, it is the heart's knowledge of God, fear of God, faith in God, 
and the beginning of eternal righteousness and eternal life. At the same time, it 
permits us to make outward use of legitimate political ordinances of whatever 
9 AC XVI, 1-7. 
I° George W. Forell, The Augsburg Confession: A Contemporary Commentary (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Publishing House, 1968), 69. 
11 Ap XVI, 1; see also In. 406 in BC, 231. 
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nation in which we live, just as it permits us to make use of medicine or 
architecture or food, drink, and air. Neither does the gospel introduce new laws 
for the civil realm. Instead, it commands us to obey the present laws, whether 
they have been formulated by pagans or by others, and urges us to practice love 
through this obedience...Our people have written extensively on these matters, 
because the monks had spread many pernicious ideas throughout the church. 
They called it an evangelical order to hold property in common, and they called it 
an evangelical counsel not to own property and not to go to court. These notions 
seriously obscure the gospel and the spiritual kingdom and are dangerous to 
public matters. For the gospel does not destroy the state or the household but 
rather approves them, and it orders us to obey them as divine ordinances not only 
on account of the punishment but also "because of conscience" [Rom. 13:5].12 
While the Gospel forbids "private redress" and personal vengeance, public redress—
including just war—is not prohibited but is commended, even commanded by God: 
Public redress, which is made through the office of the judge, is not forbidden but 
is commanded and is a work of God according to Paul in Romans 13. Now the 
different kinds of public redress include judicial decisions, punishment, wars, and 
military service. How poorly many writers understood these matters is evident 
from their erroneous view that the gospel is something external, a new and 
monastic form of government. They failed to see that the gospel brings eternal 
righteousness to hearts while outwardly approving the civil realm.13 
While the topic of secular government is addressed elsewhere in the Confessions, the 
specific issue of "just war" is not. And unfortunately, "neither the AC nor the Apology 
gives any help in defining the just war as over against an unjust one."14 Typically, 
therefore, commentators on the Lutheran Confessions turn to the more extensive writings 
of Luther himself on this topic to explore in more detail the Lutheran understanding of 
"just war" in the Reformation period—and (as indicated above) we will imitate their 
example. 
The summary of Luther's views presented below draws primarily on treatises 
written by Luther between the years 1523 and 1529 in response to several very real yet 
12 Ap XVI, 2-5. 
13 Ap XVI, 7-8. 
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different "war and peace" questions and situations: the foundational theological essay 
Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed (1523);15 the three treatises 
written by Luther in connection with the peasant's revolt of 1525 (Admonition to Peace: 
A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia; Against the Robbing and 
Murdering Hordes of Peasants; An Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the 
Peasants);16 Luther's 1526 essay on Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved;' 7 and the 
1529 treatise On War Against the Turk.18 Other essays, such as Luther's Exposition of 
Psalm 8219 and his Treatise on Good Works, 20 will also be utilized along the way. 
War and Peace As a Theological Issue 
The first thing that needs to be said about Luther's writings on just and unjust war 
is that "Luther approaches the problem primarily as a theologian."21 He is concerned not 
with social or political theory or with military strategy or with abstract ethical reasoning 
based on human reason and natural law but with the question of what God, in his Word, 
has to say about war and peace in the civil realm. Frederic Cleve writes: 
Luther makes frequent statements about violence and non-violence, but their 
interpretation becomes difficult unless the precise theological impact of their 
context is taken into account. The theological contexts in which these statements 
occur cover a wide variety of important theological issues. Among these we find 
Luther's view of the human being, God's struggle against the devil, the question 
of the human being's conscience and eternal salvation, the interpretation of God's 
14 Leif Grane, The Augsburg Confession: A Commentary, trans. John H. Rasmussen (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Publishing House, 1959), 169. 
15 LW45, 75-130. 
16 LW46, 3-86. 
17 L W46, 87-138. 
18 LW46, 155-206. 
19 LW 13, 38-72. 
20 L W44, 15-114. 
21 Frederic Cleve, "Violent Rebellion: Luther's Point of View and Its Application in a Finnish Crisis," in 
Justice Through Violence: Ethical Criteria for the Legitimate Use of Force, ed. Eckehart Lorenz (Geneva: 
Department of Studies, Lutheran World Federation, 1984), 80. 
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commandments and sacred institutions, justification and the doctrine of the two 
kingdoms.22 
Cleve's list could easily be expanded to include other key theological themes: Luther's 
doctrine of vocation, the two (or three) kinds of righteousness, the theology of the cross, 
the hidden and revealed God, the doctrine of creation, Luther's ecclesiology, his view of 
history and eschatology—and even more could be added. Obviously, it is impossible 
even to begin to do full justice to all (or even any one) of these related issues here, though 
all of them need to be kept in view in considering Luther's writings on war and peace. 
While it would be counter-productive (and worse, academically dishonest) to 
avoid or downplay aspects of Luther's theology that are fundamentally at odds with 
Hauerwas's theological orientation (e.g., Luther's understanding of the two realms and 
his doctrine of justification), our goal in this section is to highlight essential themes in 
Luther's writings on war and peace that appear to offer real potential for meaningful 
interaction and conversation with Hauerwas on this topic. It seems rather pointless to 
expound at length, for example, on all of the nuances and complexities of Luther's 
understanding of the two realms (and its various interpretations) only to reach the rather 
obvious conclusion that "Luther and Hauerwas clearly disagree" on this issue. As part of 
a Lutheran appraisal of Hauerwas' pacifism in part two of our study, we will discuss 
some of the contributions that Lutherans seem well-positioned to make—on the basis of 
unique and/or significant aspects of Luther's theology—in seeking to present a 
"peaceable witness" to the world. What we are primarily interested in discovering at this 
point is whether—despite the significant theological disagreements that exist between 
Lutherans and Hauerwasians on any number of substantive theological issues—there are 
22 Ibid. 
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common issues of concern and conviction that might support and sustain meaningful and 
mutually beneficial theological conversation on the topic of war and peace. Can those 
committed to taking seriously Luther's witness concerning war and peace genuinely learn 
and benefit from Hauerwas's pacifist witness, and vice-versa? The very fact that Luther, 
like Hauerwas, approaches the issue of war and peace from a specifically Christian and 
genuinely theological perspective seems to hold out at least some hope for giving an 
affirmative answer to this question. In the summary that follows, therefore, we highlight 
theological themes that are common to and central for the thinking of both Luther and 
Hauerwas on the issue of war and peace, without in any way seeking to downplay their 
differing approaches to and understandings of the specific content of these themes. 
Luther's Witness to the "Whole Truth" of Holy Scripture 
To approach an issue theologically, for Luther, meant above all to approach it on 
the basis of what God himself has to say about it in the pages of Holy Scripture. In 
addressing questions of war and peace, "Luther was bound to the Scriptures and did not 
teach on the basis of his own willful speculation or in terms of what the political 
authorities wanted him to say.'/23 In fact, according to Wilhelm Maurer, in seeking to 
give faithful witness to Scripture's teaching regarding war and peace, Luther and the 
Lutheran confessors were actually running quite radically against the popular, scholarly 
and even political grain of the times: 
The age of the Reformation was filled with the clamor of war. Even if the 
military entanglements never reached the magnitude of destruction peculiar to 
modem mass warfare, life was still dominated by fear of their horrors. Erasmus 
had repeatedly asserted that war in any case was immoral because it was 
inhumane; it was widely believed—at least theoretically—that a Christian prince 
23 Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 
43. 
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should avoid war under all circumstances. The age was basically not warlike, 
despite the number and horror of its wars. The Anabaptists to which CA 16 refers 
were only expressing the tendency of their time when they rejected all war and 
refused any participation in it. The Augustana, with its talk about just wars, went 
against this tendency of the time. It obviously thought it possible to evaluate 
individually the wars that swept through the world in those days.24 
Maurer's comments may help to explain why, in an era that is undoubtedly perceived by 
many today as glorifying or at least easily rationalizing war, significant political figures 
like Duke John of Saxony and Assa von Kram could be so deeply and sincerely troubled 
about these issues.25 They also provide a helpful context for considering Luther's 
"boasting" that "not since the time of the apostles have the temporal sword and temporal 
government been so clearly described or so highly praised as by me."26 And yet, says 
Luther, the "thanks that I have earned by it are to have my doctrine called seditious and 
condemned as resistance to rulers"—due to his perceived instigation of the Peasants' 
War.27 It is clear from a reading of any of Luther's treatises on war and peace in the 
1520's that he is hardly following anyone's "party line." Let the chips fall where they 
may, says Luther, I have no choice but to bear witness faithfully to what the Scriptures 
teach regarding these matters. Because it is based on God's Word alone, "what I teach 
and write will still be true, even though the whole world were to burst. If anyone who 
wants to be peculiar, I, too, shall be peculiar, and we shall see who is right in the end."28  
At the heart of Duke John of Saxony's request for Luther's treatise on "Temporal 
Authority" was a genuine exegetical conundrum: "You are perturbed over Christ's 
injunction in Matthew 5 [:39, 25, 40], 'Do not resist evil, but make friends with your 
24 Maurer, 133. 
25 See L W45, 77-81 and LW46, 89-94. 
26 Whether Soldiers, 95. 
27 Mid 
28 .4n Open Letter, 85. 
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accuser;' and Romans 12 [:19], 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord. "'29 
Here is a politician who obviously takes Scripture seriously—like prince Volusian of old, 
who used these very texts against St. Augustine, charging "that Christian teaching 
permits the wicked to do evil, and is incompatible with the temporal sword."3° Perhaps 
the simplest response to this conundrum would have been for Luther to idealize or 
"spiritualize" these words of Christ and Paul: to suggest that in view of the pressing and 
pragmatic political realities currently existing, as well as the reality of sin (within 
ourselves and in the world), it is impossible to take them seriously or literally. But this, 
says Luther, is pure, damnable sophistry: 
The sophists in the universities have also been perplexed by these texts, because 
they could not reconcile the two things. In order not to make heathen of the 
princes, they taught that Christ did not command these things but merely offered 
them as advice or counsel to those who would be perfect. So Christ had to 
become a liar and be in error in order that the princes might come off with honor, 
for they could not exalt the princes without degrading Christ—wretched, blind 
sophists that they are.31  
One can hardly accuse Luther of not taking Scripture seriously. His solution, 
instead, is to let "Scripture interpret Scripture." These passages from Matthew 5 and 
Romans 12 certainly cannot contradict equally clear passages in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 
2, where God speaks plainly about the divinely-instituted authority of civil government 
and the sword. This leads to the conclusion that "God has ordained two governments: the 
spiritual, by which the Holy Spirit produces Christians and righteous people under Christ; 
and the temporal, which restrains the un-Christian and wicked so that—no thanks to 
them—they are obliged to keep still and to maintain an outward peace."32 For Luther, 
29 
 Temporal Authority, 81. 
3° Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 82. 
32 'bid, 91. 
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however, the concept of the "two governments" was not merely a clever way of trying to 
harmonize two apparently contradictory sets of texts; much less was it an attempt to 
develop a "theory of government" or "theory of statecraft" which could stand alone apart 
from the Scriptures. The doctrine of the two realms was the only possible way (he 
believed) of explaining and taking seriously the full and truthful testimony of Holy 
Scripture in all its variety, wholeness, and Christ-centeredness.33  
Luther did not base his doctrine of the two kingdoms or the two governments on 
his own speculative thinking. He felt that in this matter too his position was 
wholly determined by Scripture. He distinguishes two types of statements. One 
type is characterized by Jesus' statements in the Sermon on the Mount and the 
apostles' statements about the "law of Christ": the disciples of Jesus never use 
force, do not resist evil, do not avenge themselves, but under all circumstances 
serve one another in love. These statements of the gospel appear to reject 
completely the state and the activity of the political authorities. But there is a 
second type of statement. The same Scripture contains the apostolic affirmation 
of the state and, as in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2:13-14, admonishes us to obey the 
authorities. In addition there are the statements of the Old Testament which 
institute and establish the "sword" which, as in Genesis 9:6 or Exodus 21:14, 
22ff., includes the death penalty. There is also the conversation between John the 
Baptist and the soldiers (Luke 3:14) in which John obviously does not in any way 
condemn the soldiers' station in life but rather recognizes it. Finally, Luther read 
the Old Testament descriptions of God telling his people to prepare for battle and 
leading them to war; and he was aware that "all the saints have wielded the sword 
from the beginning of the world."34 
33  For a helpful summary of the both the complexities and the "wholeness" of Luther's doctrine of the two 
kingdoms, see Kenneth Hagen, "Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms" in God and Caesar Revisited, 
ed. John R. Stephenson (Luther Academy Conference Papers Number 1, Spring 1995), 15-29. In 
answering the question whether Luther actually had a doctrine of the two kingdoms, Hagen says: "I am 
willing to say yes not only because it is such a commonplace in the literature but also because I think 
Luther had one doctrine with several nuances and complementary configurations depending on the 
historical (and polemical) situation. I see no problem with the term 'two' kingdoms while there were 
actually four or six. Predominately there were two kingdoms and two governments, namely, two different 
schemes, two configurations in one overall framework. The point here is that for Luther it all hung 
together." The other essays in this volume are also very helpful as background for and explication of 
Luther's doctrine of the two realms. Recent scholarship is fairly consistent in using the language of the 
"two kingdoms" to refer to Luther's distinction between "God's kingdom" and "the devil's kingdom," 
while using the terms "the two realms" or "the two governments" to refer to Luther's distinction between 
the gracious rule of Christ in the hearts and lives of believers and (on the other hand) God's rule of power, 
law and human reason through human authorities and earthly government (which is not co-extensive with 
"the kingdom of Satan"). For the sake of clarity, we will attempt to be as consistent as possible in 
following this usage of terms, but because Luther's own terminology (and the terminology of Luther-
scholars) is often not consistent in this regard, compete consistency will not always possible. 
34 Althaus, 43-44. 
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Those (like the "enthusiasts") who insisted that passages like Matthew 5 require 
Christians to abstain from all use of force are—contrary to appearances—actually not 
taking Scripture seriously enough, since they ignore, downplay or "spiritualize" other 
passages of Scripture that run counter to this interpretation. 35 
At the heart of Scripture's testimony, of course, is the story of Christ, and even in 
addressing the seemingly secular issues of war and peace Luther is constantly (even 
primarily) concerned to bear witness to the true nature of Scripture's account of Christ 
and his own unique "office," "vocation," and "kingdom:" 
Christ pursued his own office and vocation, but he did not thereby reject any 
other. It was not incumbent upon him to bear the sword, for he was to exercise 
only that function by which his kingdom is governed and which properly serves 
his kingdom. Now, it is not essential to his kingdom that he be a married man, a 
cobbler, tailor, farmer, prince or hangman, or constable; neither is the temporal 
sword or law essential to it, but only God's Word and Spirit....This was and had 
to be Christ's peculiar function as the Supreme King in this kingdom.36 
We will discuss in more detail below Luther's witness to Christ in the context of his 
discussion of war and peace; the point here is simply that this is a crucial part of his 
witness to Scripture as a whole. We consider now Luther's views on Scripture's witness 
regarding the divinely-instituted purpose of the sword entrusted to temporal government, 
which is—as ironic as it may seem—the cultivation and preservation of peace.37  
35 Ibid., 44. 
36 Temporal Authority, 100-101. 
37 It might be helpful to note already at this point that "peace" and "peacemaking" as discussed by Luther in 
his treatises on war and peace do not have exactly the same meaning or connotation as they do in the 
writings of Hauerwas. As is made clear below, "peace" for Luther in this specific context refers primarily 
to external order and the absence (or restraint) of armed conflict or tyranny in the civil realm, while for 
Hauerwas peace is a manifestation of the presence of Christ himself in the life of the Christian community. 
As we have seen, however, for Hauerwas the peace embodied in the life of the church also has definite 
implications for "peacemaking" outside the specific confines of the church. By the same token, for Luther 
(as we will see) there is a definite connection between "peacemaking" in the civil realm and the "peace-
prizing" duties and responsibilities of Christians and the Christian community—although this connection, 
like the concept of "peace" itself, is not understood by Luther and Hauerwas in precisely the same way. 
We will discuss this issue in more detail in our appraisal of Hauerwas's pacifism in part two of the study. 
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Luther's Witness to God's Gift of Temporal Peace  
Everything Luther says about war—if it is to be understood properly—must be 
viewed in the context of Luther's convictions regarding the incalculable value of God's 
gift of temporal peace. In his exposition of Psalm 82, Luther can hardly find words 
sufficient to praise the virtues and benefits of peace: "It is from peace that we have our 
bodies and lives, wives and children, houses and homes, all our members—hands, feet, 
eyes—all our health and liberty; and within these walls of peace we sit secure. 'Where 
peace is,'" quotes Luther, 'there is half a heaven.'"38 "Peace," writes Luther elsewhere, 
is "the greatest of earthly goods, in which all other temporal goods are comprised."39 
When Luther praises the institution of temporal government and the office of 
rulers and princes within the civil realm (as he does often, and in quite exalted terms), he 
does so not on the basis of any naiveté regarding the personal goodness or morality of 
earthly rulers (quite the contrary!), nor with the intention of legitimizing any particular 
form or manifestation of earthly government. He does so because of his conviction that, 
according to Scripture, "it is precisely because God wills to create and preserve peace 
among men that he has instituted govemments."40 "For where there is no government," 
says Luther, "or where government is not held in honor, there can be no peace."'" And 
without peace—however uncertain, unstable, and imperfect it may be on this side of 
heaven—there can be no life. "It is certain...that temporal authority is a creation and 
ordinance of God, and that for us men in this life it is a necessary office and estate which 
38 Exposition of Psalm 82, LW 13, 55; according to the footnote, "This proverbial expression, which also 
appears in Walther von der Vogelweide (d. ca. 1230), is approximately equivalent to the English "sheer 
heaven" or to the colloquial expression "out of this world." 
39 A Sermon on Keeping Children in School, LW46, 226. 
ao Althaus, 114-115. 
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we can no more dispense with than we can dispense with life itself, since without such an 
office this life cannot continue."42 
Peacemaking is one of the chief duties and virtues of an earthly ruler. So exalted 
is this duty and virtue that Scripture, on account of it, goes so far as to call earthly princes 
"gods." "They wear golden crowns, too, that it may be known that they are appointed by 
God to be gods, and have not come into their office of their own accord, but are to be His 
assistants."43  
Now, who can recount all the benefits that come from this...virtue? One would 
first have to tell what the benefits of peace are, and what harm the absence of 
peace does. But who on earth is so eloquent and so wise that he would undertake 
to recount the whole of both of these things? For all the good that peace can do, 
God does for us through these gods; and all the harm that lack of peace can do, 
God keeps from us by means of these gods 44 
Establishing and preserving peace—and avoiding war—is a ruler's greatest 
responsibility, challenge, and accomplishment: 
It is indeed a splendid and needful thing to build strong cities and castles against 
one's enemies; but that is nothing when compared with the work of a prince who 
builds a stronghold of peace, that is loves peace and administers it. Even the 
Romans, the greatest warriors on earth, had a saying that to make war without 
necessity was to go fishing with a golden net; if it was lost, the fishing could not 
pay for it; if it caught anything, the cost was too much greater than the profit. 
One must not begin a war or work for it; it comes unbidden all too soon. One 
must keep peace as long as one can, even though one must buy it with all the 
money that would be spent on war or won by the war. Victory never makes up 
for what is lost by war.45  
If peace is the greatest earthly good and virtue, it follows that for Luther war is 
the greatest earthly plague and curse. If peace is "half a heaven," war is "half a hell:" 
41 
 Exposition of Psalm 82, 44-45. 
42 A Sermon on Keeping Children in School, 238. 
43 Exposition of Psalm 82, 55. 
" Ibid. 
45 Ibid.,56-57. 
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[T]hough you had all the money and wealth of the Turk but were not at peace, all 
your wealth would do you so little good that you could not have a happy bite of 
bread or a quiet drink of water. If things went well, there would be care, fear, and 
danger all around; if things were worse, there would be only blood and fire and 
robbery and every kind of calamity. Thus lack of peace may be counted half a 
hell, or hell's prelude and beginning.46 
In war, the innocent invariably suffer more than the guilty: "What have the many women 
and children done," Luther asks the war-mongering prince, "to deserve being made 
widows and orphans in order that you may avenge yourself on a worthless tongue or an 
evil hand which has injured you?"47 To wise and sensible princes Luther says: "Take my 
advice, dear lords: stay out of war."48 Do not "for the sake of one man's head plunge 
country and people into want and full the land with widows and orphans;" do not "follow 
the advice of those counselors and fire-eaters who would stir and incite [you] to start a 
war, saying, 'What, must we suffer such insult and injustice?'"49 Princes should follow 
the example, suggests Luther, of Duke Frederick of Saxony: 
He had so many reasons to start a war that if some mad prince who loved war had 
been in his position, he would have started ten wars. But Frederick did not draw 
his sword. He always responded with reasonable words and almost gave the 
impression that he was afraid and was running away from a fight. He let the 
others boast and threaten and yet he held his ground against them. When he was 
asked why he let them threaten him so, he replied: "I shall not start anything....II 
He saw that the others were foolish and that he could be indulgent with them." 
" Ibid., 55. 
47 Temporal Authority, 124. 
48 On War Against the Turk, 121. 
49 Temporal Authority, 124. 
50 Ibid, 119-120. 
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Although Luther's treatise in response to the Peasants' War ("Against the 
Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants") is renown for its harshness, it should be 
remembered that it was preceded by a fervent "Admonition to Peace," and that all three 
of Luther's treatises written in the context of this war reflect his convictions regarding the 
inestimable value of peace. Luther recognized that fair and just rulers were few and far 
between, and he offered no aid and comfort to tyrants. But he insisted that "a wicked 
tyrant is more tolerable than a bad war"51 and counseled "flight rather than fight" to those 
faced with a necessary choice between the two.52 Luther's early opposition to the war 
against the Turks, expressed in his Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses, 53 was 
considered seditious by his opponents, and even in his 1529 treatise On War Against the 
Turk he insisted: "I shall never advise a heathen or a Turk, let alone a Christian, to attack 
another or begin war. That is nothing else than advising bloodshed and destruction, and 
it brings no good fortune in the end."54 
More often than not, treatments of Luther's perspective on war and peace 
(whether by critics, advocates or "neutral" commentators) begin with and focus on 
Luther's defense of war rather than his passion for peace. But it is only in the context of 
the latter that the former can properly and meaningfully be understood. There is no hint 
whatsoever of a glorification of war in Luther's writings, nor is there any glossing over 
the horrors of war. There is, however, a sober realism—rooted in both Scripture and 
experience—regarding life in a fallen world filled with sinful human beings, most of 
whom refuse to acknowledge God as their Creator and Redeemer. In such a world people 
51 Whether Soldiers, 109. 
52 Admonition to Peace, 37. 
53 See On War Against the Turk, 158. Cf. LW 31, 91-92. 
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often behave more like wild beasts than like human beings, and, in Luther's own words, 
"it is the function and honor of worldly government to make men out of wild beasts and 
to prevent men from becoming wild beasts."55  
For the very fact that the sword has been instituted by God to punish the evil, 
protect the good, and preserve peace [Rom. 13:1-4; 1 Pet. 2:13-14] is powerful 
and sufficient proof that war and killing along with all the things that accompany 
wartime and martial law have been instituted by God. What else is war but the 
punishment of wrong and evil? Why does anyone go to war, except because he 
desires peace and obedience?56 
When Luther boasts, therefore, of being the first since St. Augustine to engage in 
such unabashed "glorification of temporal government," it is crucial to distinguish—with 
Augustine—"glorification of government" from "glorification of war:" 
Though Augustine holds that war is fundamentally legitimate and defends 
soldiering as a service which may be pleasing to God, he specifically guards 
against the perversion of this thesis into a glorification of war. Peace is not 
sought in order that war may come; on the contrary, war serves the one purpose of 
making peace possible. Hence peace is always the goal that we must seek. War 
is never the true goal of the will but only a "necessity" with which the will finds 
itself unwillingly associated.57 
It is for this reason, too, that Luther affirms and stringently applies the Augustinian-based 
criteria for restraining and limiting war as far as possible in its pursuit of peace. 
Luther on the Limitations of War As an Instrument of Peace  
In his contemporary re-assessment of Luther's 1527 treatise Whether Soldiers, 
Too, Can Be Saved, Gilbert Meilaender notes that the very title of this treatise "suggests a 
55 A Sermon on Keeping Children in School, 237. 
56 Whether Soldiers, 95. 
57 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics Volume II: Politics, trans. and ed. William Lazareth (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eercimnns, 1952), 458. 
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Christian presumption against waging war, a burden of proof resting on any Christian 
who would propose to serve as a soldier."58 A similar point could be made about 
Luther's earlier and theologically foundational treatise Temporal Authority: To What 
Extent It Should Be Obeyed. The very title of this work makes it clear that there are 
limits to the power given by God to civil government—divine restraints on the "sword" 
entrusted by God to earthly rulers. The main point of the treatise on Temporal Authority 
is that "the temporal government has laws which extend no further than to life and 
property and external affairs on earth, for God cannot and will not permit anyone but 
himself to rule over the soul." Therefore, "where the temporal authority presumes to 
prescribe laws for the soul, it encroaches upon God's government and only misleads 
souls and destroys them."59 Even heresy, says Luther, is not the business of civil 
government: 
Heresy can never be restrained by force. One will have to tackle the problem in 
some other way....Here God's Word must do the fighting. If it does not succeed, 
certainly the temporal power will not succeed either, even if it were to drench the 
world in blood. Heresy is a spiritual matter which you cannot hack to pieces with 
iron, consume with fire, or drown in water. God's Word alone avails here....60 
In the third part of Temporal Authority, and in Whether Soldiers, Too, May Be 
Saved, Luther extends his treatment of the limitations of the authority of civil government 
by taking up the question of restraints placed by God upon the sword even within its 
proper sphere. War is justifiable, says Luther, as a divine instrument of peace—but it is 
by no means always justifiable, nor does it always serve the purpose for which God 
58 PJWT, 89. 
59 Temporal Authority, 105. 
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intended it. In taking up this issue Luther develops what Meilaender calls "a very simple 
version of the just war tradition:" 
The task of civil government, even when it wages war, is to maintain peace. 
Indeed, "every lord and prince is bound to protect his people and preserve peace 
for them. That is his office; that is why he has the sword" [Whether Soldiers, 
121]. This suggests that war should be waged only under certain circumstances—
which Luther articulates mainly in terms of being "forced to fight."61  
Luther's counsel in this regard reflects the first and primary concern of the just 
war tradition, that of "justifiable cause:" only a defensive war can possibly serve the 
cause of peace. "Let this be, then, the first thing to be said in this matter: No war is 
just... unless one has such a good reason for fighting and such a good conscience that he 
can say, 'My neighbor compels me and forces me to fight, though I would rather avoid 
it."'62 Wars without justifiable cause Luther describes as "wars of desire" and "wars of 
the devil." Necessary defensive wars are "human disasters," which we should do 
everything in our power to avert. When unavoidable, however, we should implore God 
to work through such wars to serve the cause of peace.63  
The just war criterion of legitimate authority is reflected in Luther's conviction 
that rebellion against an overlord is always wrong. Even in the case of tyrants (e.g., the 
abuses cited in defense of the Peasants' War) it is better "to suffer wrong for God's 
sake"64 or even to flee than to "be disobedient and destroy God's ordinance."65 As those 
entrusted by God with proper authority, overlords have the right to quench rebellion 
when necessary. Here too, however—in the greater interest of peace—rulers should 
61 Ibid., 89. 
62 Whether Soldiers, 121. 
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exercise great restraint and show mercy whenever possible. If "the antagonist is your 
equal...or of a foreign government," says Luther, "you should first offer him justice and 
peace" before plunging headlong into war.66 Here the consideration of "last resort" 
comes into play: Luther repeatedly advises rulers to engage in negotiation with their 
enemies as a means of averting war, even if this involves making significant sacrifices in 
power and property in order to avoid the disaster of war. The consideration of 
"proportionality" (the good ends achieved must outweigh the damage done by the means) 
surfaces frequently in both treatises: Luther warns rulers not to "step on the dish while 
picking up the spoon,"67 an analogy comparable to that of the "golden net" that exceeds 
the value of the fish.68  
The concern of "right intention" is also crucial for Luther: in going to war "you 
must not consider your personal interests and how you may remain lord, but those of your 
subjects to whom you owe help and protection."69 War against the Turks, if initiated, is 
not to be grounded in religious or ideological ideals: Luther absolutely rejects any 
application of the just war theory that would support the notion of a crusade: "I do not 
advise men to wage war against the Turk ...because of false belief or evil life, but 
because of the murder and destruction which he does."7° Nor is nationalism, in some 
jingoistic sense, an appropriate motivation for war: we should not and cannot "expect 
any miracle or special grace of God for Germany," says Luther; all we can do is repent, 
66 Temporal Authority, 125. 
67 Ibid.,124. 
68 Treatise on Good Works, LW 44, 94. 
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pray and honor God and leave it to him to bless or chastise according to his will and 
wisdom.71  
Although jus in bello considerations are not as clearly or formally spelled out in 
Luther's writings as the various jus ad bellum criteria summarized above, it is clear that 
for Luther just conduct in the midst of war is as important as just reasons for going to 
war. 
Even though you are absolutely certain that you are not starting a war but being 
forced into one, you should still fear God and remember him. You should not 
march out to war saying, "Ah, now I have been forced to fight and have good 
cause for going to war." You ought not to think that that justifies anything you do 
and plunge headlong into battle.72 
Two concerns are evident here: first, an awareness of the need to "place limits on the 
means by which we seek good ends,"73 reflected in historic just war criteria of 
discrimination, proportionality, and limited objectives; second, a caution against 
assuming that even a just war will automatically be blessed by God on the basis of the 
justice of the cause. God always remains God; he, not any ruler, army or government, 
controls the course of history. His will in temporal matters always remains hidden and 
inscrutable. Even a war that appears to us to be just must be entrusted to God's judgment 
and the outcome left in his hands. 
It is indeed true that you have a really good reason to go to war and defend 
yourself, but that does not give you God's guarantee that you will win. Indeed, 
such confidence may result in your defeat—even though you have a just cause for 
fighting the war—for God cannot endure such pride and confidence except in a 
man who humbles himself before him and fears him.74 
71 Ibid., 184-185. 
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Wise rulers should fear God and entrust their cause to him. Christian soldiers should 
console themselves with the knowledge that they are being obedient to his command to 
submit to governing authorities (Romans 13), "so that we are sure we are pleasing his 
divine will and are doing right, whenever we do the will and pleasure of the ruler."75  
Just how seriously does Luther take these criteria as divine requirements (not just 
"helpful guidelines" or "natural or reasonable considerations") for engaging in a conflict 
that serves God's purpose of preserving and protecting temporal peace? The answer to 
this question can be discerned from his admonitions to those confronted with real-life 
choices in these matters. In the case of an unjust war, participation is out of the question, 
regardless of the consequences: 
What if a prince is in the wrong? Are his people bound to follow him then too? 
Answer: No, for it is no one's duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires 
the right) rather than men [Acts 5:29].76 
But if, as often happens, the temporal power and authorities, or whatever they call 
themselves, would compel a subject to do something contrary to the command of 
God, or hinder him from doing what God commands, obedience ends and the 
obligation ceases....[It is] as if a prince desired to go to war, and his cause was 
clearly unrighteous; we should neither follow or help such a prince, because God 
had commanded us not to kill our neighbor or do him a wrong. Likewise, if the 
prince were to order us to bear false witness, steal, lie or deceive, and the like. In 
such cases we should indeed give up our property and honor, our life and limb, so 
that God's commandments remain.'7  
Soldiers, says Luther, are not the only ones to confront such challenges and choices: "In 
every other occupation we are also exposed to the danger that the rulers will compel us to 
act wrongly; but since God will have us leave even father and mother for his sake, we 
75 Ibid., 134. 
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must certainly leave lords for his sake."78 Better to die, if necessary, than knowingly 
disobey God: to sin against God and one's conscience is neither right nor safe. 
But there is, of course, another side to this coin. If the war is just, participation is 
not an option: obedience to rulers in such cases is obedience to God, and disobedience to 
rulers is disobedience to God. In the case of a just war 
...subjects are duty bound to follow, and to devote their life and property, for in 
such a case one must risk his goods and himself for the sake of others. In a war of 
this sort it is both Christian and an act of love to kill the enemy without hesitation, 
to plunder and burn and injure him by every method of warfare until he is 
conquered (except that one must beware of sin, and not violate wives and virgins). 
And when victory has been achieved, one should offer mercy and peace to those 
who surrender and humble themselves.79 
As paradoxical as it seems, participation in a war that is truly just is actually a work of 
love, since it serves God's purpose of peace: 
[W]hen I think of a soldier fulfilling his office by punishing the wicked, killing 
the wicked, and creating so much misery, it seems an un-Christian work 
completely contrary to Christian love. But when I think of how it protects the 
good and keeps and preserves wife and child, house and farm, property, and honor 
and peace, then I see how precious and godly this work is; and I observe that it 
amputates a leg or a hand, so that the whole body may not perish. For if the 
sword were not on guard to preserve peace, everything in the world would be 
ruined because of a lack of peace. Therefore, such a war is only a very brief lack 
of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small 
misfortune that prevents a great misfortune.8°  
War, when just, is actually God's work and activity, not ours: 
...God honors the sword so highly that he says he himself has instituted it [Rom. 
13:1] and does not want men to say or think that they have invented it or instituted 
it. For the hand that wields this sword and kills with it is not man's hand, but 
God's; and it is not man, but God, who hangs, tortures, beheads, kills, and fights. 
All these are God's works and judgments.8I 
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To judge just war justly, therefore, we must keep our eyes fixed on God and on his goal 
and purpose for war, not on our limited and "childish" standards of judgment: 
To sum up, we must, in thinking about a soldier's office, not concentrate on the 
killing, burning, striking, hitting, seizing, etc. This is what children with their 
limited and restricted vision see they regard a doctor as a sawbones who 
amputates, but does not see that he does this only to save the whole body. So too, 
we must look at the office of the soldier, or the sword, with the eyes of an adult 
and see why this office slays and acts so cruelly. Then it will prove itself to be an 
office which, in itself, is godly and as needful and useful to the world as eating or 
drinking or any other work.82 
In this context, it is important to emphasize several additional points. First, 
although Luther is speaking here primarily to Christian princes and soldiers who may be 
troubled in conscience about their participation in the brutal work of war, Luther does not 
mean to say that a just war is conceivable only in the context of a Christian nation or 
under the authority of a Christian prince. "The emperor's sword," says Luther, "has 
nothing to do with the faith; it belongs to physical, worldly things."83 "The emperor is 
not the head of Christendom or defender of the gospel or of the faith;" in fact, "they are 
usually the worst enemies of Christendom and the faith."84 A Christian prince, Luther 
says over and over again, is a "rare bird." "Luther is under no illusions regarding the 
moral quality of the authorities," says Grane. "On the contrary, he believes that the 
greatest number of princes are godless tyrants. This, however, changes nothing regarding 
the authorities' office."85 The God-given duty of rulers is simply to govern and protect 
their subjects: "This would be their duty whether they themselves were Christians or 
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not."86 And the duty of subjects is to obey their rulers—as long as they can do so without 
disobeying God. Thus for Luther: 
The question about the justness of a war thus concerns a monarch's military 
subordinates and not just the monarch himself. Each must make his own 
decision. Here again the judgment about whether a war is just is made personal; 
there is no blind obedience. But all this presupposes that the individual soldier is 
set within a previously existing ethic of orders that is by no means exclusively 
Christian in its expression. It is, however, to be practiced by a Christian when it 
can be done with a good conscience. Everything done in that way is justified by 
the divine demand for obedience.87 
To nail home the point, Luther can even say in the context of the "just war" to quash the 
unjust rebellion of the peasants: "I am called a clergyman and am a minister, but even if 
I served a Turk and saw my lord in danger, I would forget my spiritual office and stab 
and hew as long as my heart beat. If I were slain in so doing, I should go straight to 
heaven."88 Service in a just war is service to God for the sake of peace, regardless of the 
personal faith of the ruler or the moral or political characteristics of the temporal 
authority to which one is bound to submit. 
Yet a second question remains. What if a soldier is not sure whether a particular 
war is or is not just? What if he is uncertain whether his ruler is in the right or in the 
wrong? "So long as they do not know," says Luther, " and cannot with all possible 
diligence fmd out, they may obey him without peril to their souls... and leave the matter 
to God."89 God does not hold us accountable for what we do not and cannot know. What 
is important in such cases is the certainty that we are seeking to be obedient to God: 
"Since we know that our prince is in the right in this case, or at least do not know 
86 On War Against the Turk, 186. 
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otherwise, we are therefore sure and certain that in serving and obeying him we are 
serving God."9° Finally, says Luther, "we have to face the fact that it is impossible to 
establish hard and fast rules" for determining in some absolute sense whether a particular 
war is or is not just.91 To take the just war criteria seriously—as Luther clearly does—is 
not to suggest that judgments in this regard can be made without difficulty, disagreement 
or ambiguity: "There are so many cases and so many exceptions to any rule that it is very 
difficult or even impossible to decide everything accurately and equitably.... If we do not 
make exceptions and strictly follow the law we do the greatest injustice of all."92 Those 
who argue that just war considerations are useful only if all ambiguity can be removed 
are discounting the possibility that it can be useful at all. This view, however, argues 
Luther, actually undermines the cause of peace. 
Luther's Witness Concerning War and Peace As a Witness to Christ 
"For in my heart," writes Luther in his 1535 preface to his lectures on Galatians, 
"there rules this one doctrine, namely, faith in Christ [fides Christi] . From it, through it, 
and to it all my theological thought flows and returns day and night."93 If this is true, and 
if—as we have argued—Luther's discourses on war and peace are also part of his 
"theological thought," then there must be an intimate connection between Luther's 
witness to Christ and his witness to war and peace. And indeed, even a cursory reading 
of Luther's treatises on war and peace will show that they are incomprehensible apart 
from Luther's convictions about the significance and uniqueness of Christ's person and 
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work, even if (in accordance with his primary and specific intent) Luther does not spell 
out in detail in these treatises all of the features and presuppositions inherent in his 
Christology and ecclesiology. 
First, it is important to emphasize once again in this connection that Luther's 
treatises on war and peace are written primarily for professing Christians or for those 
genuinely interested in the "Christian point of view" regarding these matters. Luther has 
no interest in developing arguments based on reason or natural law that will be acceptable 
or comprehensible to those who reject Scripture's teaching concerning the radical nature 
of Christ's person, work and words, and he has no illusions (therefore) about how his 
writings will be received by the vast majority of readers. Since "a Christian is a rare 
bird,"94 no one should be surprised (says Luther) that his teaching on war and peace, like 
his teaching on the Gospel itself, is twisted, distorted, misunderstood and met with 
widespread scorn and ridicule. Those who cannot comprehend the Gospel will not 
comprehend this teaching either; those who will not receive Christ will not receive 
Christ's teaching regarding war and peace. This is the primary reason, says Luther, that 
his writings on the peasants' war were misunderstood: he was writing not as a political 
advisor for rulers in general or as a political commentator for the masses, but he was 
writing as a Christian pastor, teacher and counselor for Christian rulers and subjects 
whose consciences were bound by the word of the Lord Christ: 
I earnestly ask you, and everyone, to read my book fairly, and not run through it 
so hurriedly. Then you will see that I was advising only Christian and pious 
rulers, as befits a Christian preacher. I say it again and for the third time. I was 
writing only for rulers who might wish to deal in a Christian or otherwise honest 
way with their people, to instruct their consciences concerning this matter to the 
effect that they ought to take immediate action against the bands of rebels both 
innocent and guilty. And if they struck the guilty, they were not to let their 
94 Admonition to Peace, 29. 
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consciences trouble them, since they were by the very act confessing that they 
were bound to do their duty to God. Afterward, however, if they won, they were 
to show grace, not only to those whom they considered innocent, but also to the 
guilty as well. 
But these furious, raving, senseless tyrants, who even after the battle cannot get 
their fill of blood, and in all their lives scarcely ask a question about Christ—these 
I did not undertake to instruct. It makes no difference to these bloody dogs 
whether they slay the guilty or innocent, whether they please God or the devil. 
They have the sword, but they use it to vent their lust and self-will. I leave them 
to the guidance of their master, the devil, who is indeed leading them.95  
The underlying concern in all of Luther's treatises on war and peace is a faith-
based desire to take completely seriously the words and the will of the one and only Son 
of God and Savior of the world. Needless to say, those without true faith in Christ would 
hardly be troubled by the central question that motivated these treatises—namely, how 
we can commit ourselves to live in full obedience to radical demands of the One who 
redeemed us from sin, death and hell while also living in faithful obedience to what His 
Word says about the duties and responsibilities of Christian citizens in the secular realm. 
Christ's words in the Sermon on the Mount (about nonresistance, loving one's enemies, 
etc.) dare not be "explained away" (as they were—in different ways—by both the 
"sophists" and the peasants): this makes a liar out of the Son of God himself, with dire 
consequences. Christ "is unwilling to have the least word of [his] set aside, and 
condemns to hell those who do not love their enemies."96 But these words of Christ must 
not be separated from—or elevated above—the equally binding words of Christ given 
elsewhere in Scripture: 
...for there stands our Master, Christ, and subjects us, along with our bodies and 
our property, to the emperor and the law of this world, when he says, "Render to 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's" [Luke 20:25]. Paul, too, speaking in Romans 
12 [13:1] to all baptized Christians, says, "Let every person be subject to the 
95 Open Letter, 84. 
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governing authorities." And Peter says, "Be subject to every ordinance of man" 
[1 Pet. 2:13]. We are bound to live according to this teaching of Christ, as the 
Father commands from heaven, saying, "This is my beloved Son, listen to him" 
[Matt. 7:5] .97 
As indicated earlier, the determination to take both of these "teachings of Christ" 
completely seriously led Luther to his articulation of Scripture's teaching regarding the 
two governments, at the heart of which is a concern to preserve the purity and integrity of 
Scripture's teaching concerning the Gospel of Christ and the kingdom of Christ. All the 
ink Luther expends in writing about the "kingdom of this world" is spilled for the sake of 
clarifying the true nature of the kingdom that Jesus described as "not of this world:" 
Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all the true believers who are in 
Christ and under Christ, for Christ is King and Lord in the kingdom of God....For 
this reason he came into the world, that he might begin God's kingdom and 
establish it in the world. Therefore he says before Pilate, "My kingdom is not of 
the world"....In the gospel he continually refers to the kingdom of God....He also 
calls the gospel a gospel of the kingdom of God; because it teaches, governs, and 
upholds God's kingdom.98  
Both the peasants with their "Gospel-motivated" rebellion and the papists with their 
proposed crusade against the Turks were attacking the Gospel by distorting the true 
nature and purpose of Christ's kingdom. As for the peasants: "You take God's name in 
vain when you pretend to be seeking divine right, and under the pretense of his name 
work contrary to divine right."99 "Because you neither call upon God nor patiently 
endure, but rather help yourselves by your own power and make yourselves your own 
god and savior, God cannot and must not be your God and Savior."m° Worst of all is the 
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claim that waging war against oppressive rulers is condoned, even demanded, by the 
Gospel: 
Your declaration that you teach and live according to the gospel is not true. Not 
one of the articles teaches anything of the gospel. Rather, everything is aimed at 
obtaining freedom for your person and for your property. To sum it up, 
everything is concerned with worldly and temporal matters. You want power and 
wealth so that you will not suffer injustice. The gospel, however, does not 
become involved in the affairs of this world, but speaks of our life in the world in 
terms of suffering, injustice, the cross, patience, and contempt for this life and 
temporal wealth...You are only trying to give your unevangelical and un-
Christian enterprise an evangelical appearance; and you do not see that in doing 
so you are bringing shame upon the holy gospel of Christ, and making it a cover 
for wickedness....If you want to keep on doing these things, then use another 
name and do not ask anyone to call you or think of you as Christians. There is no 
other possibility. 101 
By confusing the two kingdoms the peasants "would put wrath into God's kingdom and 
mercy into the world's kingdom; and that is the same as putting the devil in heaven and 
God in hell."102 Such false teaching Luther is determined to condemn and expose until 
his last breath. 
Equally erroneous and condemnable, in Luther's view, is the idea that war against 
the Turks is to be undertaken and defended "in the name of Christ." "This is absolutely 
contrary to Christ's doctrine and name," says Luther. "This is the greatest of all sins and 
is one that no Turk commits, for Christ's name is used for sin and shame and thus 
dishonored."103 At stake here is the very nature of the "proper office" of Christ and of 
those who bear his name: 
Why should Christ or his people have anything to do with the sword, and kill 
men's bodies, when he declared that he has come to save the world, not to kill 
people [John 3:17]? His work is to deal with the gospel and to redeem men from 
sin and death by his Spirit to help them from this world to everlasting life.104  
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Luther is quick to answer the anticipated objection: 
I say this not because I would teach that worldly rulers ought not be Christians, or 
that a Christian cannot bear the sword and serve God in the temporal government. 
Would to God that they were all Christians...! But what I want to do is to keep a 
distinction between the callings and offices, so that everyone can see to what God 
has called him and fulfill the duties of his office faithfully and sincerely in the 
service of God.'°5  
Ironically, only by "excluding" Christ and the Gospel from the temporal kingdom 
can one hope to serve Christ and the Gospel within the temporal kingdom by performing 
acts of love on behalf of one's neighbor in the civil and social realm. War itself, when 
justified and necessary to serve the cause of peace, can be such an act of love. 
Since a true Christian lives and labors on earth not for himself alone but for his 
neighbor, he does by the very nature of his spirit even what he himself has no 
need of, but is needful and useful to his neighbor. Because the sword is most 
beneficial and necessary for the whole world in order to preserve peace, punish 
sin, and restrain the wicked, the Christian submits most willingly to the rule of the 
sword, pays his taxes, honors those in authority, serves, helps, and does all he can 
to assist the governing authority, that it may continue to function and be held in 
honor and fear.106 
Serving as a judge, lord, prince, constable, hangman, or soldier "is something which you 
do not need, but which is very beneficial and essential for the whole world and for your 
neighbor....the world cannot and dare not dispense with it."1°7 
In this way the two propositions are brought into harmony with one another: at 
one and the same time you satisfy God's kingdom inwardly and the kingdom of 
the world outwardly. You suffer evil and injustice, and yet at the same time you 
punish evil and injustice; you do not resist evil, and yet at the same time you do 
resist it. In the one case, you consider yourself and what is yours; in the other, 
you consider your neighbor and what is his. In what concerns you and yours, you 
govern yourself by the gospel and suffer injustice toward yourself as a true 
Christian; in what concerns the person or property of others, you govern yourself 
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according to love and tolerate no injustice toward your neighbor. The gospel does 
not forbid this; in fact, in other places it actually commands it.108 
Whether we are called to suffer injustice or to fight against injustice in accordance with 
God's word and will in the civil realm, therefore, we do so in obedience to Christ, in 
Christ-like love for our neighbor, and as faithful witnesses to the true nature of Christ's 
kingdom. 
There is clearly a tension here between the Christ-like love in our hearts for all 
people and the actual activities in which we may find it necessary to engage in order to 
defend one neighbor against another. But as Paul Althaus explains, this tension exists in 
the very nature and activity of God himself: 
The tension between our personal attitude and our objective activity for the sake 
of justice, between love in our hearts and the severity of our administration of 
justice, is great indeed. However, the Christian must not be destroyed by this 
tension anymore than God himself is. For, as Luther shows, the same deep 
tension is found in God himself. God administers justice but is at the same time 
nothing else than love itself. God must use force against those who rebel against 
him, and yet his heart burns with love for them. God's love appears in our evil 
world also in the broken form of his wrath—as his "strange work." Thus the 
ethical paradox in which the Christian finds himself when he administers his 
office justly is no more difficult to bear than the theological paradox of God's 
own activity. Indeed, Luther feels that the first paradox is based on the second. 
This clearly shows that his solution of the Christian in political office is not based 
on a compromise. The basis of Luther's solution lies deep in his knowledge of 
God.'°9 
 
When one plumbs the depths of the knowledge of God, one encounters mysteries that 
must simply be confessed, not fully understood—such as the economy of offices and 
activities within the Godhead itself. According to Luther, the same God who instituted 
the kingdom of grace in Christ also instituted the secular kingdom with its swords, 
108 Ibid., 96. 
109 Althaus, 77. 
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offices, laws, judgments, and wars. In terms of his unique salvific work and office, 
however, Christ (says Althaus) 
...does not participate in this secular kingdom. God—and not Christ—institutes 
it. It is therefore certainly God's kingdom but it is not Christ's kingdom. Christ 
is concerned only with the spiritual kingdom. He concerns himself about secular 
government as little as about God's working in nature—as about storms, for 
example. At this point Luther clearly distinguishes between the activity of God 
and the activity of Christ. Not everything that God institutes and works comes 
from Christ. But Christ, although his kingdom is only the spiritual government, 
has very explicitly confirmed that this other secular government is also God's will 
and order.1")  
Thus Luther can say that "God himself is the founder, lord, master, protector, and 
rewarder of both kinds of righteousness"—the righteousness of faith corresponding to the 
spiritual government ruled by Christ through his Word of grace and forgiveness, and the 
temporal righteousness that corresponds to the civil government ruled by earthly 
authorities through reason, law and the sword!" 
Despite the radical differences between these two kinds of righteousnesses and 
their corresponding realms, they are unified with respect to their common (divine) origin. 
On the basis of this unity, Luther can actually speak of the secular government as a 
"picture" or "mask" of the heavenly kingdom of Christ. "God wants the government of 
the world to be a symbol of true salvation and of his kingdom of heaven, like a 
pantomime or a mask."112 Althaus says: 
Thus there is an analogy between secular government and the lordship of Christ, 
between Christ the Lord and secular lords. In both instances to be a lord means to 
11° Ibid., 46-47. 
111 L W46, 100. Luther's understanding of the "two (sometimes three) kinds of righteousness" is itself a 
complex one, especially since this distinction can refer to different theological realities in different 
contexts. In Luther's treatises on war and peace, the contrast is typically between the civil righteousness 
compelled by the law or sword (thus applicable particularly to non-Christians) and the "spiritual" or 
"eternal" righteousness enjoyed by Christians as a gift of God's grace through faith in Christ. We will 
discuss this topic in more detail in part two of our study; for a more extensive treatment, see chapter four of 
the Biermann dissertation cited earlier. 
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be a "helping power." When lordship is properly understood and practiced, lord 
is a pleasant, friendly term even in the world....Therefore is the lords of this 
world wish to be used as helpers and if their subjects wish to use them as such, 
trust must be as much a part of the relationship between lords and subjects as it is 
a part of our relationship to Christ. The fact that someone is my lord means that I 
may rely on him; there is a correspondence between the lordship of Christ and 
that of the lords of this world, even though it is only a relative one. Thus Luther 
establishes a very close relationship between our ethical relationship to political 
authorities and our relationship to God. Both have a common characteristic)" 
This explains Luther's conviction that Christian princes, though rare, have a greater 
opportunity and responsibility to rule well and justly in the secular realm: they are (or 
should be!) in a better position to "translate" the realities of Christ's lordship into the 
(relatively corresponding) realities that exist in temporal government. There is even a 
parallel between the "wrath of God" exhibited in both kingdoms in different ways—but 
always in the service of God's mercy. "The political authorities cannot repudiate the use 
of wrath anymore than the parents of a family or the preacher in his pulpit can do so. 
And just as parents and preachers use 'necessary wrath' as a means of love, so it is also a 
means of God's love when used by political authorities."114 Luther says: "Although the 
severity and wrath of the world's kingdom seems unmerciful, nevertheless, when we see 
it rightly, it is not the least of God's mercies."115 
For Luther, of course, the lordship of Christ in the kingdom of grace and faith 
must always be seen and understood "in the context of the theology of the cross. It is still 
hidden under the 'form of this world.'"116 "The kingdom of Christ," says Luther, "is and 
remains a secret kingdom, concealed from this world, maintained in Word and faith until 
113 Althaus, 55. 
"4 Ibid., 56. 
115 Open Letter, 71. See chapter 6 in part two for a much more extensive discussion of Luther's view of 
"God's merciful wrath" in both realms. 
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the time of its revelation."'" The secular kingdom is ruled and shaped not by Word and 
faith but by human reason and law—but this does not mean that it is not subject to God's 
rule and will. "Reason is obliged to shape the orders in order to fulfill God's strict 
demands"—set forth in his Word and incumbent also on followers of Christ—"that life 
be preserved."'" The devil rages in both governments and seeks to attack and destroy 
God's gracious work in each—Luther is certainly well-versed in Scripture's teaching 
regarding the "powers" of this world and of the demonic kingdom. The way to do battle 
against the devil until the time of the coming of Christ is to maintain the proper 
distinction between the two governments and to recognize, honor, and support God's 
unique and distinctive work in each—all for the ultimate purpose of serving and 
extending the peaceable kingdom of Christ. 
A crucial part of recognizing God's work in the temporal realm, therefore, is 
recognizing that it, too, is often (and in certain respects, always) hidden and 
inscrutable. Just as in Christ's kingdom God's wrath—his "alien work"—ultimately 
serves the "proper work" of leading sinners to the mercy-seat of Christ, so also in the 
temporal realm God's wrath often serves his merciful purposes of providing and 
preserving temporal blessing, order and peace. This recognition is especially important 
for Christians troubled by the harsh and seemingly unloving aspects of their earthly 
vocations. As Wingren points out: 
Even hard and severe measures may be commanded by God. Man is a "mask of 
God." But God is wrath as well as love, hence man may present himself as both 
demanding and giving in relation to others. At one time he may be a mask for 
God's goodness, at another for his severity. He is only doing obediently what he 
is bidden to do. Living in vocation is so constituted that it includes both 
gentleness and severity....Both the love of God and the wrath of God step forth in 
117 Exposition of Psalm 117, LW 14, 30. 
118 Althaus, 80. 
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visible form on earth in the fact that the exercise of vocation comprises this 
ambivalence.119 
The hiddenness of God's work and purposes in this regard requires, on the part of the 
Christian, not only the faithful exercise of his vocation but also the exercise of faith: 
God's wrath is an instrument of his love. To be sure, there can never be a clearly 
evident relation between divine wrath and love, but when cross and suffering 
come upon man he has to believe that God's love is concealed in his wrath. He 
will be able to see the connection only after death. As an officeholder he is often 
in a situation where he has to bring cross and suffering upon others; that is, he has 
to serve as a point through which God's stern law and punitive wrath break 
through. The reaction is like that which occurs when a man himself is smitten by 
God's wrath; reason cannot see how this wrath can be an instrument of God's 
love. Then man is usually unwilling to give himself to an office in which he must 
bring suffering on others, as, for instance, in military service or judicial action, in 
the work of a soldier or an agent of justice. Faith, however, is willing to serve in 
this way, for it has learned that God's love is veiled under law. Faith trusts that 
the mandate of a man's vocation leads to something good; behind all stations and 
offices stands the Creator, who is none other than the God of the gospel. So even 
severe action is something which a Christian can freely will, certain about God's 
command.12° 
The Church in Luther's Witness Concerning War and Peace  
A superficial reading of Luther's treatises on Temporal Authority and Whether 
Soldiers, Too, May Be Saved may result in the conclusion that Luther is dealing here 
primarily with questions of individual Christian ethics—that he is offering a theological 
framework for individual Christians (whether soldiers, princes, pastors, or peasants) to 
make God-pleasing decisions about participating in or supporting specific activities in 
which the use of force or violence is involved. A more thoughtful reading of these 
treatises will reveal, however, that Luther is concerned with much more than individual 
decisions made by individual Christians in particular situations. He is deeply—if not 
119 Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1957), 
232. Cf. Althaus, 45. 
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primarily—concerned to clarify the true nature of the church in the face of false 
understandings of it that threatened to do great damage to its unique and irreplaceable 
mission on earth. 
Both the "papists" and the "radical reformers" of Luther's day fell into the trap of 
identifying Christ's church with an external institution or assembly—an "association of 
external ties and rites like other civic organizations"I21—rather than as "the assembly of 
saints in which the gospel is taught purely and the sacraments are administered 
This led to inevitable misunderstandings regarding the church's relationship 
to civil government and about the use of the sword by the church or by members of the 
church. 
Luther's first concern in Temporal Authority, therefore, is to clarify the true 
nature of the church by distinguishing it from the world on the basis of faith in Christ (or 
lack thereof): "We must divide the children of Adam and all mankind into two classes, 
the first belonging to the kingdom of God, the second to the kingdom of the world."123 
The first consists only of "real Christians," "true believers," who—as Christians—have 
no use or need for the sword. 
....Christ did not wield the sword, or give it a place in his kingdom. For he is a 
king over Christians and rules by his Holy Spirit alone, without law. Although he 
sanctions the sword, he did not make use of it, for it serves no purpose in his 
kingdom....Christians, among themselves and by and for themselves, need no law 
or sword, since it is neither necessary nor useful for them.I24 
However: 
Since a true Christian lives and labors on earth not for himself alone but for his 
neighbor, he does by the very nature of his spirit even what he himself has no 
121 ,4p VIUVIII, 5. 
122 AC VII, 1-2. 
123 Temporal Authority, 88. 
124 Aid, 93-94. 
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need of, but is needful and useful for his neighbor. Because the sword is most 
beneficial and necessary for the whole world in order to preserve peace, punish 
sin, and restrain the wicked, the Christian submits most willingly to the rule of the 
sword, pays his taxes, honors those in authority, serves, helps, and does all he can 
to assist the governing authority, that it may continue to function and be held in 
honor and fear.125 
True Christians are few and far between: "the whole world is evil and...among 
thousands there is scarcely a true Christian."I26 "The world and the masses are and 
always will be un-Christian, even if they are all baptized and Christian in name."127 
Christ's little flock, the church, is not called by God to rule over this fallen world by the 
law or by the Gospel: 
[I]t is out of the question that there should be a common Christian government 
over the whole world, or indeed over a single country or any considerable body of 
people, for the wicked always outnumber the good. Hence, a man who would 
venture to govern an entire country or the world with the gospel would be like a 
shepherd who should put together in one fold wolves, lions, eagles, and sheep, 
and let them mingle freely with one another....The sheep would doubtless keep 
the peace and allow themselves to be fed and governed peacefully, but they would 
not live long, nor would one beast survive another.128 
For this reason, says Luther, 
...one must carefully distinguish between these two governments. Both must be 
permitted to remain; the one to produce righteousness, the other to bring about 
external peace and prevent evil deeds. Neither one is sufficient in the world 
without the other. No one can become righteous in the sight of God by means of 
the temporal government, without Christ's spiritual government. Christ's 
government does not extend over all men; rather, Christians are always a minority 
in the midst of non-Christians.129 
The church is "spiritual," but that does not mean that it is not real or locatable. 
Christ rules over his church on earth by "God's Word and Spirit," and the church can be 
125 /bid, 94. 
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found wherever Christ's "spiritual rulers" are "busily occupied with the spiritual sword, 
the Word of God," through which Christ himself is at work "always bestowing God's 
Word and Spirit."130 This is "the truly peaceful kingdom of Christ," the actual fulfillment 
of Old Testament prophecies such as Isaiah 2:4 and 11:9: 
This is what the prophets mean in Psalm 110 [:3], "Your people will act of their 
free volition"; and in Isaiah 11 [:9], "They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy 
mountain"; and again in Isaiah 2 [:4], "They shall beat their swords into 
plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks, and no one shall lift up the sword 
against another, neither shall they put their efforts into war anymore," etc. 
Whoever would extend the application of these and similar passages to wherever 
Christ's name is mentioned, would entirely pervert the Scripture; rather, they are 
spoken only of true Christians, who really do this among themselves.I31  
The peaceable witness of Christ's truly peaceful kingdom is especially crucial 
during times of war. One must not confuse Luther's affirmation of the offices of prince 
and soldier as God-pleasing vocations (vocations that Christians may also occupy 
"without sin") with Luther's insistence that the church as church has a radically different 
calling and is involved in a radically different conflict, a calling that is all the more 
crucial during times of political turbulence and military conflict. In a time of war, such 
as the possibly imminent war against the Turks, "Sir Christian" 
...should be there first with his army... that is, [with] the pious, holy, precious 
body of Christians. They are the people who have the arms for this war and they 
know how to use them. If the Turk's god, the devil, is not beaten first, there is 
reason to fear that the Turk will not be so easy to beat. Now the devil is a spirit 
who cannot be beaten with armor, muskets, horses, and men, and God's wrath 
cannot be allayed by them.... Christian weapons and power must do it.132 
It is important to recognize that in identifying the devil as the "Turk's god," 
Luther is in no way suggesting that God himself is clearly "on the side" of those battling 
13° Ibid., 100-101. 
131 Ibid., 93. 
132 On War Against the Turk, 170. 
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the Turks (i.e., the emperor, the pope, Germany, etc.). The devil rules among the papacy, 
among the princes, and among the Germans in general just as surely and powerfully as he 
rules among the Turks. Luther expects no "miracle or special grace of God for 
Germany;"133 in fact, the Turks may well be a "rod of God" to bring well-deserved 
judgment upon the pope, the emperor, and the nation of Germany for their many sins. 
But since this is a matter of God's hidden will, "Sir Christian," the church, is simply to go 
about the business God has given it to do—which means bearing witness, in the midst of 
a warring world, to the peaceful kingdom of Christ and fighting valiantly against the 
devil's kingdom with the weapons provided by God himself (Eph. 6). 
This fight must begin, says Luther, "with repentance, and we must reform our 
lives."134 This is not child's play—it requires discipline, careful attention to God's Word 
and daily practice and exhortation: 
I know that to the scholars and saints who need no repentance this advice of mine 
will be laughable since they have long since passed beyond, nevertheless, I have 
not been willing to omit it for the sake of myself and of sinners like myself, who 
need both repentance and exhortation to repentance every day. In spite of it, we 
remain all too lazy and lax, and have not, with those ninety and nine just persons, 
got so far as they let themselves think they have.I35  
Along with true repentance, the next weapon the church needs to employ in its fight 
against the devil is prayer: 
After people have thus been taught and exhorted to confess their sin and amend 
their ways they should then be most diligently exhorted to prayer and shown that 
such prayer pleases God, that he has commanded it and promise to hear it, and 
that no one ought to think lightly of his own praying or have doubts about it, but 
with firm faith be sure that it will be heard.13' 
133 Ibid.,184. 
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The preaching of God's Word is also essential—so essential, in fact, that "it rests entirely 
upon the preachers whether the people shall amend their ways and pray or not," for where 
God's Word is spoken, it is not without fruit."137 In sum, "Sir Christian," the church, 
...is not to fight physically with the Turk, as the pope and his followers teach; nor 
is he to resist the Turk with the fist, but he is to recognize the Turk as God's rod 
and wrath which Christians must either suffer, if God visits their sins upon them, 
or fight against and drive away with repentance, tears, and prayer. Let whoever 
will despise this counsel despise 
"They call me and my followers seditious," says Luther, 
...but when have I ever coveted the sword or urged men to take it, and not rather 
taught and kept peace and obedience, except when I have instructed and exhorted 
the regular temporal rulers to do their duty and maintain peace and justice? One 
knows the tree by its fruits [Matt. 7:16]. I and my followers keep and teach 
peace....139 
The church bears witness in and to the world, therefore, by doing the "peaceful 
work" God has given it to do: preaching, teaching, baptizing, gathering around the Lord's 
Table to receive his gifts, worshipping, repenting, praying, living holy lives, and 
performing good works. It is not the church's job, according to Luther, to "control 
history"—that is God's business and it must be entrusted to him. Yet the church's 
witness is not contradicted or compromised when Christians serve, in obedience to God 
himself, in offices and vocations that involve them in the justifiable use of force in the 
temporal realm. In doing so they serve both God and their neighbor by helping to 
preserve and protect the temporal peace so necessary for life in this world—and for the 
work of Christ's kingdom. From Luther's perspective, 
The kingdom of Christ...could not exist in this world apart from the varied 
functioning of the secular government. The institution of marriage creates new 
members for Christendom; the political authorities create the peace which the 
137 Ibid., 174. 
138 Ibid., 184. 
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congregation of Christ needs to carry out its task. Christendom does not have the 
resources to establish this peace. It has only the gospel. And we cannot rule the 
world according to the gospel in such a way that we could do without secular 
government and the state....Christians are always a minority; the power of evil 
continues to exist. And the Christian community will never finish its battle 
against evil. Rejecting political authority and expecting everything to come from 
the gospel "would be like loosing the ropes and chains of the savage wild 
beasts."140 
On the other hand: 
The secular government needs the spiritual government as much as the spiritual 
government needs the secular. For no society properly maintains law and order 
and continues to be blessed if it lacks that knowledge of God and his truth which 
the spiritual government provides. Only the proclamation of the word permits us 
to recognize properly and respect secular government and the various stations of 
society as God's work and will. The office of preaching helps the authorities to 
preserve peace and order by instructing all stations concerning God's will for 
them and by teaching "obedience, morals, discipline and honor." The secular 
government by itself can indeed force people to behave well outwardly, but it 
cannot make the heart righteous. Where secular government works by itself, 
therefore, it produces only hypocrisy and outward obedience without the proper 
attitude of the heart to God.141  
It is clear from his treatises On War Against the Turk that Luther is not opposed, 
in principle, to giving direct political and military advice to secular rulers. If those in 
authority should insist on fighting the Turks, says Luther, "my advice...is that we not 
insufficiently arm ourselves and send our poor Germans off to be slaughtered."142 The 
Turks' military strength is grossly underestimated by an overconfident emperor and 
nation, warns Luther. Almost anything would be better than "useless bloodshed:" 
If we are not going to make an adequate, honest resistance that will have some 
reserve power, it would be far better not to begin a war, but to yield lands and 
people to the Turk in time, without useless bloodshed, rather than have him win 
anyhow in an easy battle and with shameful bloodshed.143 
140 Althaus, 60. 
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But Luther offers this advice as an individual who is "not qualified to give instruction on 
this point,"144 not as one who presumes to "speak for the church" or (much less!) to 
"speak for God" on this issue. His primary concern is to make it clear—and this on the 
basis of God's Word—that "it is not right for the pope, who wants to be a Christian, and 
the highest and best Christian at that, to lead a church army, or army of Christians, for the 
church ought not to strive or fight with the sword."I45 The very nature of Christ's church 
as God's "peaceable kingdom" is at stake here, and when God's Word speaks Luther 
cannot remain silent. Luther's closing words provide not only his clear witness before 
God and the world regarding this war and all wars like it, but they also serve as a 
reminder that certain aspects of the work of Christ himself are portrayed by Scripture in a 
way that contrasts quite sharply with its portrayal of the suffering, resignation and non-
resistance displayed so wondrously on the cross. The consummation of the church's 
redemption by the blood of Christ will not be accomplished apart from a bloody 
judgment on the Last Day: 
With this I have saved my conscience. This book shall be my witness concerning 
the measure and manner in which I advise war against the Turk. If anyone wishes 
to proceed otherwise, let him do so, win or lose. I shall neither enjoy his victory 
nor pay for his defeat, but I shall be innocent of all the blood that will be shed in 
vain. I know that this book will not make the Turk a gracious lord to me should it 
come to his attention; nevertheless, I have wished to tell my Germans the truth, so 
far as I know it, and to give faithful counsel and service to the grateful and the 
ungrateful alike. If it helps, it helps; if it does not, then may our dear Lord Jesus 
Christ help and come down from heaven with the Last Judgment and strike down 
both Turk and pope, together with all tyrants and the godless, and deliver us from 
all sins and from all evil. Amen.146 
144 Ibid., 201. 
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Luther's Christological and Ecclesial Presuppositions 
Regarding Luther's attitude and approach to Holy Scripture Paul Althaus writes: 
Luther does not ignore the manifold character of Holy Scripture. He notes the 
different styles with which the apostles wrote and also the different ways in which 
they taught. He knows that the rich content of the Bible includes laws, historical 
accounts, prayers, proclamation, prophecy, etc. However, taken theologically, 
and that means in terms of its essential theme, Luther sees the Bible as a great 
unity. It has only one content. That is Christ. "There is no doubt [insists Luther] 
that all the Scripture points to Christ alone." "Take Christ out of the Scriptures 
and what more will you find in them?" "All of Scripture everywhere deals only 
with Christ." Christ is the incarnate Word of God. Therefore the Bible can be the 
word of God only if its sole and entire content is Christ.147 
This observation by Althaus corresponds to Luther's claim (cited earlier) that, for him, 
"there rules this one doctrine, namely, faith in Christ. From it, through it, and to it all my 
theological thought flows and returns day and night."148 
For Luther, therefore—no less than for Yoder and Hauerwas—Scripture's 
teaching about Christ is (properly and theologically speaking) at the heart and center of 
Scripture's teaching about war and peace, even if this centrality is not always readily or 
obviously apparent (just as it is not always readily apparent in the case of many other 
important teachings of Scripture). One can hardly "remove Christ" from Luther's 
writings on war and peace and (cf. Yoder's comment in Nevertheless) "retain the 
substance" of Luther's approach to these issues.149 As we have seen, for Yoder and 
Hauerwas "non-violent resistance" is inextricably bound to the essential meaning and 
message of the life and death of Christ, and the cross of Christ is the "one and only point" 
at which Christians (in and through their peaceable life together in the world) are called 
to imitate Christ. Luther, too (especially in his essays on the Peasants' War) frequently 
147 The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 74. 
148 Lectures on Galatians, LW27, 145. 
149 See Nevertheless, 124. 
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emphasizes the fact that Christians are called by God to imitate Christ by facing and 
enduring suffering (even death) just as Jesus did. On the basis of his understanding of the 
two realms and Scripture's doctrine of vocation, however, Luther comes to different 
conclusions about whether or not a Christian may participate in violence under any 
circumstances and still remain faithful to the "messianic ethic" of Jesus. In the final 
section of this chapter, we seek to articulate more clearly and explicitly the Christological 
and ecclesial presuppositions underlying Luther's approach to issues of war and peace—
presuppositions that are often more implicit than explicit in those writings themselves. 
If The Politics of Jesus and The Peaceable Kingdom contain the clearest, simplest 
and most "confessional" presentation of Yoder and Hauerwas's Christological and 
ecclesial presuppositions, then the clearest, simplest and most confessional presentation 
of Luther's Christological and ecclesial presuppositions can be found in his catechetical 
writings. The basic Christological and ecclesial presuppositions underlying Luther's 
writings on war and peace during the mid-late 1520s are set forth straightforwardly, 
simply and systematically in these catechetical writings formulated during the same 
general time period (especially during the years 1528-1529). Just as Luther's writings on 
war and peace contain little explicit discussion of such topics as "the meaning and 
purpose of Christ's death on the cross" or "the relationship between Christology and 
ecclesiology," so also it is true that Luther's catechetical writings contain little explicit 
discussion of such questions as "the Christian attitude toward war and peace" or "the 
possibility of Christian support for and/or participation in acts of violence." But this 
does not mean that these catechetical writings are not relevant to the issue of war and 
peace—one could make the argument, in fact, that they are the best and most appropriate 
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starting point for a discussion of Luther's perspective on this issue. This is so not only 
because they set forth in a simple and straightforward way the foundational theological 
(Christocentric) presuppositions that undergird all of Luther's theology and ethics, but 
also because they do so in a way that demonstrates the unified, organic nature of his 
theological thought, demonstrating (for example) the relationship between the three 
articles of the Creed (i.e., God's work in creation, the redemptive work of Christ, and the 
sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit) and the relationship between the three articles of the 
Creed and the other "chief parts" of the Christian faith (e.g., the Ten Commandments and 
the Lord's Prayer, with all of their implications for such issues as Christian vocation and 
Christian obedience to earthly authorities; also Baptism, the Lord's Supper and 
Confession and Absolution, with all of their implications for ecclesiology and the life and 
mission of the church). 
We noted earlier in our study Frederic Cleve's observation that Luther's writings 
on war and peace "cover a wide variety of important [and inter-related] theological 
issues," such as "Luther's view of the human being, God's struggle against the devil, the 
question of the human being's conscience and eternal salvation, the interpretation of 
God's commandments and sacred institutions, justification and the doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms."15° In a concise yet profound way, Luther's catechisms address each of these 
issues and offer insight into the inter-relationship between them, centered always around 
Scripture's teaching about Christ and the Gospel. Our intention in the final section of this 
chapter is not (of course) to address all of these topics in detail, but rather (for the 
purpose of comparison and contrast with the views of Yoder and Hauerwas) to make use 
Is° Cleve, 80. 
149 
of Luther's catechisms (especially The Large Catechism) as a primary resource for 
summarizing the Christological and ecclesial presuppositions underlying his 
understanding of the nature and limits of earthly authority and the nature and limits of 
Christian duty and responsibility when it comes to the issue of war and peace. The 
summary that follows employs the same categories and headings as were used in chapter 
two in summarizing the views of Yoder and Hauerwas, and (at key points) compares and 
contrasts Luther's views with those of Yoder and Hauerwas. Both of these summaries 
will be useful in connection with our attempt in the next part of the study to offer a 
Lutheran appraisal of the Christological and ecclesial pacifism of Hauerwas. 
The Meaning and Purpose of Christ's Life, Suffering, and Death on the Cross 
Whenever and wherever in his writings on war and peace Luther refers to the 
"rule" or "Lordship" or "government" of Christ, the Christ of which Luther speaks is the 
Christ depicted as follows in The Large Catechism: 
If anyone asks, "What do you believe in the second article [of the Creed] about 
Jesus Christ?" answer as briefly as possible, "I believe that Jesus Christ, true Son 
of God, has become my Lord." What is it "to become a lord?" It means that he 
has redeemed and released me from sin, from the devil, from death, and from all 
misfortune. Before this I had no lord or king, but was captive under the power of 
the devil. I was condemned to death and entangled in sin and blindness. 151  
Like Yoder and Hauerwas, therefore, Luther can (and often does) speak of the problem of 
sin as "captivity" to the rebellious "powers" of Satan and his minions, and he can and 
often does portray Christ as coming to "release" and "liberate" fallen humankind from 
the devil's dominion. The nature and consequences of Satan's power, however, are 
viewed by Luther in a way that is quite different from that of Yoder and Hauerwas. 
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For when we were created by God the Father and had received from him all kinds 
of good things, the devil came and led us into disobedience, sin, death, and all 
misfortune. As a result, we lay under God's wrath and displeasure, sentenced to 
eternal damnation, as we had merited and deserved it. There was no counsel, no 
help, no comfort for us until this only and eternal Son of God, in his unfathomable 
goodness, had mercy on us because of our misery and distress and came from 
heaven to help us.152 
For Luther, the primary problem brought about by humankind's fall into sin is not 
"subjection to the rebellious powers of a fallen world;" rather, it is a depraved and 
deformed human nature which is bound to live in "disobedience" to God, and which 
therefore merits "God's wrath and displeasure" and "eternal damnation." Yoder and 
Hauerwas, by contrast, rarely if ever speak of "God's wrath against disobedient sinners" 
as a (much less the) major problem of human existence, which has significant 
implications not only for their understanding of the nature of Christ's work on the cross 
but also for their understanding of God's work in the world. 
Since (for Luther) the problem of sin is essentially a problem of rebellion against 
and alienation from a holy (yet loving) God, the essential nature and central purpose of 
Christ's saving work is seen as rendering "payment" or "satisfaction" for the sin of the 
world, vanquishing the threat of divine judgment, and restoring human beings to a right 
relationship with a just and righteous God based on his grace alone. 
Let this be the summary of this article, that the little word "Lord" simply means 
the same as Redeemer, that is, he who has brought us back from the devil to God, 
from death to life, from sin to righteousness, and keeps us there. The remaining 
parts of this article simply serve to clarify and express how much and by what 
means this redemption was accomplished—that is, how much it cost Christ and 
what he paid and risked in order to win us and bring us under his dominion. That 
is to say, he became a human creature, conceived and born without sin, of the 
Holy Spirit and the Virgin, so that he might become Lord over sin; moreover, he 
suffered, died and was buried so that he might make satisfaction for me and pay 
what I owed, not with silver and gold but with his own precious blood.153 
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Those tyrants and jailers have now been routed, and their place has been taken by 
Jesus Christ, the Lord of life, righteousness, and every good and blessing. He has 
snatched us, poor lost creatures, from the jaws of hell, won us, made us free, and 
restored us to the Father's favor and grace. As his own possession he has taken us 
under his protection and shelter, in order that he may rule us by his righteousness, 
wisdom, power, life and blessedness.154 
This is the reason Christ came into the world: to establish his grace-based "rule of 
righteousness" by paying the debt of human sin and appeasing God's wrath against 
sinners by his sacrificial death on the cross. It is this understanding of the meaning and 
purpose of Christ's life and death that underlies Luther's view of the "kingdom of God" 
in Temporal Authority and in his other writings on war and peace: 
Those who belong to the kingdom of God are all the true believers who are in 
Christ and under Christ, for Christ is King and Lord in the kingdom of God....For 
this reason he came into the world, that he might begin God's kingdom and 
establish it in the world. Therefore he says before Pilate, "My kingdom is not of 
the world".... In the gospel he continually refers to the kingdom of God....He 
also calls the gospel a gospel of the kingdom of God; because it teaches, governs, 
and upholds God's kingdom.155 
The Significance of Christ's Cross for Christian Faith and Life 
For Luther, the central theme of Scripture's Christology is that "the work [of 
redemption] is finished and completed; Christ has acquired and won the treasure for us by 
his sufferings, death and resurrection."156 Our response to the work of Christ on the 
cross, therefore, is not first of all to "imitate Christ" or to "follow his example," but rather 
to trust and confess: "I believe that Jesus Christ, true Son of God, has become my 
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Lord."I57 In Luther's understanding of "the significance of Christ's cross for Christian 
faith and life," faith clearly takes precedence: 
I believe that Jesus Christ, true God, begotten of the Father in eternity, and also a 
true human being, born of the Virgin Mary, is my Lord. He has redeemed me, a 
lost and condemned human being. He has purchased and freed me from all sins, 
from death, and from the power of the devil, not with gold or silver but with his 
holy, precious blood and with his innocent suffering and death.158 
This does not mean, however, that the redemptive work of Christ has no 
significance for the Christian life. On the contrary: 
He has done all this in order that I may belong to him, live under him in his 
kingdom, and serve him in eternal righteousness, innocence, and blessedness, just 
as he is risen from the dead and lives and rules eternally.159  
In terms of sheer quantity, in fact, Luther devotes as much (or even more) attention in 
both catechisms to a discussion of what it means to "live under Christ in his kingdom, 
and serve him in eternal righteousness, innocence, and blessedness" as he does to the 
central issue of faith in Christ. In describing the kind of life that God demands and 
desires, Luther (at least in his catechetical writings) points us primarily to the Ten 
Commandments, which teach us how we are to "fear, love and trust" in God above all 
things and how we are to imitate Christ by serving our neighbor in love—namely, how 
"we are to be subordinate to, honor, and obey father and mother, masters, and all in 
authority, not on their own account but for God's sake."16° For Luther, the divine 
requirement to honor and obey those in authority—rooted not only in the fourth but also 
ultimately in the first commandment—extends also (within certain Scriptural limits) to 
157 /bid., 27; emphasis added. 
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the "governing authorities." These commands, moreover, are sanctioned and repeated by 
Christ himself, our Savior, Lord, and Master: 
...for there stands our Master, Christ, and subjects us, along with our bodies and 
our property, to the emperor and the law of this world, when he says, "Render to 
Caesar the things that are Caesar's" [Luke 20:25]. Paul, too, speaking in Romans 
12 [13:1] to all baptized Christians, says, "Let every person be subject to the 
governing authorities." And Peter says, "Be subject to every ordinance of man" 
[1 Pet. 2:13]. We are bound to live according to this teaching of Christ, as the 
Father commands from heaven, saying, "This is my beloved Son, listen to him" 
[matt 7:5].161 
The Ten Commandments, along with other clear passages of Scripture that require 
obedience to God and his earthly representatives, 
...are not human trifles but the commandments of the most high Majesty, who 
watches over them with great earnestness, who is angry and punishes those who 
despise them, and, on the contrary, abundantly rewards those who keep them. 
Where people consider this and take it to heart, there will arise a spontaneous 
impulse and desire gladly to do God's will.162 
"Each of us," therefore, "is to make them a matter of daily practice in all circumstances, 
in all activities and dealings, as if they were written everywhere we look, even wherever 
we go or wherever we stand."163 
One can hardly accuse Luther of not taking the issue of the Christian life 
seriously; he can even say that "we should prize and value [the Ten Commandments] 
above all other teachings as the greatest treasure God has given us."164 This remarkable 
sentence, however, immediately precedes his treatment of the Creed in The Large 
Catechism, which (says Luther) points us to Christ, teaches us about faith and imparts 
faith to us, and in this way gives us "help to do what the Ten Commandments require of 
161 Against the Peasants, 51. 
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us. Moreover, this emphasis on the Christian life does not end with Luther's 
treatment of the Creed; it continues in his treatment of the Lord's Prayer, Baptism, the 
Lord's Supper, and Confession and Absolution, all of which (according to Luther) have 
significant implications for the individual lives of those who rest securely in God's grace 
through faith in the cross of Christ—and for the corporate life of Christ's "set apart" 
people, the church. 
It is clear from Luther's writings on war and peace, moreover, that living in 
submission to earthly authorities in obedience to God's command may well involve the 
willingness to endure great suffering at the hands of tyrants or as the result of the need to 
disobey earthly laws that conflict with God's law. To the peasants who were determined 
to defend their "Gospel-based rights" with the sword, Luther says: 
Listen, then, dear Christians, to your Christian law! Your Supreme Lord Christ, 
whose name you bear, says in Matthew 6, "Do not resist one who is evil. If 
anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles. If anyone wants to take 
your coat, let him have your cloak too. If anyone strikes you on one cheek, offer 
him the other too." Do you hear this, 0 Christian association? How does your 
program stand in light of this law? You do not want to endure evil or suffering, 
but rather want to be free and to experience only goodness and justice. However, 
Christ says that we should not resist evil or injustice but always yield, suffer, and 
let things be taken from us. If you will not bear this law, then lay aside the name 
of Christian and claim another name that accords with your actions.166 
In this same context, Luther points directly to the example of Christ himself: 
What did he do when they took his life on the cross and thereby took away from 
him the work of preaching for which God himself had sent him as a blessing for 
the souls of men? He did just what St. Peter says. He committed the whole 
matter to him who judges justly, and he endured this intolerable wrong [1 Pet. 
2:23]. More than that, he prayed for his persecutors and said, "Father, forgive 
them, for they know not what they do" [Luke 23:34].167 
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"Christians," says Luther, 
...do not fight for themselves with sword and musket, but with the cross and 
suffering, just as Christ, our leader, does not bear a sword, but hangs on the cross. 
Your victory, therefore, does not consist in conquering and reigning, or in the use 
of force, but in defeat and weakness, as St. Paul says in II Corinthians 1 [10:4], 
"The weapons of our warfare are not material, but are the strength which comes 
from God," and, "Power is made perfect in weakness" [II Cor. 12:9].168 
On the other hand (as we have also clearly seen in the writings of Luther), obedience to 
earthly authorities may also (under certain circumscribed circumstances) involve 
participation in justified violence—not in an effort to "defend Christ and the Gospel," nor 
in an effort to defend one's self, but as a way of defending one's neighbor from 
unjustified violence through the performance of one's God-given vocation within the 
scope of God's rule in the secular realm. 
The Relationship Between Christology and Ecclesiology 
For Luther as for Hauerwas, there is a vital and inseparable link between 
Christology and ecclesiology, and in each case the nature of that link is inextricably tied 
to their distinct understandings of the nature of Christ's "liberating" and "peace-creating" 
work. Yoder and Hauerwas emphasize that Jesus is "the bearer of a new possibility of 
human, social, and therefore political relationships."169 "The cross of Christ is the model 
of social efficacy, the power of God for those who believe."17° Because of his concern 
to challenge and correct serious distortions of the redemptive work of Christ present in 
the church of his day, Luther places primary emphasis on Christ's cross as the means 
through which Christ "purchased and won" forgiveness for lost and condemned sinners, 
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making it possible for us to be "declared righteous" and restored to a right ("peaceable") 
relationship with God. For Luther too, however, this understanding of the cross has 
definite ecclesiological implications; the third article follows hard and fast upon the 
second: 
Just as the Son obtains dominion by purchasing us through his birth, death, and 
resurrection, etc., so the Holy Spirit effects our being made holy through the 
following: the community of saints or the Christian church, the forgiveness of 
sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. That is, he first leads us 
into his holy community, placing us in the church's lap, where he preaches to us 
and brings us to Christ. I71  
The church, says Luther, is a "unique community in the world," it is "the mother 
that begets and bears every Christian through the Word of God... through which he 
illuminates and inflames hearts so that they grasp and accept it, cling to it, and persevere 
in it."172 Because faith in God's (incarnate and written) Word is the constitutive element 
of membership in Christ's church, however, its presence and existence in this world is 
always (like faith itself) "hidden" in significant ways. It is hidden in the sense that its 
true nature cannot be grasped by "human wisdom, understanding, and reason."I73 But it 
is also hidden in the sense that it cannot be identified (even by Christians) with any 
particular earthly institution. This church that Luther describes as "called together by the 
Holy Spirit in one faith, mind and understanding" and "united in love without sect or 
schism" truly exists, but its precise boundaries cannot be determined.I74 Therefore we 
must always confess: "I believe that there is on earth a little flock and community of pure 
saints under one head, Christ."I75  
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This "holy flock" or "pure community," Luther emphasizes repeatedly, is holy in 
a twofold sense. It is holy (first and most importantly) because "God's grace has been 
acquired by Christ, and holiness has been wrought by the Holy Spirit through God's 
Word in the unity of the Christian church," despite the fact that "we are never without sin 
because we carry our flesh around our neck."176 But it is also holy in the sense that 
through his Word and sacraments God "creates and increases holiness, causing it daily to 
grow and become strong in the faith and in its fruits, which the Spirit produces."m 
"Although we have sin, the Holy Spirit sees to it that it does not harm us because we are a 
part of this Christian community. Here there is full forgiveness of sins, both in that God 
forgives us and that we forgive, bear with, and aid one another."178 Therefore, writes 
Luther, "we believe in him who daily brings us into this community through the Word, 
and imparts, increases and strengthens faith through the same Word and the forgiveness 
of sins."179 
The Mission of the Church in and to the World 
Like Yoder and Hauerwas, Luther views the church as a radically unique 
community within the world—there is no community like it. The constitutive element of 
its uniqueness is not, however (as for Yoder and Hauerwas), its "social style 
characterized by... the rejection of violence of any kind," but rather its radically unique, 
faith-based understanding of the true nature of God and his attitude toward sinners 
revealed and hidden in the cross of Christ: 
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These three articles of the Creed, therefore, separate and distinguish us Christians 
from all other people on earth. All who are outside this Christian people, 
whether heathen, Turks, Jews, or false Christians and hypocrites—even though 
they believe in and worship only the one, true God—nevertheless do not know 
what his attitude is toward them. They cannot be confident of his love and 
blessing, and therefore they remain in eternal wrath and condemnation. For they 
do not have the Lord Christ, and besides, they are not illuminated and blessed by 
the gifts of the Holy Spirit.18° 
The primary mission of the church, therefore, is to pray that God's kingdom—his 
rule of grace through Christ in the church—would "come among us," and to make 
faithful use of the divine means that God has entrusted to it so that this kingdom might be 
extended and enlarged throughout the world by the power of his Word and Spirit at work 
in his church. 
We ask here [in the second petition of the Lord's Prayer] that all this may be 
realized in us and that his name may be praised through God's holy Word and 
Christian living. This we ask, both in order that we who have accepted it may 
remain faithful and grow daily in it and also in order that it may find approval and 
gain followers among other people and advance with power throughout the world. 
In this way many, led by the Holy Spirit, may come into the kingdom of grace and 
become partakers of redemption, so that we may all remain eternally in this 
kingdom that has now begun.181 
As the church carries out this mission in faithfulness to God's Word and will, it must 
expect to face (as did Jesus himself) suffering, opposition, and persecution at the hands of 
those help captive by the power of Satan, who is determined to thwart the spread of 
God's Word and the extension of his kingdom on earth: 
We who would be Christians must surely expect to have the devil with all his 
angels and the world as our enemies and must expect that they will inflict every 
possible misfortune and grief upon us. For where God's Word is preached, 
accepted, or believed, and bears fruit, there the holy and precious cross will also 
not be far behind. And let no one think that we will have peace; rather, we must 
sacrifice all we have on earth—possessions, honor, house and farm, spouse and 
children, body and life.'82  
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Here once again we refer to Luther's admonition to the peasants to be faithful to Christ's 
own example and teaching: 
This is what Christ taught in Matthew 10 [:23]: "When they persecute you in one 
town, flee to the next." He does not say, "When they persecute you in one town, 
stay there and take over the town by force and rebel against the ruler of the 
town—all to the praise of the gospel."... [Furthermore] in II Corinthians 4 [I Cor. 
4:11] Paul says that we are homeless. And if it does happen that a Christian must, 
for the sake of the gospel, constantly move from one place to another, and leave 
all his possessions behind him, or even if his situation is very uncertain and he has 
to move at any moment, he is only experiencing what is appropriate for a 
Christian. For because he will not suffer the gospel to be taken or kept from him, 
he has to let his city, town, property, and everything that he is and has be taken 
and kept from him.183 
"If you were Christians," says Luther, "you would stop threatening and resisting with fist 
and sword. Instead, you would continually abide by the Lord's Prayer and say, 'Thy will 
be done,' and, 'Deliver us from evil, Amen.'"184 
In commending our prayers for God's kingdom to come and his will to be done in 
The Large Catechism, Luther finds an analogy between God's spiritual government and 
earthly governments: 
In a good government there is need not only for good builders and rulers, but also 
for defenders, protectors, and vigilant guardians. So here also; although we have 
prayed for what is most necessary—for the gospel, for faith, and for the Holy 
Spirit, that he may govern us who have been redeemed from the power of the 
devil—we must also pray that God cause his will to be done. If we try to hold 
these treasures fast, we will have to suffer an astonishing number of attacks and 
assaults from all who venture to hinder and thwart the fulfillment of the first two 
petitions.185 
This recognition of the relentless battle between God's kingdom and Satan's kingdom 
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underlies Luther's comment in On War Against the Turk that in times of temporal peace 
as well as in times of earthly strife and conflict, "Sir Christian" 
...should be there first with his army... that is, [with] the pious, holy, precious 
body of Christians. They are the people who have the arms for this war and they 
know how to use them. If the Turk's god, the devil, is not beaten first, there is 
reason to fear that the Turk will not be so easy to beat. Now the devil is a spirit 
who cannot be beaten with armor, muskets, horses, and men, and God's wrath 
cannot be allayed by them....Christian weapons and power must do it.I86 
After the first three petitions of the Lord's Prayer, however, comes a fourth 
petition. And this fourth petition ("Give us today our daily bread") also contains a vital 
insight into God's gracious way of ruling, ordering and preserving life in the world for 
the sake his church and of his entire creation. In view of the primary topic of our study, 
it is worth quoting Luther here at length (or, in his words, "briefly"): 
To put it briefly, this petition includes everything that belongs to our entire life in 
this world, because it is only for its sake that we need daily bread. Now, our life 
requires not only food and clothing and other necessities for our body, but also 
peace and concord in our daily activities, associations, and situations of every sort 
with the people among whom we live and with whom we interact—in short, 
everything that pertains to the regulation of both our domestic and our civil or 
political affairs. For where these two spheres are interfered with and prevented 
from functioning as they should, there the necessities of life are also interfered 
with, and life itself cannot be maintained for any length of time. Indeed the 
greatest need of all is to pray for the civil authorities and the government, for it is 
chiefly through them that God provides us daily bread and all the comforts of this 
life. Although we have received from God all good things in abundance, we 
cannot retain any of them or enjoy them in security and happiness were he not to 
give us a stable peaceful government. For where dissension, strife, and war 
prevail, there daily bread is already taken away or at least reduced.187 
It is not sufficient, therefore, for the church simply to pray "Thy kingdom come" 
and "Thy will be done." Christ also instructs the church, in the fourth petition, to pray for 
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civil government and earthly leaders, through which God himself works to bestow the 
blessings of peace, order and justice apart from which no person or institution on earth 
(including the church) can maintain its existence and carry out its work. 
It would therefore be fitting if the coat of arms of every upright prince were 
emblazoned with a loaf of bread instead of a lion or a wreath of rue, or if a loaf of 
bread were stamped on coins, in order to remind both princes and subjects that it 
is through the princes' office that we enjoy protection and peace and that without 
them we could neither eat nor preserve the precious gift of bread. Therefore, 
rulers are also worthy of all honor, and we are to render to them what we should 
and what we are able, as to those through whom we enjoy all our possessions in 
peace and quietness, because otherwise we could not keep a penny. Moreover, 
we should pray for them, that through them God may bestow on us still more 
blessings and good things.188 
Specifically, says Luther, 
...we may ask God both to endow with wisdom, strength, and prosperity the 
emperor, kings, and all estates, especially the princes of our land, all councilors, 
magistrates, and officials, so that they might govern well and be victorious over 
the Turks and all our enemies, and to grant to their subjects and the general 
populace to live together in obedience, peace and concord.189 
The reason that such prayers and such honor toward civil government are so 
necessary is that the devil is just as determined to interfere with this aspect of God's work 
as he is to frustrate God's rule in his kingdom of grace. 
[E]specially is this petition directed against our chief enemy, the devil, whose 
whole purpose and desire it is to take away or interfere with all we have received 
from God. He is not satisfied to obstruct and overthrow the spiritual order, by 
deceiving souls with his lies and bringing them under his power, but he also 
prevents and impedes the establishment of any kind of government or honorable 
and peaceful relations on earth. This is why he causes so much contention, 
murder, sedition, and war....it pains him that anyone should receive even a 
mouthful of bread from God and eat it in peace. If it were in his power and our 
prayer to God did not restrain him, surely we would not have a straw in the field, 
a penny in the house, or even an hour more of life—especially those of us who 
have the Word of God and would like to be Christians.19° 
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Therefore, as Luther insists in his treatise on Temporal Authority, "one must carefully 
distinguish between these two governments. Both must be permitted to remain; the one 
to produce righteousness, the other to bring about external peace and prevent evil 
deeds."191  
Luther's view that good government is also a good gift of God and that Christ's 
church has a divine responsibility to assist in maintaining it through its prayers and 
through appropriate reverence and obedience also comes to clear expression in his 
explanation of the first article of the Creed. Here Luther lists "good government, peace, 
and security" as good gifts of God's creation, despite the fact that they are often taken for 
granted and misused by sinful human beings in a fallen world.192 Not only does God 
give us these precious gifts, but he himself (often through human mediators and 
structures) "daily guards and defends us against every evil and misfortune, warding off 
all sorts of danger and disaster. All this he does out of pure love and goodness, without 
our merit, as a kind father who cares for us so that no evil may befall us."193 
Hence, because everything we possess, and everything in heaven on earth besides, 
is daily given, sustained, and protected by God, it inevitably follows that we are in 
duty bound to love, praise, and thank him without ceasing, and, in short, to devote 
all these things to his service, as he has required and enjoined in the Ten 
Commandments.194 
As is clear from the summary provided in the earlier sections of this chapter, for 
Luther the divine commands that govern the life of the church in the world allow for (and 
at times even require) Christian participation in and support for the use of force and 
violence in certain situations, even as they forbid such participation and support in other 
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situations. Ironically, the fifth commandment ("You are not to kill") does not contradict 
but actually condones and supports the use of such violence, since the purpose of this 
commandment is to instruct us how we are to live in obedience to God and in service to 
our neighbor: "We are to fear and love God, so that we neither endanger nor harm the 
lives of our neighbors, but instead help and support them in all of life's needs."I95 War, 
tragically, forces the soldier to "help and support" his or her neighbor by defending him 
or her against unjustified or uninstigated attack by another neighbor in the context of the 
responsibility given by God to government and governing authorities to maintain order 
and peace. 
We have now dealt [in the first four commandments] with both the spiritual and 
the civil government, that is, divine and parental authority and obedience. 
However, here we leave our own house and go out among our neighbors in order 
to learn how we should live among them, how people should conduct themselves 
among their neighbors. Therefore neither God nor the government is included in 
this commandment, nor is their right to take human life abrogated. God has 
delegated his authority to punish evildoers to the civil authorities in the parents' 
place; in former times, as we read in Moses [Deut. 21:18-20], parents had to judge 
their children themselves and sentence them to death. Therefore what is 
forbidden here applies to individuals, not to the governmental officials.I96 
According to Luther, this commandment forbids not only sinful acts of physical 
violence against our neighbor's person or property, but (as Jesus teaches in Sermon on 
the Mount) even the harboring of anger or vengeance in our hearts. There is, however, a 
type of anger (and therefore also a kind of violence) that is not sinful: 
This commandment is easy enough to understand, and it has often been treated 
because we hear Matthew 5 every year in the Gospel lesson, where Christ himself 
explains and summarizes it: We must not kill, either by hand, heart, or word, by 
signs or gestures, or by aiding and abetting. It forbids anger except, as we have 
said, to persons who function in God's stead, that is, parents and governing 
authorities. Anger, reproof, and punishment are the prerogatives of God and his 
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representatives and are to be meted out to those who transgress this and the other 
commandments.197  
Ironically, therefore—in keeping with Luther's argument—a person can actually be 
guilty of murder (and therefore of breaking the fifth commandment) by refusing to kill 
when called upon to do so in service to God and his or her neighbor in need. 
[T]his commandment is violated not only when we do evil, but also when we 
have opportunity to do good to our neighbors and to prevent, protect, and save 
them from suffering bodily harm or injury, but fail to do so.... [I]f you see anyone 
who is [innocently] condemned to death or in similar peril and do not save him 
although you have the means and ways to do so, you have killed him. It will be of 
no help for you to use the excuse that you did not assist their deaths by word or 
deed, for you have withheld your love from them and robbed them of the kindness 
by means of which their lives might have been saved. 
Therefore God rightly calls all persons murderers who do not offer 
counsel or assistance to those in need and peril of body and life. He will pass a 
most terrible sentence upon them at the Last Day, as Christ himself declares [in 
Matthew 25: 42-43]....That is to say, "You would have permitted me and my 
family to die of hunger, thirst, and cold, to be torn to pieces by wild beats, to rot 
in prison or perish from want." 
What else is this but to call these people murderous and bloodthirsty? For 
although you have not actually committed all these crimes, as far as you are 
concerned, you have nevertheless permitted your neighbors to languish and perish 
in their misfortune.198 
In his writings on war and peace, Luther applies this logic specifically to the issue of 
justified war: 
[A] prince and lord must remember that according to Romans 13 [:4] he is God's 
minister and the servant of his wrath and that the sword has been given him to use 
against such people [i.e., those who threaten and destroy order and peace]. If he 
does not fulfill the duties of his office by punishing some and protecting others, 
he commits as great a sin before God as when someone who has not been given 
the sword commits murder. If he is able to punish and does not do it—even 
though he would have had to kill someone or shed blood—he becomes guilty of 
all the murder and evil that these people commit.199 
197 Ibid., 182. 
198 Ibid., 189-192. 
199 Against the Peasants, 52-53. 
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At the same time, Luther strongly emphasizes the fact that the "kindness and-
love" commanded by God in the fifth commandment is to be "directed especially toward 
our enemies. For doing good to our friends is nothing but an ordinary virtue of pagans, 
as Christ says in Matthew 5 [:46-47].''200 God himself urges us "to true, noble, exalted 
deeds, such as gentleness, patience, and, in short, love and kindness toward our enemies. 
He always wants to remind us to recall the First Commandment, that he is our God: that 
is, he wishes to help, comfort, and protect us, so that he may restrain our desire for 
revenge.,,201 Participation by Christians in justified violence in obedience to 
governmental authorities and in fulfillment of their God-given vocation(s), therefore, is 
(or at least ought never be) a matter of exacting "vengeance" on our "enemies." Rather, 
it is (or at least ought always be) simply a matter of participating in God's work of 
preserving earthly order and peace through temporal government and showing love to our 
neighbor by defending and protecting him or her against unprovoked harm and violence. 
In this way, too, we are "imitating Christ"—by faithfully fulfilling (as Christ himself did) 
the specific vocation that God has given us and by faithfully discerning God's ability to 
accomplish his differing purposes in different ways in the two realms. 
So plainly is God's will revealed in the commandments, according to Luther, that 
even non-Christians can catch a glimpse of it by way of human reason and conscience; 
but only Christians (by virtue of faith in Christ) can comprehend God's will with the 
"mind of Christ" enlightened by God's grace, and only Christians can keep it with truly 
happy and joyful hearts, as those gifted and empowered by the Holy Spirit: 
From this you see that the Creed is a very different teaching than the Ten 
Commandments. For the latter teach us what we ought to do, but the Creed tells 
2® LC I, 194. 
2°1 Ibid., 195. 
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us what God does for us and gives to us. The Ten Commandments, moreover, are 
written in the hearts of all people, but no human wisdom is able to comprehend 
the Creed; it must be taught by the Holy Spirit alone. Therefore the Ten 
Commandments do not succeed in making us Christians, for God's wrath and 
displeasure still remain upon us because we cannot fulfill what God demands of 
us. But the Creed brings us grace and makes us righteous and acceptable to God. 
Through this knowledge we come to love and delight in all the commandments of 
God because we see here in the Creed how God gives himself completely to us, 
with all his gifts and power, to help us keep the Ten Commandments: the Father 
gives us all creation, Christ all his works, the Holy Spirit all his gifts.202 
Christ's Cross and Resurrection As the Meaning of History (Christology and 
Eschatology) 
As with Yoder and Hauerwas, so also for Luther Christology and ecclesiology are 
inseparable from eschatology. The holiness that is ours through faith in Christ and the 
holiness reflected in our lives by the work of God's Spirit both point us forward, in hope, 
to a "complete and perfect holiness" assured by the promise of Christ's resurrection. 
"Meanwhile, because holiness has begun and is growing daily, we await the time when 
our flesh will be put to death, will be buried with all its uncleanness, and we will come 
forth gloriously and arise to complete and perfect holiness in a new, eternal life."2°3  
"Then, when we pass from this life, in the blink of an eye [God] will perfect our holiness 
and will eternally preserve us in it."204 In the meantime, the third article—the article of 
the church and of the Spirit—"must always remain in force." 
For creation is now behind us, and redemption has also taken place, but the Holy 
Spirit continues his work without ceasing until the Last Day, and for this purpose 
he has appointed a community on earth, through which he speaks and does all his 
work. For he has not yet gathered together all of this Christian community, nor 
has he completed the granting of forgiveness. Therefore we believe in him who 
daily brings us into this community through the Word, and imparts, increases, and 
strengthens faith throughout the same Word and the forgiveness of sins. Then 
when his work has been finished and we abide in it, having died to the world and 
202 LC II, 67-69. 
2°3 Ibid., 57-58. 
204 Ibid., 59. 
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all misfortune, he will finally make us perfectly and eternally holy. Now we wait 
in faith for this to be accomplished through the Word.2°5  
It is clear that for Luther, just as for Yoder and Hauerwas, the relationship 
between "cross and resurrection"—between the sufferings, failures, uncertainties and 
ambiguities of this life and the perfect holiness, joy and certainty of the life to come—is 
not a relationship of "cause and effect." We do not "effect" the culmination of our 
Christ-centered hopes and dreams by our willing and obedient participation in the 
sufferings of Christ (regardless of what form this obedience may take). God is the 
author and controller of history, not sinful human beings. The Creator and Redeemer is 
also the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, who will usher in the parousia in his own time 
and way. It is not the church's responsibility to "make sure everything turns out all 
right," whether on a governmental, international, cultural, societal or cosmological level. 
As long as we live in this world, emphasizes Luther, there will be sin, suffering, 
misfortune, calamity, strife and war—the devil will make sure of that. Our job is to trust 
God to do his job (in both the church and the world) and to do the work that God has 
given us to do: to trust in his grace in Christ Jesus, to receive the gifts that he makes 
available in and through his church and to serve him and one another in the church and in 
the world by keeping his holy commandments and by imitating the perfect example of 
Christ. Depending on one's vocation and situation, such obedience may well include 
participation in certain acts of justified violence, carried out in obedience to governing 
authorities (who serve as God's—highly imperfect!—earthly representatives) and out of 
love for one's neighbor in need. On the other hand, it may well involve suffering 
violence at the hands of others, whether as a Christian (as a result of one's faithfulness to 
205 Ibid., 61-62. 
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the supreme command and example of Christ) or as a citizen (as a result of a justified or 
unjustified attack upon one's own nation). Because the cross and resurrection are the 
ultimate meaning of history; however, such obedience is always ultimately a matter of 
faith, not of sight—nor of right or of might. "Therefore we believe in him who daily 
brings us into this community through the Word, and imparts, increases, and strengthens 
faith through the same Word and the forgiveness of sin."2°6 
Therefore at the end [i.e., in the last petition of the Lord's prayer, "But deliver us 
from evil"] we sum it up by saying, "Dear Father, help us to get rid of all this 
misfortune." Nevertheless, this petition includes all the evil that may befall us 
under the devil's kingdom: poverty, disgrace, death, and, in short, all the tragic 
misery and heartache, of which there is so incalculably much on earth. For 
because the devil is not only a liar but a murdered as well, he incessantly seeks 
our life and vents his anger by causing accidents and injury to our bodies. He 
crushes some and drives others to insanity; some he drowns in water, and many 
he hounds to suicide or other dreadful catastrophes. Therefore, there is nothing 
for us to do on earth but to pray without ceasing against this archenemy. For if 
God did not support us, we would not be safe from him for a single hour.207 
2°6 Ibid., 62. 
207 LC 1.11, 114-116. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In chapter one we offered a historical survey of Christian attitudes toward war and 
peace. In chapters two and three, we attempted to summarize as objectively and 
accurately as possible the views of Hauerwas and Luther on war and peace. The primary 
purpose of these first three chapters was to fulfill the first two goals set forth in the 
introduction—namely, to explore and examine the nature and content of Hauerwas' 
pacifist convictions and to do so in the light of historic and contemporary Christian 
perspectives on war and peace, particularly those that belong to the just war tradition and 
the specific form of that tradition exemplified in the writings of Luther. The first three 
chapters also provide us with the basic data necessary for attempting to fulfill the third 
stated purpose of this study, namely, "to examine the possibilities for meaningful, 
constructive, mutually beneficial dialog between `Hauerwasians' and Lutherans on the 
issue of war and peace." In the introduction we asked: 
How do we respond as Lutherans to Hauerwas's pacifist claims and his critique of 
the just war tradition? Despite his commitment to a radical pacifism rooted firmly 
in the theological tradition of the radical reformation, does he have anything 
valuable to say to us as Lutherans—particularly Lutherans in America—about the 
potential dangers or weaknesses of just war thinking, especially in today's world? 
Is there anything that Hauerwas might learn from "the Lutheran perspective" on 
war and peace that could serve to challenge and sharpen his own thinking on this 
issue?' 
Despite the many common theological themes and concerns shared by Luther and 
Hauerwas (as identified in chapters two and three), it is clear from the foregoing 
summaries that Luther and Hauerwas take different positions on the proper Christian 
attitude toward war and peace and on the possibility of Christian support for and 
participation in certain acts of violence. 
Introduction, page 8. 
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As the very titles of Yoder's books The Politics of Jesus and The Original 
Revolution suggest, for Yoder (as for Hauerwas) Jesus was a social and political 
revolutionary—and a very specific kind of revolutionary at that. Jesus came to expose 
the deception and oppose the repression of the rebellious powers and the control they 
exercise over fearful, deluded people in and through the violent structures of a fallen 
creation. Jesus accomplished this divine mission by his perfect obedience to the Father's 
will—an obedience that led (inevitably and necessarily) to death on the cross (the 
"standard punishment for insurrection" and "social non-conformity"2). Implicit in the 
"politics of Jesus" espoused by Hauerwas and Yoder, moreover, is the conviction that 
"the central theme of Christology [is] that Jesus' suffering is the law of his disciples' 
life."3 Yoder and Hauerwas, therefore, are here not concerned primarily with Jesus 
Christ as "Savior from sin" but as "the bearer of a new possibility of human, social, and 
therefore political relationships. His baptism is the inauguration and his cross is the 
culmination of that new regime in which his disciples are called to share."4 This 
portrayal of Jesus is viewed and intended by Hauerwas and Yoder, of course, as a 
necessary corrective to traditional Christological approaches that (from their perspective) 
tend to ignore or downplay the social and political significance of Christ's life, suffering 
and death—and in many respects it can surely serve this helpful purpose. 
Yoder and Hauerwas also place great emphasis on the nonviolent character of 
Christ's obedience, especially as this nonviolence was manifested in his nonresistant 
submission to death on the cross. According to Hauerwas and Yoder, the primary 
2 PJ, 45. 
3 Ibid., 178; emphasis added. 
4 Ibid., 62. 
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temptation Jesus faced—and the primary temptation we continue to face as his 
followers—was the temptation to use "justified and legitimate violence" to seek to 
accomplish God's purposes.5 By renouncing the use of legitimate violence at the crucial 
and climactic point of his obedience to God, Jesus—by virtue of the paradigmatic nature 
of his life and death—makes it clear that this is also God's will for all those who seek to 
follow him. "For a Christian to be nonviolent," therefore, " is... at the very heart of what 
it means to be a Christian."6 Nonviolence "constitutes the heart of our worship of a 
crucified Messiah," and is "incumbent on those who would worship Jesus as the Son of 
God."7 For Hauerwas and Yoder, the story of Christ—in order to be conveyed and 
enacted honestly and faithfully in the (social and political) life and witness of the 
Christian community—must retain and maintain nonviolence as part of its central "story 
line," since "the narrative into which Christians are inscribed means we cannot be 
anything other than nonviolent."8  
Luther, as we have seen, does not view or depict Christ primarily as a social and 
political revolutionary. According to Luther, Jesus is rightly viewed primarily as the 
sinless Savior and Redeemer who took upon himself the sin of the world so that the 
unrighteous might be declared righteous in God's sight. Restored to a right relationship 
with God, Christians are then empowered by God's Spirit to imitate Christ by living lives 
of holiness in obedience to God's commandments and in service to their neighbor (which 
includes willingly participating in God's "peaceable" work in both realms). They do so, 
however, knowing that "the work [of redemption] is finished and completed; Christ has 
5 Ibid., 98. 
6 Hauerwas, "Faith Fires Back," 12. 
7  Hauerwas, "Remembering Yoder," 15-16; "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 134. 
Hauerwas, "Whose 'Just' War," 137. 
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acquired and won the treasure for us by his sufferings, death, and resurrection."9 They 
also do so knowing that God's work in both realms is often, and in some sense always, a 
"hidden" work requiring faith in God's ability to use even the "strange work" of violence, 
wrath and judgment to accomplish his purposes. 
This does not mean, however, that there is for Luther no "politics of Jesus"—i.e., 
that the life, death and resurrection of Jesus have no social and political or normative and 
paradigmatic significance for Christians or for the church. We noted earlier that: 
Like Yoder and Hauerwas, Luther views the church as a radically unique 
community within the world—there is no community like it. The constitutive 
element of its uniqueness is not, however (as for Yoder and Hauerwas), its "social 
style characterized by... the rejection of violence of any kind," but rather its 
radically unique, faith-based understanding of the true nature of God and his 
attitude toward sinners revealed and hidden in the cross of Christ (page 157 
above; emphasis added). 
At the same time, it is crucial to emphasize—and this is one of the ways in which the 
work of Yoder and Hauerwas can prove especially helpful to Lutherans—that for Luther 
this "faith-based understanding of the true nature of God and his attitude toward sinners 
revealed and hidden in the cross of Christ" also will—and must—produce a churchly 
response in the form of holy lives and peaceable practices patterned after the holy life and 
uncompromising obedience of Christ himself. It is clear from the writings of Luther that 
Christ is not to be viewed only as "Savior from sin." He is also (as a direct and necessary 
result of his fully efficacious work as Savior) to be regarded as "King of kings and Lord 
of lords"—not only in some cosmic or spiritual or eschatological sense, but also in terms 
of his actual and concrete "Lordship" in the church and in the daily lives of all those who 
put their trust in him for salvation. Therefore, when Yoder (in The Politics of Jesus) 
criticizes "those other views" (including Lutheranism) that—according to Yoder—hold 
9 LCII, 38. 
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that "because Jesus is seen as sacrifice he may not be seen as King, or that because he is 
seen as Word made flesh he cannot be seen as normative person,"1° he is undoubtedly 
justified in criticizing various distortions of Luther's view that wrongly separate (at least 
effectually and functionally) the salvific work of Jesus from the "politics of Jesus." His 
words do not ring true, however, as a valid criticism of the view of Luther himself. On 
the contrary, for Luther it is precisely because Christ can and must be viewed primarily 
as the divine "Word made flesh" and the perfect and fully sufficient sacrifice for the sin 
of the world that he not only may but also must be viewed as "King" and as "normative 
person"—the only perfect exemplar of Christian faith and life. 
From a Lutheran perspective, the life of Christ is normative for us in that it is a 
life lived in perfect obedience to his heavenly Father and to the will of God clearly 
expressed in his law. Although we know that as sinners we will never be able to emulate 
perfectly Christ's example, we look constantly to that example as the ultimate human 
demonstration of loyalty to God and selfless love for our neighbor (including our 
enemies). The death of Christ is paradigmatic for us in the sense that we are called "to 
participate in the sufferings of Christ" and to "bear our crosses" as a direct and inevitable 
result of our faithfulness to Christ and his cross. Like Scripture, Luther often points his 
readers to the sufferings of Christ as an example for them to follow. As noted in chapter 
three, Luther reminds the war-mongering peasants again and again that Christ's cross 
serves as a constant reminder that we must be willing to suffer and even die for his sake 
rather than transgress his clear commands (such as participating in sinful or unjustified 
violence). The resurrection of Christ serves as an example for us of our need to trust in 
God's promises and his power to bring good out of apparent evil, to depend on God to 
10 P. I, 232. 
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"fight for us" and to conquer all of our enemies (including death), and to draw on the 
power of his Spirit—through our baptism into Christ's death and resurrection—to live 
lives that manifest those virtues (love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, gentleness, etc.) so 
perfectly displayed in the life of Christ himself. 
On the basis of the evidence provided in chapters two and three, therefore, we 
would maintain that Luther and Hauerwas (and Yoder) do not disagree about whether the 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus are, in fact, normative and paradigmatic for the 
Christian life and the life of the church. They do disagree, however, about precisely how 
or in what sense this is the case. For Yoder and Hauerwas, nonviolence is consistently 
viewed and depicted as critical for a proper understanding of the paradigmatic nature and 
significance of Christ's life, death and resurrection. The purpose of the cross, says 
Yoder, was to show that "God's will for God's man in this world is that he should 
renounce legitimate defense."" "Christ is agape," says Yoder—and the very definition 
of "agape" is "nonresistant love." "The cross is the extreme demonstration that agape 
seeks neither effectiveness nor justice, and is willing to suffer any loss or seeming defeat 
for the sake of obedience."12 This is why, for both Yoder and Hauerwas, the church's 
witness—if it is to be faithful to the crucified Christ—"must be nonviolent."13 
Nonviolence "constitutes the heart of our worship of a crucified Messiah," and is 
"incumbent on those who would worship Jesus as the Son of God."14 This is true even if 
and when it is the case that many Christians and Christian communities do not recognize 
the true significance of this central aspect of Christ's person and work. 
11 Ibid., 100. 
12 The Original Revolution, 59 (emphasis added); cf. Grain, 219. 
13 Grain, 219 (emphasis added). 
14 Hauerwas, "Remembering Yoder," 15-16; "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 134. 
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For Luther, Christ's refusal to resist the earthly authorities who sought to put him 
to death was certainly a necessary aspect of his obedience to the Father's will whereby he 
accomplished our salvation and provided the perfect human model for our sanctification. 
In depicting Christ's obedience, however, Luther tends to emphasize Christ's willingness 
to submit to the entire law and will of God (as summarized in the Ten Commandments), 
rather than focusing specifically on the non-violent and non-resistant aspects of Christ's 
obedience in connection with the events leading up to and culminating in his death on the 
cross. In describing the kind of life that God demands and desires of those who seek to 
follow Christ, therefore, Luther does not emphasize as frequently or centrally as do 
Yoder and Hauerwas the non-violent resistance exemplified by Christ on the cross. 
Rather, Luther typically points us to the Ten Commandments, which teach us how we are 
to "fear, love and trust" in God above all things and how we are to imitate Christ by 
serving our neighbor in love—including how "we are to be subordinate to, honor, and 
obey father and mother, masters, and all in authority, not on their own account but for 
God's sake."15 
It is also important to emphasize, however, that in pointing us to these 
commandments Luther is not "pointing us away" from the life, death and resurrection of 
Christ as an example for us to follow. As a God-given summary and practical explication 
of the entire Law of God—summarized by Christ himself in the twofold command to 
love God with all of our being and our neighbor as ourselves (Matthew 22:37-40)—these 
very commandments are a written reflection, expression, and description of the holy life 
of Christ himself. No one has ever loved God more completely or loved his neighbor 
more perfectly and selflessly (in the way required by these commandments) than our 
Is LC I, 327. 
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Lord and Master Jesus Christ. Christians "imitate Christ," therefore, not by focusing 
narrowly or even primarily on the non-violent aspects of his witness and example, but by 
focusing on his complete trust in and obedience to the will of the Father as summarized 
for us by God himself in the twofold "law of love" and in the Ten Commandments. 
For Luther, such obedience—in imitation of Christ himself—may well involve 
(depending upon one's vocation or specific situation) participation in divinely-approved 
violence as an act of love for one's neighbor and an act of obedience to God's authority 
as invested in earthly authorities. In such cases (according to Luther), it is actually God 
himself who is administering his wrath and executing his judgment in the civil realm 
through his human creatures, even as those who claim the name of Christ maintain 
absolute allegiance to God's clear commands not to murder and to love their neighbors 
(including their enemies) as themselves. Such absolute obedience to God may also, at 
times, involve the absolute refusal to use violence in any and all ways and situations in 
which it cannot rightly be viewed or justified as an act of "divine judgment" which God 
performs through us as part of the faithful and neighbor-loving fulfillment of our God-
given vocation(s). For Luther, too, "absolute obedience" to Christ trumps any and all 
human concerns for justice, freedom, or peace. But (once again) such "absolute 
obedience" to Christ does not rule out the possibility of Christian participation in or 
support for justified violence in the civil realm (where God also rules as King and Lord). 
How, then, do we answer the questions raised at the very beginning of this study, 
namely: Is there any sense in which Hauerwas's pacifism is compatible with just war 
thinking in the Christian tradition—specifically with Luther's version of just war 
thinking? And if they are irreconcilable, does this mean that no meaningful dialog is 
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possible between Hauerwasian pacifists and Lutherans committed to the continuing 
viability of the just war traditions as articulated by Luther? In both cases, we affirm the 
answers already given (or least suggested) by Hauerwas. Hauerwas is right, we believe, 
when he insists that "you simply cannot mix just war and pacifism and have a consistent 
position."16 While there may be certain types of (so-called) pacifism and (so-called) just 
war thinking that can be mixed because of their ambiguous, a-theological, and/or 
inconsistent presuppositions and conclusions, it is clearly the case that the Christological 
and ecclesial pacifism of Hauerwas and the just war thinking espoused by Luther on the 
basis of his own Christological and ecclesial assumptions cannot be mixed. There is 
finally no way to harmonize Hauerwas's view that "nonviolence...is incumbent on all 
Christians who seek to live faithfully in the kingdom made possible by the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus"17 with Luther's admonition to Christian princes and soldiers: 
Let whoever can stab, smite, slay. If you die in doing it, good for you! A more 
blessed death can never be yours, for you die while obeying the divine word and 
commandment in Romans 13, and in loving service of your neighbor, whom you 
are rescuing from the bonds of hell and of the devil....To this let every pious 
Christian say, "Amen!" 18 
In view of Hauerwas's reference (above) to "all Christians" and Luther's 
reference to "every Christian," it may be appropriate to note at this point that numerous 
statements by both Hauerwas and Luther may at times seem to infer that those who 
disagree with their positions on war and peace ought not even be regarded as Christians. 
It is clear from the broader context in which these statements occur, however, that neither 
Hauerwas nor Luther holds this position. Luther certainly recognizes the possibility that 
Christians may hold positions that (from his perspective) are clearly at odds with the true 
16 A Church Capable," HR, 444. 
17 PK, xvi. 
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teaching of Scripture, and that they may be sincerely troubled in conscience about these 
issues when (in his view) they need and ought not be. This is, in fact, one of the primary 
reasons that Luther writes his treatises on war and peace: to instruct and offer pastoral 
counsel to sincere Christians confused, troubled and ill-informed regarding these issues. 
Similarly, despite Hauerwas's strong statements about pacifism as "constitutive" of 
Christian orthodoxy and orthopraxy, and despite his strong and frequent denunciations of 
those who think and argue wrongly regarding the issue of war, Hauerwas is clearly 
willing to dialog with any and all of his "brothers and sisters in Christ" who are willing to 
discuss issues of war and peace on genuinely theological terms. 
We share the conviction—implicitly and explicitly expressed in the writings of 
both Luther and Hauerwas—that substantive and meaningful theological conversation 
can and must take place between confessing Christians committed to differing positions 
on the issue of pacifism and just war, even where fundamental presuppositions may 
differ. The honest admission and recognition of differing presuppositions and 
conclusions does not "close off' dialog; in fact, it provides the basis on which meaningful 
dialog can take place. In the second part of our study, therefore, we offer a Lutheran 
appraisal of Hauerwas's pacifism and a proposal for dialog that seeks to take both 
positions (and their presuppositions) seriously by affirming valid Hauerwasian insights 
and concerns, presenting a Lutheran response to these concerns that also seeks to 
highlight authentically Lutheran insights and contributions to the problem of war and 
peace, and identifying various issues raised by Hauerwas that (from a Lutheran 
perspective) both require and merit further clarification, exploration and discussion. 
Is Against the Peasants, 54-55. 
PART TWO 
THE PACIFISM OF STANLEY HAUERWAS: 
A LUTHERAN APPRAISAL AND PROPOSAL 
Introduction: 
How Not to Respond to the Pacifism of Stanley Hauerwas 
In his essay "Whether (in This Nuclear Age) Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved," 
Gilbert Meilaender offers counsel on "How Not to Argue Against Nuclear Weapons." He 
warns both against cultural temptations (such as those inspired by Jonathan Schell's 
"survivalist" view) and against theological temptations (especially those inherent in the 
"realism" or "pessimism" of the Lutheran tradition) that—ironically—underwrite 
similarly unhelpful ways of "retreating from the responsibility to think morally about the 
public realm" when it comes to the issue of nuclear weapons.' Without exploring the 
details of this argument here, it may be helpful—as a way of making clear the basic 
assumptions on which this appraisal and proposal is based—to imitate Meilaender's 
approach by beginning part two of our study with a discussion of "How Not to Respond 
to the Pacifism of Stanley Hauerwas." 
On the one hand, Lutherans committed to taking the just war tradition seriously 
need to guard against the temptation of the Niebuhrian compliment when responding to 
the pacifism of Hauerwas. Most Lutherans are understandably attracted to aspects of 
I  PJW'T, 91ff. 
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Niebuhr's theology and his "public theology:" in his book The Paradoxical Vision, 
Robert Benne argues that Niebuhr "was clearly a practitioner of the paradoxical vision" 
that most closely conforms to the dualities of Lutheran theology, and that Niebuhr "was 
the best proponent in modem religious history of the doctrine of the twofold reign of 
God."2 Yet even those who are sympathetic to elements of Niebuhr's "Christian realism" 
(as is Hauerwas himself!) must acknowledge that Hauerwas is justified in his rejection of 
the Niebuhrian compliment, which praises the purity, consistency and integrity of the sort 
of radical pacifism represented by Yoder and Hauerwas but at the same time attempts to 
dismiss it as politically and practically irrelevant due to its intrinsically "sectarian" 
character. Responding to Hauerwas's pacifism in this way—as do the editors of First 
Things in the exchange referred to in the introduction—is unfair and unhelpful, especially 
in view of Hauerwas's repeated (and convincing) denials of the charge of sectarianism. 
To respond to Hauerwas by attempting to silence him or by dismissing his challenges to 
just war thinking as "irrelevant" because of his (admittedly radical) pacifist convictions is 
to suggest that Hauerwas's views need not be taken seriously by those who do not share 
his convictions or their underlying presuppositions. This approach only results in 
impoverishing the discussion (on all sides) of a very serious issue. 
On the other hand, Lutherans committed to taking the just war tradition seriously 
need to guard against the temptation of succumbing too quickly or easily to what might 
be called the "Yoderian compliment." Yoder, as we have seen, expresses respect for 
"honest and serious" just war thinkers and a sincere interest in dialoging with them. Such 
"honesty, " however, seems at times to imply that just war thinkers must accept Yoder's 
characterization of the just war tradition as rooted in a "presumption against violence" 
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defined on the basis of pacifist assumptions, as well as an admission that just war 
thinking is, by its very nature, morally inferior to pacifism. In other words, as long as 
just war thinkers are willing to join in Niebuhr's confession that their position is "less 
consistent with the radical claims of Christ" than Yoder's Christological and ecclesial 
pacifism, then their views can be respected and taken seriously, and meaningful dialog 
can take place. As noted earlier, Luther himself is highly praised by Yoder for his 
uncompromising stance against participation in an unjust war, even though (from Yoder's 
perspective) Luther's "dualistic" ethic left room for a unbiblical and unjustifiable "double 
standard" when it came to Christ's commands regarding nonviolence and loving one's 
enemy. As we will discuss in more detail below, the willingness of some Lutherans to 
accept this Yoderian compliment leads them also to accept certain Yoderian-Hauerwasian 
characterizations and presuppositions that do not fully or accurately reflect the just war 
tradition nor the thinking of Luther on this issue. Other Lutherans, skeptical of the 
continuing usefulness or validity of the just war tradition, end up embracing a semi-
pacifist position that (ironically) is subject to even harsher criticism and condemnation by 
Hauerwas. 
A truly honest, serious, fruitful and faithful Lutheran response to Hauerwas's 
pacifism, therefore, involves resisting both the Niebuhrian compliment and the Yoderian 
compliment, and needs to include (we would suggest) the following four elements: 1) An 
honest acknowledgement of the differing theological (especially Christological and 
ecclesial) presuppositions underlying Luther and Hauerwas's perspectives on just war 
and other war and peace issues; 2) An honest affirmation of valid Hauerwasian insights, 
concerns, and criticisms on issues relating to war and peace, especially those that may be 
2 Robert Benne, The Paradoxical Vision (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 146-147. 
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particularly applicable to (American) Lutherans; 3) An honest re-appraisal of the 
Lutheran witness to war and peace that seeks to identify—in view of Hauerwas's valid 
concerns yet also on the basis of the "peaceable witness" of Martin Luther—the authentic 
and significant contributions that Lutherans can make in responding (both theologically 
and practically) to the tragic reality of war in today's world; 4) An honest critique of 
aspects of Hauerwas's views that (from a Lutheran perspective) appear to require and to 
merit further clarification, exploration and discussion. 
In this second part of our study, therefore, we will revisit (in a somewhat modified 
and simplified form) the basic thematic elements of Hauerwas's Christological and 
ecclesial pacifism outlined and discussed in chapter two of part one, namely: the 
particularist nature of Christian ethics, the narrative character of Christian ethics, the 
problem of violence and the politics of Jesus, and the witness of the church in and to 
society. As we revisit each of these themes in light of the data gathered in part one, we 
will seek to identify in each case 1) valid Hauerwasian insights and concerns; 2) a 
Lutheran response to these concerns that highlights both challenges that Lutherans face 
and contributions that Lutherans may be able to make as they seem to offer an 
authentically Lutheran "peaceable witness" to the world; and 3) issues raised by Yoder 
and Hauerwas that need further clarification and exploration. It is our hope that this 
Lutheran appraisal of the pacifism of Stanley Hauerwas may also serve as a modest 
proposal for honest and meaningful dialog between Hauerwasians and Lutherans on 
issues of war and peace. 
Chapter Four 
War, Peace and the Particularist Nature of Christian Ethics 
Valid Hauerwasian Insights and Concerns:  
Thinking Theologically about War and Peace 
In an exchange with Paul J. Griffiths in the April 2002 issue of First Things, 
George Weigel traces the history of what he calls "a new 'default position' in 
contemporary Catholic commentary on war and peace," a position he describes as "a 
functional pacifism that mistakenly imagines itself an authentic development of the just 
war tradition."I This position, suggests Weigel, originated in activist circles during the 
Vietnam War, but has now migrated to the Catholic hierarchy itself, significantly 
influencing official statements and pronouncements at the highest levels of the church 
(such as the Catholic bishops' 1983 pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace"). In a Wall 
Street Journal article published shortly before the 2003 war in Iraq, William McGurn 
offers evidence that supports Weigel's thesis, citing Pope John Paul Ws comments to 
military chaplains that "the 'vast contemporary movement in favor of peace' is evidence 
that 'war as an instrument for resolving conflicts' has been repudiated by the 'conscience 
of the majority of humanity.'" Also noted is a recent interview with Archbishop Renato 
Martino, head of the Pontifical Council for Peace and Justice, in which he was asked if he 
believed that "there is no such thing as a just war anymore"—to which he gave the 
unequivocal answer: "Absolutely."2 
FT 122 (April 2002), 33-36. 
2 "War No More? Rome Suggests an Answer," Wall Street Journal (March 28, 2003), W15. 
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This "functional pacifism" is increasingly evident in many mainline Protestant 
denominations as well, including those that historically have supported the basic 
principles and presuppositions of the just war theory. It is clearly the "majority position" 
in contemporary Lutheranism—at least on an official and academic level—as reflected in 
the statements of church body leaders, essays by theologians, and resolutions adopted by 
church bodies and ecumenical organizations (such as the Lutheran World Federation).3  
As James Childs notes, "Many contemporary Lutheran theologians such as Helmut 
Thielecke have rejected just war theory as absurd or at least inadequate in a nuclear 
age."4 Paul Jersild argues that the only legitimate use of the just war theory today is to 
contribute toward "making clear the total unacceptableness of nuclear warfare," a 
position typically termed "nuclear pacifism."5 George Brand insists that discussion of 
possible contemporary applications of "traditional just war theory are best confined to 
university seminars, where they can do no political damage"—the just war theory, in 
other words, has become obsolete in view of the realities of modern warfare.6 At the 
same time, each of these theologians implicitly or explicitly calls upon the church to 
reclaim its "duty to play an active and creative role in politics in this country," "to 
3 For recent official statements on war and peace by the LWF, its officials, and its member churches, see 
www.lwf.org and www.elca.org. For a historical overview, see "Peace and Politics" in the book by Christa 
R, Klein with Christian D. von Dehsen, Politics and Policy: The Genesis and Theology of Social 
Statements in the Lutheran Church in America (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989). See also Hiitter's essay 
"Be Honest in Just War Thinking!" for references to various historical Lutheran statements on war and 
peace. With reference to the current state of affairs in Lutheran academia, Robert Benne writes, "The recent 
war with the Saddam Hussein regime has provided many opportunities to struggle with the question: should 
I just fume in silence amid all these liberal opinions about the war or should I challenge those liberals and 
argue the case for the Bush administration's policies?...[G]iven the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
Lutheran academics are politically liberal, conservatives like myself fmd themselves fuming and asking 
that question quite often." Dialog 42:3 (Fall 2003), 193. 
4 PJWT, 57-58; see Thielecke, Theological Ethics v. 2, 419-540. 
5 PJWT, 86. 
6 Ibid.,52. 
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maintain its 'prophetic voice,'" and to recognize its responsibility to keep the world 
"safe" from war.7  
Ironically, however, it is just these kinds of statements and positions that are most 
harshly and frequently criticized by Hauerwas as capitulating to Constantinian notions 
about the nature and function of the church in the world and to non-Christian (or at least 
"a-Christian") conceptions of the nature and function of pacifism. In his Epilogue to Paul 
Ramsey's book Speak Up for Just War or Pacifism, for example, Hauerwas mercilessly 
critiques the "functional pacifism" (or "nuclear pacifism") of the United Methodist 
Bishops' statement "In Defense of Creation," since "it presupposes that if we could 
eliminate nuclear weapons then war again might be a viable institution."8 Hauerwas 
compares this position to Schell's crassly secular "survivalist" view: 
The Bishops want to be a little bit pacifist. But it is no easier to be a little bit 
pacifist than it is to be a little bit pregnant. The peace that is sought is not the 
peace that has been given by Christ. Instead it is a peace that encourages us to put 
our faith in the threat of nuclear war, for it is assumed that threat is frightening 
people to the extent that they may finally come to their senses and realize that 
they stand on the brink of annihilation. Yet a peace so built cannot be the shalom 
to which the Bishops appeal; it is a peace based on fear rather than on positive 
faith in God.9 
Hauerwas is much more respectful and appreciative of the position taken in the book by 
Paul Ramsey in defense of just war—even though (obviously) he strongly disagrees with 
it—since it recognizes that both "pacifism and just war (at least if Ramsey is right in his 
account of just war) are only intelligible against the background of faith in Jesus as the 
7 Sigval Berg, in PJWT, 34. 
8 Speak Up, 156. 
9 Ibid. 
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Lord's anointed. If that faith is missing, then pacifism and just war alike become hollow 
abstractions inviting casuistical games at best and ideological perversions at worst."10 
As this statement of Hauerwas (rightly) suggests, however, it is not only "semi-
pacifist" Lutherans who must "examine themselves" to determine if (or to what extent) 
their views on war and peace are genuinely grounded in particular theological 
presuppositions and truly formed by "faith in Jesus as the Lord's anointed." Charles Lutz 
writes: 
Dr. Yoder suggests that, in practice, most citizens in nations of the West (those 
most influenced by the assumptions of the just-war tradition) have followed 
throughout the centuries and at the present moment continue to follow neither 
pacifism nor an ethic of justifiable war. In fact, most of us have adhered to a 
crusader ("this is God's holy war") or a national-interest ("my nation, right or 
wrong") ethic. I believe he is correct.11  
Especially on a grass roots level, there are undoubtedly many non-pacifist Lutherans who 
(if they are honest) tend to support or oppose a particular war or military policy proposed 
by a particular president or administration not so much on the basis of specific 
theological presuppositions and considerations but on the basis of personal political 
preferences and proclivities—or on the basis of their own (largely unexamined) 
naturalistic, rationalistic, capitalistic or nationalistic assumptions about the nature and 
role of secular government and the nature and necessity of war. If Lutherans are 
seriously interested in engaging in meaningful dialog with Hauerwas on issues of war and 
peace, therefore, they would be wise to follow the example of Ramsey by speaking up for 
the just war tradition as honestly and straightforwardly as possible—in clear theological 
terms—rather than effectively setting it aside by defending either a functional pacifism or 
a politically-based militarism ultimately rooted in non-theological, non-Christological, 
10 Ibid., 152. 
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and non-ecclesial presuppositions and convictions. Lutz gets to the heart of the matter—
for both Luther and Hauerwas—when he writes: 
The essential origin of anything like the just-war ethic, in terms of the biblical 
faith, is the overarching concern of love for one's neighbor. I understand pacifists 
to begin there also, leading to the argument that violence is never a way to show 
love to a neighbor, including a neighbor who is my enemy. But I see just-war 
ethics as being equally concerned with such love. The difference is that another 
set of neighbors receives primary attention: those who may be called the innocent, 
those who are in need of protection from attack, those who would be defenseless 
unless someone took up arms on their behalf. It is finally that question, "How 
shall the defenseless be protected?" which just-war theory is seeking to address. 
Any other question (such as, "How shall my nation remain supreme in the 
world?" or "How can the comfortable life-style we have be maintained?") is not a 
legitimate one for the just war ethic.12 
Lutheran Challenges and Contributions:  
Making a Theological Case for Just War Thinking 
Based on the evidence provided in chapter three, the best Lutheran response to 
this valid criticism of Hauerwas (we would argue) is to strive to rediscover, revive and 
recover Luther's own theologically-grounded and Christ-centered approach to issues of 
war and peace. In his treatises on war and peace, Luther reminds his readers constantly 
that he is writing as a Christian theologian to believing, professing, practicing 
Christians—anyone else, he says, is bound to misunderstand and misconstrue his 
comments. While he occasionally appeals to reason or natural law as supporting or 
confirming truths revealed in Scripture, Luther has no interest in using natural law as a 
foundation for war and peace ethics. 
In this respect, it could be argued that Luther is as potentially vulnerable as 
Hauerwas to the charge of "sectarianism"—indeed (as we have seen), Luther freely 
acknowledged the inevitability of the inability of non-Christians to grasp the true nature 
II When War Is Unjust, 10. 
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and implications of his Gospel-centered and Scripturally-grounded reasoning regarding 
war and peace. This does not mean, of course, that either Luther or Hauerwas is willing 
to accept the charge of sectarianism—as if their "particularistic" positions regarding war 
and peace have no practical implications for the church's witness to the world. On the 
contrary, both see this witness as crucial, although there are significant differences in the 
way that they perceive and depict it. For Hauerwas, this witness take place primarily (if 
not exclusively) in and through the life of the church itself as "social ethic"—as a 
radically unique and "peaceable" alternative to the world's ethics and politics, which 
(from the perspective of Hauerwas) are always ultimately rooted in the use of force or 
violence. For Luther, the Christian witness to the world takes place in a variety of ways 
and on a variety of levels: through widely diverse acts of Christian love and kindness 
carried out by individual Christians in their God-given vocations in the civil realm (some 
of which may involve the loving use of necessary and justifiable force); through "peace-
promoting" activities and arguments that may appeal even to non-Christians by virtue of 
their (God-given, even if fallen and distorted) awareness of the need for order and 
stability in the civil realm; and through the church's constant and faithful efforts to "be 
the church" and to do what only the church has been called, gifted and empowered by 
God's Spirit to do: preach, teach, live and worship in faithfulness to the radical Gospel of 
Christ as a bright beacon of hope, peace and truth in a dark and sinful world. It is 
especially in this latter respect that Lutherans can learn much and benefit greatly from 
Hauerwas's insights into the nature of the church as "social ethic" and as a radical 
alternative to the politics of this world—we will return to this point later in this chapter 
and in subsequent chapters in this part of our study. 
12 Ibid., 14. 
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In this connection it is also important to underscore the point made in chapter 
three that Luther's treatises on war and peace were not prompted by abstract, 
philosophical theorizing about war and peace nor by a desire to craft a "universal theory 
of statecraft" nor even by primarily political considerations and concerns. For Luther, 
theology is never an abstract speculative activity, but is always a most practical and 
pastoral endeavor. Frederic Cleve notes that Luther's writings on war and peace, like his 
theological approach to matters in general, "seems to be typical of his disposition and it 
also gives his statements their poignant intent: Luther appeals to people's consciences; he 
wants to influence their relationship to God, and his chief concern is to show them the 
road to eternal salvation."13 As we have seen, the historical context and background for 
Luther's treatises on war and peace bears this out. For example, when Duke John of 
Saxony and other sincere followers of Luther were "perturbed over Christ's 
injunction[s]" in Matthew 5 and Romans 12 about "not resisting evil," Luther wrote his 
treatise on "Temporal Authority" as a theological and pastoral response to these very 
practical concerns.14 Assa von Kram, professional soldier and counselor to Duke Ernst of 
Braunschweig-Liineberg, was "troubled in conscience and unable to reconcile his 
confession of the Christian faith with his profession." For him and others like him, 
Pastor Luther addressed the question of "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved."I5  
At the conclusion of his essay "Toward a Christian Ethic on Peace and War," 
contemporary Lutheran theologian Sigval Berg notes, in an almost understated way, that 
13 Cleve, 80. 
14 Temporal Authority, 81; cf. 77-80. 
15 Whether Soldiers, 89. 
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"the people in our parishes are often confused by our conflicting statements and fearful 
about the future."I6 Christian consciences are undoubtedly as troubled today as they were 
in Luther's day about issues of war and peace. Unfortunately, much of the current 
theological literature on this topic, and even statements by church bodies, seems to be 
directed most often not to the troubled and confused "person in the pew" who is 
genuinely looking for guidance on these issues, but to the academic elite or to 
governmental officials and agencies that are not typically waiting with baited breath to 
hear what this or that theologian or denomination has to say. And when genuinely 
theological discussion and dialog on these issues does take place within the church, it 
often takes place in a manner and on a level that seems rather far removed from the real-
life fears, doubts and anxieties of the average church-goer—including the parents, 
spouses and children of soldiers who may well be wrestling with the very kinds of 
questions that Luther sought to address in his essay on "Whether Soldiers, Too, May Be 
Saved." A return to the writings of "Pastor Luther" himself, we would suggest, may 
help to inspire and generate greater sensitivity and attention to the genuinely pastoral, 
practical and theological concerns that lie at the heart of real-life issues of war and 
peace—and that lie deep within the hearts of the real, live people whom Christ came to 
save, shepherd, serve and send forth as his witnesses. 
In this regard, Lutherans would do well to model Hauerwas's desire and 
willingness to "get a little help from his friends"—even (especially!) friends from outside 
his own theological circle or tradition. Ironically, Methodist Paul Ramsey (in his book 
War and the Christian Conscience) gives more attention to the writings and theological 
insights of Luther than do many Lutheran scholars who write on the issue of war and 
16 PJWT, 33. 
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peace. His book serves as a good example of how to approach the issue of just war from 
a genuinely theological perspective and in a way that takes seriously the practical and 
pastoral concerns of Christian just war thinkers like Augustine and Luther. 
Paul Ramsey 
Ramsey's fundamental thesis is that although the Christian just war tradition owes 
much to classical thought, "the norm of Christian love, and not natural justice only, was 
still the main source both of what the Christian could and should do and what he could 
and should never do in military action."17 It was "the conscience schooled by Christ," 
argued Ramsey, "which first compelled Christians to justify warfare [and] at the same 
time proscribed for them its moral limits."Is  
It was to be expected that natural justice would not be the only or even the main 
source of the Christian's conduct, and that, even in the special case of war, certain 
clearly limiting definitions had to be given of the military conduct permitted or 
prohibited to the Christian in justifiable warfare.I9 
Just war in the Christian tradition, properly understood, must be seen as a product of 
Christian love—and it must continue to be seen in that way if it is to be properly 
understood and applied in a world that has witnessed the horrors of Dresden and 
Hiroshima and understandably fears witnessing horrors even greater than these: 
That product of agape in Western thought, the doctrine of the just or limited war, 
must happen again as an event in the minds of men and in Christian ethical 
analysis in every age. He who has gone so far as to justify, for the sake of justice 
and the public order, wounding anyone whom by his wounds Christ died to save, 
will find no one to escape from the moral limitation upon the conduct of war 
which requires that military force be mounted against the attacking force and not 
directly against whole populations. Christian love should again, as in the past, 
17 War and the Christian Conscience, xviii. 
18 Ibid., xix. 
19 Ibid. 
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surround the little ones with moral immunity from direct killing. It should discern 
the difference between just war and murder.20 
According to Ramsey, it is Aquinas who was mainly responsible for the historical 
shift in just war thinking that resulted in "an increasing emphasis upon the natural-law 
concept of justice," which further resulted in more pragmatic, rationalistic and 
nationalistic applications of just war theory—many of which must be rejected by 
Christians.21 Ramsey's goal is to help Christians to recognize and recover the true 
Augustinian roots of the just war tradition, which (argues Ramsey) are also clearly 
reflected in the thinking of Luther. Though writing in different historical and theological 
contexts, "Augustine is in agreement with Luther," says Ramsey, when the latter writes 
(in Temporal Authority): 
In what concerns you and yours, you govern yourself by the Gospel and suffer 
injustice for yourself as a true Christian; in what concerns others, you [still] 
govern yourself according to love, and suffer no injustice for your neighbor's 
sake.22 
For Luther, argues Ramsey, it is clear that "bearing the sword is an alien work yet still the 
proper work of love. This is the very essence of Luther's political ethics, and not 'a 
somewhat labored argument' (as Preserved Smith believed)."23 Summarizing the just 
war tradition as rooted and reflected in the theological presuppositions and pastoral 
convictions of Augustine and Luther, Ramsey writes: 
The point that needs stressing is that the limitations placed upon conduct in the 
just-war theory arose not from autonomous natural reason asserting its 
sovereignty over determinations of right and wrong (and threatening to lead 
Christian faith and love, which are and should be free, into bondage to alien 
principles), but from a quite humble moral reason subjecting itself to the 
2° Ibid., xx. 
21 Ibid., 32. 
22 Cited in War and the Christian Conscience, 37-38; emphasis Ramsey's. 
23 Ibid., 38; fn. 3. 
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sovereignty of God and the lordship of Christ, as Christian men felt themselves 
impelled out of love to justify war and by love severely to limit war.24 
Gilbert Meilaender 
One prominent Lutheran theologian and ethicist who (like the Methodist Ramsey) 
has attempted to take seriously the theological thinking of Luther on war and peace and 
its implications for modem-day application is Gilbert Meilaender. Meilaender writes: 
In the centuries immediately after the Lutheran Reformation, the tradition of just 
war, which already had a strong hold on the Christian West, was developed in 
much greater detail than Luther offers in Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, 
and it has continued in its development to the present day. But the essential foci 
of reflection remain those noted in Luther's treatise; we continue to discuss the 
sorts of injustice that may legitimize and indeed require war to rectify. We 
continue to refine and discuss our understanding of the limits that should govern 
all acts of war. And we continue to try to understand war as a work of love, but a 
strange and alien one: love's doing in behalf of the needy neighbor what love 
would never do in its own behalf.25  
Building on the theological thought of Luther, Meilaender attempts to develop an 
argument for the viability of the just war tradition today by asking "Whether (in This 
Nuclear Age) Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved." As noted earlier, he warns against two 
temptations—first, the temptation presented by secular authors like Hans Morgenthau 
and Jonathan Schell, who see as the greatest possible evil the "extinction of the human 
species." Certainly, says Meilaender, "Christians cherish the earth and the drama of 
human history, but they have always expected that the curtain will someday fall on the 
final act." At the same time, they "believe the promise that this curtain cannot fall until 
God Himself is ready."26 Therefore, Christians must "reject the idol of the survival of the 
human species" as an end in itself," which is tantamount to a "worship of humankind" 
24 
Tut"., 
 59. 
25 lw RIWT, 90-91. 
26 pjw7: 93. 
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rather than a worship of God. Hauerwas, of course, shares this disdain for "survivalism," 
and he would no doubt affirm Meilaender's strong critique of Schell's approach plea as a 
reminder that it is impossible to do ethics "without a qualifier," i.e. without faith in 
something or someone: 
"We do not even necessarily ask for our personal survival; we only ask that we be 
survived. We ask for assurance that when we die as individuals...mankind will 
live on" [Schell, The Fate of the Earth, 184]. This is genuine religious faith. I 
have no wish to belittle it; indeed, I am moved by it. But it happens not be 
Christian. We all live on borrowed time, and if the human species is to become 
extinct after the generation of my children (or next week), it is still important for 
me to take the time to play games with these children, celebrate their marriages, 
enjoy my own, read good books, pull the weeds in my garden, sing a good hymn. 
All good things are meant for my enjoyment and my neighbor's, but I am to 
worship none of them. One of the great temptations of our time is the loss of faith 
that would let the worth of such activities depend on the continuation of our world 
and our history. Christians should resist this temptation and learn how not to 
argue against nuclear weapons.27 
On the other hand, says Meilaender, the very eschatological hope that enables 
Lutherans to resist the temptation of survivalism exposes them to another dangerous 
temptation: a theological realism that often devolves into a pessimism regarding the 
possibility of actually placing moral limits on the use of violence in a sinful world. The 
end result of this kind of thinking is some form of the "functional pacifism" spoken of 
earlier, which (despite the outward appearance of a concerned Christian activism) 
actually involves a retreat from serious moral deliberation about war and peace in the 
modem (nuclear) era. This temptation, suggests Meilaender, 
...is the one likely to become most powerful among American Lutherans in the 
immediate future. But this, too, is no way to argue against nuclear weapons. To 
argue that the weapons themselves are autonomous, that they are inherently 
beyond our control, that considering their possible uses for deterrence or war is 
tantamount to affirming nuclear devastation and the extinction of our species, that 
no possible use of such weapons could be just, all this is only to fall prey to the 
old Lutheran temptation. It is to imagine that moral limits have no place in the 
27 Thid., 94. 
195 
public sphere, that no moral distinctions can be made when we discuss possession 
and use of nuclear weapons, that if we have nuclear weapons, there is no 
controlling them. This is only a way of retreating from the responsibility to think 
morally about the public realm. The weapons alone are not our greatest danger. 
We are threatened even more by our willingness to grant them autonomy from 
human will and moral reflection.28  
Meilaender insists, therefore, that we must adamantly reject this temptation of 
nuclear pacifism: 
"Nuclear weapons are beyond our control; hence, we must be rid of them 
entirely." We should recognize that formulation as a temptation. It is no way to 
argue against nuclear weapons, nor does it take seriously the needs of neighbors 
who can only be served in the political realm. "War first became total in the 
minds of men," Paul Ramsey once wrote, echoing thereby Jesus' observation that 
it is what comes from the heart that defiles (Matt. 15:18-19). Lutheran discourse 
about nuclear weapons can be responsible only as it learns this lesson: The 
weapons do not entirely control us. They may make life precarious. Their 
existence may set in motion forces not easily reversed. But they do not make 
impossible moral reflection and discrimination. And since they do not, such 
reflection is our obligation. We must still seek to distinguish between just and 
unjust in the possession and use of nuclear weapons.29 
Charles Lutz agrees with this assessment of Meilaender's regarding the right and wrong 
way to argue against nuclear weapons. He writes: 
It has become popular in recent decades—especially since the development of 
atomic and thermonuclear weaponry—for some people to say, "The just-war ethic 
has outlives its usefulness. In an age of mass-destruction weaponry, the just war 
criteria no longer apply." It has always seemed to me that such statements miss 
the whole point of the just-war tradition, which is, precisely, that because warfare 
is terribly destructive and is inclined to escalate into total devastation there must 
be a system of restraints, of limits. It is the just-war criteria themselves that, for 
many pacifists today, furnish the tests by which nuclear weapons... are declared 
morally unacceptable.3°  
Drawing on the insights of Luther regarding our necessary Christian concern for 
the needs of our neighbor, and on the insights of Ramsey regarding the need for renewed 
28 Ibid., 95-96. 
29 Ibid., 96. 
3° When War Is Unjust, 7. 
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attention to the just war criterion of discrimination in the use of force (i.e., protection of 
non-combatants), Meilaender argues that 
...the same love for neighbors that prevents us from retaliating in our own 
defense may move us to use force in defense of neighbors who need our 
protection. Indeed, this is finally the only Christian justification of force: It is a 
work of love in service of neighbors in need. And we can reformulate Luther's 
dictum for a more contemporary political setting as follows: "Every political 
community is bound to protect its people and preserve the peace for them. That is 
the purpose of government and that is why it must use force.3I 
Lutherans who take Article 16 of the Augsburg Confession and the writings of Luther 
seriously must not hesitate to decry and denounce the unlimited and indiscriminate use of 
force (and even the threat to use such force) that has all too often characterized our own 
nation's conduct and strategy in modem warfare, even as they defend the need to 
deliberate seriously about the possible use of limited and discriminate force: 
Not to limit our forcefulness...would make a mockery of the justification for 
using force at all. Christian love discerns this insight in the just war tradition, and 
this is the religious case for the traditional protection given noncombatants. As 
neighbors who themselves are not directly inflicting harm, non-combatants are to 
be exempt from direct, intended attack. This, of course, cannot mean that they 
will never be injured; it means only that they ought not be targeted. Harm must 
often come to many who are not combatants, but we ought never aim at such 
harm.32  
The choices we face in this area today, Meilaender says in summary, "are limited 
in number and limited in the satisfactions they offer."33 The first choice is to "turn our 
back on the moral limits of the just war tradition" by supporting some of kind of deterrent 
policy that threatens indiscriminate and potentially unlimited nuclear devastation—a 
threat that is meaningless unless there is an accompanying intention to carry it out if 
necessary. The second choice (and in many respects the most risky and radical choice, 
31 PJWT, 97. 
32 Ibid., 97. 
33 See PJWT, 103-104 for this and all following quotations in this paragraph. 
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argues Meilaender) is to commit ourselves to the limits required by the just war 
tradition—"to a policy that relies for its deterrent on our ability and will to wage war if 
need be and to wage it in limited ways (even if with nuclear weapons that have limited, 
discriminate uses)." This will require financial, psychological, and spiritual risks—
including the constant challenge of confronting the temptation of survival at any cost. Or 
there is a third choice: the decision that "in our age there can be no just wars and that we 
cannot serve as soldiers. But then the cost may be heaviest of all: a world made safe for 
injustice and oppression because we have turned not only our cheek but our neighbor's as 
well." He concludes: 
Only the second of these choices, the alternative road we have for the most part 
not taken, commits us to respect both the needs of our near neighbors and the 
image of God even in our enemies. The third choice, eschewing war even for the 
sake of freedom and justice, will inevitably fail to support the just claims of many 
neighbors in a world as unjust and dangerous as ours. The first choice, overriding 
the moral limits that justice requires even in war or threats of war, treats the 
citizens of an enemy nation as no more than pawns in the strategic struggle, as 
mere political functionaries. Whether therefore we consider our duties to the 
neighbor near to us or the neighbor who is also an enemy, the second path is 
morally preferable. But no one can deny that it is a path with its own risks and 
dangers, and many may wonder whether it requires a more lively and substantial 
health than our civilization can muster. "No one in our generation can measure 
the full implications of this decision. He can only decide the question for himself 
in an act of personal venture. No one is in a position or has the authority to make 
either the one answer or the other a matter of binding confession for Christianity 
as a whole" [Thielecke]. But this much at least we can say: Even in this nuclear 
age, soldiers, too, can be saved. There are, if we have the will, ways to fight 
justly, respecting both the claims of near neighbors and the human dignity of 
enemies, and Christians may without sin support such efforts. 
Hauerwas, of course, would not and could not agree with this conclusion without 
compromising his commitment to his own particular Christological and ecclesial 
presuppositions. But one would hope that he would be able to recognize and respect 
Meilaender's argument as an honest and theologically meaningful attempt to apply the 
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just war tradition today in a way that is consistent with Luther's own Christological and 
ecclesial principles. This hope seems reasonable and justifiable on Hauerwas's claim 
(repeated often and in various ways) that "even though I am a pacifist, I have presumed 
that it would be a great good if moral reflection by Americans concerning war could be 
formed by just war considerations."34 Comments such as this also help to illustrate the 
real and legitimate link between Hauerwas's understanding of "peace" as a unique 
manifestation of the presence of Christ in and through the life of the Christian community 
and Luther's concerns for "peacemaking" in the civil realm. Although (as noted earlier) 
there is clearly a distinction between these two types of peace, they cannot finally be 
separated—for either Hauerwas or Luther. The peace embodied in the life of the 
Christian community, according to Hauerwas, has definite implications—among them a 
certain form of pacifism that welcomes and appreciates (even as it critiques and 
criticizes!) any and all sincere efforts toward peacemaking outside the confines of the 
church (even if these efforts are based on the principles of the just war tradition). By the 
same token, the peacemaking supported and encouraged by Luther on the basis of the 
Scriptural principles underlying the just war tradition is rightly grasped and appreciated 
by Christians only as they are "formed" and "transformed" in their thinking and living 
through faithful participation in the life of the Christian community sustained by Word 
and Sacrament (see chapter five for a more extensive discussion of this issue). 
Issues Needing Further Clarification and Exploration 
When it comes to Hauerwas's emphasis on the particularist nature of Christian 
ethics, one issue that (from a Lutheran perspective) needs further clarification is whether 
34 "Whose 'Just' War," 140. 
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(and/or to what extent and in what way) Hauerwas sees "reason" (apart from faith) and 
"natural law" (however defined or designated) as having any valid and useful role at all 
in discussions of war and peace issues in the public realm. Typically, Hauerwas frames 
the issue of "Christian ethics" in stark "either-or" terms: either one must do ethics in a 
radically Christian way that excludes the role of reason or natural law or one must find 
some "a-Christian" foundation for ethics that excludes (or, at best, leaves as optional) the 
unique person and work of Christ. Hauerwas does not engage in extensive, substantive 
dialog with the position (held by Luther and historic Lutheranism) that a specifically and 
radically Christian ethic includes the God-given means and ability (through reason and 
some form of natural law) to converse with non-Christians about truths that Scripture 
says are able to be perceived by both Christians and non-Christians. His position seems 
to be that as soon as we attempt to engage in conversation on the basis of human reason 
or universally accessible insights or principles, we inevitably open the door to violence 
(since Christ alone makes authentic and lasting non-violence possible). This leaves 
Hauerwas himself open, however, to the very charge that he most detests: the charge that 
finally the church has no real means of communicating with a non-Christian world, since 
the only language it speaks is a language the world cannot (by its very nature) 
understand. As Robert Jenson says: 
All address by the church to the world must indeed be "violent"—as all mutual 
address by factions within the world undoubtedly must be—unless the church and 
the world are always antecedently involved in one conversation. That is, unless 
there is God and unless he is in converse with the world by ways other than by 
way of the church. We may not want, as I do not, to construe this converse by the 
categories of "natural" and "law." But Hauerwas has arrived at a position where 
he must acknowledge it somehow, or end with a silenced church.3)  
35 "Hauerwas Examined," FT 25 (Aug./Sept. 1992), 51; cf. "The Hauerwas Project," Modern Theology 8:3 
(July 1992), 285-295. 
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The fact that such conversations (regarding, e.g., issues of war and peace) can and do 
take place between Christians and non-Christians need not undermine or obliterate the 
qualified nature of Christian ethics, as long as Christians remain honest about and faithful 
to the radically unique (i.e., Christ-centered) character of their own witness to the world. 
In this respect Hauerwas's position appears at times to be even more radical than 
Yoder's, since Yoder clearly allows for meaningful conversation between Christians and 
non-Christians on the basis of what he calls "middle axioms," norms that are formulated 
"in pagan terms (liberty, equality, fraternity, education, democracy, human rights)," and 
which are the "highest conceivable level of standards to which one can appeal in the 
world of unbelief."36 Yoder sees these norms as ultimately grounded not in some 
structure of "natural law" or "universal morality" instituted by God apart from Christ, but 
rather as grounded in the love of Christ himself. The norms themselves, however, are 
apparent (in varying degrees) even to those without faith in Christ, and they make 
conversation possible: "It is therefore possible to explain...how the Christian can speak 
to the statesman, without failing to take account of their differing presuppositions, using 
pagan or secular terminology to clothe his social critique without ascribing to those 
secular concepts any metaphysical value outside of Christ."37 
Hauerwas, at times, seems to presume a similar view: in "Can a Pacifist Think 
About War," for example, he says that he is concerned to show that "just because 
Christians are committed to the practice of nonviolence does not mean that the 
36 Yoder, The Christian Witness to the State (Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press, 1964), 73. 
37 Ibid. 
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conversation [with the world] is at an end."38 In The Peaceable Kingdom, he 
acknowledges that "people who are not Christians" may, at times, "manifest God's peace 
better than we ourselves," leading to the hope that "such people may provide the 
conditions for our ability to cooperate with others for securing justice in the world."39 He 
immediately goes on to say, however, that "such cooperation... is not based on 'natural 
law' legitimation of a generally shared 'natural morality."'40 On what then, the reader 
may reasonably ask, is such cooperation and conversation based? Hauerwas never 
answers this question, however; he simply goes on to say that such cooperation is "a 
testimony to the fact that God's kingdom is wide indeed," and that the church has "no 
right to determine the boundaries of God's kingdom," which is "wider than the church."'" 
Precisely what this means or implies is (to say the least!) less than clear—and (as Jenson 
argues) this issue seems quite crucial in addressing the question of the possibility of the 
church's conversation and cooperation with non-Christians when addressing issues of 
common concern (such as war and peace). Hauerwas's lack of clarity in this regard is 
disappointing, since—at least on the basis of Yoder's discussion of "middle axioms"—
there seems to be more hope for finding common ground here than one might think on 
the basis of Hauerwas's strong and consistent denunciation of any concept of "natural 
law." With reference once again to Yoder, this hope is engendered also (ironically) by 
38 Dispatches, 123. See also Hauerwas's ultimate appeal to "common sense" in his testimony on in vitro 
fertilization before the Ethics Advisory Board of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
published in Suffering Presence (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 142-158. 
PK, 101. 
4° Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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Yoder's mischaracterization of the historic Lutheran view of "the order of creation" and 
the two realms.42 
For example, one of Yoder's sharpest criticisms of the Lutheran ethic is its 
alleged dualistic character—its acceptance of a higher standard for Christians on the level 
of private, personal relationships and a lower standard on the level of the public 
performance of their responsibilities in their allotted stations or vocations in society. In 
The Christian Witness to the State Yoder writes: 
Christian ethical thought has attempted to deal with social problems in one of two 
general ways. One the one hand there have been the dualistic approaches, of 
which the Roman Catholic distinction between "mandates" and "counsels," or the 
Lutheran "two kingdoms" (better "two regimes") may be taken as classical 
historical expressions. Here it is clearly recognized that for the operation of 
society there must be moral standards falling short of the righteousness of Christ, 
but ways are found for explaining the adequacy of these lower standards as guides 
for Christian behavior, at least for certain Christians or certain portions of the 
Christian life.43  
Later on, in his summary of "The Classical Lutheran View," Yoder argues that: 
Instead of dividing mankind into two categories, some saints living in perfect love 
and the mass of common men operating on the level of justice, Luther places 
every man on both levels. As an individual, involved in face-to-face relations 
with his neighbor, every Christian is to be nonresistant, bearing patiently every 
kind of evil treatment. Likewise, every man, when he functions with a view to his 
assignment ("vocation" or "station") in society, operates on the lower level. 
Thus, instead of asking, What kind of person am I..., the Christian will ask from 
case to case and moment to moment, On what level am I now operating, in my 
station or as an individual? 44 
42 See Christian Witness, 63-64. Yoder 1) has far too narrow a view of Luther's concept of the order of 
creation; 2) fails to grasp the simultaneous nature of the Christian life in the two realms, contributing to the 
view that this involves a dualistic double standard; 3) confuses Luther's view of human sinfulness with the 
notion that this assumes the necessity of willful, conscious, deliberate sin in the "lower realm;" 4) misreads 
Luther's view of the divinely instituted nature of human government as divine approval of specific 
governments and rulers and their actions and decisions. These issues are taken up in more detail below and 
in subsequent chapters. 
43 Christian Witness, 29-30. 
44 Ibid., 63. 
203 
As an individual, says Yoder (in his effort to summarize the view of Luther), the 
Christian is always and only to be guided by "agape," selfless love for one's neighbor. 
On the lower level of one's vocation in the world, the Christian need not be guided by 
love but by the "lower standard" of justice. 
It should be clear from our discussion of Luther's views in chapter three, 
however—and from the foregoing summary of Luther's perspective as reflected in the 
just war arguments of Ramsey and Meilaender—that Yoder's presentation of Luther's 
"dualistic," "private-public" ethic is not fully adequate nor accurate. While it is true (first 
of all) that Luther maintained that a Christian might be called upon to engage in 
contrasting (and even apparently conflicting) types of behavior in different situations in 
life, it is misleading to say that for Luther the key question involved in making such 
decisions is, "On what level am I now operating, in my station or as an individual?" For 
Luther, life in the "two realms" is not a matter of moving back and forth between two 
static and separate, higher and lower levels of existence, and making (ultimately 
incompatible) decisions on the basis of determining "on which level I am now operating." 
Rather, the Christian lives and operates simultaneously in both "realms"—which are not 
two distinct and static spheres of human existence but rather two different and dynamic 
forms of divine rule and activity. Thus, each Christian remains at all times and in all 
places and situations under the unified realm of God's twofold governance—both as an 
individual and as one called by God to serve in a variety of public vocations. It should 
also be noted (as we discussed in chapter three in connection with Luther's explanation of 
the fifth commandment in the Large Catechism) that any Christian (regardless of his or 
her civic vocation) may be called upon by God in certain situations to come to the 
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assistance of a neighbor in need, which may (regrettably) require the use of force or 
violence. In such situations, the Christian "as individual" is fulfilling the responsibilities 
of his general station or vocation of neighbor, which remain in force in any and all 
situations in life (whether in a public or private setting or context). 
More importantly, it is not at all accurate to say that a Christian fulfilling the 
responsibilities of his vocation (whether as soldier or judge or neighbor) is required or 
expected to forego or ignore the Christian standard of "agape" and is merely to be guided 
by the "lower standard" of justice. For Luther, it is never permissible for a Christian to 
act contrary to Christian love—love for one's neighbor in need is the sole and 
unwavering standard for all actions and decisions by the Christian, whether done or made 
privately as an individual or publicly in one's vocation. This must be clearly understood 
in order for genuinely meaningful dialog to take place between those committed to the 
position of Luther on war and peace and those committed to the position of Yoder and 
Hauerwas. Charles Lutz says it well (in words cited in the introduction to this chapter): 
The essential origin of anything like the just-war ethic, in terms of the biblical 
faith, is the overarching concern of love for one's neighbor. I understand pacifists 
to begin there also, leading to the argument that violence is never a way to show 
love to a neighbor, including a neighbor who is my enemy. But I see just-war 
ethics as being equally concerned with such love. The difference is that another 
set of neighbors receives primary attention: those who may be called the innocent, 
those who are in need of protection from attack, those who would be defenseless 
unless someone took up arms on their behalf. It is finally that question, "How 
shall the defenseless be protected?" which just-war theory is seeking to address.45  
45 When War Is Unjust, 14. 
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The "public-private" distinction found in Luther's writings on war and peace, in 
summary, is not a distinction between a higher and lower realm with higher and lower 
ethical standards. It is a distinction between differing responses that may be required in 
differing situations as the Christian seeks to remain completely faithful to the sole ethic 
of Christian love in living out his or her life as a simultaneous citizen of two realms—
both of which exist under God's governance and both of which require absolute 
obedience to the standard of love laid down in Scripture (e.g., the Ten Commandments) 
and exemplified in the life (and death) of Christ. The question facing the Christian in 
every situation in life is: how do I show love to my neighbor in faithfulness to the 
command and example of Christ? 
When a Christian is personally confronted by threats or acts of violence by his or 
her enemy, our Lord and Master Jesus insists that the proper and necessary way to show 
love to this enemy (who is also his or her neighbor) is to submit to such attacks, to "turn 
the other cheek," and not to resist or respond in kind—trusting in the mercy and 
protection of God, who promises to cause all things to work together for the good of 
those who love him. When a Christian sees his or her neighbor confronted by threats or 
acts of violence by another, the only possible way to show love to the neighbor in need is 
by coming to his or her help and defense, which may involve the use of violence—not in 
one's own defense, but in the defense of one's neighbor. As Meilaender puts it, Jesus 
commands us to "turn our own cheek"—he does not command us to "turn the cheek" of 
our neighbor. The fact that a Christian may find himself or herself in this situation of 
having to choose between acting "peaceably" toward one of two neighbors (one attacking 
and the other under attack) is a regrettable result of life in a fallen world. In Luther's 
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view, however, the same Christ-centered, Scripture-based ethic of love requires and 
motivates both responses—one in the context of our personal relations with a neighbor 
who is our "enemy," the other in the context of our Christian vocation as "neighbor" or as 
civil servant entrusted (by God and by the human authorities acting in his behalf) with the 
responsibility of serving and protecting those in need. This crucial (at least for Luther) 
issue of Christian vocation will be discussed in more detail below in chapters six and 
seven. 
Luther's ethic, therefore, is just as "particularistic" as that of Yoder and 
Hauerwas—it is not grounded in the notion that one can identify two separate ethics, a 
higher, love-based "ethic of Jesus" and a lower, justice-based "ethic of the state" to which 
Christians are equally bound and between which they must constantly choose. In 
describing his own position in The Christian Witness to the State Yoder writes: 
The position which we would here argue seeks to be more faithful to the example 
of the New Testament. It fits none of these [dualistic] patterns, since in searching 
for a way to speak of an "ethic for the state" we do not believe that such an ethic 
can stand alone. With the New Testament we shall affirm the necessity of orders 
and organization based on power in social relations. This is the result not first of 
God's having willed that it be so, but only of human sin. The Anabaptists 
described this "duality without dualism" by speaking of the sword as part of the 
world "outside the perfection of Christ"; the phrase "inside the perfection of 
Christ" designated both the Christian church as a body and Christian ethics as a 
new ethical level. Both the violent action of the state (Romans 13:4) and the 
nonresistance of the Christian (12:9) are ways of God's acting in the world. 
These two aspects of God's work are not distinguished by God's having created 
two realms but by the actual rebelliousness of men a6 
This helpful summary clearly identifies the concept of the "two realms" as a key point of 
difference in the thinking of Yoder (and Hauerwas) and Luther, and yet it also provides 
several "handles" for further discussion and dialog on this important issue. It is clear that 
46 Christian Witness, 31. 
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in articulating their understanding of the two realms to those schooled in the thinking of 
Yoder and Hauerwas, Lutherans need to make more clear that it is not their intention to 
defend or establish a separate "ethic for the state" that allows or encourages Christians to 
compromise their absolute and radical commitment to the love-ethic of Jesus. Lutherans 
may also find it helpful to point out that the pacifist Anabaptist tradition itself finds it 
necessary—on the basis of the teaching of Jesus and the New Testament—to speak of 
some sort of "duality" in Scripture's teaching on this issue, even if it cannot accept the 
Reformation understanding of the "two realms" as a proper description of this duality. 
Yoder, too, speaks of "two aspects of God's work" and "two ways of God's acting in the 
world"—even if he is (apparently) led to conclude that one of those ways of "acting" (in 
response to the tragic reality of the fall) is possible or "permissible" only for God and not 
for his followers in Christ. In any event, there are clearly issues here that seem fruitful 
for further discussion, issues relating to shared concerns and convictions about both the 
particularity of Christian ethics and God's activity in (and care and concern for) a fallen 
world. 
Among the Lutheran theologians who have stressed the need to retain a 
particularistic approach to Christian ethics while at the same time taking seriously Yoder 
and Hauerwas's concerns about the church's falling prey to the charge of sectarianism is 
Ronald Thiemann. An extended discussion and critique of Thiemann's entire program 
for engaging in "public theology" is outside the scope of this study; it should be noted 
that his work has been sharply criticized by theologians (such as D. Stephen Long) who 
are committed to the radically particularistic approach of Yoder and Hauerwas.47 Our 
47 See D. Stephen Long, The Goodness of God: Theology, the Church, and Social Order (Grand Rapids: 
Brazos Press, 2001), 71-75. 
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purpose in quoting Thiemann here is to make a rather simple and limited point—
essentially the same point made above by Robert Jenson—that one of the challenges 
faced by Christians in any society is to make known their convictions about the 
implications of Scripture's teaching for life in the civil realm to those who do not share 
those convictions, and do so (so far as possible) in common sense ways (cf. Yoder's 
"middle axioms") without losing sight of or compromising the particularity of those 
convictions. Of course (see below), this is undoubtedly easier said than done; according 
to Thiemann, however: 
Our challenge is to develop a public theology that remains based on the 
particularities of the Christian faith while genuinely addressing issues of public 
significance. Too often, theologies that seek to address a broad secular culture 
lose touch with the distinctive beliefs and practices of the Christian tradition....On 
the other hand, theologies that seek to preserve the characteristic language and 
patterns of Christian narrative and practice too often fail to engage the public 
realm in an effective and responsible fashion....If Christians are to fmd an 
authentic public voice in today's culture, we must find a middle way between 
these two equally unhappy altematives.48  
In his concluding thoughts Thiemann defines this challenge more specifically: 
There has been a great deal of discussion in academic theology about "public 
theology." Most of that debate has focused on the question of whether theological 
arguments are available for public examination and whether theological assertions 
are intelligible beyond the confines of a particular religious community. 
Although such issues are intellectually interesting and important within a rather 
small circle of academic theologians, they only begin to help us address what I 
consider the far more important questions: Will religious convictions and 
theological analyses have any real impact on the way our public lives are 
structured? Can a truly public theology have a salutary influence on the 
development of public policy within a pluralistic democratic nation? The real 
challenge to a North American public theology is to find a way—within the 
social, cultural, and religious pluralism of American politics—to influence the 
development of public policy without seeking to construct a new Christendom or 
lapsing into a benign moral relativism.49 
48 Ronald F. Thiemann, Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic Culture (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster; John Knox Press, 1991), 19. 
48 Ibid., 173. 
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In discussions of this nature, Robert Kolb reminds us, "believers do not hide the fact that 
their convictions spring from their faith. They do not deny the power of historical 
arguments from the Judeo-Christian heritage which shaped this culture." "But," says 
Kolb, 
...if we are to argue persuasively in this culture, we must use arguments which 
can reconstruct a commonly accepted "common sense" in this society for those 
who do not share Christian convictions concerning the vertical relationship with 
God. That is entirely possible. Those with different convictions regarding life's 
ultimate meaning may still come to consensus on how to operate in the horizontal 
realm. The regulation of that realm will arise from rational argument and 
formulation among people of different ultimate beliefs as they seek the common 
good within the realm of the possible.5°  
Once again, it is not entirely clear if, or to what extent, Hauerwas himself would 
find such an approach acceptable, but Lutherans making use of this approach in 
articulating arguments about war and peace in the public realm would certainly do well to 
take to heart Hauerwas's warning—shared by the Lutheran theologians cited above—not 
to "lose touch with the distinctive beliefs and practices of the Christian tradition."51 This 
may involve (among other things) the challenge of developing different arguments for 
different audiences: speaking to Christians in ways that make explicit the connection 
between faith in Christ and loving service to one's neighbor (and society as a whole), and 
speaking to non-Christians on the basis of "common sense" arguments about the common 
good—even while keeping clearly in view the very different nature of those arguments. 
At times, however, it may also mean simply bearing witness to the world the church's 
faith-based perspective on an issue such as war and peace, without expecting that it will 
be understood or accepted—even while hoping that it may be respected as stemming 
50 Robert Kolb, "Christian Civic Responsibility in an Age of Judgment," Concordia Journal 19:1 (January 
1993), 20. 
51 Thiemann, 19. 
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from genuine religious convictions that are shared by many professing Christians in 
society. 
It must also be acknowledged—as Hauerwas strongly and repeatedly warns—that 
the very act of engaging the world's interests and issues on its terms (rather than on 
specifically Christian terms) may itself involve compromise. One of the reasons that 
Hauerwas is so concerned about reclaiming and retaining the particularistic nature of 
Christian ethics is that only in this way can the church—God's "particular people" who 
exist as an alternative polis in the world—preserve the sense of freedom it needs to bear 
witness faithfully to God's truth by challenging the pretentious presumptions of the state 
(any state) and its own demands for obedience and loyalty. In this way Christians 
actually serve society and government, as Long explains: 
Hauerwas's project is against the nations only in that it is for the church as the 
only social formation holding the narrative that can prevent freedom from 
usurping the good and thus making violence more determinative of our lives than 
God's peaceable kingdom. The point is not to destroy liberalism but "to help the 
church recover a sense of its own integrity that it might better be able to make 
discriminating judgments about the society which we happen to call America." If 
liberalism is the theory of society under which Christians must live until the 
eschaton, then the point is to prevent it from realizing its own imperial demands. 
The church does this by being the church. If another form of society arises, then 
the church will have to respond to it as well. The response will be different, but 
Hauerwas follows Yoder in insisting that the response should be one that reflects 
the "war of the lamb" who refused to seize power and instead endured the cross.52 
As Long's summary makes clear, much more important to Hauerwas than abstract 
arguments (whether grounded in specifically Christian truths or in what Yoder calls 
"middle axioms") is the actual life of the Christian community, which is the "social ethic" 
that exposes the world as world and bears witness to a new way of living in Christ. All 
argumentation is useless—even counter-productive—unless the church is able to 
52 Long, 103. 
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demonstrate in and through its life together how the story of Christ has become (and 
continues to become) its story. We will discuss the topic of "the church as social ethic" 
in more detail in chapter seven (which is in many ways a continuation of this chapter). 
However, following the basic logic and progression of Hauerwas's presentation in The 
Peaceable Kingdom (as outlined in chapter two), we turn our attention now to the crucial 
issue of Hauerwas's understanding of the church as "God's story" under the heading, 
"War, Peace and the Narrative Character of Christian Ethics." 
Chapter Five 
War, Peace and the Narrative Character of Christian Ethics 
Valid Hauerwasian Insights and Concerns:  
Staving Connected to Christ's Story 
One of Hauerwas's most fascinating (and insightful) essays is titled "A Story-
Formed Community: Reflections on Watership Down."1 In this essay Hauerwas makes 
use of Richard Adam's classic novel about a threatened and courageous colony of rabbits 
to illustrate "the importance of stories for social and political life." He writes: 
Too often politics is treated solely as a matter of power, interests or technique. 
We thus forget that the most basic task of any polity is to offer its people a sense 
of participation in an adventure. For what we finally seek is not power, or 
security, or equality, or even dignity, but a sense of worth gained from 
participation and contribution to a common adventure. Indeed, our "dignity" 
derives exactly from our sense of having played a part in such a story.2 
"A Story-Formed Community" is written for the express purpose of explicating 
Hauerwas's "Ten Theses" for "Reforming Christian Social Ethics," the first of which (as 
we noted in chapter two) is that "the social significance of the Gospel requires the 
recognition of the narrative structure of Christian convictions for the life of the church."3  
Hauerwas asserts: 
Christian social ethics too often takes the form of principles and policies that are 
not clearly based on or warranted by the central convictions of the faith. Yet the 
basis of any Christian social ethic should be the affirmation that God has 
decisively called and formed a people to serve him through Israel and the work of 
Christ. The appropriation of the critical significance of the latter depends on the 
recognition of narrative as a basic category for social ethics.4 
HR, 170-199. 
2 "Story-Formed Community," HR, 172. 
' "Ten Theses," HR, 111. 
4 Ibid., 110. 
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Whether we realize it or not, says Hauerwas, "every social ethic involves a narrative, 
whether it is concerned with the formulation of basic principles of social organization 
and/or with concrete policy alternatives."5 In fact, the very "form and substance of a 
community is narrative-dependent, and therefore what counts as 'social ethics' is a 
correlative of the content of that narrative."6 The primary task of the church, therefore, 
"is not to make the 'world' better or more just, but to help Christian people form their 
community consistent with their conviction that the story of Christ is a truthful account of 
our existence."' 
For Hauerwas, of course, a faithful and truthful account of the story of Christ as 
retold and re-enacted in the life of the church includes "the refusal to resort to violence," 
which (for Hauerwas) is always a sign of the failure to trust in God as the "Lord of 
history" and to live in obedience to his way (revealed in Christ's cross) of dealing with 
the evil and violence of the world.8 Even if Lutherans cannot accept this specific 
conclusion of Hauerwas's, they can certainly recognize and affirm the truth of much of 
what Hauerwas has to say about the narrative character of Christian ethics. Precisely 
because of its long and dominant history of "doing theology" primarily on the basis of 
systematic and dogmatic categories and strategies, Lutheranism is among those 
theological traditions that must be on guard against allowing such systematic approaches 
to dominate its theology in ways that fail to do full justice to the narrative of Scripture 
itself (centered in the story of Christ as recounted in the Gospels) and to its continuation 
in the life and tradition of the church. As they seek to respond in appropriate and 
5 Ibid., 112. 
6 Ibid. 
Ibid. 
8 See Thesis 5 of "Ten Theses," HR 113. 
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meaningful ways to the issue of war and peace, Lutherans would do well to remember 
that 
The nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian convictions 
take the form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories that constitutes a 
tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community. Christian ethics does not 
begin by emphasizing rules or principles, but by calling our attention to a 
narrative that tells of God's dealing with creation.9 
Lutherans who seek to remain faithful in just war thinking to their own (truly 
"Luther-an") story can benefit from this insight of Hauerwas in several ways. First, 
Lutherans need to guard against a legalistic or narrowly systematic obsession with the 
just war principles themselves—an attitude or approach that allows the principles to 
become detached or isolated from the Christ-centered story of Scripture that gives them 
their true Christian context, content, and purpose. As Hauerwas repeatedly (and rightly) 
warns, such an attitude can—and no doubt sometimes does—lead Christians (including 
Lutheran Christians) to use the abstract principles of the just war theory as a blanket 
justification for virtually any war their own government wants to fight, for virtually any 
reason. Joseph Allen's word of caution also applies to Lutherans: 
One question to put to a just-war approach is whether it merely serves as a 
rationalization for whatever the government does. That can happen. Some 
citizens or national leaders may use the criteria as a check list to try to show that 
at every point a war is justifiable, but without any serious moral self-examination. 
When this happens, the criteria have been reduced merely to verbal weapons 
against those who disagree.1° 
This, says Allen, "is a misuse of the criteria, not an inherent weakness of a just-
war approach."11 As Ramsey and Meilaender clearly demonstrate, such use of the just 
war theory is also inconsistent with and unfaithful to the Christian and Lutheran story of 
9 PK, 24-25. 
I° Allen, 48. 
II Ibid. 
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the just war tradition and the Scriptural story on which it is based. Still, we do well to 
heed Hauerwas's warning that "once 'justice' is made a criterion [or at least the central 
criterion] of Christian social strategy, it can too easily take on a meaning and life of its 
own that is not informed by the Christian's fundamental convictions."12 He rightly 
reminds Christian (and Lutheran) just war thinkers that 
...just war theory surely requires its adherents to contemplate the possibility that 
they will find themselves in deep tension with the warmaking policies of their 
governments. The criteria that war be declared by "legitimate authority" does not 
in itself entail any account of what constitutes legitimacy....I suspect that those 
who employ just war thinking as Christians are able to do so with integrity exactly 
to the extent that they assume a position of resistance to the state not unlike that of 
their pacifist sister and brother! 
The second point is closely related to the first: Lutherans need to keep in mind 
that any form of the just war tradition (like any form of pacifism) is part of a larger 
"story"—part of a broader historical tradition that contains both commendable and 
Christian elements as well as variations, applications and manifestations that faithful 
Christians and Lutherans simply cannot (or at least should not) affirm and accept. As 
was noted in our survey of Christian attitudes toward war and peace in part one of this 
study, there is little question that medieval theories regarding just war helped lay the 
theological groundwork for the acceptance (or at least tolerance) of the crusades in the 
Middle Ages. As Joseph Allen points out, the principles of the just war theory are also 
(mis)used by some today to support a crusading attitude toward war, an attitude clearly 
rejected by Luther—and (more importantly!) by Jesus. His warning and historical 
reminder is one to which Lutherans, too, need to give heed: 
In the wars of religion that followed the Reformation, Catholic fought against 
Protestant, Protestant against Catholic, and often Protestant against Anabaptist 
12 "Ten Theses," HR, 112. 
13 "Can A Pacifist Think About War?" 134. 
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Protestant, all in the name of God and often without moral restraint. In the past 
two centuries we have seen the emergence of ideas of total war, which is much 
like the crusade in its absolute ends and lack of moral restraint. Christians and 
others have fought in the name of religious and nonreligious causes that they 
deemed absolute against what they saw as the forces of evil: extremists of the 
French revolution against anything that smacked of the old order, communists 
against the forces of "reaction," Nazis and Fascists as embodiments of all evil, 
Iranians against the United States as "the Great Satan," Iraqis against the evil 
Americans, and Western leaders against Saddam Hussein as "a new Hitler." 
Crusade thinking has a long history, one not confined to Christians but also 
present among them.14 
Finally, one of the most helpful insights of Hauerwas concerning the narrative 
character of Christian ethics is his constant reminder that it is through the concrete and 
communal life of the church—particularly through its worship life and practices— that 
the story of Christ becomes "our story." "The emphasis on narrative," says Hauerwas, 
"is unintelligible abstracted from an ecclesial context."15 And the church is known only 
by its marks: "through practices such as preaching, baptism, eucharist—in short, 
worship."16 This explains Hauerwas's insistence that the liturgical practices of the 
church "are our effective social work. For if the church is rather than has a social ethic, 
these actions are our most important social witness."I7 In his book In Good Company, 
Hauerwas explains how, in his course on theological ethics at Duke University, he 
teaches "Christian ethics as worship" by highlighting "the liturgical shape of the 
Christian life."18 The topics discussed in the class are structured around the liturgy used 
in the United Methodist Church in an attempt to show how the worship life of the church 
is integral to and inseparable from the formation of Christian character (which is at the 
14 Allen, 8. 
15 "The 'End' of 'Narrative Theology,'" in HR, 152; cf. "Casuistry in Context: The Need for Tradition," in 
HR, 267-286. 
16 Where Resident Aliens Live, 18. 
17 PK, 108. 
18 "The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Christian Ethics as Worship," in IGC, 153-168. 
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heart and core of Christian ethics). In the following section we will suggest ways that 
Lutherans might make practical use of this insight by seeking more intentionally and 
deliberately to demonstrate how the church in and through its catechesis and worship 
seeks to inculcate attitudes and practices that reflect a truly Christian and Lutheran 
perspective on "real life" ethical issues—including the issue of war and peace. In the 
very act of undertaking this task, we are implicitly acknowledging the validity of 
Hauerwas's own narrative-based theological methodology, as well as his accompanying 
assumption that the story of Christ itself—his life, suffering, death and resurrection—has 
paradigmatic moral significance for those who seek to make his story their own. We 
acknowledge and affirm these insights of Hauerwas even while recognizing that, from a 
Lutheran perspective, certain aspects of Hauerwas's own construal of Scripture's story 
are themselves distorted or incomplete due to his failure to view the person and work of 
Christ (and the work of Christians done in obedience to and imitation of Christ) within 
the broader Scriptural context of God's dual reign in the church and in the world. 
Lutheran Challenges and Contributions: Worship and Catechesis  
Far too often we forget, says Hauerwas, that "the most basic task of any polity is 
to offer its people a sense of participation in an adventure."19 Despite the many ways that 
Lutherans have undoubtedly failed to recognize and to demonstrate how the story of 
Jesus and of our participation as real-life "adventurers" in that story is at the heart of a 
truly Lutheran approach to issues of war and peace, confessional Lutherans seem well 
resourced—with their high regard for the Christ-centered authority of Scripture and the 
strong heritage of Luther's efforts to affirm a version of just war thinking rooted in 
19 "Story-Formed Community," HR, 172. 
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Scripture's story—to recapture this necessary insight and emphasis. If they are to do this, 
however, it must be done not only on an academic or intellectual or official level (by way 
of dissertations, scholarly essays, or institutional policies and principles), but in a way 
that attempts to show how the Christ-centered, Scripture-based "narrative" of the 
Lutheran just war tradition is and can be incorporated into the ongoing spiritual, 
liturgical, and educational formation and nurturing that takes place as part of the normal 
life and worship of the Christian community, the church. We highlight here two historic 
Lutheran strengths that could be further strengthened by more deliberate attention to how 
and where the issue of war and peace fits into the story of Christ and the "adventure" of 
the Christian church—namely, worship and catechesis. 
War, Peace, and Lutheran Worship 
"The best way to learn the significance of stories is by having our attention drawn 
to stories through a story."2° And the way that Lutherans (like most other Christians) are 
most frequently, consistently, effectively brought into contact with and formed by the 
story of Christ and his work is through the rehearsal and repetition of that story in and 
through the regular liturgical practices of the church. The liturgy, in countless ways, 
rehearses the truths and realities that connect and reconnect us to the story of Christ and 
remind us how our "story" is radically different from "the world's story," and the 
implications that this has for our witness in and to the world. Hauerwas insists that that 
the liturgical practices of the church—its preaching, teaching and faithful observance of 
the sacraments—"are the essential rituals of our politics," since "through them we learn 
who we are," who God is, and how he acts and intervenes in our lives and in a world 
20 Hauerwas, "Story-Formed Community," HR, 172. 
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marked and marred by evil and violence.21 Luther makes a strikingly similar point in his 
treatise On War Against the Turk when he insists that "the devil is a spirit who cannot be 
beaten with armor, muskets, horses, and men;" rather, "Christian weapons and power 
must do it."22 According to Luther, the best and most effective witness the church can 
offer during times of war and peace is to show, through its regular worship and faithful 
use of God's Word and sacraments, that it is "the pious, holy, precious body of 
Christians" which has the true "arms for this war"—and that "they know how to use 
them."23  
Although we will discuss the issue of catechesis separately below as a vital task of 
the church that needs to go hand in hand with its ongoing liturgical life and practices, it is 
also important to recognize that worship itself is, in many ways, the most effective and 
meaningful form of catechesis. In a recent article in Theology Today titled "Worship as 
Catechesis: Knowledge, Desire, and Christian Formation," Debra Dean Murphy (a 
colleague of Hauerwas's at Duke University Divinity School) persuasively argues that 
...knowledge's intimate connection to action, to doing, to practice, to habit, and to 
ritual means that what we know cannot be separated from who we are or within 
the confessional language of the church, who we hope to be. Thus the original 
question How do we know what we know? Should now be recognized as deeply 
indebted to the Cartesianism under scrutiny here and to the objectivist view of 
knowledge that needs dismantling. In other words, a doxological, liturgical, 
eucharistic account of knowledge—as I am attempting to develop here--account 
of knowledge—as I am attempting to develop here—assumes that we can never 
be at any distance from the knowledge we need.24 
Thus, insists Murphy, 
...to admit the intimate connection between knowledge and action, between 
learning and bodily practice, is to recognize that, for Christians, worship is the site 
21 See PK, 108. 
22 On War Against the Turk, 170. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Theology Today (October 2001), 323-324. 
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at which our formation and education are initiated and completed (insofar as they 
can ever be complete). What we do, how we act, in the liturgical assembly, 
shapes us in particular and powerful ways and is both formative of identity and 
catechetical in the most basic sense.25  
Murphy closes her article with a strong critique of traditional approaches to catechesis 
and their underlying assumptions, and with an urgent plea to "pay more serious attention 
to preparation for and reflection on the church's worship:" 
Much of what constitutes educative efforts in Christian communities today is 
bland, feeble, and ineffectual. This signals the failure to take seriously the 
catechetical nature and power of the worshipping assembly, the body of Christ 
gathered in Eucharistic fellowship, becoming the truth in a world captivated by 
falsehood and deception. Modem catechesis (multiform though it is) has often 
assumed the "objectivist" model of learning and viewed Christian "knowledge" as 
context-free, disembedded from the liturgy and life of the worshipping 
community. It has presumed the priority of "the individual" and the autonomous 
self and, in regard to Christian formation, has understood the liturgy to be, at best, 
supplementary and, at worst, superfluous. This makes all the more urgent the 
need to pay more serious attention to preparation for and reflection on the 
church's worship. Such preparation and reflection are, ultimately, the core of 
Christian discipleship and the heart of extraliturgical formation and education. 
The forms of such preparation cannot be known and delineated a priori; they 
emerge out of particular worshipping communities' engagement with Scripture, 
tradition, cultural and political contexts, economic exigencies, and so on. The 
least that can be said is that the forms that these practices take must assume that 
catechesis is a lifelong process of conversion—not a program for instilling 
rationalist book-knowledge in the young.26 
While it is no doubt true that the formation, instruction, and training for witness of 
God's people that takes place in and through the liturgy is more "caught" than "taught," it 
is not hard to envision ways in which pastors and worship leaders (e.g., through written 
or verbal "worship notes," appropriate sermonic commentary, and the regular and 
ongoing instruction that takes place outside the context of worship) can help worshippers 
to perceive and better understand how the various parts of the liturgy relate in very 
25 Ibid., 324-325. 
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practical ways to our unique identity as Christians and our "peaceable witness" in and to 
the world.27  
The invocation, for example, names the God who has called us his own and has 
given us a radically new identity and purpose in life. It reminds us that we begin our 
worship in the same way that we were given a new beginning in life—"in the name of 
the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit" into whose name we were baptized. 
By his undeserved and unlimited love, the Triune God has claimed and captured our trust 
and loyalty in way that (as Jesus himself demonstrated in the desert temptations and in 
the trial before Pilate) makes it impossible for us to put our ultimate trust in ourselves or 
in "princes" or in any of the earthly "powers that be." The confession of sin reminds us 
of our innate and inexhaustible capacity for self-deception ("we deceive ourselves, and 
the truth is not in us") and for deception by others, and our need to look to Jesus 
constantly not only for forgiveness but also for the ability to come to grips with the truth 
about ourselves and the competing "gods" in our hearts and lives and nation and world—
anyone or anything which would seek to qualify in any way the loyalty that we owe to 
God alone. Having received assurance of God's love and forgiveness in Christ, we also 
trust that he will "renew us, and lead us, so that we may delight in your will and walk in 
your ways to the glory of your holy name." We look to Jesus' own example—especially 
his willingness to forgive those who hated and persecuted him—as our supreme guide for 
determining what kinds of lives please God and truly give him glory. 
26 Ibid., 331. For another engaging discussion of this issue, see Hauerwas's own essay "Suffering Beauty: 
The Liturgical Formation of Christ's Body" in Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of 
Nonviolence (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2004), 151-168. 
27 Unless otherwise noted, the various liturgical references and citations in the following paragraphs are 
taken from Divine Service II (Second Setting), Lutheran Worship (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
1982), 158-177. Parenthetical references to Lutheran Worship in the text of this chapter are abbreviated 
LW; references to "H598" are to Hymnal Supplement 98 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1998). 
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The Kyrie reminds us that we look to and depend on the Triune God alone for the 
gift of a twofold peace. First, "for the peace from above and for our salvation," we pray 
"Lord, have mercy." This peace we find in the cross of Christ, who has freed us by his 
willing suffering and death from the tyranny of sin, death, and all demonic powers in 
heaven and on earth. But in the same breath we also pray "for the peace of the whole 
world," which (we realize) is intimately and necessarily tied to our plea "for the well-
being of the Church of God." For without the peace preserved by God through the 
structures of earthly government, says Luther, "no one could support wife and child, feed 
himself and serve God. The world would be reduced to chaos," and the church itself—as 
a real (though radically unique) "social and political institution" could not exist.28 Thus 
we conclude by praying, "Help, save, comfort, and defend us, gracious Lord"—a prayer 
that has clear implications for God's gracious and powerful rule and work in both realms. 
In the "Hymn of Praise" we give "glory to God in the highest," and once again 
praise and implore him for the gift of "peace to his people on earth." We extol our "Lord 
God, heavenly King, almighty God and Father," who "takes away the sin of the world" 
through Jesus Christ—the "Lamb of God" who, because of his obedient sacrifice on the 
cross, is now "seated at the right hand of God," and is "alone" the Lord and "the Most 
High." He alone is the God we serve and in whom we trust, even when we "serve" and 
"trust" those to whom he has delegated certain earthly authority and responsibility. In the 
same way, the "Feast of Victory" celebrates not only the reign of the "Lamb who was 
slain," "whose blood set us free to be people of God," but also the "power, riches, 
wisdom and strength" that belong to both "God and the Lamb forever." Jesus not only 
sets us free by his blood from the sin that seeks to hold in bondage, he also sets us free to 
28 Temporal Authority, 91. 
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be "the people of God:" people who show themselves to be a new and different kind of 
people as they seek to display in and through their lives together the virtues (love, joy, 
peace, patience, kindness, gentleness) so clearly displayed in the life of Christ himself. 
Our faith in the God who is our Redeemer and also our Creator, Protector, and Preserver 
makes it possible for us to sing not only "with the people of God," but also to loin in the 
hymn of all creation"—a creation that God preserves day after day through his appointed 
"masks" on earth, until the day when it will be restored and set free from its bondage to 
sin and from the fallen powers of this world (Romans 8). 
The Scripture lessons connect us in a direct and obvious way with the story of 
Christ, and many of those lessons throughout the church year speak directly to the ever-
present problems of war, tragedy, violence and injustice in the world. These lessons 
provide ample opportunity for sermonic exposition on these real life issues—exposition 
that aims to help the hurting, confused, fearful, sinful, proud, repentant people of God 
better understand the connection between the "story of Christ" and "the politics of the 
church," and between the story of Christ and his church and "the politics of the world." 
Sermons delivered on the basis of Lutheran theological presuppositions, of course, will 
seek to preserve the Scriptural distinction between Law and Gospel and retain the 
centrality of Scripture's own central message concerning the redemptive power and 
significance of Christ's saving work. Such sermons dare not exclude, however, 
Scripture's own emphasis (frequently reflected in the sermons of Luther himself, as in his 
sermons on Peter's letters referred to earlier) on the paradigmatic moral of Christ's life, 
suffering, death and resurrection. Included in and among Hauerwas's numerous 
occasional essays are sermons that he has preached: "My use of sermons," he says, "is an 
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attempt to use a practice central to the church's life in which form and matter are one," 
and which illustrate "what Christian practice might look like in a world without 
foundations."29 In imitation of Hauerwas's example, included in an appendix of this 
study are several sermons that may help to illustrate how the Lutheran perspective on 
"the politics of Jesus and the church" might be conveyed in a way that demonstrates the 
practical implications of our confession that "Jesus is Lord"—Lord of our lives, Lord of 
the church, and (properly understood!) Lord of our nation and of all nations.3°  
The Creed reaffirms the connection between creation, salvation and sanctification 
that is so crucial for understanding the Christological and ecclesiological presuppositions 
underlying a Lutheran perspective on war and peace. Once again, incorporating into the 
liturgy in appropriate ways Luther's explanations of the Creed from both catechisms 
could greatly enrich this aspect of the service. The prayers provide manifold 
opportunities to demonstrate that (for Lutherans) there is no contradiction or even tension 
between our sincere supplications for our own government and nations around the world, 
for our own leaders and leaders around the world, for our friends and for our enemies, for 
those who love us and for those who hate us, for temporal peace and for God's help and 
protection in times of war. Here once again we are instructed and encouraged by the 
example of Christ himself, who responds to our request "Lord, teach us to pray!" not only 
by giving us the perfect prayer to pray (the Lord's Prayer) but by showing us how to pray 
by his own fervent and disciplined practice as recorded throughout the Gospels. The 
29  "The Church's One Foundation Is Jesus Christ Her Lord, or In a World Without Foundations All We 
Have Is the Church," in IGC, 33-34. Three of Hauerwas's sermons are included in this essay on pages 33-
49 of IGC; additional sermons appear periodically in his other essays and books. 
3° See Appendix II. 
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rubrics of Lutheran Worship indicate that in the divine service prayers not only "may" 
but are to be offered "for the whole Church" and "for the nations" of the world.31  
In the "General Prayer of the Church" we ask that God would "in mercy 
remember the enemies of your church, and grant them repentance to life." We ask God 
to "protect and defend your Church in all tribulation and danger," and help us as 
Christians "to fight the good fight of faith." We also beseech God to "bestow your grace 
on all nations of the earth" (not just our own nation), but that he would "bless especially 
our country and its inhabitants and all who are in authority." "Let your glory dwell in our 
land," we pray, "that mercy and truth, righteousness and peace may abound everywhere." 
"Graciously defend us against all calamity...from war and pestilence...and from every 
other evil." We ask God to remember, even as we remind ourselves, that "we are 
strangers and pilgrims on earth;" therefore we implore the wisdom and humility, "by true 
faith and a godly life to prepare for the world to come, doing the work you have given us 
to do while it is still day."32 
In the "General Intercession" we pray that God would keep his church "in the way 
of truth" and "in the bond of peace" and that he would sustain and comfort in "in every 
time of trouble." We also implore God's mercy for "all who are in authority over us," 
that "they may be inclined to your will and walk according to your commandments."33  
This is followed (in Lutheran Worship) by a fervent prayer "For Peace:" "Grant peace, 
we pray, in mercy, Lord. Peace in our time, oh, send us! For there is none on earth but 
you, None other to defend us. You only, Lord, can fight for us."34 Included among the 
31  Lutheran Worship, 187. 
32 /bid., 132-133. 
33 Ibid., 128-129. 
34 Ibid., 129. 
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numerous special supplications and intercessions are prayers "for divine protection," "for 
our enemies," "for good government," "for responsible citizenship," "for our country," 
"for the armed forces of our nation," "for those who minister in the armed forces."35 The 
regular use of these and other prayers in public worship (including the Litany36 and the 
many prayers written by Luther himself for peace, rulers, good government and divine 
blessings in the temporal realm37), perhaps more than any other single ecclesial practice, 
can serve to form the minds, hearts and lives of Lutheran people in ways that enable them 
to imitate the worship-centered character and conduct of Christ and bear witness 
faithfully to the Lutheran understanding of the "Scripture's story" of God's work in the 
church and in the world. 
Especially during times of war, when the minds and hearts of people are focused 
on Christian (and Lutheran) friends, family members, fellow-citizens, and members of 
allied (and even enemy) forces who are serving in a military vocation, it may be 
meaningful and appropriate to make use of or at least call attention to the "Soldier's 
Prayer" included in Luther's treatise "Whether Soldiers, Too, May Be Saved," since it 
brings together in such a simple yet profound way the connection between faith in Christ 
alone and service to God through obedience to earthly authorities: 
Heavenly Father, here I am, according to your divine will, in the external work 
and service of my lord, which I owe first to you and then to my lord for your sake. 
I thank your grace and mercy that you have put me into a work which I am sure is 
not sin, but right and pleasing obedience to your will. But because I know and 
have learned from your gracious word that none of our good works can help us 
and that no one is saved as a soldier but only as a Christian, therefore, I will not in 
any way rely on my obedience and work, but place myself freely at the service of 
your will. I believe with all my heart that only the innocent blood of your dear 
Son, my Lord Jesus Christ, redeems and saves me, which he shed for me in 
35 See Lutheran Worship, 124-133. 
36 Ibid., 279-287. 
37 See, e.g., "Index H" in Luther's Prayers, ed. Herbert F. Brokering (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1967). 
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obedience to your holy will. This is the basis on which I stand before you. In this 
faith I will live and die, fight, and do everything else. Dear Lord God that Father, 
preserve and strengthen this faith in me by your Spirit. Amen.38  
Following the prayers of the church, the gathering of the offerings reminds us that 
the church in this world (as Hauerwas often emphasizes) is more than a merely "spiritual" 
entity. It must be sustained with gifts earned by the labors of Christians serving in 
various God-given vocations, and it cannot be sustained apart from certain organizational 
structures and "brick and mortar" facilities that make interaction with realities in the 
"left-hand kingdom" necessary and inevitable. God sustains government, as Luther says, 
so that we may receive such crucial and precious gifts as bread, order and peace—gifts 
apart from which the church itself cannot be sustained. 
As we prepare to receive Christ's body and blood, we laud the thrice-holy God 
"of pow'r and might," who shows forth his glory both in heaven and on earth, in and 
through his work in both realms. We pray the prayer that Jesus taught us: the prayer that 
Christ's kingdom would come, and that God's (often inscrutable) will would be done 
here on earth as it is in heaven. We pray that God would give us (through his 
preservation of order and peace) our daily bread; that he would forgive us, even as we 
forgive our enemies and those who sin against us; that he would spare us from temptation 
and (finally) deliver us from the evil one and from the threat of every evil. Before 
partaking of Christ's Supper, we extend God's peace to one another—including 
"enemies" even within the Christian community whom God calls us to love and forgive 
as Jesus did, and as God himself has loved and forgiven us. In the Supper, we receive 
and celebrate God's forgiveness, as well as the unity that is ours in Christ with all those 
38 Whether Soldiers, 135-136. Having prayed this prayer, says Luther, the Christian soldier may "commit 
body and soul into God's hands, draw your sword, and fight in God's name." 
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(of every race, class and nationality) who trust in him. By freely associating with all 
those who showed any interest in his message and mission, Jesus clearly demonstrated by 
his own attitude and behavior—and in a way that we are called to reflect in our own lives 
in both the church and the world—that "God shows no partiality" (Acts 10:34). We then 
we go forth with shouts of thanksgiving to bear witness to his love and grace, the 
"salvation which [he] has prepared in the sight of ev'ry people." 
The final word we hear in the divine service (through the benediction) is the word 
"peace." And so we depart in God's peace—the peace won for us by Jesus' life, death 
and resurrection, the peace that enables us to imitate Christ by living in love with one 
another in the church, the peace that sustains us in our daily lives and in our daily 
vocations, the peace that empowers us to forgive those who hate us and sin against us, 
and the peace that allows us to discern and rejoice in God's great gift of peace in the 
world, and to trust in his (sometimes strange and "alien") way of providing that peace for 
the sake of the world that he loves—and for the sake of the church and its "peaceable 
witness" in and to the world. 
The hymns that we sing throughout the divine service reinforce the truths 
rehearsed in the liturgy and learned and re-learned through the sermon and the Scripture 
lessons. We implore God's blessing on the church (LW 287-310) and on our nation and 
its leaders (LW 497-502). We pray for all people and all societies of the world, that God 
would "cure your children's warring madness" and "bend our pride to your control" (LW 
398; cf. 394-400). We pray for Christians in their daily vocations (HS98, 879) and for 
God's comfort and assurance at those times "when aimless violence takes those whom 
we love" (HS98, 890). And we ask God to grant us a measure of Solomon's wisdom to 
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discern that, in God's plan centered in Christ's story, "There Is a Time for Everything:" a 
time for peace and a time for war, as we at all times trust in God's ability (demonstrated 
so clearly in Christ's cross) to bring great good out what appears to be only evil. 
There is a time for ev'rything, 
A time for all that life may bring: 
A time to plant, a time to reap, 
A time to laugh, a time to weep, 
A time to heal, a time to slay, 
A time to build where rubble lay, 
A time to die, a time to mourn, 
A time for joy and to be born. 
A time to hold, then be alone, 
A time to gather scattered stone, 
A time to break, a time to mend, 
A time to search and then to end, 
A time to keep, then throw away, 
A time to speak, then nothing say, 
A time for war till hatreds cease, 
A time for love, a time for peace. 
Eternal Lord, Your wisdom sees 
And fathoms all life's tragedies; 
You know our grief, You hear our sighs— 
In mercy, dry our tear-stained eyes. 
From evil times, You bring great good; 
Beneath the cross, we've safely stood. 
Though dimly now life's path we trace, 
One day we shall see face to face. 
Before all time had yet begun, 
You, Father, planned to give Your Son; 
Lord Jesus Christ, with timeless grace, 
You have redeemed our time-bound race; 
0 Holy Spirit, Paraclete, 
Your timely work in us complete; 
Blest Trinity, Your praise we sing— 
There is a time for ev'rything!39 
39 This hymn, written by LCMS pastor Stephen P. Starke, is contained on page 161 of the Proposal for the 
Lutheran Service Book based on the work of the Lutheran Hymnal Project and prepared by the LCMS's 
Commission on Worship. At the time of this writing, this hymn together with other hymns and worship 
resources contained in the book—was approved by the 2004 convention of the LCMS for official adoption 
and inclusion in its new hymnal, to be published in the year 2005. 
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Many more (and no doubt more insightful) connections could be observed and 
suggested between God's work in Christ—together with our confession of it in the divine 
service—and God's work in the world and our response to it by living lives of faith and 
obedience to him. Additional insights could certainly be gleaned from an examination of 
special rites such as Holy Baptism, the Burial of the Dead, and rite of Confirmation—
including the solemn vow of confirmands that they intend, with the help of God, "to 
continue steadfast in this confession and Church and to suffer all, even death, rather than 
fall away from it."40 If Luther's views on war and peace are taken seriously by 
Lutherans, this willingness to "suffer all" rather than to deny Christ has especially 
pointed and poignant significance for the Lutheran soldier, whether he or she is 
conscience-bound to obey or to disobey earthly authorities for the sake of their primary 
and unconditional obedience to Christ. 
In summary, it is clear that abundant resources exist within the rich tradition of 
Lutheran worship to shape and form the minds, hearts, attitudes and character of our 
members in ways that support, confirm and create "the Lutheran perspective" on war and 
peace, and in so doing help to connect "God's story" with "our story" in a way that is 
critical for the proper formation of Christian (personal, social and ecclesial) ethics. 
443 Lutheran Worship, 206. 
231 
The Challenge of Catechesis 
At the beginning of this section on "Worship and Catechesis" we discussed Debra 
Murphy's contention that preparation for and reflection on the liturgical practices of the 
church "are, ultimately, the core of Christian discipleship and the heart of extraliturgical 
formation and education."'" This very assertion, however, assumes the importance and 
necessity of such "extraliturgical formation and education" as further embodiments of 
what we receive and do in the liturgy. We turn now, therefore, to the topic of catechesis 
as a task and practice of the church that flows from and goes hand in hand with its 
liturgical life as God's particular and "peaceable" people in Christ. 
Charles Lutz bemoans the fact that 
It is hard to find evidence of serious Lutheran attention to the [issue of ] nuclear 
weapons...in resources for parish education, in the statements of Lutheran church 
bodies, or in the teaching of the denomination's colleges and seminaries....We 
have not learned how to sustain a concern for our ethical tradition on war and 
peace during the times between global crises. We have yet to commit ourselves 
to consistent peace education among our children, youth, and adults at all times 
and places in the church's nurturing ministry.42 
One of the questions Walter Bouman raises in his recent "Survey" of the just war 
tradition "from a Lutheran perspective" is "whether members of the churches...are 
instructed" in the a way that enables and allows them to reflect meaningfully on this issue 
from a truly Christian and Lutheran perspective.43 Reinhard Hater raises the same 
question, and insists (on the basis of insights gleaned from Yoder and Hauerwas) that 
41 "Worship As Catechesis," 331. 
42 When War Is Unjust, 6-7. 
43 Walter R. Bouman, "The 'Just War' Tradition: A Survey from a Lutheran Perspective," Lutheran 
Theological Journal 37.3 (December 2003), 133-137. 
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"only in the context of communities of moral deliberation and formation can we reclaim 
the just war tradition."44 
The good news is that resources do, in fact, exist for recovering this tradition and 
its theological underpinnings in the context of the catechetical formation of the Lutheran 
community. As the overview provided in the final section of chapter three may serve to 
illustrate, the regular use of the catechism in worship and in Bible classes (not only The 
Small Catechism, but also the all-too-frequently neglected treasures of The Large 
Catechism) cannot help but inculcate—in both conscious and unconscious ways—the 
fundamental Christological and ecclesial truths that underlie the Lutheran perspective on 
war and peace (such as God's twofold rule in the church and in the world; the 
relationship between "peace with God" gained for us by the work of Christ and God's 
providential preservation of temporal peace; the relationship between the "two kinds of 
holiness"—i.e., between justification and sanctification; the concept of Christian 
vocation; the creedal emphasis on God's threefold work as Creator, Redeemer, and 
Sanctifier and its implications for our work in the church and in the world). Luther's 
relatively brief but rich exposition of Psalm 82 could serve as a valuable resource for 
highlighting his understanding of the God-given role and responsibility of "princes" and 
governmental authorities, foremost among them the task of pursuing peace as the greatest 
of God's earthly gifts.45 Insofar as it contains a simple, unusually concise, and highly 
practical and pastoral version of the Augustinian-based just war tradition, Luther's 
treatise on "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved" (or at least portions of it) could 
conceivably be studied and discussed in certain Bible class settings with a view toward 
" "Be Honest in Just War Thinking," 81. 
45 LW 13, 43-73. 
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wrestling with how the theological principles set forth by Luther can be applied in 
today's much more complex political and military context. 
Within The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, a variety of resources exist for 
helping its members understand how the basic approach of their church body to issues of 
war and peace is part of a larger "story"—how it is guided by fundamental theological 
principles rooted in the broader Lutheran and Christian tradition. "Guidelines for Crucial 
Issues in Christian Citizenship," prepared by the Synod's Commission on Theology and 
Church Relations, summarizes succinctly historic Lutheran principles underlying its 
understanding of "The Christian and Government" (including the civic responsibilities 
that belong to Christians both as individual citizens and as members of the Christian 
community), "The Christian and the Civic Order," "The Christian, Violence, and War," 
and "The Christian and Conscience."46 The report "Civil Obedience and Disobedience" 
affirms and discusses in some detail the historic Lutheran conviction (strongly 
emphasized in all of Luther's treatises on war and peace) that "Christians are to obey God 
rather than man when a civil law conflicts with a clear precept of God, being willing, at 
the same time, to accept as a part of their crossbearing the punitive consequences of their 
action."47 The report Render Unto Caesar and Unto God: A Lutheran View of Church 
and State offers a much more extensive historical survey of Christian perspectives on the 
relationship between church and state, a summary of the "Lutheran Two-Kingdom 
Perspective," and a practical section (based primarily on the framework proposed by 
Robert Benne in The Paradoxical Vision) which attempts to show how the Lutheran 
45 Guidelines for Crucial Issues in Christian Citizenship, Report of the Commission on Theology and 
Church Relations, The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (April 26, 1968). 
47 Civil Obedience and Disobedience, Report of the Commission on Theology and Church Relations, The 
Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod (January 19, 1967), 5. 
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perspective can be applied to real-life social and ethical issues, including the issue of war 
and peace.48 Any of these documents could serve well as resources for helping Lutherans 
better understand, support, apply, and critique the "just war narrative" of which they are a 
part by virtue of their identity as Lutherans. Also worthy of mention in this connection is 
an outstanding Bible study prepared by LCMS pastor Edward Engelbrecht and LCMS 
chaplain Jonathan Shaw titled Holy Resolve: Terror and War Today, which brings 
together pertinent historical resources and draws on the insights of Luther in his writings 
on war and peace while at the same time raising critical questions about the application of 
these insights to contemporary questions and issues.49 Finally, a statement titled 
"Peace," issued by the President of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod on March 4, 
2003 (as the American government was wrestling with its decision to go to war against 
Iraq), provides a succinct summary of the Augustinian and Lutheran just war tradition 
and could well serve as a primer or "discussion starter" for use in Bible classes or 
discussion groups seeking to take up the issue of war and peace.5°  
The work of Hauerwas can help us to discern a significant deficiency in most (if 
not all) of these materials, however, which (it must be admitted) can be traced to a 
deficiency inherent in the Lutheran tradition itself. As we have noted at various points 
throughout this study, Lutherans have tended to "do theology" primarily on the basis of 
systematic truths and principles concerning Christ rather than on the basis of the story of 
Christ itself as found in the Gospels. To the extent that Lutherans do give attention to the 
story of Christ, furthermore, they do not typically emphasize the paradigmatic moral 
48 Render Unto Caesar, Report of the Commission on Theology and Church Relations, The Lutheran 
Church—Missouri Synod (September 1995); hereafter Render. 
49 Holy Resolve: Terror and War Today (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2003). 
5° A copy of this statement is included in Appendix I. 
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significance of his life, death and resurrection, but tend to focus rather narrowly 
(sometimes even exclusively) on the redemptive significance of Christ's person and 
work. As we have seen from Luther's own writings on war and peace (especially those 
relating to the peasants' war), Luther himself certainly can and does point to the specific 
aspects of Christ's character and story (including his willingness to suffer and die in 
obedience to God's will) as an example for all Christians to follow. This does not 
emerge as a central or primary theme in Luther's writings, however; and it surfaces only 
rarely and implicitly in the much of the material noted above. In making use of such 
materials, therefore, Lutherans would do well demonstrate more clearly and specifically 
how the story of Christ itself underlies the theological truths and principles contained in 
these materials. When, for example, the report on "Civil Obedience and Disobedience" 
speaks of the need for a Christian to be willing "to accept as part of their crossbearing the 
punitive consequences of their action,"51 connections can easily and obviously be made 
to the story of Christ's own willingness to "bear the cross" and accept the "punitive 
consequences" of his unwillingness to submit to demands of the earthly authorities, and 
to the ways in which Christ's story becomes "our story" when we are faced with similar 
challenges and demands. Or (for example) when the report "Guidelines for Crucial 
Issues in Christian Citizenship" says that one way that Christians "further justice" in the 
world is to serve as "responsible critics of the social order" and to "remind rulers that 
they are under God and the Law and that they too must give an account of their 
stewardship,,,52  a Christian well-versed in the story of Christ is reminded almost 
immediately of Jesus' own "reminders" to Pilate and the Jewish leaders (see, e.g., 
51 Civil Obedience and Disobedience, 5. 
52 Guidelines for Crucial Issues, 5. 
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Matthew 26:64; John 19:11) that they, too, were subject to a "higher power" who would 
someday call them to account for their actions. Critical theological truths abound in 
these and other catechetical resources for articulating the Lutheran perspective on issues 
of war and peace, but in many cases a conscious effort must be made to show how those 
truths are grounded in the story of Christ himself and how they become part of "our 
story" as we seek to imitate Christ in his unqualified obedience to his Father's will. 
One issue raised by all of the Lutheran resources and Lutheran theologians cited 
above as crucial for Lutherans who seek to be faithful to the Lutheran expression of the 
just war tradition is that of conscientious objection. We noted earlier that one of the 
reasons that Yoder, in When War Is Unjust, is so eager to dialog with Lutherans (and so 
hopeful about the possibilities for dialog) is that Luther himself "called soldiers to refuse 
to serve in unjust wars."53 According to Luther, 
...if a prince desired to go to war, and his cause was clearly unrighteous... we 
should neither follow nor help such a prince, because God [has] commanded us 
not to kill our neighbor or do him a wrong. Likewise, if the prince were to order 
us to bear false witness, steal, lie, or deceive, and the like. In such cases we 
should indeed give up our property and honor, our life and limb, so that God's 
commandments remain.54 
Yoder rightly observes that 
...[the] just war criteria are pointless if they cannot also demand, situationally, the 
refusal of some acts apparently commanded by the national interest. In modern 
times the person holding honestly to a just-war position may well be obliged to 
withdraw at least form certain military responsibilities (what has recently come to 
be called "selective conscientious objection") and certain high levels of civilian 
command, if that command involvement is seen as taking moral responsibility for 
what actually goes on in the war.55  
53 When War Is Unjust, dedications on copyright page. 
54 Treatise on Good Works, 100; cf. Temporal Authority, 130. 
55 When War Is Unjust, 22. 
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As Lutz explains, however, this (Christian and Lutheran) approach to just war 
creates a serious ethical and legal dilemma for military personnel who sincerely seek to 
be faithful to it. For while the American government recognizes the right of consistent or 
"vocational" pacifists (those who believe that all war is inherently immoral and that 
participation in any war would be wrong) to refuse to serve as combatants in a war, the 
same is not true for nonpacifists who object to a particular war. What Lutz writes in 1984 
is still true today, and it needs to be taken quite seriously as the potential for war 
continues to escalate around the globe and the possibility looms of re-instituting the draft: 
The law does not recognize the right of a citizen to make judgments about the 
morality of specific wars or military enterprises and then to withhold service as a 
combatant on the basis of such judgments. The irony is that a position held by 
relatively few of our citizens ("all wars are immoral") is recognized under the 
draft law as valid; the view supposedly emanating from the religious tradition 
claimed by the great majority of Americans ("each war must be judged by strict 
ethical criteria") has no legal status under the draft law.56 
Like other Lutheran commentators on this issue, Lutz recognizes the great "practical 
difficulty" faced by the government in this regard; how could it ever be determined fairly 
and accurately whether a "selective conscientious objector" is really objecting on the 
basis of conscience-bound religious convictions or on the basis of some lesser motive? 
For this very reason, says Lutz, this is an "ethically troubling" situation, and one that 
requires as much (if not more) moral courage and character than is required by adherents 
of pacifism: 
I would argue that selective participants/objectors who come to a particular 
military enterprise with careful, conscientious judgments about its morality and 
then refuse participation on the basis of such moral reasoning are engaging more 
consciously in moral conduct than are total pacifists. In adopting the position that 
they can never, under any circumstances, engage in bearing arms, principled 
56 Ibid., 11. 
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pacifists have put the decision beyond the realm of moral judgments conditioned 
by day-to-day circumstances.57  
Such a position—which is the authentic Lutheran position on just war—requires not only 
profound moral courage and character on the part of individual objectors, but also on the 
part of the church that must offer them much-needed support in the wake of the inevitable 
legal and social consequences of their decisions: 
Those who seek to follow an ethic such as the just/unjust war tradition rather than 
one of universal principle ("all used of armed force is always wrong") are left 
without a legal place to stand. It is because of this dilemma that the religious 
communities following a justifiable-war ethic must be very clear: those who run 
afoul of their own nation's laws because they follow that ethic deserve the fullest 
support of their churches. To be consistent, those churches ought to advocate 
change in the conscription law so that selective participation/objection regarding 
combat service is made legal. But until and unless the law is changed, those 
churches must stand with their young people who find themselves in civil 
disobedience out of faithfulness to the ethic they have learned.58  
The problem and challenge presented by selective conscientious objection is also the 
primary concern of Reinhard Hater's essay "Be Honest in Just War Thinking!" Hatter 
has many valuable insights and exhortations to offer in this essay, not the least of which 
is that "the denunciation of unjust wars is an inherent element of the truth-telling mandate 
of proclaiming God's Word."59 
One of the challenges for The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod in properly 
catechizing its members on issues of war and peace is informing and instructing them 
regarding the (perhaps little-known) fact that their church body has clearly and 
definitively gone on record—in keeping with its own theological principles—as 
supporting selective conscientious objection and objectors. The report of its theological 
57 Ibid., 12. 
58 Ibid., 12. 
59 "Be Honest in Just War Thinking," 81. 
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commission on Guidelines for Crucial Issues in Christian Citizenship, as well as its 
report on Civil Obedience and Disobedience, offer explicit theological argumentation for 
this position and specific criteria to individuals seeking to make such judgments. At its 
1969 convention the LCMS gave this position official status, resolving in Resolution 
2-28 that the reports cited above be used "in providing a counseling and supporting 
ministry to those who conscientiously object to military service as well as to those who in 
conscience choose to serve in the military," that the Synod "petition the government to 
grant equal status under law to the conscientious objector to a specific war as it does to a 
conscientious objector to all wars," and that it investigate the matter "of amnesty for 
those who have refused to serve in the armed force for reasons of conscience."60 
Issues Needing Further Clarification and Exploration 
When it comes to Hauerwas's strong emphasis on faithfulness to "the story of 
Christ" as the basis for Christian social ethics, perhaps the primary issue that needs 
further clarification from a Lutheran perspective is the question of Hauerwas's own 
faithfulness to that story in all of its (often disconcerting) wholeness. Ironically, 
Hauerwas's own account of the story of Israel, Christ and the church sometimes appears 
to be controlled and circumscribed by a systematic adherence to the "material principle" 
of pacifism, raising the same question Hauerwas is quick to put to others: whose story is 
this—Scripture's story or a particularized account of Scripture's story? Hauerwas gives 
very little explicit attention to portions or aspects of the story of Scripture (e.g., Old 
Testament accounts in which both Israel and God himself are directly involved in 
60 Res. 2-28, 1969 Convention Proceedings, 91. For the full text of this resolution, see Appendix I. 
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justifiable acts of violence;61 New Testament passages cited by Luther such as Christ's 
cleansing of the temple; and the apparent commendation of practicing soldiers by Jesus 
and John the Baptist) that challenge or complicate his pacifist version of God's story. 
In a letter written in response to Hauerwas's critique of his article "Listening to 
Pacifists,"62 Daryl Cole raises this issue by pointing out, first of all, that "if the pacifism 
of the messianic community is characterized by anything, it is characterized by a 
renunciation of all use of force, not simply 'less violent altematives.'"63 Therefore, says 
Cole, "if pacifists are right about their use of force, then soldiering is the same thing, 
morally speaking, as prostitution. Each is a profession that is inherently evil and out of 
step with God's kingdom." However, says Cole, "such a view of soldiering is hard to 
establish within the text of the Christian Bible (much less the Jewish one)," as illustrated 
by a "useful thought experiment" based on specific texts of Scripture. 
Consider the passage in Luke (3:14) where soldiers come to John the Baptist to be 
baptized. Simply follow the moral logic of pacifism and substitute "prostitutes" 
for "soldiers." Can anyone imagine prostitutes coming to John the Baptist to be 
baptized and John not telling them simply to quit their profession rather than offer 
advice on how to pursue it more justly? Similar substitutions should be made in 
the passages where Jesus deals with the centurion of great faith (Matthew 8:5-13, 
Luke 7:1-9), where Peter brings the gospel to Gentiles for the first time via the 
centurion Cornelius (Acts 10), and where the writer of Hebrews commends to his 
Christian audience the acts of force used by notable soldiers in the Old Testament 
(ch. 11). When we substitute prostitution for soldiery in these passages, the 
difficulty of reading pacifism back into the New Testament (as all pacifists of the 
messianic community do) become obvious. 
To his credit, Hauerwas rarely fails to respond in some way to those who question or 
criticize his views; for this very reason, it is disconcerting to note that (as far as our 
research is able to determine) nowhere in his books or essays does he give serious, 
61 We will discuss this issue in greater detail in the next chapter. 
62 FT 125 (Aug-Sept 2002), 22-25. 
63 For the citations by Cole in this paragraph, see FT 128 (December 2002), 3-5. 
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substantive attention to exegetical questions such as those raised by Cole above that seem 
to have such serious implications for his pacifist views and their alleged grounding in the 
narrative of Scripture itself. 
This failure or reluctance to deal fully and adequately with portions of Scripture's 
story that seem to condone the use of violence in certain circumstances may lead some to 
suspect that part of Hauerwas's preference for narrative and his distaste for systematics is 
the latter's disconcerting habit of forcing us to account for the whole truth of Scripture 
and not just the portions of the story that seem most meaningful and valuable to us. 
While such systematic approaches may themselves become forced in unhealthy ways, 
this discipline (rightly used) serves the salutary purpose of keeping us honest (a 
paramount concern of Hauerwas's!) when it comes to accounting for the whole story of 
the Holy Scriptures. As indicated above, we are not suggesting here that Hauerwas deny 
or set aside the Christological and ecclesial presuppositions on which his radical pacifism 
is based. We are simply suggesting—especially in view of his own strong insistence on 
the need to be fully faithful to the story of Scripture—that his account of those 
presuppositions might be more compelling and persuasive if a greater effort was made to 
show how those presuppositions take into account specific parts of Scripture's story that 
do not appear to be consistent with them. 
In this connection, it also seems ironic (and at times, even somewhat 
disingenuous) that one of Hauerwas's sharpest criticisms of the just war tradition is its 
fluidity, flexibility, and ambiguity—its tendency to adapt and be adapted over time to a 
wide variety of historical situations and political realities and its inability to render "hard 
and fast" conclusions about whether a particular war can, in fact, be justified from a 
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Christian perspective. For someone who (primarily on the basis of a narrative approach 
to theology and ethics) consistently resists being described as having a position or as 
offering hard and fast definitions and conclusions"64 to insist that others (e.g., just war 
thinkers) articulate their positions and conclusions in strictly dogmatic and unambiguous 
terms seems somewhat unfair and inconsistent, especially since—as Luther, Ramsey, 
Meilaender and all honest just war thinkers freely admit—a certain (and sometimes 
considerable) degree of ambiguity is inherent in the very fabric of a just war approach.65  
64 See, e.g., IGC, 12; HR, 5, 13, 16, 31, etc.; see also the discussion of "The Definition of Violence" in the 
next chapter. 
6$ For a helpful discussion of the ambiguity inherent in a (Lutheran) two realms approach to Christian 
participation in social and political life and debates, see Richard John Neuhaus, "The Ambiguities of 
`Christian America,' Concordia Journal 17:3 (July 1991), 285-295. 
Chapter Six 
The Problem of Violence and the Politics of Jesus 
Valid Hauerwasian Insights and Concerns:  
Taking Violence (and the Words and Witness of Jesus) Seriously 
Hauerwas's pacifism is not (as is often alleged) utopianism. He understands the 
consequences of the fall for every person on earth and for every social and political 
community (including the church). Hauerwas has no illusions, therefore, about the 
possibility of creating a world free from violence, war, suffering, injustice and tragedy. 
As Christians, however—as those who have learned from Christ to put our trust in God 
and not in ourselves or in competing authorities—"we have the means to recognize and 
accept the tragic without turning to violence:" 
For finally our freedom is learning how to exist in the world, a violent world, in 
peace with ourselves and others. The violence of the world is but a mirror of the 
violence of our lives. We say we desire peace, but we have not the souls for it. 
We fear the boredom peace seems to imply. Even more we fear the lack of 
control a commitment to peace would entail. As a result the more we seek to 
bring "under our control," the more violent we have to become to protect what we 
have. And the more violent we allow ourselves to become, the more vulnerable 
we are to challenges.' 
Much of what Hauerwas says about violence as evidence of human sinfulness and 
of our insidious, idolatrous insistence on claiming control of our lives and destinies is not 
only true but quite profound, and it has profound implications for the church's peaceable 
message and mission. If we have any hope at all of helping the world to see itself as it 
really is, then we must first see ourselves as we really are: as fellow sons and daughters 
of Adam and Eve, consumed by the craving to "play God" and to choose and create our 
1 PK, 48-49. 
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own gods rather than letting God be God. If we are honest, we must admit that it is all 
too often true that 
Our need to be in control is the basis for the violence of our lives. For since our 
"control" and "power" cannot but help but be built on an insufficient basis, we 
must use force to maintain the illusion that we are in control. We are deeply 
afraid of losing what unity of self we have achieved. Any idea or person 
threatening that unity must either be manipulated or eliminated. We fear others 
because they always stand as an implicit challenge to our deceptions. Thus it 
seems the inherent necessity of all people to have or create an enemy.2 
Those who (like Lutherans) have been reared in the context of Christian traditions 
that take for granted the validity and viability of just war thinking may not be nearly as 
aware as they should be of the seriousness of the problem of violence in their hearts, 
homes, lives, nations, and world—nor about the way this violence may penetrate the 
structures, patterns, habits and practices of congregational life and the politics of the 
institutional church. Lutherans who have learned "too well" (i.e., too simplistically) the 
"distinction between Law and Gospel" can easily read Jesus' words in Matthew 5 (about 
"turning the other cheek" and not resisting those who do evil and forgiving our enemies) 
exactly as Luther refused to read them (and as Niebuhr resigned himself to reading them): 
as "ideal but impossible" commands that are ultimately not relevant to life in the real 
world, but are simply meant to remind us of the depth of our sinfulness and our tragic 
need to choose continually between greater sins and lesser sins in our attempt to reflect in 
our behavior a dim approximation God's will in a sinful world. 
From an academic perspective, it may be possible to take issue with Yoder's 
characterization of Luther's ethic as essentially "dualistic"—i.e., as suggesting that Jesus' 
words about non-resistance and non-violence must be taken seriously on a personal level 
2 Ibid., 47. 
245 
but not on a social or political level.3 Aside from that academic debate, however, one 
wonders how many Lutherans would be willing to identify with Luther's 
uncompromising insistence that these words be taken seriously even on a personal (or 
ecclesial) level as offering actual, practical guidance for the Christian life and the life of 
the church. 
In Romans 12 [:19] Paul says, "Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to 
the wrath of God." In the same sense he praises the Corinthians for gladly 
suffering if someone hits or robs them, II Corinthians 11 [:20]. And in 1 
Corinthians 6 [:1-2] he condemns them for going to court for the sake of property 
rather than suffering injustice. Indeed, our leader, Jesus Christ, says in Matthew 7 
[5:44] that we should bless those who insult us, pray for our persecutors, love our 
enemies, and do good to those who do evil to us. These, dear friends, are our 
Christian laws....[I]f you claim that you are Christians and like to be called 
Christians and want to be known as Christians, then you must allow your law to 
be held up rightly.... If you will not bear this law, then lay aside the name of 
Christian and claim another name that accords with your actions, or Christ 
himself will tear his name away from you....4 
The question is worth asking: how well do Lutheran Christians (as individuals and in 
their congregational and institutional life, relationships and debates) bear up under the 
weight of these strong words of Luther? Hauerwas's warnings about the ever-present and 
insidious nature of violence can (at the very least) serve to prod us to do some careful 
self-examination in light of Luther's own teaching concerning the implications of the 
"law of Christ" for our personal and ecclesial conversation and conduct. 
This dissertation is being written at a time when the writer's own church body, 
The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, is coming to the close of an ecclesial triennium 
marked and marred by serious intra-synodical conflict and division, bitter infighting 
between various groups and parties within the Synod, the issuing of charges and 
3 See Christian Witness to the State, 63-64. 
4 Admonition to Peace, 29; 28. 
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counter-charges of false doctrine and political power-plays, and a highly-charged 
convention (church assembly) at which the majority of decisions were made by way of 
hotly contested resolutions typically adopted by the slimmest of margins. At the same 
time, ironically, the theme and central emphasis of this convention was the "mission of 
the church"—its urgent, all-important, God-given calling and responsibility to bear 
witness to the world concerning the grace, forgiveness, kindness, and peace—with God 
and with one another—that is available only in and through Jesus Christ. If it is true, as 
Hauerwas insists, that the most significant witness the church has to offer to the world is 
the witness of its own life, character, and practices as an embodiment of the peaceable 
kingdom of Christ, then (in view of the characterization offered above) this has serious 
implications for a church like The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. It means that the 
LCMS must take utterly seriously the undeniable contradiction between the witness that 
it seeks to give to the world by way of its proclamation of the Gospel message and the 
witness that it actually is giving to the world through its apparent inability or 
unwillingness to grasp the real and practical implications of that Gospel for its own life 
together as members of Christ's "peaceable community," the church. As Hauerwas says, 
ultimately the church is known by the character of its own communal life, "and if we lack 
that character, the world rightly"—or at least understandably and inevitably—"draws the 
conclusion that the God we worship is in fact a false God."5 No matter how "right," 
"true," and "orthodox" our theology and our written and spoken articulation of the 
precious message of God's peace that we seek to share, it is difficult to imagine our 
church body gaining an eager and sympathetic hearing for that message if it is not 
incarnate in our own life together as God's peaceable community on earth. 
5 PK, 109. 
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Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how a church like The Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod can truly be or become an effective and authentic witness for peace in 
the world as long as the characteristic for which it is most widely and publicly known is 
its own internal and institutional lack of peace and harmony. This is not merely a 
bureaucratic or institutional problem or issue—it has serious ramifications for the very 
integrity (even survival) of our church body as an authentic witness for Christ and his 
Gospel in and to a watching world. At the same time, although this pattern of 
institutional violence is not merely an institutional problem, it must certainly be 
addressed also in very concrete, practical ways that enable us to examine how the very 
structure of our institutional life seems to foster and encourage (rather than prevent and 
discourage) conflict, division, and the constant grasping for control among those who 
hold contrasting views regarding important issues. While it is true (of course) that 
decision-making in any organization or institution (including the church) will inevitably 
involve some use of power and experience some degree of conflict resulting from 
disagreements about how that power is or should be exercised, ways must be found—
especially in the church—to deal with those disagreements both honestly and charitably, 
both seriously and civilly, in ways that both require and promote fraternal dialog, 
conversation, and (where necessary) reconciliation rather than continuing dissension and 
verbal and political sparring and dueling. 
The regrettable situation in this writer's own church body testifies to the wisdom 
and lucidity of Hauerwas's assertion that the way of violence and coercion is always the 
easiest way to deal with disagreements and with challenges to our personal craving 
(however properly motivated, from our own perspective) to be in control. Overcoming 
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such tendencies, insists Hauerwas, requires "hard work." It requires (among other things) 
the patient and persistent determination to seek more imaginative and creative ways to 
address our difficulties and disagreements—ways that go beyond "majority votes" at 
conventions and "rules and bylaws" that seek to restrain outward behavior in the absence 
of an inward desire for peace and unity based on truth and trust. Offering specific 
creative solutions to such problems in this (highly specific and illustrative) case goes 
beyond the scope of this study. At the very least, however, it would seem to require a 
strong commitment on the part of church leaders to work toward identifying the major 
issues of contention and to create both the "space" and the "place" for frank, genuine and 
fraternal conversation regarding those issues. Only in this way will it be possible for 
God's Spirit, working through the Word of Christ (which must stand at the center of 
those conversations), to restore some sense of the peace and unity that must go hand in 
hand with our proclamation of Christ's peace to the world. 
With regard to the Christian perspective on issues of war and peace, Lutherans 
can also benefit from Hauerwas's insights about the all-too-frequent connection between 
violence and the craving for control by being attentive to the subtle ways that the (real or 
potential) use of unjustified governmental violence can be rationalized by personal 
concerns about safety and security and survival that (while understandable) do not form 
the theological basis for Christian just war thinking. Whenever war is not justified, we 
must refuse to participate in it or support it, resist the temptation to seek to control the 
situation by our own power, and instead put our trust in God and bring our pleas for help 
and deliverance before his throne of grace: 
The psalms show us many examples of genuine saints taking their needs to God 
and complaining to him about them. They seek help from God; they do not try to 
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defend themselves or to resist evil. That kind of prayer would have been have 
more help to you, in all your needs, than if the world were full of people on your 
side. This would be especially true if, besides that, you had a good conscience 
and the comforting assurance that your prayers were heard, as his promises 
declare: "God is the Savior of all men, especially those who believe," I Timothy 4 
[:10]; "Call upon me in the day of trouble, I will deliver you," Psalm 50 [:15]; He 
called upon me in trouble, therefore I will help him," Psalm 91 [:15]. See! That 
is the Christian way to get rid of misfortune and evil, that is, to endure it and call 
upon God. But because you neither call upon God nor patiently endure, but rather 
help yourselves by your own power and make yourselves your own god and 
savior, God cannot and must not be your God and Savior. 
Where Lutherans and Hauerwasians part ways, of course, is on the question of 
whether violence can ever be used by Christians in a way that does not contradict the core 
meaning and message of the life and death of Jesus and its implications for the peaceable 
witness of the church, and in a way that does not reflect a sinful (faithless) craving for 
control, but actually flows from true and genuine faith in God as Creator and Redeemer 
and from true and genuine (Christ-like) love for one's neighbor in the context of fulfilling 
one's God-given vocation in the world. The challenge for Lutherans—both in terms of 
offering a clear and consistent Lutheran witness in this regard and in terms of articulating 
the basis on which serious, Christ-centered dialog with Hauerwasians might take place—
is to articulate more clearly than has (perhaps) been done in the past how the occasional 
justification of acts of violence by Christians (especially those serving in specific civic 
vocations that inevitably require the use of violence) is consistent with the non-violent 
witness of Jesus and his climactic act of non-resistant submission on the cross. We 
address this challenge in the following section and in our discussion of the two kinds of 
righteousness and their connection to Christian vocation in chapter seven. 
6 Admonition to Peace, 34. 
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Lutheran Challenges and Contributions:  
The Hidden Nature of God's Work in Both Realms 
The Strange Work of God's "Merciful Wrath" in the Civil Realm 
Sharply criticizing the just war theory and its viability in a world of modern 
warfare, Roman Catholic James Douglass writes as one who approaches the issue from 
within the just war tradition itself. The basic (and fatal) problem with the just war 
tradition today, says Douglass, is that it cannot "bear the cross:" 
It is evident that the doctrine [of just war] is too weak in its theological 
presuppositions to be able to support the cross, either the cross of conscientious 
objection or the cross of unilateral disarmament. The foundations of a just-war 
theory do not have the strength to sustain adequately the kind of witness 
demanded today by its own moral logic, which taken by itself compels one to 
relinquish all recourse to modern war.7  
Hauerwas's primary concern, however, is not the ability of certain theological 
presuppositions to "bear the cross" of "unilateral disarmament" or even of conscientious 
objection, but their ability to bear the cross of Christ himself. "For," as Hauerwas says, 
"if you believe that Jesus is the messiah of Israel, then 'everything else follows, doesn't 
it? "'8  
Lutherans would certainly agree with this assertion from Hauerwas's essay "A 
Story-Formed Community," even if they cannot agree with Hauerwas's specific 
understanding of the nature of the messiahship of Jesus and its implications for the 
church. The crucial Lutheran contribution to the question of "the problem of violence 
and the politics of Jesus" is Luther's insight, based primarily on his understanding of 
God's hidden and alien work in the left-hand kingdom as a providential work of 
7 James Douglass, The Non-Violent Cross (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), 172. 
8 "Story-Formed Community," 198. 
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divine love and mercy, that participation in violence need not always stem from a sinful 
craving to exact personal vengeance or exercise god-like control, but it actually can at 
times and in certain situations stem from true faith in God, loyalty to God, and love for 
one's neighbor. Here the words of Gustaf Wingren cited earlier are worth repeating, not 
only for their pithy insight into the reality of the strange work of God's merciful wrath 
and violence but also for their practical relevance to the issue of Christian vocation (also 
a primary concern of Luther's): 
God's wrath is an instrument of his love. To be sure, there can never be a clearly 
evident relation between divine wrath and love, but when cross and suffering 
come upon man he has to believe that God's love is concealed in his wrath. He 
will be able to see the connection only after death. As an officeholder he is often 
in a situation where he has to bring cross and suffering upon others; that is, he has 
to serve as a point through which God's stem law and punitive wrath break 
through. The reaction is like that which occurs when a man himself is smitten by 
God's wrath; reason cannot see how this wrath can be an instrument of God's 
love. Then man is usually unwilling to give himself to an office in which he must 
bring suffering on others, as, for instance, in military service or judicial action, in 
the work of a soldier or an agent of justice. Faith, however, is willing to serve in 
this way, for it has learned that God's love is veiled under law. Faith trusts that 
the mandate of a man's vocation leads to something good; behind all stations and 
offices stands the Creator, who is none other than the God of the gospel. So even 
severe action is something which a Christian can freely will, certain about God's 
command.9 
Such a view is unthinkable for Hauerwas, of course, because of the centrality of 
nonviolence in his understanding of the nature and meaning of Christ's cross and its 
necessary implications for the nonviolent character of any authentic Christian witness to 
the world. We recall his affirmation of the words of Yoder: 
Christ is agape; self-giving, nonresistant love. At the cross this nonresistance, 
including the refusal to use political means of self-defense, found its ultimate 
revelation in the uncomplaining and forgiving death of the innocent at the hands 
of the guilty. This death reveals how God deals with evil; here is the only valid 
starting point for Christian pacifism or nonresistance. The cross is the extreme 
9 Wingen, 232. 
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demonstration that agape seeks neither effectiveness nor justice, and is willing to 
suffer any loss or seeming defeat for the sake of obedience.1° 
Luther insists, however, that even Christ's work can and must be viewed in the context of 
his own divinely-given office and vocation, and in the context of the unique nature of 
Christ's kingship: 
You ask: Why did not Christ and the apostles bear the sword? Answer: You tell 
me, why did Christ not take a wife, or become a cobbler or a tailor. If an office or 
vocation were to be regarded as disreputable on the ground that Christ did not 
pursue it himself, what would become of all the offices and vocations other than 
the ministry, the one occupation he did follow? Christ pursued his own office and 
vocation, but he did not thereby reject any other. It was not incumbent upon him 
to bear the sword, for he was to exercise only that function by which his kingdom 
is governed and which properly serves his kingdom. Now, it is not essential to his 
kingdom that he be a married man, a cobbler, tailor, farmer, prince, hangman, or 
constable; neither is the temporal sword or law essential to it, but only God's 
Word and Spirit. It is by these that his people are ruled inwardly. This is the 
office which he also exercised then and still exercises now, always bestowing 
God's Word and Spirit. " 
Therefore, says Luther, "although Christ did not bear or prescribe the sword, it is 
sufficient that he did not forbid or abolish it but actually confirmed it,"12 just as he 
confirmed marriage without himself taking a wife. For Hauerwas, absolute nonviolence 
is an absolutely essential characteristic of the character of Christ and is the key to 
understanding the very nature of his person and work. Luther believed that Christ 
eschewed violence not because it was absolutely essential that he do so in any and every 
situation (and, in fact, Scripture suggests that even Christ—as in the cleansing of the 
temple—did not always refrain from acts of violence), but because he wanted to make it 
clear that violence was not essential to the unique nature and purpose of his kingdom. 
He had to manifest himself wholly in connection with that estate and calling 
which alone expressly served his kingdom, lest from his example there should be 
10 Grain, 219; cf. The Original Revolution, 59. 
11 Temporal Authority, 100-101. 
12 /bid., 101. 
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deduced the justification or necessity of teaching and believing that the kingdom 
of God could not exist without matrimony and the sword and similar externals 
(since Christ's example is necessarily binding), when in fact it exists solely by 
God's Word and Spirit. This was and had to be Christ's peculiar function as the 
Supreme King in this kingdom. Since not all Christians, however, have this same 
function... it is fitting that they should have some other external office by which 
God may be served.1' 
In these "other external offices," Christians serve not only God but they also serve their 
neighbor in love—even when such offices or vocations may involve the use of necessary 
violence. 
Here you inquire further, whether constables, hangmen, jurists, lawyers, and 
others of similar function can also be Christians and in a state of salvation. 
Answer: If the governing authority and its sword are a divine service, as was 
proved above, then everything that is essential for the authority's bearing of the 
sword must also be divine service. There must be those who arrest, prosecute, 
execute, and destroy the wicked, and who protect, acquit, defend, and save the 
good. Therefore, when they perform their duties, not with the intention of seeking 
their own ends but only of helping the law and the governing authority function to 
coerce the wicked, there is no peril in that; they may use their office like anybody 
else would use his trade, as a means of livelihood. For, as has been said, love of 
neighbor is not concerned about its own; it considers not how great or humble, but 
how profitable and needful the works are for neighbor or community.'4 
As noted earlier, even apart from the specific civic vocations cited above by 
Luther, a Christian may (in extreme circumstances) be called upon to use force to defend 
a neighbor in need. In such cases (as we discussed) a Christian is carrying out the 
responsibilities of his more general vocation as "neighbor." It should be emphasized 
once again, however, that Luther insists (with Christ and the New Testament!) that a 
Christian must never use violence merely in self-interest or self-defense, or when 
motivated by hatred or a desire for personal vengeance. And even within the context of 
one's vocation of neighbor or civil servant, a Christian must never use violence in ways 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 103-104. 
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or situations that cannot be justified as divinely allowed or approved acts of love 
performed for the sake of public order, justice and peace and/or in service to one's 
neighbor in need. When asked or expected to participate in unjustified works of 
violence, a Christian has no choice but to "obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). 
This understanding of violence as "divine service" and as "a work of Christian 
love" is admittedly difficult to grasp, says Luther—if viewed simplistically, it even seems 
contradictory and paradoxical. But from the vantage point of faith, things are not always 
what they seem to be: "Now slaying and robbing do not seem to be works of love. A 
simple man therefore does not think it is a Christian thing to do. In truth, however, even 
this is a work of love."15 Just as a doctor does not seem kind and loving when he 
amputates a hand or foot in order to save the body, in the same way (says Luther): 
...when I think of a soldier fulfilling his office by punishing the wicked, killing 
the wicked, and creating so much misery, it seems an un-Christian work 
completely contrary to Christian love. But when I think of how it protects the 
good and keeps and preserves wife and child, house and farm, property, and honor 
and peace, then I see how precious and godly this work is; and I observe that it 
amputates a leg or hand, so that the whole body may not perish. For if the sword 
were not on guard to preserve peace, everything in the world would be ruined 
because of lack of peace. Therefore, such a [justified] war is only a very brief 
lack of peace that prevents an everlasting and immeasurable lack of peace, a small 
misfortune that prevents a great misfortune.16 
Yet Luther goes one step further. When necessary and justifiable, such acts of 
violence are not only commendable human acts performed in service to God and 
neighbor, they are actually "works of God," performed by God himself through human 
instruments. 
This is why God honors the sword so highly that he says that he himself has 
instituted it [Rom. 13:1] and does not want men to say or think that they have 
invented it or instituted it. For the hand that wields this sword and kills with it is 
15 Whether Soldiers, 96. 
16 Ibid. 
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not man's hand, but God's; and it is not man, but God, who hangs, tortures, 
beheads, kills, and fights. All these are God's works and judgments.17 
Frederic Cleve finds confirmation for this view in Luther's explanation of the first 
commandment: 
If God has instituted the sword, he is also the supreme authority that uses the 
sword. In his explanation of the first commandment Luther states that anything 
that we receive from human beings we actually receive from God, whenever 
events in question are ordained and commanded by God. The created things are 
only the hand or the means through which God acts. This is something that 
Luther applies directly to the use of power in mundane contexts. In his opinion 
God has created the justice there is on earth, and God is its Master and Lord, and 
also maintains this earthly justice. Therefore, the hand that sways the sword is no 
human hand, but God's hand. It is God who is the executioner, who puts the 
convict on the rack, who wages war and kills. A soldier who fights with a clear 
conscience has a right to think that his fist is God's fist and his lance is the lance 
of God. He is justified in thinking: It is not I that cuts and kills, but God and my 
prince, whose servants my hand and my body are.'8  
Since such acts of justified violence are actually the works of a good and loving 
God, no one has the right or authority to say that Christians are forbidden to participate in 
them: 
Be not so wicked, my friend, as to say, "A Christian may not do that which is 
God's own peculiar work, ordinance, and creation." Else you must also say, "A 
Christian must not eat, drink, or be married," for these are also God's work and 
ordinance. If it is God's work and creation, then it is good, so good that everyone 
can use it in a Christian and salutary way, as Paul says in II Timothy 4, 
"Everything created by God is good, and nothing is to be rejected by those who 
believe and know the truth." Under "everything created by God" you must 
include not simply food and drink, clothing and shoes, but also authority and 
subjection, protection and punislunent.I9 
Not only, in fact, may Christians participate in such works; according to Luther, they 
must—if and when such works are clearly commended and commanded by God for the 
sake of one's neighbor. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Cleve, 81-82. 
19 Temporal Authority, 99. 
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Just as [the Christian] performs all other works of love which he himself does not 
need—he does not visit the sick in order that he himself may be made well, or 
feed others because he himself needs food—so he serves the governing authority 
not because he needs it but for the sake of others, that they may be protected and 
that the wicked may not become worse. He loses nothing by this; such service in 
so way harms him, yet it is of great benefit to the world. If he did not so serve he 
would not be acting as a Christian but even contrary to love; he would also be 
setting a bad example to others who in like manner would not submit to authority, 
even though they were not Christians. In this way the gospel would be brought 
into disrepute, as though it taught insurrection and produced self-willed people 
unwilling to benefit or serve others, when in fact it makes a Christian the servant 
of al1.2°  
John Stephenson observes: 
It is essential to grasp that Luther regards secular government...as an integral part 
of the good divine work of preservation, for—especially when it conscientiously 
respects its appointed limits—civil authority acts as a curb against the kingdom of 
the devil. Accordingly, although its coercive authority must partially take the 
form of punishment and notwithstanding the fact that, as a tool of God's wrath, it 
must work his opus alienum, the eye of faith may discern in secular authority a 
manifestation—albeit usually blurred and at times outright paradoxical—of divine 
love.21  
Stephenson's comment about the appointed limits of civil authority serves as a 
vital reminder (lest we forget!) that the primary purpose of the various just war criteria 
set forth by Luther (in keeping with the just war tradition) is to limit the use of violence 
and to ensure that it is used only when absolutely necessary and appropriate, in divinely 
approved ways and for God-pleasing reasons: namely, in pursuit of peace and the 
maintenance of order. For Luther, such justifiable participation in violence is not (or at 
least ought never be viewed as) a human attempt to "control history:" "Whichever side... 
suffers defeat, whether it be in the right or in the wrong, must accept it as a punishment 
from God....You are his creature and He can do with you as He wills, just so your 
2° Ibid., 94. 
21 John R. Stephenson, "The Two Governments and the Two Kingdoms in Luther's Thought," Scottish 
Journal of Theology 34:4 (August 1981), 324. 
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conscience is clear."22 In this sense, too, God's work is a strange and hidden work—his 
ways are not our ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts (Isaiah 55:8-9). Our task is not 
(contrary to Yoder's assertion) to "discern definitively and... not only in the light of 
faith"23 how God is working in the world. Since (for Luther) God's work in the world is 
always in some sense hidden, faith is always required to discern it. Ultimately, those who 
are constrained by conscience to support or participate in acts of violence in obedience to 
God and out of love for one's neighbor trust not in their "right decision" or "right 
discernment" of God's will or activity in the world, but in "the innocent blood of your 
dear Son, my Lord Jesus Christ [who] redeems and saves me. This is the basis on which 
I stand before you. In this faith I will live and die, fight, and do everything else."24 In 
this faith, too, of course, the Christian must refuse to participate in violence—no matter 
what the cost—if and when called upon to do so in ways that are clearly contrary to 
God's Word and will. 
God's "Strange Work" in the Civil Realm and the Theology of the Cross 
Ultimately, perhaps the most helpful and unique contribution Lutherans can make 
to a proper understanding of God's "strange work" in the (left-hand) realm of civil 
government is to demonstrate how that work is (in many ways) analogous to God's 
strange work in the (right-hand) realm of the government of Christ. As Luther 
understood, it is precisely through the violence and judgment endured by Christ on the 
cross (not only by the hands of sinners and the power-hungry earthly authorities, but 
ultimately by the wrathful hand of God himself) that God reveals himself to be a 
22 Temporal Authority, 126. 
23 See PJ, 158-159. 
24 Whether Soldiers, 135-136. 
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gracious, merciful and peaceable God. In his "Heidelberg Theses," therefore, Luther 
insists: 
19. That person does not deserve to be called a theologian who looks upon the 
invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible in those things 
which have actually happened [Rom. 1:20]. 
20. He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the visible 
and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross. 
21. A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross 
calls the thing what it actually is.25  
Paul Althaus writes: 
The theology of the cross permeates all of Luther's theological thought. All true 
theology is "wisdom of the cross." This means that the cross of Christ is the 
standard by which all genuine theological knowledge is measured, whether of the 
reality of God, of his grace, of his salvation, of the Christian life, or of the church 
of Christ. The cross means that all these realities are hidden. The cross hides 
God himself For it reveals not the might but the helplessness of God. God's 
power appears not directly but paradoxically under helplessness and lowliness. 
Thus it is that God's grace is hidden under his wrath and that his gifts and 
benefits are "hidden under the cross"....God's reality thus completely contradicts 
the world's standards. In the eyes of the world—and they are also our eyes—
God's truth seems to be a lie and the world's lies seem to be the truth. The 
world—and Christians also belong to this world—judges God on the basis of 
what he does with his own and concludes that he is a devil. The devil, however, 
appears to be God, the Lord of the world. That is the terrible impression the 
reality of the world gives. All men, including the Christian, must endure before 
the miracle of faith can occur. The man who believes must repeatedly pass from 
this experience to that faith which recognizes the reality of the grace, truth, and 
faithfulness of God hidden under its opposite.26 
For Luther (in contrast to Yoder and Hauerwas), faith does not mean primarily 
faithfulness to the nonviolent example of Christ, but (in a sense) it means the very 
opposite: it means to despair completely in one's ability to follow the example of Christ 
and instead to trust completely in the God who, by means of the very violence he himself 
25 Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, LW 31, 40. 
26 Aithaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 30-31. 
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inflicted upon Christ on the cross in our stead, shows himself (despite all outward 
appearances) to be a gracious, kind, and loving God. 
The theology of the cross works with a standard exactly contrary to that of the 
theology of glory....This standard is the cross....The theology of glory leads man 
to stand before God and strike a bargain on the basis of ethical achievement in 
fulfilling the law, whereas the theology of the cross views man as one who has 
been called to suffer. Man's cross "destroys man's self-confidence," so that now, 
instead of wanting to do something himself, he allows God to do everything in 
him. Such a man has been led from moralistic activism to pure receptivity.27  
This radical faith that views everything in relationship to God as "pure receptivity" and 
"pure gift" does not discount obedience and new life lived in imitation of Christ; rather it 
makes such a life possible. It allows the Christian to see and understand (by faith) that 
even this new life is ultimately nothing but another free gift of God in Jesus Christ. Thus, 
for Luther, 
The theology of the cross means that God hides himself in his work of salvation 
and that he acts and creates paradoxically while camouflaging his work to make it 
look as though he were doing the opposite. In this Luther feels that God glorifies 
himself as God. God has the power to create out of nothing; he can even create 
something out of its opposite. This is demonstrated by the reversal of all earthly 
standards and relationships. God shows that he is God precisely in the fact that he 
is mighty in weakness, glorious in lowliness, living and life-giving in death. This 
in Luther's thinking, the theology of the cross and God's being are most 
intimately connected.28  
One cannot truly know God without coming to know him through the "alien 
work" of the wrath and suffering of the cross of Christ, through which he (paradoxically) 
performs his proper work of grace, love and forgiveness. And it is this same God who 
works in a strikingly similar way in the left-hand realm. "Although the severity and 
wrath of the world's kingdom seems unmerciful," writes Luther, "nevertheless, when we 
27 Ibid., 27-28. 
28 Ibid., 34. 
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see it rightly [with the eyes of faith and in the light of the theology of the cross], it is not 
the least of God's mercies."" Robert Kolb writes: 
The Gospel permits us to recognize that God's judgment [including his judgment 
through human disasters such as war] is an expression of His ultimate love....We 
would rather write a history of our society without the necessity of such judgment. 
In view of the fact that we have seized the pen and written a history ridden by 
rebellion against our God, we can rejoice in the judgment that recalls—that recalls 
the fresh breeze of Eden and that recalls us out of the storm of our sin.3°  
As the authors of the study Holy Resolve: Terror and War Today rightly 
recognize, the specter of war raises some very terrible and temptation-riddled questions: 
Why doesn't God judge here and now terrorists or nations who play war games 
with real, deadly toys? Is He at fault for not intervening in these crises? How can 
fellow human beings, created in God's image, hate us so intensely that they would 
die for the opportunity to murder us?31  
Some Christians, they suggest, may experience profound and troubling anger at God for 
"letting war happen;" other may "chafe at war" and wonder whether or how they can 
support the government's decision to go to war. "How," they ask, "are fear, love, and 
trust involved" in answering these questions? Their answer points us to the mystery of 
God's hidden work in the cross of Christ: 
Apart from God's love, we couldn't dare ask such questions. Because we know 
he loves us, we ask and seek answers form His Word. Scripture declares that 
Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, perfectly submitted Himself to His Father's 
will. Fearing no human threat and loving His Father above all others, He trusted 
completely in His Father's help. Christ kept God's Law perfectly in our place. 
He submitted Himself to authority—earthly and heavenly—and accepted the 
death sentence of the cross, suffering the just punishment for our sins. Having 
accomplished this mission, once and for all, He rose from the dead to bring us 
forgiveness of our sins, true life, and salvation. In the cross, which appeared to be 
only evil, God hid the greatest good—the salvation of the world.32 
29 An Open Letter, 71. 
30 Kolb, "Christian Civic Responsibility," 15. 
31 Holy Resolve, 8. 
32 Ibid., 9. 
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In his discussion of the "hidden God," "the way of the cross," and the problem of 
evil in his book Where God Meets Man, Lutheran theologian Gerhard Forde points out: 
For Luther most attempts to "solve" the problem of evil are theologically suspect 
because they involve the same kind of illegitimate attempts to penetrate God's 
"mask" that we have already seen. One usually tries to solve the problems by 
limiting God's omnipotence in some way. But all such theoretical attempts are of 
little real use. When one is really met by tragedy and sorrow it is small comfort to 
be confronted by a theoretical discourse on whether or not God is completely in 
control of things. The real question is whether we have any warrant to affirm life 
and to believe in the face of evil and tragedy that the good God is in fact ultimate 
control, whether we can confess our trust in "the Father Almighty." The question 
is really whether anything that happens here is strong enough to enable us to look 
evil in the face and still say, "I believe."33  
According to Forde: 
Luther's conviction was that such a thing happened in the cross and resurrection 
of Christ. There something was accomplished: the will of God was revealed in 
such a way as to enable us to say, "I believe in God the Father Almighty," which 
means, "I trust God with the government of the world." Of course this is not a 
solution to the problem of evil in the sense that it explains where it came from or 
how it started or how exactly it is related to God's omnipotence. Luther has no 
better answers to those questions than anyone else: the problem of evil remains 
for him a deep mystery. But by making the distinction between God hidden and 
God revealed he points out better how it might actually be handled. Apart from 
his revelation in Christ, God is hidden. We have, ultimately, no means for 
penetrating that hiddenness. We don't really even have a basis for making an 
absolute separation between good and evil. Many things we think are good turn 
out to be evil in the end and vice versa. But this confusion of good and evil, this 
impenetrable hiddenness drives us to that one place where the hiddenness is 
broken through: the cross. Because of the cross we can say, "I believe in a good 
God, creator of a good earth." There God has come down to earth and revealed 
his will for his.34 
Only as we comprehend God's ability to bring good out of the apparent evil of the 
cross can we begin to reflect meaningful on the next question raised in Holy Resolve: 
"How does God also use war, which can appear to be only evil, to bring people His help 
33 Gerhard 0. Forde, Where God Meets Man: Luther's Down-to-Earth Approach to the Gospel 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1972), 29-30. 
34 Ibid., 30. 
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and blessing?"35 We cannot answer this question with the eyes of reason or the eyes of 
human experience, which (on the basis of a theology of glory) is bound to call "evil 
good" and "good evil." Fortunately, however, 
The Scriptures...have good, clear eyes [Matt. 6:22-33] and see the temporal 
sword aright. They see that out of great mercy, it must be unmerciful, and from 
utter kindliness, it must exercise wrath and severity. As Peter and Paul say, it is 
God's servant for vengeance, wrath, and punishment upon the wicked, but for the 
protection, praise, and honor of the righteous [1 Pet. 2:14; Rom. 13:4]. It looks 
upon the righteous with mercy, and so that they may not suffer, it guards, bites, 
stabs, cuts, hews, and slays, as God has commanded; and it know that it serves 
God in doing even this. The merciless punishment of the wicked is not being 
carried out just to punish the wicked, and make them atone for the evil desires that 
are in their blood, but to protect the righteous and maintain peace and safety. And 
beyond all doubt, these are precious works of mercy, love, and kindness, since 
there is nothing on earth that is worse than disturbance, insecurity, oppression, 
violence and injustice. Who could or would stay alive if such things were the 
rule? Therefore the wrath and severity of the sword is just as necessary to people 
as eating and drinking, even as life itself.36 
This does not suggest, of course, that those whom Luther describes here as "the 
righteous" (law-abiding citizens, including Christians) may not also suffer at times (even 
frequently) at the hands of unjust and ungodly leaders and enemies. The cross answers 
that question by assuring us of the ever-certain and everlasting love of God in Christ, and 
by turning our eyes of faith to the promise that someday "our dear Lord Jesus Christ 
[will] come down from heaven with the Last Judgment and strike down... all tyrants and 
the godless, and deliver us [once and for all] from all sins and from all evil. Amen."37 
Finally, as Luther suggests, even God's ultimate "work of wrath," the final 
judgment, is a work of great mercy and love performed on behalf of those who trust in 
Christ as Savior and Lord—for there can be no final end to the cosmic war against sin, 
35 Holy Resolve, 9. 
36 Open Letter, 73. 
37 On War Against the Turk, 205. 
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death, hell and the devil without a final Armageddon in which the enemies of God and 
his church are vanquished once and for all. Only when "the wrath of God is finished" do 
the saints "sing the song of Moses... and the song of the Lamb;" only when the "seven 
bowls of God's wrath" have been fully emptied upon the earth does the angel rejoice in 
the "justness" of God: 
"Just are you, 0 Holy One, who is and who was, for you have brought these 
judgments. For they have shed the blood of saints and prophets, and you have 
given them blood to drink. It is what they deserve!" And I heard the altar saying: 
"Yes, Lord God the Almighty, true and just are your judgments!"38  
At this very point, however, it seems appropriate to add a sobering word of 
caution and even warning. Scripture's theology of the cross and its analogous 
manifestation of "God's merciful wrath" in the civil realm can easily become a theology 
of glory if we glorify violence as such, or seek to use these God-glorifying teachings of 
Scripture to explain and justify our own self-devised and self-appointed words and works 
of wrath and violence in the church or in the world. Like all true and radical teachings of 
Scripture, the teaching of God's alien work in both kingdoms is an exceedingly 
dangerous teaching—with the smallest of slips in any direction, it can quickly and easily 
degenerate into sheer heresy.39 As we discussed in the very first chapter of our study, 
the (proper and Biblical) justification of violence as "God's work" in the left-hand realm 
can be (and often has been) used to justify a crusade mentality in which Christians have 
taken it upon themselves to identify, punish and even eliminate "God's enemies. In 
addition, the (proper and Biblical) concern for "God's work" and God's truth in the realm 
38 See Rev. 15:1-4; 16:1-7. Unless otherwise noted (or quoted from other sources), all quotations of 
Scripture are from The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 
2001). 
39 No one expresses this more vividly than G. K. Chesterton in his classic work Orthodoxy: The Romance 
of Faith (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 100-101. 
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of his rule in Christ has been used to justify sinful conflict in the church as well as wrong-
headed efforts to defend and establish God's kingdom here on earth through force, 
violence and/or coercion. 
There are dangers on every side, and the only way to guard against these dangers 
is to continue to strive to articulate as carefully as possible—and to defend as zealously 
as God gives us the grace and wisdom to do so—the whole truth of God's Word with all 
of its (often subtle) distinctions and connections. This includes the crucial distinction 
between the two realms, the distinction between God's work in both realms and our faith-
based participation in it (as opposed to our sinful attempts to control it), the connection 
between justification and sanctification (as this relates to our lives and conduct in both 
realms), and the connection between Christology and ecclesiology—the connection 
between the radical and unique work of Christ and radical and unique calling of his 
church in the world. On the other hand, it is not a capitulation to a theology of glory, but 
a proper expression of Scripture's true theology of the cross, to recognize and celebrate 
the glorious truth that he who humbled himself even to the point of death on the cross has 
now been highly exalted by God and given the name that is above all names, "so that at 
the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven and on earth and under the earth" 
(Phil. 2:2:9-11). Nor is it a capitulation to a theology of glory to rejoice and take comfort 
in God's sure promise that by his own grace and power in Christ, and in his own time and 
way, we will someday share fully in Christ's eternal victory over all of God's enemies 
and reign with him "in glory and dominion forever and ever" (Rev. 1:6). 
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Issues Needing Further Clarification and Exploration 
The Wrath of God and of the Lamb 
On the basis of the foregoing summary of the Lutheran perspective on "The 
Problem of Violence and the Politics of Jesus," one of the primary issues that (for 
Lutherans) requires further clarification in the thought of Yoder and Hauerwas is how 
they understand and interpret the teaching of Scripture regarding God's wrath against 
sinners, which is hardly a minor theme in the Bible as a whole. One looks in vain for an 
explicit discussion of this theme in the writings of Yoder and Hauerwas. There is a great 
emphasis on God's mercy, love, kindness, patience, forgiveness, trustworthiness, wisdom 
and power, but where (one is left to wonder) does the prominent (and theologically 
crucial) Scriptural teaching of God's real and righteous wrath fit into the theology and 
ethics of Yoder and Hauerwas? 
One problematic aspect of the teaching of God's wrath in Scripture (for Yoder 
and Hauerwas) is its rather unambiguous portrayal of God's support for and participation 
in numerous of wars and acts of violence in the Old Testament. This is, of course, 
problematic in various ways for all readers and interpreters of Scripture—we noted in the 
introduction the need for great care in either "spiritualizing" these texts or interpreting 
and applying them too literalistically (e.g., abstracting them from the unique theocratic 
context of the Old Testament)—as if they provide direct guidance for the church or state 
today in its struggle against its enemies. But in view of their convictions about the non-
violent story of Christ as typified in the life of God's Old Testament people Israel, it 
seems especially crucial that Yoder and Hauerwas deal forthrightly with this aspect of 
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Scripture's story. It is rather surprising, therefore, that this issue receives so little 
attention in their writings. Yoder does devote a brief (11 page) chapter to this topic 
("God Will Fight For Us") in his book The Politics of Jesus; Hauerwas addresses this 
issue only in passing (e.g., various footnotes) in a few of his books and essays. In The 
Peaceable Kingdom, for example, Hauerwas comments in a footnote: 
The strong emphasis on the continuity between Jesus and Israel may felt to be 
misleading exactly in terms of the central theme of this book—namely, 
nonviolence. For the depiction of war and violence in the Hebrew Scriptures 
continues to underwrite the crude, but still powerful picture held by many, that the 
God of the Old Testament is one of wrath and vengeance compared to the New 
Testament God of mercy and love. Yet those who hold this picture often, 
ironically, appeal to the Hebrew Scriptures to justify Christian approval of war.4°  
Hauerwas goes on to refer to a book that serves as both his and Yoder's answer to the 
problem of divinely-approved violence in the Old Testament: Millard C. Lind's Yahweh 
Is a Warrior: The Theology of Warfare in Ancient Israel.'" Chapter four in Yoder's book 
The Politics of Jesus is, in essence, a concise version of Lind's extended argument in 
Yahweh Is a Warrior. Hauerwas summarizes: 
Lind argues that "Yahweh the warrior fought by means of miracle, not through 
the armies of his people; 'it was not by your sword or by your bow' (Josh. 24:12). 
By miracle we mean an act of deliverance that was outside of Israel's control, 
beyond the manipulation of any human agency. This conviction was so emphatic 
that Israel's fighting, while at times a sequel to the act of Yahweh, was regarded 
ineffective; faith meant that Israel should rely upon Yahweh's miracle for her 
defense, rather than upon soldiers and weapons. The human agent in the work of 
Yahweh was not so much the warrior as the prophet."42 
While the evidence and argumentation provided in Lind's book is very helpful for 
forming a more complete and theologically profound picture of holy war and divine 
40 PK, 163. 
41  Published by Herald Press (Scottdale, Pennsylvania), 1980; Yoder contributes the introduction to Lind's 
book. 
42 PK 163-164; cf. Lind, 23. 
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violence in the Old Testament, it ultimately fails to answer the most fundamentally 
problematic questions relating to Yoder and Hauerwas's pacifist views. First, by placing 
the emphasis on Yahweh rather than on Israel as "warrior," Lind appears to solve the 
problem of the complicity of God's people in acts of violence. In so doing, however, he 
seems to highlight even further the problem singled out by Hauerwas in his footnote and 
by Yoder in the introduction to Lind's book—namely, the question of Marcionite 
tendencies in the pacifist view of God himself. On the basis of their expressed support 
for Lind's argument, one is led to assume that Yoder and Hauerwas believe that God is 
justified in killing and using violence in a way that Israel is not. Neither Yoder nor 
Hauerwas actually acknowledges this in so many words, however; and their silence on 
this issue raises questions about to what extent the character of God in the Old Testament 
(who clearly engages in violence) corresponds to the nonviolent character of God as 
revealed in Christ in the New Testament. 
In his book When God Says War Is Right, Darrell Cole devotes an entire chapter 
to "What God's Character Tells Us" about "Why Christians Use Force." He rightly 
points out that New Testament accounts of Jesus' person, work and teachings must not be 
read "in a way that conflict with God's eternal and unchanging moral character as it is 
revealed in the Old Testament.... The New Testament reveals a new covenant, but not a 
new God."43 Yoder and Hauerwas's strong denials of any sympathy for a Marcionite 
view must, of course, be regarded as sincere and taken seriously; but unless and until a 
43 
 When God Says War Is Right (Waterbrook Press, 2002), 32. Cf. Leonard Verduin's admission, in The 
Reformers and Their Stepchildren (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1964; 272) that there was a tendency 
toward Marcionism in the Anabaptist treatment of the Old Testament when it came to issues such as 
pacifism. He quotes Harnack as affirming the historic Anabaptist perspective: "Better to let go of the Old 
Testament than to let the image of the Father of Jesus Christ be clouded by a warlike shadow." 
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clearer explanation is given of how God's violent character and activity in the Old 
Testament corresponds to the non-violent character and work of Christ in the New 
Testament, questions about this issue will undoubtedly remain and will hamper 
meaningful dialog. 
Just as troublesome, however, is that Lind's emphasis on divine violence in the 
Old Testament as a miracle of Yahweh by no means eliminates the problem of Israel's 
frequent participation in this violence—not only with the aid and support of Yahweh, but 
also by his direct command (the disobedience of which has dire—and violent—
consequences). The fact the victory in battle is always to be ascribed to the divine 
blessing and intervention of Yahweh does not, in and of itself, answer the question of 
how it is that God's peaceable people in the Old Testament were justified in serving as 
God's instruments in battle, while (according to Yoder and Hauerwas) this is not and 
cannot be true of God's peaceable people in the New Testament. In the footnote cited 
above, Hauerwas clearly sees this as a problem, especially (as he himself acknowledges) 
in view of his strong emphasis on the continuity between the life and witness of Israel and 
that of Jesus and the church. Lind's book, however, simply does not deal with this 
question in a satisfactory way, and in view of the significance of the problem it hardly 
seems sufficient for Hauerwas to note that "it is beyond the scope of this book [The 
Peaceable Kingdom] to attempt to challenge this understanding of war in the Hebrew 
Scripture."44 On a more positive note, if it is true that Hauerwas is open to an 
understanding of justified violence that is rooted primarily in God's activity rather than in 
the (often sinful, selfish, dishonest and controlling) initiative and efforts of human 
" PK, 163 (fn. 11). 
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beings, then in view of Luther's understanding of justified war (as essentially God's work 
and not ours) this would seem to hold out some possibility for further discussion and 
clarification of this issue. 
Even more critical, of course, is the question of the role God's wrath and violence 
in connection with the work of Christ itself. If it is true that neither Yoder nor Hauerwas 
wants to deny more traditional understandings of the work of Christ on the cross, in what 
sense are they willing to accept and affirm the traditional understanding of Christ's death 
as satisfying the just demands of God's law, appeasing God's righteous wrath against 
sinners, and rendering full and complete payment for the sin of the world? How do they 
account for the New Testament teaching (e.g., the book of Hebrews) that the entire 
sacrificial system of the Old Testament is to be seen as a type of the person and work of 
Christ? It is one thing to seek to offer a corrective to what is seen as an overly narrow 
focus on the atoning and sacrificial nature of Christ's death on the cross, but it is hard to 
discern from the writings of Yoder or Hauerwas how or even whether they would regard 
such a view as compatible with their own particular understanding of the work of Christ 
and the nature of God. 
In his most recent book Performing the Faith, for example, Hauerwas explicitly 
rejects the idea that we can speak of God as punishing sin, since punishment by its very 
nature always bears the taint of sin. He writes: 
All punishment cannot help but be a tragic risk because punishment by its very 
nature has a private relationship to being and, therefore, cannot escape the taint of 
sin. That is why God cannot be said to punish. We are not punished for our sin, 
but rather sin is our punishment.45  
45 Performing the Faith, 178. 
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While these words are not written in the specific context of a discussion of the 
propitiatory nature of Christ's work on the cross, they seem to have direct and far-
reaching implications for Hauerwas's perspective regarding this issue. In a recent (and 
provocatively-titled) article titled "The Good News of God's Wrath," Anglican 
theologian Peter Jensen seeks to explain and defend the classical orthodox understanding 
of the atonement, and in so doing takes issue directly with the notion that we must not 
conceive of God as punishing sin—whether our sin or the sin that Christ bore on our 
behalf: 
The New Testament again and again connects the death of Christ to our sins. And 
when it does, it means that God himself is the one who actively punishes; it is not 
merely a matter of sin being its own reward. Thus the New Testament speaks of 
Christ "bearing sin," "of him "becoming a curse," even of him "becoming sin."46 
This aspect of Christ's story, says Jensen, is inseparable from the story of God's dealing 
with Israel—and of his dealing with all of his human creatures who find themselves 
under God's curse because of sin: 
When Christ was handed over by his own people to the pagan occupying power, it 
was understood to be a mark of judgment. He fell under the curse of God. When 
Israel went into exile, that is precisely what was happening. As the story unfolds, 
every sign of God's wrath is experienced by Jesus: the betrayal, the abandonment 
of friends, the twofold negative judicial verdict by those who were God's agents 
of justice, the darkness at noonday, the great cry of dereliction from the cross. It 
is important to see here not some heavenly Trinitarian transaction occurring out of 
our sight, but the actual, in-the-body acceptance of judgment by a totally 
righteous man for the sake of those who deserve to be forsaken of God.47  
Moreover, as the title of Jensen's article conveys (and as Luther himself 
repeatedly emphasizes in his own writings), apart from the reality of God's wrath against 
sin there is finally no good news of God's grace and forgiveness: 
46 Christianity Today (March 2004), 46. 
47 Aid 
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The Scriptures speak of the wrath of God, his holy anger against sin and those 
who sin against him. His anger is just and thoroughly righteous; it is deserved by 
us. If there were no anger of God in this universe, we would be living in an unjust 
and hopeless world. But the fact that we are the enemies of God means that we 
are by nature children of wrath. It is this that John means when he writes, "He is 
the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not only for ours but also for the sins of the 
whole world" (1 John 2:2).48  
It seems crucial for meaningful conversation with Lutherans (and other Christians) who 
hold firmly to this traditional understanding of Christ's atonement that Hauerwas spell 
out more clearly his understanding of specific passages of Scripture that speak of God's 
wrath and punishment in the context of Christ's sacrificial death and his atoning work, 
and whether (or how) he actually does view this traditional understanding of the 
redeeming work of the Triune God as complementary to his own. 
Of course, the issue of God's wrath and judgment is not limited to the question of 
the meaning of Christ's cross. As emphasized above, the New Testament makes it clear 
that Christ will also return on the last day "to judge the living and the dead." In some 
ways, this connection between divine wrath and the work of Christ seems even more 
problematic for Hauerwas and Yoder, since here it is not simply a matter of Jesus 
passively enduring divine wrath and judgment but actively meting it out. "Behold, he is 
coming with the clouds, and every see will see him, even those who pierced him, and all 
the tribes of the earth will wail on account of him" (Rev. 1:7). The Lamb of God himself, 
Scripture teaches, will preside over the last judgment at which any and all who have 
rejected him "will drink the wine of God's wrath, poured full strength into the cup of his 
anger, and he will be tormented with fire and sulfur in the presence of the holy angels and 
in the presence of the Lamb" (Rev. 14:9-10). If for Yoder and Hauerwas any active 
exercise of violence is simply incompatible with the person and work of Christ, how do 
48 Ibid. 
272 
they explain this teaching of Scripture regarding Christ's role not as "Prince of Peace" 
but as co-executor of God's wrath and punishment on the last day? The final chapter of 
The Politics of Jesus is titled "The War and the Lamb" and quotes frequently from the 
book of Revelation; strangely, however, Yoder offers no treatment of passages and 
questions such as those cited and raised above. Further explication of questions such as 
these also seems crucial for meaningful conversation between Hauerwasians and 
Lutherans. 
War as a "Lesser Evil" 
A second issue that needs clarification (even correction) in connection with the 
"problem of violence and the politics of Jesus" is the consistent characterization of the 
just war tradition by Yoder and Hauerwas as rooted in a "presumption against violence" 
and in a "lesser evil" view of war. "Any account of just war in the Christian tradition," 
says Hauerwas, "owes its intelligibility to the presumption of the practice of nonviolence 
in the church."'" On the fmal pages of the final essay included in the anthology The 
Hauerwas Reader, Hauerwas is at pains to make it clear that: 
I am not a Niebuhrian. One of the problems with Niebuhr's account of sin is that 
it gets you into a lesser-of-two-evils argument. Because I am a pacifist, I do not 
want to entertain lesser-of-two-evils arguments. As you know, Christians are not 
about compromise. We are about being faithful.5°  
This implies, of course, that those who are not pacifists (i.e., adherents of the just war 
tradition) are inevitably bound to adopt some form of Niebuhr's "lesser-of-two-evils 
argument," which (in turn) seems to imply that they are inevitably bound to be "about 
compromise" rather than "about being faithful." This brings us back to the issue of the 
49 "Can a Pacifist Think About War?" 122. 
99 "Abortion, Theologically Understood," HR, 621. 
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Yoderian compliment referred to earlier: the notion that as long as just war thinkers are 
willing to admit that their position is less consistent with the radical claims of Christ than 
absolute pacifism, then their views can be respected and serious dialog can take place—
on the basis of a pacifist characterization of the just war tradition. 
As we have emphasized in various ways and places throughout this study, 
however, Niebuhr's "lesser evil" view of just war is not the only—nor even the classical 
historic Christian—understanding of just war. Cole writes: 
If you accept the lesser evil approach to war, then you cannot think in classical 
just war terms. This is the main reason why the book trumpeted by Hauerwas and 
Sider, Yoder's When War Is Unjust, is such a failure in just war thinking. On the 
very first page Yoder claims: "The just war tradition considers war to be an evil." 
Because his entire approach to just war thinking is based upon this mistaken 
assumption, his analysis is rendered quite fruitless in the eyes of the classical just 
war advocate.51  
George Weigel agrees: "The claim that a 'presumption against violence' is at the root of 
the just war tradition cannot be sustained historically, methodologically, or 
theologically."52 James Turner Johnson insists that "the concept of just war... does not 
begin with a 'presumption against war' focused on the harm war may do, but with a 
presumption against injustice focused on the need for responsible use of force in response 
to wrongdoing." According to Johnson, "the presumption-against-war position...is 
simply not to be found in classic just war teaching, 'even in the specifically churchly 
theorists Augustine and Aquinas to whom Catholic just war theorists generally refer for 
authority.19953 
51 "Darrell Cole Replies," FT 128 (December 2002), 4. 
52 Weigel, 23. Cf. "Just War: An Exchange" FT 122 (April 2002), 31-37. 
53 Keith J. Pavlischek, "The Justice in Just War," FT 103 (May 2000), 43. 
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For all of its helpful insights, Hater's essay "Be Honest in Just War Thinking" 
also falls short in this critical regard, since it uncritically embraces Yoder's "lesser evil" 
characterization of the just war tradition. Lutz, too, in his (generally excellent) 
introduction to Yoder's book When War Is Unjust, gives the author a bit too much credit 
when he describes Yoder as "one who stands outside [the just war] tradition, but knows it 
as well as its best inside theorists."54 Lutherans who reject—against Niebuhr and with 
Luther—a "lesser evil" approach to just war would need to modify this compliment in 
order to establish an honest basis for theological dialog. 
It is this same "lesser evil" view of the just war tradition that allows Yoder to 
assert, in his 1991 essay "Just War Tradition: Is It Credible?" that, when set alongside his 
own pacifist "testimony to Jesus' words and work," the just war tradition "still has the 
burden of proor—i.e., it is "guilty" of moral failure and inconsistency until and unless 
"proven innocent."55 There is, of course, a sense in which it can be said that just war 
thinking bears the burden of proof and carries with it a "presumption against violence." 
As we noted earlier, Gilbert Meilaender acknowledges that Luther's treatises on 
Temporal Authority and Whether Soldiers, Too, May Be Saved both "suggest a Christian 
presumption against waging war, a burden of proof resting on any Christian who would 
propose to serve as a soldier."56 The burden of proof of which Meilaender speaks here, 
however, is one that assumes the viability and moral validity of the just war principles, 
and seeks to defend (offer proof for) a given decision on the basis of them. The burden 
of proof of which Yoder speaks, on the other hand, calls into question the viability and 
54 When War Is Unjust, 5. 
55 The Christian Century (March 13, 1991), 298. 
56 PJWT, 89. 
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moral validity of the just war tradition as such, not simply its need to "live up to its own 
principles." The very notion of just war as such, from Yoder's perspective, is guilty until 
proven innocent—and the just war tradition itself (claim Yoder and Hauerwas) admits 
this guilt. 
At least part of the problem here may be differing and even conflicting 
understandings of the concept of evil itself. Augustine, we recall, spoke of war as both 
the consequence of as well as the remedy for sin and evil. According to Augustine, war 
may certainly be described as evil—or more accurately, as "an evil"—in the sense that it 
is a tragic result or consequence of sin. The same can (and must) be said, of course, 
about tragic realities of the fall such as suffering and sickness. But to say that suffering 
and sickness are "evil" or "evils" in the sense that they are consequences of sin is not to 
say that they are inherently "evil" or "sinful"—as if anyone participating in suffering or 
sickness were necessarily participating in sinful or evil behavior. The same distinction 
must be kept clearly in mind when speaking of war as an "evil" or "tragic" consequence 
of sin. To speak of war in this way does not mean that it is inherently evil or sinful—
otherwise, a holy God could hardly participate in it or command others to do so. As the 
editors of First Things put it, just war, "although occasioned by evil, is not itself an evil; 
nor is it even, as is commonly said today, a necessary evil. It is, if just, a positive duty, 
the doing of which, while it may entail much suffering, is to be counted as good."57 
This is why it is crucial to keep in mind the second half of Augustine's 
assertion—namely, that war is also a remedy for evil, in the sense that God himself can 
57 "hi a Time of War," 12. 
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(and does) use it to punish wrongdoing, to restrain evil, and to promote and preserve the 
(very good!) gift of peace. As Luther says, "it is precisely because God wills to create 
and preserve peace among men that he has instituted governments" which at times 
(tragically) must wage war.58 Here again we encounter a parallel with the profound 
mystery of Christ's suffering and death on the cross. The suffering of Christ was, in a 
very real sense, the greatest evil (the greatest tragic result of sin) that has ever occurred in 
the history of the world. God's violent and wrathful punishment of Christ was likewise a 
great evil (a tragic consequence of sin). At the same time, paradoxically, the suffering of 
Christ at the hands of a just, holy, and wrathful God was the greatest and most profound 
remedy for sin in the history of the world. Neither God by his divine punishment nor 
Christ by his (innocent!) suffering were complicit in doing evil. It was, in fact, the very 
innocence of Christ's act of suffering that made it possible for God to accept his work as 
rendering satisfaction for the sin of the world—only in this sense can Christ rightly be 
called (as Luther often calls him) "the greatest sinner who ever lived." A "lesser evil" 
view of war that considers any and all participation in violence to be sinful in and of itself 
confuses Augustine's understanding of war as both a consequence of sin and a remedy 
for sin, and makes it difficult if not impossible to discuss meaningfully the validity and 
viability of the just war tradition as a legitimate moral option for Christians who sincerely 
seek to be faithful and uncompromising followers of Christ. As Cole says: 
Classical just war advocates (those who rely upon the tradition as formulated by 
the likes of Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas, and Calvin) deny that the just war 
criteria allow us to do evil—even prima facie evil—that good might come. They 
hold in fact that the just war criteria rule out evil altogether and help us determine 
when we must refrain from certain proposed acts of force. Just warriors refuse to 
restrain evil with evil. If we cannot prevent an evil without doing evil ourselves, 
then we throw ourselves on God's mercy and trust in His will for us, even if it 
58 Exposition of Psalm 82, 55. 
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means dying; for such dying is a noble death, and noble dying always beats 
ignoble living.59 
The question of whether (or in what way) war is to be regarded as evil is, of 
course, more than just an abstract and academic question. It also has profound practical 
and pastoral implications. For if war is inherently evil (even in a lesser sense), and if 
(therefore) any and all participation in war is (in and of itself) wrong and sinful (even if it 
is regarded as a regrettably necessary sinful activity), then it follows—at least if the 
matter of sin is taken seriously—that those who participate even in justifiable war and 
violence cannot do so not with the conviction that they are performing a good work in 
obedience to God and in loving service to their neighbor. Rather they must participate in 
such acts with the understanding that their complicity in violence is conscious and 
deliberate sinful behavior that requires repentance and forgiveness by God and by the 
church. 
In the response to the editorial "In a Time of War" referred to in the introduction, 
Hauerwas says: "I did not expect the Editors to take a pacifist stance, but I confess that 
their lack of any sadness that should accompany the use of violence fills me with 
sadness."60 It is clear that for Hauerwas the "sadness" required by those who support or 
participate in what they believe to be a justified war is not merely sadness resulting from 
the tragic reality of war in the world but the sadness that (according to Scripture) must 
accompany true repentance for sinful acts. In a subsequent response to Cole's article 
"Listening to Pacifists," Hauerwas wonders aloud "what Prof. Cole can possibly 
mean when he says that it is a 'sad fact that Christians are always going to have to use 
violence' and yet also maintain that when just warriors use force justly, 'such acts bear no 
59 
"Listening to Pacifists," FT 125 (Aug./Sept. 2002), 23. 
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stain of evil.'" "Why," asks Hauerwas, "would it be appropriate to feel sorrow for an 
action that is justified?"61  
In the medieval world [continues Hauerwas] penance was required from those 
returning from a just war, but surely such a requirement was because the Church 
continued to have some sense that war is incompatible with the gospel. Prof. Cole 
does not think war is incompatible with the gospel. So why is he sad?62 
Cole's responds in the same issue of First Things by including an analogy often 
used by Luther himself in addressing God's remedy for the evil of war: 
Just soldiers and commanders are sorry that evil exists to such an extent that acts 
of force are necessary to bring about justice, but they are not sorry about their acts 
of force. Similarly, surgeons should feel sorrow that cancerous tumors exist, but 
feel joy and even experience a certain amount of professional satisfaction in being 
able to cut out the cancer. Or closer still, policeman may express sorrow that 
crime exists, but not at their just acts of stopping crime....Karl Barth, who rarely 
spoke for the classical Christian view of war, surely got it right when he said that 
our decision to go to war should be made in sorrow, but once it is made, we ought 
to go to war joyfully.63  
On the other hand, Cole emphasizes, there is certainly a place for repentance in the 
church's teaching and practice in connection with just war: 
The church can do even better than say "no" to some wars and some acts in war; 
it can demand penance from its members who participate in unjust wars or do 
unjust things in war. Penance is the practice that enables the Church to show the 
world that it takes just-war thinking seriously. Aquinas and Calvin insist that, at 
the very least, the Eucharist be withheld from anyone suspected of unjust acts. 
Thus any ecclesiastical official (bishop, priest, or pastor) who knows or has good 
reason to believe that someone under his care has done injustice in war should 
withhold the Eucharist until either the suspicions are allayed or penance imposed. 
Notorious offenders should of course have to undergo public penance, since the 
Church should show itself to be a place where sin is not taken lightly....Thus 
penance in wartime serves two purposes: it protects the integrity of the Church 
(and thus Christ) and restores the soldier and political leader to the body of Christ. 
60 "In a Time of War: An Exchange," FT 120 (February 2002), 13. 
61 "Pacifism Redux," FT 128 (December 2002), 3. 
62 Ibid. 
63 "Darrell Cole Replies," FT 128 (December 2002), 5. 
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Such ecclesial practices should allay any fears that the Church cannot maintain its 
independence [from the state] while saying "yes" to particular conflicts.64 
Luther, as we have seen, offers no "aid and comfort" to Christians who would try 
to justify participation in a clearly unjust war: "If you know for sure that [a particular 
war] is wrong, then you should fear God rather than men...and you should neither fight 
nor serve, for you cannot have a good conscience before God."65 He also stresses the 
importance of repentance during a time of war as part of the church's unique "battle" 
against the consequences of sin and the devil's "stirring up of strife" in the world. For 
"Sir Christian" (the church), says Luther: "This fight must begin with repentance, and we 
must reform our lives, or we shall fight in vain."66 But this exhortation relates not to the 
decision of an individual Christian soldier or military commander to engage in what he is 
convinced is a just war, but to the ongoing life and character of the church as a whole, in 
keeping with Luther's understanding that the entire Christian life should be a life of 
repentance.67 The Christian soldier who goes off to fight in a war that he is convinced is 
justified is free to go (indeed, must go) "with a good conscience," giving thanks and 
praise to God for "your mercy and grace that you have put me into a work which I am 
sure is not sin, but right and pleasing obedience to your will."68 "Though in God's sight 
we are as poor sinners as our enemies are," says Luther, when we put our trust in God's 
grace in Christ and in his assurance that he has chosen to work through civil government 
" "Listening to Pacifists," FT 125 (Aug-Sept 2002), 25. See also Cole's article "Just War, Penance, and 
the Church" in Pro Ecclesia XI:3 (Summer 2002), 313-328 for a much more extensive discussion and 
analysis of the general (not universal) practice of the early church, in the first centuries of its existence, to 
require Christian soldiers to do penance. 
65 Whether Soldiers, 130. 
66 On War Against the Turk, 171. 
67 Thesis one of the "Ninety-Five Theses" reads: "When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ said, 'Repent 
[Matt. 4:17], he willed the entire life of believers to be one of repentance" (see LW 31, 83). 
" Whether Soldiers, 135. 
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to restrain evil and promote peace, we can indeed go "forward with joy" into battle, "sure 
and certain that in serving and obeying [our commander] we are serving and obeying 
God."69 For soldiers troubled in conscience such as Assa von Kram70—and Christian 
soldiers and their friends, families and loved ones troubled in the same way today—this 
was (and remains) precious, necessary and comforting good news, even if it surely does 
not (and should not) eliminate the sense of sadness that fills the heart of every Christian 
who soberly reflects on the tragic necessity and reality of war as a consequence of sin in a 
fallen world. 
The Definition of Violence 
Another (rather significant) issue that bears mentioning in this connection is that 
the term "violence" itself is never clearly defined or delimited in the writings of 
Hauerwas. It is clear that Hauerwas believes that any and all participation in violence is 
contrary to the will of God—but what exactly constitutes violence? In the post-911 
"Exchange" in First Things, the editors challenge Hauerwas's loose use of this term: 
The crucial distinction here is between violence and the use of force in the service 
of justice. Violence is the disordered use of physical force that injures, abuses 
and destroys. The use of military force in a just war...is ordered to the defense of 
the innocent and the securing of justice. Violence is inherently disordered—
meaning it is random or capricious, or ordered to an evil end. Force is a 
sometimes necessary means ordered to a good end.71  
Hauerwas himself seems to acknowledge a rather uncomfortable ambiguity regarding the 
scope of this term by including as an appendix in his book After Christendom a letter 
from a graduate student chiding him for the violence of his own language and 
69 Ibid., 133. 
7° Cf. pages 111 and 189 above. 
71 FT 120 (Feb. 2002), 14. 
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argumentation in his efforts to persuade others of the truth of his position. Hauerwas 
offers no response to this letter except to say that "it is a reminder that the way of 
nonviolence is never easy and that our language can embody that violence in ways that 
we hardly knew."72 But this hardly seems a satisfactory answer to the far-reaching 
questions raised by the suggestion that virtually everything we do or say as Christians 
might legitimately be viewed as "violent" (and therefore sinful) efforts to "exercise 
control" over the lives of others. If this is the case, virtually any type of Christian witness 
is rendered suspect. Allen's primary critique of Hauerwas's witnessing argument, in fact, 
is its "unclarity" about the precise nature and use of violence.73  
Hauerwas's most straightforward—and helpful—attempt to explain his 
understanding of "violence" and "nonviolence"—as well as his reluctance to define these 
terms in a narrowly circumscribed way—is contained in an essay titled "Explaining 
Christian Nonviolence," included as chapter seven in his most recent book Performing 
the Faith. The problem with insisting on a strict definition of violence, argues Hauerwas, 
is that it concedes to nonpacifists the right to establish the terms and framework for the 
debate—as if "concerns about violence" are at the heart of a true, Biblical, Christological, 
ecclesial pacifism. Authentic pacifists, however (says Hauerwas), are not so much 
"against violence" as they are "for peace"—and the true nature of violence cannot be 
known or perceived apart from this peace: the peace that (for Hauerwas) is embodied in 
the life of the church itself as God's "peaceable people." 
My argument, quite simply, and it is a simple point, is that pacifists cannot let 
their understanding of Christian nonviolence be determined by what we are 
against. We do not know what violence is or may be if we do not know violence 
against the background of a more profound peaceableness...any attempt to 
72 After Christendom (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991), 153. 
73 Allen, 22-23. 
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develop a defense of "Christian nonviolence" but reproduces the problem I am 
trying to avoid. The very phrase, "Christian nonviolence" cannot help but suggest 
that peace is "not violence." Yet a peace that is no more than "not violence" 
surely cannot be the peace that is ours in Christ.74 
A commitment to Christian nonviolence, insists Hauerwas, is not a pious, 
legalistic, perfectionist pledge to avoid all forms of violent behavior, but (on the contrary) 
it is a confession that each one of us, if we are honest—being prone to violence by nature 
and by virtue of the violent world in which we live—desperately needs help from others 
within God's peaceable community to notice and name the violence in our lives and to 
continue to struggle against it by continually recommitting ourselves to a life of peace 
modeled after the life of Christ and manifested in the church. 
This is one of the reasons I have always felt something of a fraud when I claim to 
be a pacifist. My sense of being fraudulent is not simply because—Texan that I 
am—I am a violent person. That I do not know how to be nonviolent is, of 
course, a problem, but even more troubling is my sense that I do not know what I 
am claiming when I claim to be a pacifist. I assume, however, that my declaration 
at least means I create expectations in others who can and should call me to 
account for living in a manner that belies my conviction that, if I am to live a 
truthful life, I must be nonviolent. In other words, nonviolence is at least a 
declaration that should make me vulnerable to others in a manner that hopefully 
can put me on the way to being at peace in a world of violence.75  
Thus, says Hauerwas, 
Christians committed to nonviolence can never...assume we know we are 
nonviolent. Rather, our nonviolence is a declaration that renders our lives 
vulnerable to challenges that may reveal that we are implicated in forms of 
violence we have not recognized or have chosen to ignore. By discovering the 
violence in our lives we hope we may witness to those that do not follow Christ 
the violence that may grip all our lives.76 
Acknowledging once again his debt to Yoder—"I have...never pretended that I 
have anything to say about nonviolence that Yoder has not said and said better than any 
74 Performing the Faith, 170. 
75 Ibid., 171. 
76 Ibid., 181. 
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of my efforts"—Hauerwas points out that "Christian nonviolence...does not name for 
Yoder a position or even a principled stance that works from a predetermined 
understanding of what counts as violence or nonviolence. Rather Christian nonviolence 
names the present reality of a community that refuses to be determined by the very 
`world' it creates by its own existence."77 Hauerwas goes so far as to say that "Yoder 
was not a pacifist" if that term is defined in some simplistic way that presumes some 
established or commonly agreed-upon definition of violence: 
Yoder is not a pacifist if by that you mean someone who assumes that pacifists 
know in advance what may and may not be violence. Of course Yoder assumes 
that Christians do not kill, but that is only to state what it means to be a pacifist in 
the most minimal fashion. The practice of peace among Christians requires 
constant care of our lives together, through which we discover the violence that 
grips our lives and compromises our witness to the world. If the church is not 
peace, then the world does not have an alternative to violence. But if the church 
is not such an alternative, then what we believe as Christians is clearly false. For 
when all is said and done, the question of peace is the question of truth and why 
the truth that is ours in Christ makes possible a joyfulness otherwise 
unobtainable.78  
It must be admitted that this is, in many ways, a compelling and persuasive 
argument: better to leave the concept of violence (and nonviolence) somewhat 
ambiguous, says Hauerwas—even if it means being open to the charge of ambiguity—
than to capitulate to the pressure to define it in some legalistic, systematic fashion and in 
so doing shift the focus of the discussion away from the true pacifist concern for the 
peace that is to be embodied in the life of the church and toward casuistic debates about 
which particular actions or decision must be placed into which category ("violent" or 
"nonviolent"). One might even see a parallel here to Luther's (equally misunderstood!) 
encouragement to "sin boldly"—i.e., not to allow a moralistic or legalistic obsession with 
77 Ibid., 172. 
78 Ibid., 174-5. 
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rules and strictly defined "do's and don'ts" to prevent us from living freely, joyfully and 
boldly as God's people, even as we remain open constantly to the guidance and 
exhortation of our brothers and sisters in Christ, and to the real and potential need for 
continual repentance and personal renewal. Lutherans formed by an appreciation for the 
ordinary, creaturely gifts highlighted by Luther in the first article will also undoubtedly 
find appealing Hauerwas's concluding emphasis on "peaceable activities such as raising 
lemurs, sustaining universities, having children, and, of course playing baseball."79 
Seeking to countering (like Meilaender) the survivalism of Jonathan Schell and Gordon 
Kaufman, Hauerwas notes: "To be sure, in the face of alleged nuclear destruction these 
appear trivial or inconsequential activities; but I believe without them and many other 
such examples, we have no hold on what it means to be nonviolent."80 To this true 
Lutherans (and baseball lovers!) cannot help but say, "Amen!"81  
It is also true, however, that in the actual, practical course of our daily life and 
existence as Christians, specific and difficult (even conscience-troubling) decisions must 
be made and actions taken. It would seem that those who claim an unwavering 
commitment to nonviolence as constitutive of true worship of the Messiah, therefore, 
would find it necessary to identify a somewhat more objective standard for determining 
whether or not they were being faithful to the will and example of Christ in specific 
situations. This would seem to be true also (even especially!) in view of Hauerwas' call 
to be open to the admonition and exhortation offered by those within God's "peaceable 
community" who seek to hold others accountable to a life of peace. Such a standard 
would not necessarily have to be based on abstract or predetermined notions of violence 
79 Ibid., 182-183 
80 Ibid., 183. 
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or nonviolence formulated apart from Scripture and the practices and traditions of the 
church; but since this church (according to Hauerwas) actually exists as a "community of 
peace," with a story and sources of authority well-tested by time and experience, the 
question might legitimately be raised: can this church itself give us any specific guidance 
in defining violence and nonviolence beyond simply admitting (as does Hauerwas in the 
final sentence of this chapter) that "nonviolence cannot be explained"?82 
As we observed in chapter two, Hauerwas himself readily acknowledges the 
seemingly abstract nature of his argument, noting the objection that "even if it is true that 
the church itself is a social ethic, surely it must also have a social ethic that reaches out in 
strategic terms in the societies in which it finds itself." "That is most certainly the case," 
admits Hauerwas; "indeed, different circumstances and social contexts bring different 
needs and strategies."83 The very mention of "needs and strategies" in "different 
circumstances and social contexts," however, seems to suggest (once again) the 
possibility of "explaining violence" a bit more concretely than Hauerwas is willing to do 
in chapter seven of Performing the Faith. Yoder's insistence that the essential mark of 
the church, according to the New Testament, is a "social style characterized by the 
rejection of violence of any kind,"84 likewise suggests the possibility—if not the 
necessity—of offering some sort of concrete explanation of what these various kinds of 
violence may look like. The insistence that "violence" cannot be explained may actually 
close off conversation with those who are genuinely interested in knowing more about 
81 See, e.g., Matthew Rose, "Unremarkably Lutheran," in First Things (February 2001), 13-14. 
82 Performing the Faith, 183. 
83 PK, 111; emphasis added. 
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how to recognize specific forms of violence that Yoder and Hauerwas are convinced are 
so destructive of our lives and of the church's witness for Christ. 
Finally, it should be recognized that there are two sides to Hauerwas's somewhat 
off-handed (at least in this essay) acknowledgement that, "of course, Christians do not 
kill." His point—and it is well taken—is that it is wrong to reduce the "pacifism of the 
Messianic community" to merely being "against killing"—it clearly involves much more 
than that (see chapter two). On the other hand, such an assertion also makes it clear that 
for Hauerwas it is impossible to separate the true and authentic politics of the non-violent 
social revolutionary Jesus (embodied in the church as alternative to the world) from the 
obvious truth that Christians can never—in faithfulness to the witness and example of 
Jesus—engage knowingly and willingly in particular acts of obvious violence such as 
taking the life a fellow human being. This may be, for Hauerwas, the most minimal 
definition of true pacifism; but it is clearly also non-negotiable. It is one fact that can 
never be "explained away," even if the term or concept of "violence" as such can never 
be fully or clearly explained. It seems important not to overlook or downplay this fact in 
conversations between Hauerwasian pacifists and Lutheran nonpacifists, so that that the 
non-negotiable conclusions of Hauerwas's Christological and ecclesial pacifism are kept 
clearly distinct from those of the "just war pacifism" (to use Yoder's term!) espoused by 
Luther and other Christians. 
Chapter Seven 
The Witness of the Church in and to Society 
Valid Hauerwasian Insights and Concerns:  
The Character and Conduct of the Church and Constantinian Temptations 
According to Hauerwas, "the question of the nature and form of the church is the 
center of any attempt to develop Christian ethics."' It follows, therefore, that for 
Hauerwas "the first word we as Christians have to say to the world about war is 'church.' 
In other words, we do not so much have an alternative ethic to the world's way of war—
we are the alternative."2 One of Hauerwas's sharpest criticisms of the Reformation is 
that it paved the way for (and resulted in) the loss of the "understanding of the church as 
the indispensable context" for doing Christian ethics.3 In this final chapter of our study, 
we focus on two critical themes in Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics that present a special 
challenge for Lutherans and the witness of the Lutheran church on issues of war and 
peace: Hauerwas's views regarding the character and conduct of the church as a real, 
visible, holy community in the world, and his concerns regarding the continuing 
temptation of "Constantinianism" for the church in its efforts to make a difference in the 
world. 
The Character and Conduct of the Church as "Holy Community" 
In chapter six of The Peaceable Kingdom Hauerwas strongly emphasizes the 
moral and ethical character of the church as fundamental to and essential for any 
PK, 95. 
2 "A Church Capable," HR, 429. 
3 "How 'Christian Ethics' Came to Be," HR, 43. 
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meaningful witness to the world. The church, says Hauerwas, is called to be a 
"community of virtues"—virtues such as love, forgiveness, patience and trust that are 
clearly visible to the world. These virtues are inculcated over time through the regular, 
habitual practices of the church, centering in its worship, preaching, teaching and 
administration of the sacraments. These practices exist for the sake of the virtues which 
they are meant to produce, since 
... neither the marks of the sacraments or preaching would be sufficient if the 
church was not also called to be a holy people—that is, a people who are capable 
of maintaining the life of charity, hospitality and justice....For the church is 
finally known by the character of the people who constitute it, and if we lack that 
character, the world rightly draws the conclusion that the God we worship is in 
fact a false God.4 
Hauerwas frequently acknowledges that this emphasis on holiness stems at least 
in part from the Methodist (Wesleyan) tradition in which he was raised and to which he 
still claims basic allegiance.5 But he also admits that his emphasis on discipleship, 
obedience and faithfulness as constitutive elements of the communal life of the (always 
visible) church also stems from the ecclesiology he learned and inherited from Yoder. 
This ecclesiology, Hauerwas further acknowledges, cannot itself be separated from the 
broader "story" of the Anabaptist tradition of the "gathered, visible community of the 
elect" and the "obedient, disciplined church."6 
One of the primary theses of Leonard Verduin's work The Reformers and Their 
Stepchildren is that one of the great failures of the Lutheran Reformation was its inability 
(or refusal) to break free from Rome's Constantinian view of the church as the Corpus 
4 
Pic, 109.  
5 See, e.g., "Whose Church? Which Future? Whither the Anabaptist Vision?" in HR, 65-78. 
6 Ibid. 
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Christianum (all people, duly christened, residing in a certain geographical area). 
Instead, says Verduin, Luther essentially affirmed this prevailing Constantinian view of 
the church, leading to an exodus by those who were "convinced that 'Christendom' is a 
myth," and that "the Church of Christ is by definition an element in society, not society 
as such."7 One of the significant side effects of this stubborn and prevailing 
Constantinian understanding of the church, argues Verduin, had to do with "the area of 
conduct, or more correctly, of conductual requirement:" 
In the unfallen Church, those who belong to it contrast with their environment in 
the manner of deportment. It is written large in the New Testament that they who 
have accepted Christ no longer live as do the rank and file. They have begun to 
walk "worthy of the calling wherewith they have been called." They have begun 
to "bring forth fruits worthy of repentance." They have been "raised with Christ" 
and as a consequence they have begun to "seek the things that are above."8  
The "stepchildren" of the Reformation, says Verduin (notably Menno Simons), 
resolutely rejected perfectionism. But they just as resolutely rejected what he calls the 
"conductual-averagism" of Luther and his followers, which eschewed any concrete or 
measurable demand for outward obedience and accompanying church discipline: 
[T]he difference of opinion that existed concerning the kind of discipline that 
should be exercised in Christ's Church was but a facet of the difference of opinion 
as to the delineation of the Church. For men who think of the Church as 
`including all in a given totality,' discipline as it had been distorted ever since 
Constantine was right and proper; for those who thought of the Church as a 
society of believers, some very radical changes were in order.9 
It is apparent, says Verduin, 
that the Reformers were not minded to discard the Constantinian formula; they 
sought to reform the Church on the last of "Christian sacralism"; this restrained 
them from launching a full-scale attack upon conductual-averagism; it likewise 
kept them from re-instituting Church discipline according to the New Testament 
blueprint....In this whole area the Stepchildren blazed a new trail, by repudiating 
7 Verduin, 17; 16. 
8 Ibid., 95 
9 /bid., 131. 
290 
the Constantinian change, by reinstituting the Church of believers with conductual 
distinctiveness, by driving away the sword function out of the Church, by 
reintroducing Church discipline in which excommunication is the ultimate 
penalty.'°  
The roots of the "conductual-averagism" of the Reformation must finally be traced 
(argues Verduin) to Luther's narrow and imbalanced doctrine of justification. 
In his haste to establish the doctrine of justification by faith rather than works 
Luther down-graded good works; the only place he had left for good works was at 
the very end, as a sort of postscript or appendage, something that needed attention 
after salvation was an accomplished fact. We meet in Luther, to put it 
theologically, a very heavy emphasis on the forensic aspect of salvation and a 
correspondingly light emphasis on the moral aspect.... There is an imbalance in 
this theology between what God does for man and what He does in man.11  
As we have seen throughout this study, many of these same concerns are 
expressed by Yoder and Hauerwas (e.g., Yoder's critique of the Reformation view of 
"justification by grace through faith" in chapter eleven of The Politics of Jesus, reflected 
in Hauerwas's depiction of justification in The Peaceable Kingdom). Included in 
Hauerwas's book Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified is a sermon bluntly 
titled "Reformation Is Sin." Oddly, says Hauerwas, "As Protestants we now take pride in 
the acknowledgement of our sinfulness in order to distinguish ourselves from Catholics 
who allegedly believe in works-righteousness." Unfortunately, however, 
...the Catholics are right. Christian salvation consists in works. To be saved is to 
be made holy. To be saved requires our being made part of a people separated 
from the world so that we can be united in spite of—or perhaps better, because 
of—the world's fragmentations and divisions. Unity, after all, is what God has 
given us through Christ's death and resurrection. For in that death and 
resurrection we have been made part of God's salvation for the world so that the 
world may know it has been freed from the powers that would compel us to kill 
one another in the name of false loyalties. All that is about the works necessary to 
save us.
12 
I° Ibid., 131. 
II Ibid., 12. 
12 Sam* Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1998), 242. 
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Later in the sermon, Hauerwas attempts to harmonize the two views: 
I realize that the suggestion that salvation is to be part of a holy people constituted 
by the law seems to deny the Reformation principle of justification by faith 
through grace. I do not believe that to be the case....After all, Calvin (and Luther) 
assumed that justification by faith is a claim about God's presence in Jesus of 
Nazareth. So justification by faith through grace is not some general truth about 
our need for acceptance; but rather justification by faith through grace is a claim 
about the salvation wrought by God through Jesus to make us a holy people....13 
In his essay "Whither the Anabaptist Vision?" Hauerwas makes a similar effort to 
"put the best construction" on the Reformation "vision" of the church. Approvingly 
citing Harold Bender's "great essay" on "The Anabaptist Vision" for example, Hauerwas 
observes that Bender 
...situated the Anabaptist as the "culmination of the Reformation, the fulfillment 
of the original vision of Luther and Zwingli,...thus making it a consistent 
evangelical Protestantism seeking to recreate without compromise the original 
New Testament church, the vision of Christ and the Apostles." The Anabaptists 
are presented by Bender as consistent Protestant reformers who insisted that true 
repentance and regeneration must be a mark of the church. The Anabaptists 
"retained the original vision of Luther and Zwingli, enlarged it, gave it body and 
form, and set out to achieve it in actual experience. They proceeded to organize a 
church composed solely of earnest Christians, and actually found the people for it. 
They did not believe in any case that the size of the response should determine 
whether or not the truth of God should be applied, and they refused to 
compromise. They preferred to make a radical break with fifteen hundred years 
of history and culture if necessary rather than to break with the New 
Testarnent."14 
Lutherans, of course, may be somewhat reluctant to receive (at least without significant 
qualification) the compliment offered by Bender (and by Hauerwas). But they should at 
least be willing to acknowledge that Lutheranism has always faced a challenge in 
explicating and demonstrating the practical, ethical and ecclesial implications of its 
understanding of the proper distinction (and relationship) between Law and Gospel, 
13 Ibid., 244. 
14  "Whose Church? Which Future? Whither the Anabaptist Vision?" in IGC, 72. 
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between justification and sanctification, between grace and works, between personal faith 
and confession and congregational holiness and discipline. 
Even within the Lutheran tradition itself these concerns have surfaced in many 
and various ways.15 To cite just one well-known example, consider the words of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: 
[T]he outcome of the Reformation was the victory, not of Luther's perception of 
grace in all its purity and costliness, but of the vigilant religious instinct of man 
for the place where grace is to be obtained at the cheapest price. All that was 
needed was a subtle and almost imperceptible change of emphasis, and the 
damage was done.... Luther has said that grace alone can save; his followers took 
up his doctrine and repeated it word for word. But they left out its inevitable 
corollary, the obligation of discipleship. There was no need for Luther always to 
mention that corollary explicitly for he always spoke as one who had been led by 
grace to the strictest following of Christ. Judged by the standard of Luther's 
doctrine, that of his followers was unassailable, and yet their orthodoxy spelt the 
end and destruction of the Reformation as the revelation on earth of the costly 
grace of God. The justification of the sinner in the world degenerated into the 
justification of sin and the world. Costly grace was turned into cheap grace 
without discipleship.I6 
In his recent doctoral dissertation titled Virtue Ethics and the Place of Character 
Formation within Lutheran Theology, Joel Biermann bemoans the "atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust in the Lutheran church today," its "indifference or ambivalence"—
even "outright hostility"—to "concerns of Christian ethics."I7 He documents the way in 
which many contemporary Lutheran theologians are wrestling with the question of how 
to defend Lutheranism against the (too often justifiable) charge of separating doctrine 
from ethics and justification from sanctification, and to do so in a way that is consistent 
with the fundamental presuppositions of Lutheran theology. And he offers his 
IS These debates are reflected, of course, in the Book of Concord itself: e.g., FC N ("Good Works,"), V 
("Law and Gospel"), and VI ("Third Use of the Law"). 
16 The Cost of Discipleship, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1959), 53. 
17 Biermann, 2-3. 
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own (very helpful) insights regarding a Lutheran framework for maintaining and 
demonstrating the proper relationship between theology and ethics on the basis of 
Luther's understanding of the two (and/or three) kinds of righteousness and the 
relationship between God's threefold activity as summarized in the Creed. 
While we (quite obviously) cannot examine this topic in detail here, it deserves at 
least some attention in the context of this study because if the witness of the Lutheran 
church on war and peace is to be taken seriously (by Lutherans and by non-Lutherans), it 
must also be demonstrated that Lutherans take ethics truly seriously as both a theological 
and ecclesial issue. Although we can deal with this issue only very briefly and succinctly 
in the context of this study, we will attempt to point to resources within Luther's writings 
(as summarized in chapter three) that offer a foundation and framework for responding to 
Hauerwas's valid concern about the holiness and character of the church as an (if not 
the) essential aspect of its witness concerning war and peace. 
Constantinian Temptations in the Church's Witness to the World 
In his book Resident Aliens, Hauerwas draws on Yoder's distinction between the 
activist church, the conversionist church, and the confessing church, and in so doing 
offers insights that are applicable and meaningful not only to the contemporary church in 
general but also to the current state of affairs within the Lutheran tradition. 
The activist church [writes Hauerwas] is more concerned with the building of a 
better society than with the reformation of the church. Through the humanization 
of social structures, the activist church glorifies God. It calls on the members to 
see God at work behind the movements for social change so that Christians will 
join in movements for justice wherever they find them. It hopes to be on the right 
side of history, believing it has the key for reading the direction of history or 
underwriting the progressive forces of history. The difficulty...is that the activist 
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church appears to lack the theological insight to judge history for itself. Its 
politics becomes a sort of religiously glorified liberalism.18 
At the other end of the spectrum, continues Hauerwas, there is the conversionist church. 
This church argues that no amount of tinkering with the structures of society will 
counter the effects of human sin. The promises of secular optimism are therefore 
false because they attempt to bypass the biblical call to admit personal guilt and to 
experience reconciliation to God and neighbor. The sphere of political action is 
shifted by the conversionist church from without to within, from society to the 
individual soul. Because this church works only for inward change, it has no 
alternative social ethic or social structure of its own to offer the world. Alas, the 
political claims of Jesus are sacrificed for politics that inevitably seems to 
degenerate into a religiously glorified conservatism.I9 
There is, however (argues Hauerwas), a "radical alternative" to these two types of 
churches: 
The confessing church is not a synthesis of the other two approaches, a helpful 
middle ground. Rather, it is a radical alternative. Rejecting both the 
individualism of the conversionists and the secularism of the activists and their 
common equation of what works with what is faithful, the confessing church finds 
its main political task to lie, not in the personal transformation of individual hearts 
or the modification of society, but rather in the congregation's determination to 
worship Christ in all things.2°  
Hauerwas goes on to offer a concise summary of his understanding of the "church 
as polis," further distinguishing the "confessing church" from both the "conversionist 
church" and the "activist church:" 
The confessing church, like the conversionist church, also calls people to 
conversion, but it depicts that conversion as a long process of being baptismally 
engrafted into a new people, an alternative polis, a countercultural social structure 
called the church. It seeks to influence the world by being the church, that is, by 
being something the world is not and can never be, lacking the gift of faith and 
vision, which is ours in Christ. The confessing church seeks the visible church, a 
place, clearly visible to the world, in which people are faithful to their promises, 
love their enemies, tell the truth, honor the poor, suffer for righteousness, and 
thereby testify to the amazing community-creating power of God. The confessing 
church has no interest in withdrawing from the world, but it is not surprised when 
its witness evokes hostility from the world. The confessing church moves from 
18 RA, 45. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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the activist church's acceptance of culture with a few qualifications, to rejection 
of the culture with a few exceptions....This church knows that its most credible 
form of witness (and the most "effective" thing it can do for the world) is the 
actual creation of a living, breathing, visible community of faith.21 
Finally, Hauerwas links the character and witness of the confessing church to the work of 
Christ himself, especially to his central and culminating work on the cross: 
Yoder also notes that the confessing church will be a church of the cross. As 
Jesus demonstrated, the world, for all its beauty, is hostile to the truth. Witness 
without compromise leads to worldly hostility. The cross is not a sign of the 
church's quiet, suffering submission to the powers-that-be, but rather the church's 
revolutionary participation in the victory of Christ over those powers. The cross 
is not a symbol for general human suffering and oppression. Rather, the cross is a 
sign of what happens when one takes God's account of reality more seriously than 
Caesar's. The cross stands as God's (and our) eternal no to the powers of death, 
as well as God's eternal yes to humanity, God's remarkable determination not to 
leave us to our own devices.22 
Thus, "the overriding political task of the church is to be the community of the cross"23—
which for Hauerwas implies (of course) a radical commitment to resist submission to the 
fallen structures of this world by renouncing (and therefore exposing) its violent and 
coercive politics. 
We have had opportunity throughout this study, and especially in chapter two, to 
examine in some detail Hauerwas's view of the nature and mission of the confessing 
church, particularly (in view of the focus of our study) its uncompromising commitment 
to nonviolence because of the nonviolence of the cross and the necessary implications of 
that cross for the life of the church. Despite the fact that Hauerwas's description of the 
confessing church is dependent on certain assumptions that cannot finally be harmonized 
with historic Lutheran ecclesial and Christological presuppositions, Lutherans can and 
should agree that there is much that is true, insightful and instructive about his 
21 Ibid., 47-48. 
22 Ibid., 47. 
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description of the confessing church and his critique of the activist and conversionist 
churches—a critique that rings true in many ways when applied to the various 
manifestations of Lutheranism in today's world. 
In its report Render Unto Caesar... and Unto God: A Lutheran View of Church 
and State, the Commission on Theology and Church Relations of The Lutheran Church—
Missouri Synod offers evidence that supports much of what Hauerwas has to say about 
the characteristics and tendencies of both the activist and conversionist churches, as well 
as evidence that demonstrates their various Lutheran incarnations. 
In 1979, LCUSA adopted a statement on "The Nature of the Church and Its 
Relationship with Government," in which the role of the church in direct social 
action, long promoted by the LCA and accepted also by many in the ALC and 
LCMS, become the policy of LCUSA. The statement declared that "God also 
calls the church to be a creative critic of the social order, an advocate for the 
needy and distressed, a pioneer in developing and improving services through 
which care is offered and human dignity is enhanced, and a supportive voice for 
the establishment and maintenance of good order, justice and concord." The role 
of the church includes "informing persons about, advocating for and speaking 
publicly on issues and proposals related to social justice and human rights." 
Furthermore, the statement declared, "Advocacy on behalf of justice is an integral 
part of our churches' mission."24 
"Mission" defined as "advocacy," however, all too often results in the church 
taking on the role of political lobby, with church leaders playing the role of political 
spokespersons for the church: 
What some American Lutheran church bodies have done since World War II, in 
order to implement a more socially conscious two-kingdom ethic, is what most 
other American church bodies have done since then: establish a Washington 
lobby. A 1951 study identified 16 church offices operating in Washington and 
also surfaced a complaint that would eventually become commonplace: "In many 
cases...church lobbyists promote the causes in which church leaders are interested 
rather than the views of church members in general."25  
23 Ibid. 
24 Render, 50-51. 
25 Ibid., 59. 
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The formation of the ELCA in 1988, for example, included a well-staffed Washington-
based lobby with a plateful of advocacy issues on which it spoke (presumably) for the 
church: 
According to the June 1993 issue of The Lutheran, published by the ELCA, the 
following political concerns were being actively addressed by the ELCA's 
Lutheran Office of Government Affairs: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
expansion of the earned income credit, balanced budget amendments, American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendment, aid to Nicaragua, Violence Against 
Women Act of 1993, the Mickey Leland Childhood Hunger Relief Act of 1993, 
the Every Fifth Child Act, Civil Rights Amendments for Gay and Lesbian Civil 
Rights, opposing the death penalty, and expanding the definition of conscientious 
objection to include objection to specific wars. Clearly, this advocacy had moved 
a long way from [William] Lazareth's vision of teaching the state basic ethical 
principles.26 
No wonder Lutheran sociologist Peter Berger, voicing "the exasperation of many 
Americans who are faced with a flood of social and political statements issuing from 
church bodies and church leaders these days," asked the blunt question: "Why don't the 
churches just shut up?"27 
It is clear that for Hauerwas, however, "just shutting up" is not quite the solution 
either—particularly if it leads the kind of "conversionist quietism" described in Resident 
Aliens, a quietism that is often associated with the general approach of The Lutheran 
Church—Missouri Synod to the question of the church's witness to the state. While 
(according to Render Unto Caesar) some within the Missouri Synod since World War II 
have urged support for the increasingly activist approach adopted by the ELCA and its 
predecessor bodies—even while others have advocated a more conservative activist 
approach modeled after the "New Christian Right," "the Moral Majority," and various 
Reformed, fundamentalist and evangelical groups and churches—the basic attitude and 
26 Ibid., 48. 
27 Render, 62. 
298 
strategy of the LCMS over the years (at least on an institutional level) has tended more 
toward the "conversionist" or "regenerationist" approach articulated by Carl Mundinger: 
Keeping strictly within her sphere, the Church must put forth every effort 
that the nation within whose boundaries she exists become more and more 
permeated with the principles of social life laid down in the Word of God, 
the principles of righteousness, of justice, of tolerance and forbearance, of 
mutual helpfulness and co-operation. 
She must do this not by futile efforts to control legislation or to direct 
the administration of government, but by laboring patiently and persistently 
to increase the number of those within the nation whose hearts have 
been regenerated by the Spirit of God and whose lives are directed by that 
Spirit. Not by invading political assemblies, but by entering the pulpit with 
an emphatic and convincing proclamation of the whole Gospel of Christ 
can the Church make a real contribution to the political well-being of our 
nation. The fact that the State and the Church are two separate and distinct 
organisms, that they have two separate and distinct spheres of influence, 
does not imply that they should assume an attitude of complete indifference 
toward each other; on the contrary, a mutual friendly recognition and 
a readiness on the part of each (within the limitations of its own scope and 
sphere) to aid and serve the other is indispensable to the peace and prosperity 
of both.28  
From Hauerwas's perspective, the basic problem with both of these approaches is 
that they inevitably result in different but equally dangerous and unfaithful kinds of 
Constantinianism. The activist approach is Constantinian in that it places the church into 
the role of "policing society" and "controlling history" and trying to make sure 
"everything turns out all right," even if this means (as Hauerwas believes it inevitably 
will and does mean) compromising, neglecting or even contradicting the true message 
and mission of the church as conveyed and constituted by the cross of Christ. The 
conversionist approach is Constantinian in the sense that it abdicates its proper 
(Christological!) role of resisting the demands of fealty and loyalty placed upon it by the 
"powers that be," and simply assumes that government, as an entity "instituted by God," 
28 Ibid., 74. 
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merits the Christian's unquestioning submission and obedience so long as it allows the 
church to go about its business of "converting sinners." Or, to the extent that the 
government fails to conduct itself along the lines of God's design in Romans 13, the 
conversionist church adopts a quietism based more on eschatological aspirations than on 
"first article" convictions about the God-given role of government, and so is content to 
retreat to its sanctuaries and take refuge in the other-worldly hope expressed in the time-
honored (Lutheran) hymn: "I'm But a Stranger Here, Heaven is My Home." 
Like Hauerwas, Render Unto Caesar recognizes the danger and fallacy of both 
those extremes, and proposes a middle way between them, based largely on the 
paradoxical vision of Lutheran ethicist Robert Benne rooted in the Lutheran 
understanding of the two realms.29 Benne's vision is (not surprisingly) different than 
Hauerwas's in significant ways because of their differing Christological and ecclesial 
assumptions. But the fact that they share common concerns and convictions about the 
dangers of the extremes on both sides offers at least some hope for fruitful conversation 
(and perhaps even cooperation) in certain areas relating to the church's witness in and to 
society. In the following section we will offer our own suggestions regarding the 
challenges Lutherans face and the contributions they are equipped (at least theologically) 
to make to the question of the church's witness in and to the world on issues of war and 
peace in view of the valid concerns of Hauerwas summarized above. 
Lutheran Challenges and Contributions 
The Character and Conduct of the Church As "Holy Community" 
In his essay "The Lutheran Difference," Reformed scholar Mark Noll argues that 
29 See "The Failure of Two Extremes" in Render, 55ff.; cf. Benne's book The Paradoxical Vision. 
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"Lutherans have something to say to a Christian people shaped by this American history" 
that places so much emphasis on individualism, volunteerism and personal activism. 
What they have to say, according to Noll, "involves central affirmations of the 
Reformation"—foremost among them Lutheran ecclesiology, with its emphasis on the 
church as God's creation, through which God works in ways that stand in marked 
contrast to the manipulative, deceptive, self-centered ways of the world. 
What Noll does not mention in his article is that, unfortunately, Luther's radical 
teachings on justification by faith and on the "priesthood of all believers"—which stand 
at the center of his Christologically-shaped ecclesiology—have often been misunderstood 
and misconstrued as fostering the sort of religious individualism and ethical subjectivism 
that theologians like Hauerwas so strongly (and rightly) condemn. As harshly as 
Bonhoeffer criticizes the followers of Luther for their failure to recognize and emphasize 
the necessary connection between radical grace and radical discipleship, just as 
emphatically he praises Luther himself for seeing and stressing this connection: 
Luther had taught that man cannot stand before God, however religious his works 
and ways may be, because at bottom he is always seeking his own interests. In 
the depth of his misery, Luther had grasped by faith the free and unconditional 
forgiveness of all his sins. That experience taught him that this grace had cost 
him his very life, and must continue to cost him the same price day by day. So far 
from dispensing him from discipleship, this grace only made him a more earnest 
disciple. When he spoke of grace, Luther always implied as a corollary that it 
cost him his own life, the life which was now for the first time subjected to the 
absolute obedience of Christ. Only so could he speak of grace.3°  
Therefore, insists Bonhoeffer: 
It is a fatal misunderstanding of Luther's action to suppose that his rediscovery of 
the gospel of pure grace offered a general dispensation from obedience to the 
command of Jesus, or that it was the great discovery of the Reformation that 
God's forgiving grace automatically conferred upon the world both righteousness 
and holiness. On the contrary, for Luther the Christian's worldly calling is 
3° Cost of Discipleship, 53. 
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sanctified only in so far as that calling registers the final, radical protest against 
the world.31  
"It was not the justification of sin," says Bonhoeffer, "but the justification of the sinner 
that drove Luther from the cloister back into the world:" 
The grace he had received was costly grace. It was grace, for it was like water on 
parched ground, comfort in tribulation, freedom from the bondage of a self-
chosen way, and forgiveness of all his sins. And it was costly for, so far from 
dispensing him from good works, it meant that he must take the call to 
discipleship more seriously than ever before. It was grace because it cost so 
much, and it cost so much because it was grace. That was the secret of the gospel 
of the Reformation—the justification of the sinner.32 
In a similar way, Paul Althaus seeks to clarify Luther's teaching on the priesthood 
of all believers: 
The priesthood means: We stand before God, pray for others, intercede with and 
sacrifice ourselves to God and proclaim the Word to one another. Luther never 
understands the priesthood of all believers merely in the "Protestant" sense of the 
Christian's freedom to stand in a direct relationship to God without a human 
mediator. Rather he constantly emphasizes the Christian's evangelical authority 
to come before God on behalf of the brethren and also of the world. The 
universal priesthood expresses not religious individualism but its exact opposite, 
the reality of the congregation as community.33  
Bonhoeffer's book Life Together is a classic example of how the theological resources 
exist also in the Lutheran tradition—based on a full and proper understanding of Luther's 
Christ-centered ecclesiology—for discovering, defending and displaying "the reality of 
the congregation as community." 
Christianity means community through Jesus Christ and in Jesus Christ. No 
Christian community is more or less than this. Whether it be a brief, single 
encounter or the daily fellowship of years, Christian community is only this. We 
belong to one another only in and through Jesus Christ.34 
31 Ibid., 52. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, 314. 
34 Life Together, trans. John W. Doberstein (San Fransisco: Harper and Row, 1954), 21. 
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Just as God's righteousness in Christ is an "alien righteousness" that comes to us from 
"outside of ourselves" (extra nos), so also "the Christian needs another Christian who 
speaks God's Word to him" from outside of himself, "for by himself he cannot help 
himself; " "he needs his brother as a bearer and proclaimer of the divine word of 
salvation." Fellowship in the body of Christ, the church, therefore, "is founded solely 
upon Jesus Christ and this 'alien righteousness.'"35 Later in the book, Bonhoeffer 
discusses the Christ-like virtues—meekness, helpfulness, forgiveness, burden-bearing, 
etc. that we learn from each other and teach each other in the life and practices of the 
church as "holy community" in Christ. 
Lutheran theologian Reinhard Htitter has persuasively argued that Lutherans can 
learn from and build on Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics in ways that conform well to historic, 
authentic Lutheran ecclesiology and its own particular understanding of "the 
congregation as holy community."36 Summarizing first the views of Hauerwas, Hatter 
notes that Hauerwas avoids describing the church in purely sociological terms or 
primarily on the basis of purely theological terms (e.g, "the community of saints") which, 
at least in their traditional usage, often fail to denote the crucial ethical dimension of the 
church's life and character. 
Instead, he combines the strengths of both by asking theologically for those 
concrete activities and practices which mark the church as church. Where these 
marks are found (the "notae ecclesiae") the church is found. In addition to those 
marks of the church which we know from the Confessio Augustana, the preached 
Word and the two sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper, Hauerwas adds 
the life of the Christians as a third mark. Here his United Methodist background 
plays a definite role. [Later in the article, Hiitter also comments on the influence 
of Yoder's Anabaptist ecclesiology.] But we should take Hauerwas' point 
seriously on theological grounds, especially since we find the Christian life to be a 
35 Ibid., 23. 
36 See, e.g., Reinhard Hater, "The Ecclesial Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas," Dialog 30:3 (Summer 1991), 
231-241. 
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mark of the church in Luther's late ecclesiology found in his treatise "On 
Councils and Churches."37 
In a way that is "similar to Luther," says Hater, 
Hauerwas understands the marks of the church as specific activities which the 
church is called to perform, and by which the church can be recognized as the 
church. These activities are the reason for talking about the church's "ethical 
character." They are the starting point for unfolding the basic tautological 
statement "The church is called to be the church."38 
For Luther as for Hauerwas, argues Hiitter, the marks of preaching, baptism, the 
Lord's Supper (and, we might add, absolution) must be understood as more than mere 
"doctrinal truths" or "pastoral rites," but as concrete activities that involve the entire 
worshipping community, and that presuppose and foster a specifically Christian way of 
life, a particular set of habits and practices that set the church apart from the world. 
Although the language is markedly different than Luther's, it is certainly possible to 
affirm in a way that is consistent with Luther's theology Hauerwas's statement that 
preaching and the administration of the sacraments "are the essential rituals of our 
politics." "Through them we learn who we are. Instead of being motives or causes of 
effective social work on the part of Christian people, these liturgies are our effective 
social work."39 These practices serve to create the "holiness" ("character," "virtues") 
that, for Hauerwas, constitute the "third mark" of the church. Thus, observes Hiitter, 
there is a "circular flow" to Hauerwas's argument: "the virtues are acquired and trained in 
the worship activity and the life of the church and then sustain and pattern again the 
worship service and the practices of the church."4°  
37 "Ecclesial Ethics," 233; cf. Luther's "On the Councils and the Church," LW 41, 3-178. 
38 Ibid. 
39 PK, 108. 
40 "Ecclesial Ethics," 235. 
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Although Hiitter admits that Hauerwas "often does not do enough to guard his 
work against [the] misunderstanding" that the visible church can simply be identified 
with some idealized form of the empirical church, still he insists that: 
The (as I have to admit rather hidden) strength of Hauerwas's ethical reflection 
upon the church is that he avoids the problematic distinction between an ideal and 
an empirical church, between a theological concept which does not relate to 
reality and a reality which is to be understood on primarily non-theological, i.e., 
sociological grounds. What he does instead is to take the concrete visible church 
communities theologically seriously by reminding them parenetically of their call 
as church....His "ethical ecclesiology" turns out to be nothing else than a 
parenetical reminder of the church's call to witness through its form and activity 
to God's story in and through Jesus Christ.41  
The challenge for Lutherans, says Hiitter, is "to discuss this exegesis [of the church] 
critically and accept or dismiss it on theological grounds." 
And if we as Lutherans take Eph. 2:8-10 seriously and relate it critically to 
Hauerwas's "ethical ecclesiology," we should learn from it without getting 
trapped by a few pitfalls. Eph. 2:8-10 says: "For by grace you have been saved 
by faith, and this is not of your own doing, it is the gift of God—not because of 
works, lest any person should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in 
Jesus Christ for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should 
walk in them." This is the key to understanding rightly the call of the church 
without falling into the trap of works-righteousness. The works we are called to 
perform are already prepared by God. We are giving ourselves into them by 
being faithful to our cal1.42 
How does all of this relate to Hauerwas's understand of the necessarily pacifist 
calling and character of the church? Hiitter suggests that 
Hauerwas' concept can be read in many ways: as an ethics of character and virtue, 
as a pacifist ethics, or as a consequently Methodist ethics of sanctification. In all 
of these approaches there is some truth, but these readings, I contend, remain 
peripheral; they do not hit the mark. At the very core we find the theological 
insight that Christian ethics properly has to start its reflection with the church and 
its call—not creation in general, not the orders in general, not anthropology in 
general, but rather creation as we get to know it through God the Creator, who is 
revealed first and for all time as the one who redeems and calls into the 
community of faith, orders and patterns in the world as we get to know them 
41 Ibid., 240. 
42 Mid. 
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through the God who calls his community to be a particular and specific one, 
responsible to its call, and the human being as the one who encounters God's 
justifying and sanctifying activity.43  
We have focused in this study, of course, on Hauerwas's pacifist convictions and 
on the Christological and ecclesial presuppositions underlying those convictions. We 
have come to the conclusion that insofar as there is a necessary and inseparable 
connection between Hauerwas's specific understanding of the peaceable nature of 
Christ's work and the peaceable character of the church, his pacifist views cannot be 
reconciled with the just-war thinking of Luther and of historic Lutheranism. Hauerwas 
himself, we have observed, maintains that this is the case. It does not necessarily follow, 
however, that Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics as a whole can simply be equated with or 
reduced to his specific pacifist convictions. It only means (not to minimize the 
significance of the qualifier "only!") that Hauerwas's pacifism is a critical and 
inseparable aspect of his own understanding of the social and political nature of Christ's 
work as embodied in the church. This fact, of course, can easily be understated or 
overstated—and neither way of stating the case does justice to Hauerwas or offers a fair 
and proper basis for meaningful and constructive dialog. Hatter is correct, however, in 
pointing out that Hauerwas's ecclesial ethics, properly understood, is not merely a pacifist 
ethics but also encompasses and encourages broader reflection on the church as a 
radically unique and alternative community in the world and its call to be faithful to God 
the Creator through its witness to his saving activity in Christ. That means that Hiitter is 
also correct in maintaining that there is much in Hauerwas' ecclesiology from which 
Lutherans can learn and which they can build on in ways that are consistent with historic 
Lutheran theology—despite honest and important disagreements about its implications 
43 Ibid. 
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for the precise nature of the "peaceable witness" of the church. In fact, the observations 
offered in chapter five about the way in which the Lutheran perspective on God's work 
through both war and peace is reflected and inculcated in the liturgical and catechetical 
life of the church stand as evidence in support of this conclusion. 
At the same time, we also need to be honest (as is Hatter) about aspects of 
Hauerwas's ecclesiology that we as Lutherans cannot simply affirm. These include not 
only his view of the necessarily pacifist character of the church's witness, but also "the 
very weak and almost absent pneumatology in Hauerwas' ecclesiology," "the fact that 
Hauerwas "does not seem to emphasize enough that the call of the church to witness is 
one aspect of its freedom from works," and (perhaps most significantly) "a lack in 
properly addressing the question of the eschatological hiddenness of the church—as the 
visible church."'" In the context of our study, this latter point is especially important. 
There is simply no way around the fact that "to remove the fundamental hiddenness of 
the church and to substitute faith for sight—this was for Luther the basic error of the 
Roman view of the church, a view that recurs with a new twist among the Enthusiasts in 
their ideal of the pure community."45  
Luther, on the contrary, saw the church essentially as "a community or assembly 
of the saints in faith" and as such "something very much hidden...so that no one 
can know it or see it. It must be grasped and believed exclusively on the basis of 
Baptism, sacrament, and Word." This "faith-oriented concept of the hidden 
church" which alone does justice to the New Testament reality of the church as 
the body of Christ [is] the chief accent in Luther's understanding of the church. 
This is true even in the light of certain shifts in emphasis which were possible for 
him within this fundamental view.46 
" Ibid., 240-241. 
45 Hans-Werner Gensichen, We Condemn: How Luther and le Century Lutheranism Condemned False 
Doctrine, trans. Herbert J. A. Bouman (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1967), 55. 
" Ibid. 
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As Althaus points out, the theology of the cross—which, as we discussed, is so crucial for 
understanding Luther's view of the hidden work of God in the world through violent acts 
of apparent cruelty—"also determines Luther's view of the church." 
The true church of Christ cannot be identified with the historical institution which 
calls itself the church and with its errors, sins, divisions, and heresies. Rather the 
true church is hidden under this empirical reality.... The earthly appearance of the 
church is an offense: "The devil can cover it over with offenses and divisions, so 
that you have to take offense at it. God too can conceal it behind faults and 
shortcomings of all kinds, so that you necessarily become a fool and pass false 
judgment on it. Christendom will not be known by sight, but by faith. And faith 
has to do with things not seen."'" 
One of the "shifts in emphasis" in Luther's ecclesiology (noted by Gensichen 
above) is the one to which Htitter also refers in noting Luther's inclusion of such 
elements as Christian holiness, cross-bearing, and the exercise of church discipline 
(including excommunication) as true "marks of the church" in his 1539 essay "On the 
Councils and the Church."48 But this must not be seen as a radical departure from 
Luther's understanding of the essential hiddenness of the church. Outward holiness and 
church discipline are not viewed by Luther as infallible marks by which the church can 
be judged to be present (or absent) in a given place, but as necessary fruits—outward 
signs—of the "faith alone" that constitutes membership in the church. Although "we 
must constantly grow in sanctification and always become new creatures in Christ," says 
Luther, 
...these signs cannot be regarded as being as reliable as those noted before [the 
Word and Sacraments] since some heathen too practice these works and indeed at 
times appear holier than Christians; yet their actions do not issue from the heart 
purely and simply, for the sake of God, but they search for some other end 
because they lack a real faith in and true knowledge of God.49 
47 Theology of Martin Luther, 321; cf. LW 35, 410. 
48 See LW 41, 143-167. 
49 "On the Councils and the Church," 166-167. 
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Thus the Word and Sacraments—the means by which God creates this faith—are always 
for Luther the only truly reliable and infallible marks of the church's presence and 
existence in the world . 
At the same time, as Bonhoeffer strongly and rightly emphasizes, these fruits of 
obedience and discipleship in response to God's liberating grace in Christ were taken 
extremely seriously by Luther. This is quite evident also—as we have noted 
repeatedly—in his writings on war and peace. Luther refused to tolerate any easy 
dismissal or compromising qualification of the clear words of Christ with regard to sinful 
participation in violence, no matter what form such dismissal or compromise might take 
place. Luther vowed to expend his last breath, if necessary, to "strip the name Christian" 
from those who, like the peasants, would engage in unjustified violence "in the name of 
Christ and for the sake of the Gospel:" "So long as there is a heartbeat in my body, I shall 
do all I can, through speaking and writing to take that name away from you."5° Such 
unjustified violence, says Luther, actually defames the name of Christ, contradicts his 
Gospel, and ignores the clear example (which Christians are bound to follow when 
unjustly persecuted for their faith) of Christ's willing and passive suffering on the cross: 
Christians do not fight for themselves with sword and musket, but with the cross 
and with suffering, just as Christ, our leader, does not bear a sword, but hangs on 
a cross. Your victory, therefore, does not consist in conquering and reigning, or 
in the use of force, but in defeat and weakness, as St. Paul says in II Corinthians 1 
[10:4], "The weapons of our warfare are not material, but are the strength which 
comes from God."51  
Luther applies the same sharp language and strong verdict to the pope and to 
50 Admonition to Peace, 32. 
51 ibid. 
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emperors and princes who sought to justify war "for the sake of Christ's kingdom." 
[W]hat motivated me [to respond] most of all was this: They undertook to fight 
against the Turk in the name of Christ, and taught and incited men to do this, as 
though our people were an army of Christians against the Turks, who were 
enemies of Christ. This is absolutely contrary to Christ's doctrine and name. It is 
against his doctrine because he says that Christians shall not resist evil, fight, or 
quarrel, nor take revenge or insist on rights [Matt. 5:39].52 
Besides, says Luther, "there are scarcely five Christians in such an army, and perhaps 
there are worse people in the eyes of God in that army than are the Turks; and yet they 
want to bear the name of Christ."53  
This is the greatest of all sins and is one that no Turk commits, for Christ's name 
is used for sin and shame and thus dishonored. This would be especially so if the 
pope and the bishops were involved in the war, for they would bring the greatest 
shame and dishonor to Christ's name because they are called to fight against the 
devil with the Word of God and with prayer, and they would be deserting their 
calling and office to fight with the sword against flesh and blood. They are not 
commanded to do this; it is forbidden.54 
Such strong rebukes belie Verduin's assertion that Luther was willing to acknowledge as 
Christians (in crass Constantinian fashion) all those within a certain community who 
were baptized and called themselves Christians. On the contrary, he demanded evidence 
of faith in the form of a Christian's willingness to obey the clear commands of Christ—
including his clear commands regarding justified and unjustified violence. 
Luther repeatedly reminds both pastors and the church as a whole of their true—
and utterly unique—calling in this world: to bear witness to Christ, his cross, and the 
salvation he accomplished, even if (as we should expect) this calling and witness means 
sharing in Christ's cross and suffering. 
O how gladly Christ would receive me at the Last Judgment if, when summoned 
to the spiritual office to preach and care for souls, I had left it and busied myself 
52 On War Against the Turk, 165. 
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54 Ibid. 
310 
with fighting and with the temporal sword! Why should Christ or his people have 
anything to do with the sword and going to war, and kill men's bodies, when he 
declared that he has come to save the world, not to kill people [John 3:17]? His 
work is to deal with the gospel and to redeem men from sin and death by his 
Spirit to help them from this world to everlasting life....in the garden he bade 
Peter to put up his sword and said, "All who take the sword will perish by the 
sword" [Matt. 26:52].55  
This does not mean (Luther hastens to add) "that worldly rulers ought not be Christians, 
or that a Christian cannot bear the sword and serve God in temporal government. Would 
to God they were all Christians, or that no one could be a prince unless he were a 
Christian!" "But what I want to do," says Luther, "is keep a distinction between the 
callings and offices, so that everyone can see to what God has called him and fulfill the 
duties of his office faithfully and sincerely in the service of God."56 
This reference of Luther to the "distinctions between callings and offices" 
provides occasion to discuss in a more focused way the fact that the social and political 
dimension of the Christian witness inevitably takes on a different emphasis in the thought 
of Luther than it does in the thought of Hauerwas. Because of Hauerwas's understanding 
of the inherently social and political nature of Christ's nonviolent resistance on the cross, 
the Christian witness to that cross must also (for Hauerwas) find its primary expression in 
a social and political form—namely, in the form of the church. As we have emphasized, 
the church as the community of saints also plays a vital role in Luther's thought. For 
Luther, however, one of the primary purposes of the church—by means of its Christ-
centered worship, teaching and fellowship—is to form, equip and strengthen Christians 
for their re-entry into the world to bear witness through their various and diverse 
Christian vocations in the world. The church surely exists in the world as a unique 
55 Ibid., 165-166. 
56 Ibid., 166. 
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community and contrasting model of the true peace and holiness that Christ alone came 
to bring; but the true nature of this peace and holiness (as discussed above) is always 
largely hidden from the world. In a very real sense, therefore, the most direct, 
meaningful, and effective witness that the church can give in and to the world comes in 
the form of the (visible and manifest) love shown by Christians to all people (including 
their enemies) as they exercise their God-given vocations in the world. It is here that 
they display before the world their righteousness of works and Spirit-given virtues (of 
kindness, patience, forgiveness, etc.)—works and virtues that flow (in a way that is 
always ultimately hidden to human discernment) from the righteousness received as a gift 
through faith in the work of Christ on the cross. 
In this connection, a number of Lutheran theologians have recently emphasized 
that a true return to the thought of Luther when it comes to the issue of Christian ethics 
and the sanctified Christian life involves more than a narrow focus on the distinction 
between Law and Gospel, with its dynamic of the accusatory function of the Law, the 
gracious word of forgiveness, and the response of faith in the form of obedience to the 
Law. For as soon as one begins to obey, the Law inevitably and immediately begins once 
again to accuse—and so the cycle continues (centered always in forgiveness as the 
ultimate outcome or goal), with rather uncertain implications for encouraging, discussing 
or conceptualizing concrete and consistent ethical behavior. A better framework (or at 
least one that must be seen as a necessary complement to Luther's ethical thought), it has 
been suggested, is Luther's concept of the two kinds of righteousness. 
We noted earlier Hater's observation that for Hauerwas "Christian ethics 
properly has to start its reflection with the church and its call," that is, with "creation as 
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we get to know it through God the Creator, who is revealed first and for all time as the 
one who redeems and calls into the community of faith," and "who calls his community 
to be a particular and specific one."57 The doctrine of creation also plays a crucial role in 
Luther's ecclesial ethics, but with a different emphasis. The God who created both 
church and world calls the members of his radically new creation in the church to identify 
themselves also with the larger human community in the world and to represent him in 
that very community through acts of Christ-like love and service. God created human 
beings to trust him, and in this way to receive the saving passive righteousness (or 
"vertical righteousness") based on the perfect work of Christ alone. However, 
God also created human beings to serve Him, not just by acknowledging His 
goodness, Luther insisted, but also be representing Him in the delivery of mutual 
care and concern within the human community. Fundamental to Luther's 
understanding of the Biblical teaching of creation was his conviction that God had 
made human beings in and for community with one another. God had so 
structured human life that he made individual human beings not only stand in 
relationship to Him in vertical dependence but also to associate with other human 
beings in horizontal inter-dependence. God generally comes to meet human 
beings behind His chosen "masks," that is, other people who care for those in 
need.58  
For Luther, therefore, "the situations and responsibilities which structure human life are 
part of the doctrine of creation"—not just God's creation of the church, but his 
continuing work of creation in preserving and sustaining the world in which the church 
exists and carries out its God-given work and witness. 
God places all people, not just Christians, in these situations; He assigns all 
people these responsibilities. Only those who trust in Him, however, recognize 
His hand in the construction of their situations. Only those who recognize His 
lordship perceive that their responsibilities are personal assignments from God. 
Luther used the word "calling" (Beruf) for the assignments of daily life as the 
Christian perceives and practices them. The Christian's calling is externally 
57 Ecclesial Ethics," 240. 
58  Robert Kolb, "God Calling, 'Take Care of My People': Luther's Concept of Vocation in the Augsburg 
Confession and Its Apology," Concordia Journal 8:1 (January 1982), 5. 
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identical to the responsibilities assigned to others, to non-Christian parents or 
butchers or jury members. The structure which guides the exercise of these 
responsibilities is the same. What differentiates the Christian's exercise of his 
calling from the non-Christian's practice of his responsibilities is the faith which 
motivates the Christian. The vertical relationship with God, the trust which 
recognizes God's love and lordship, impinges on and controls the horizontal 
relationships in which that faith now perceives God's calling and command. 
Christ's righteousness, the righteousness of our vertical relationship, inspires and 
produces our own righteousness, the righteous activity of our horizontal 
relationships.59 
Luther's distinction between these two kinds of righteousness, therefore, 
"recognizes and rests upon Christ's observation that human life consists of two kinds of 
relationship, one with the author and creator of life, the other with all creatures (Matt. 
22:37-39)."60 
God's human creatures are right—really human—in their vertical relationship 
because their faith embraces the God who loves them through Jesus Christ with 
the reckless trust of total dependence and reliance on him which constitutes their 
identity. They are right—really human—in their horizontal relationship with 
God's other creatures when they live a life which is active in reflecting his love 
through the deeds that deliver his care and concern. Two spheres and kinds of 
relationship demand two different ways of being right or righteous.61  
As different as these two kinds of righteousness are, however, they are also inseparable, 
since they are both ultimately rooted not only in God's work of creation but also in Christ 
and his work on the cross. 
Human life is of one piece, not divided into separate or separable spheres of 
scared and profane. Human life is cruciform—eyes lifted to focus on God, feet 
firmly planted on his earth, arms stretched out in mutual support of those God has 
placed around us. Having the focus of our lives directed toward Christ inevitably 
extends our arms to our neighbors.62 
59 Ibid., 6. 
6°  Robert Kolb, "Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness; Reflections on His Two-Dimensional 
Definition of Humanity at the Heart of His Theology," Lutheran Quarterly 13:4 (Winter 1999), 452. 
61 Ibid., 453. 
62 /bid., 453-454. 
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Since both kinds of righteousness are rooted in Christ's completely unique and 
completely sufficient work for us on the cross—the true meaning of which is hidden from 
human reason and experience—"faith" or "trust" (rather than "obedience" or "imitation") 
is always (for Luther) "the operative word:" 
Trust defines the new creature's identity as a child of God. Passive righteousness 
is the trust which embraces the loving Father and throws itself upon him. Just as 
that was true in the Garden [of Eden], until doubt broke through and broke down 
the relationship of trust in God, so it becomes true as Christ's word of love draws 
trust back to God in the human creatures that word re-creates....That trust, 
directed toward the Crucified and Risen God, is the righteousness of Eden, 
restored and revivified, ready to advertise its identity in the performance of 
activities suitable for God's children.63  
As Luther emphasizes in The Large Catechism (cf. the discussion in chapter 
three), the faith that is so crucial to our service to God and all of his children in the world 
is created, sustained, nourished, formed and strengthened in and through God's work in 
the Christian community—through the Christ-centered and cross-centered worship, 
teaching, preaching, receiving and sharing of God's gifts in the church: 
"Lutheran" faith goes to work—in confidence that the God who is present in 
Word and Sacrament creating faith is also present in human lives which operate 
responsibly in the horizontal relationships which God has designed for carrying 
out His will, for delivering His care and concern, in this world. Faith relies solely 
on God's promise that our vertical relationship is secure in His hands, the pierced 
hands of the God who died and came back from the dead. Faith recognizes that 
the Christian life is a life which has died to sin in Baptism and risen to new life in 
Christ as it emerges from the baptismal water. Faith is supremely confident that 
this water drowns the sinner and gives life to him as a babe in God's arms. Faith 
recognizes that the Lord who gave His body on the cross incorporates His people 
into Himself through the Holy Supper, of which He is both meal and chef. Faith 
recognizes that the God who created all reality with the word, "Let there be,"—
and there was—still sustains His people through His presence in His recreative 
Word of promise, spoken in the Word made flesh.64 
63 Ibid., 465. 
64 "God Calling," 10. 
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This faith created in baptism and nourished in Word and sacrament sends us back out into 
the world, to serve God our neighbor in whatever callings God (in his wisdom and 
mercy) has assigned to us. These callings becomes the very means, or "masks," through 
which God accomplishes his work in the world: 
Faith fmds its sphere of activities in the horizontal relationships which the Creator 
established as His own means of being present through the love of His people. 
Faith serves God by performing well those economic tasks which feed, clothe, 
and comfort others; faith's service in the economic sphere extends to support and 
help given to fellow workers and to all with whom we have contact on the job, in 
school, as we conduct our business and offer our labor. Faith serves God by 
meeting the needs of neighbors and fellow citizens in activities ranging from 
painting the neighbor's fence or mopping up his vomit as he lies dying, to 
participation in the activities of community organizations and political parties. 
Faith serves God by teaching and ushering and painting at the church building as 
well as by singing hymns of praise and sharing the message of Christ across the 
assembly line or the garden fence.65  
And faith also serves God, Luther was convinced, through the vocation of soldier or "just 
warrior": the "office of those who are gifted and equipped to be used as "God's hand" 
and "God's instrument" in God's strange and wrathful work of restraining and punishing 
those who seek to stir up strife and wreak havoc and chaos in the world. This strange and 
alien work always has as its loving and merciful purpose the maintenance of peace, the 
preservation of order, and the sustenance of God's creation, which remains (until the Last 
Day) the context in which God's holy community, the church, bears witness to God's 
love in Christ.66 
65 lbtd., 11. 
66 For further discussion of Luther's concept of the "two kinds of righteousness," see Charles P. Arand, 
"Two Kinds of Righteousness as a Framework for Law and Gospel in the Apology," Lutheran Quarterly 
XV (2001), 417-439; also Arand's (unpublished) essay, "Our Theology: Two Types of Righteousness." 
See also Biermann's dissertation referred to earlier, which draws on Luther's further distinction between 
the "three kinds of righteousness" (two of which apply only to Christians by virtue of their "vertical" 
relationship to God and their "horizontal" relationship to their neighbors, and one of which applies also to 
non-Christians by virtue of their ability to perform acts of "civil righteousness." 
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Constantinian Temptations in the Church's Witness to the World 
In the closing pages of The Politics of Jesus Yoder speaks of the closing days of 
an era, the passing of which may seem regrettable to many Christians but which (he 
suggests) may actually portend a new and desperately-needed recognition of the church's 
true nature and radical calling in its relationship to the world: 
Perhaps Christians in our age are being made ready for a new awareness of the 
continuing relevance of the message of the Apocalypse. There is a widespread 
recognition that Western society is moving toward the collapse of the mentality 
that has been identified with Christendom. Christians must recognize that they 
are a minority not only on the globe but also at home in the midst of followers of 
non-Christian and post-Christian faiths. Perhaps this will prepare us to see how 
inappropriate and preposterous was the prevailing assumption, from the time of 
Constantine until yesterday, that the fundamental responsibility of the church for 
society is to manage 167 
Earlier in this chapter we discussed various trends within American Lutheranism that 
manifest this tendency to take on characteristics of what Hauerwas called "the activist 
church." We noted that such tendencies can be found within Lutheranism both sides of 
the theological and political spectrum, patterned either along the lines of a Niebuhrian 
liberal Protestant social activism or along the lines of a Puritan-Reformed conservative 
evangelical political program. We voiced our agreement with Hauerwas that in either 
case the very real danger exists for the church to lose sight of its unique theological 
identity, to qualify and compromise its ultimate loyalty to God for the sake of its 
responsibility to the world, and to forsake its true calling to serve as the one and only 
witness to the world of the radical and revolutionary love of God revealed in Jesus Christ 
and his cross and exemplified in the community of the cross. 
67 PJ, 248. 
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We have also observed that, unfortunately (but perhaps not surprisingly), 
contemporary Lutheran attitudes toward war and peace often appear to be rooted in one 
or the other of these Constantinian perspectives. In his essay on "On the Viability of the 
Just War Theory" Paul Jersild observes that: 
Eckehart Lorenz, secretary for social studies in the Lutheran World Federation's 
Department of Studies, argues that on the basis of documents emanating from the 
LWF, from Lutheran churches, and from several Lutheran theologians, there is a 
new "Lutheran peace ethic" emerging in our time, one that needs more explicit 
formulation. These statements and writings reflect the conviction that in the 
nuclear age war is no longer an acceptable way of defending our rights and 
freedoms. The just war criteria are not to be applied to determine which 
anticipated war may be just....Rather, the purpose of the just war criteria now 
should be to establish the impossibility of "meaningful" warfare in the presence of 
nuclear weaponry.68  
"Striving for peace," says Jersild, "is not primarily a matter of military strategizing but a 
political, social, and economic task" in which the church must be intimately involved, as 
it seeks to make clear on the basis of the just war theory itself "the total unacceptableness 
of nuclear warfare."69 
Jersild speaks of striving for peace as a "political, social, and economic task;" 
Hauerwas would no doubt ask: "What about the church's theological task in bearing 
witness to the peace that Jesus demonstrated in his life and in his death?" Not 
insignificantly, Jesus is mentioned only twice in Jersild's essay, once in connection with 
his (one-sentence) summary of Bainton's work and once in connection with his 
questioning of Ramsey's assertion that just war theory originates from "Jesus' ethic of 
love."" We recall Hauerwas's judgment concerning the fact that: 
Christians, we have been told recently, should work for peace. But what good is a 
peace movement that works for peace for the same idolatrous reasons we build 
68 PWJT, 77. 
69 PJWT, 78; 86. 
70 Ibid., 70-71. 
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bombs—namely, the anxious self-interested protection of our world as it is? ... 
Our hope is based not on Caesar's missiles or Caesar's treaties, but on the name 
of the Lord who made heaven and earth. People often work for peace out of the 
same anxieties and perverted views of reality that lead people to build bombs.71  
It seems safe to assume that Hauerwas would respond to Jersild's nuclear pacifism in 
much the same way that he responds to the nuclear pacifism of the United Methodist 
Bishops in their statement "In Defense of Creation:" 
One cannot help but think the Bishops are trying to slip in a Jonathan Schell-like 
argument—namely, since war continues to protect a nation's right to build nuclear 
weapons, then war (and nations, according to Schell) must go. This is clearly 
utopianism, but even at that it is not pacifism, much less Christian pacifism. 
Rather it presupposes that if we could eliminate nuclear weapons then war might 
again be a viable institution.... The peace that is sought is not the peace that has 
been given by Christ. Instead, it is a peace that encourages us to put our faith in 
the threat of nuclear war, for it is assumed that threat is frightening people to the 
extent that they may finally come to their senses and realize that they stand on the 
brink of annihilation.72 
One the other hand (as we have seen), Hauerwas is no less patient with or 
approving of just war thinking that (from his perspective) is devoid of serious theological 
(Christological) grounding and merely seeks to justify national policy on the basis of the 
need to defend allegedly virtuous American values and goals. Hauerwas's review (with 
Paul J. Griffiths) of Jean Bethke Elshtain's book Just War Against Terror is (if possible) 
even more scathing in its tone and content than his review of the "semi-pacifist" 
statement of the Methodist Bishops: 
Jean Bethke Elshtain is rightly admired for her courage, for her trenchant critiques 
of peculiarly American pathologies, and for the wisdom of her political judgment. 
We think, however, that her current attempt morally to justify the Bush 
presidency's "war against terrorism" along with its entire National Security 
Strategy...is nothing more than an uncritical justification of the ideology of 
America as empire. It is itself a deeply ideological work rather than one of 
careful and critical thought.73  
71 RA, 89-90. 
72 Speak Up, 156, 
73 FT 138 (October 2003), 41. 
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The basic problem with Elshtain's book, says Hauerwas, is its assumption 
...that good Christians simply accept the American solution to the church-state 
question and to the complexities of how best to advocate Christian teaching in a 
pluralist society. But as Elshtain knows perfectly well, not all Christians do 
(these two [Hauerwas and Griffiths] don't, for different reasons and in different 
ways), and her elision of the boundary between the category "Christian" and the 
category "American" is another feature of the book's grammar never explicitly 
addressed or shown for what it is.74 
"In the end," therefore, 
...the use of Christian language and ideas in this book is nothing more than 
window-dressing for a passion to impose America upon the world. It is not a 
book whose argument should convince Christians; it is not a book whose 
argument should convince anyone thoughtful; it is a book—and here, out of 
respect for its author, we do not mince words—informed by jingoistic dreams of 
empire. Clarity about Elshtain's question, the question of the burden of American 
power, can only be had if clarity is gained about America. That clarity has both a 
theological and an empirical aspect. Neither is present in this book.75  
Whether or not (or to what extent) Elshtain is guilty as charged (it should be noted 
that she defends herself equally passionately in the same issue of First Things) is a 
question that we will leave others to discuss and determine. There is little doubt, 
however, that there are American Lutherans who are guilty (in varying degrees of 
seriousness and with various degrees of awareness) of eliding the distinction between 
"American" and "Christian" and accepting governmental decisions about war on the 
basis of political views and nationalistic biases rather than on the basis of the theological 
principles and presuppositions that we have discussed in this paper as forming the true 
basis for a Lutheran perspective on war and peace. The solution to both varieties of 
Lutheran Constantinianism, we would once again suggest, is a return to the thought and 
writings of Luther himself on war and peace. However Hauerwas (or anyone else) might 
74 Ibid., 43. 
75 ibid., 44. 
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judge Luther's theological presuppositions and conclusions in this regard, it is hard to see 
how the charge of Constantinianism (in the Yoderian and Hauerwasian sense of the term) 
can be leveled or sustained against Luther on the basis of his own treatment of the issue 
of war and peace. 
Obviously, Luther lived and wrote in a historical, political context when the lines 
between church and government were not clearly drawn. The affairs of the church were 
inextricably tied to the exercise of political authority in both church and state, and 
activities and authority in both spheres had crucial and concrete implications for the daily 
life of nearly everyone in society. Christendom in this historical and political sense was 
certainly an inescapable social and ecclesial reality in Luther's day.76 As Lewis Spitz 
cautions, however, "how much reality the concept of Christendom"—as a "religious-
meta-physical entity"—actually "had in the minds of medieval men is difficult to 
determine."77 It is quite clear that for Luther (contrary to Verduin's argument) the use of 
the term and concept of "Christendom" did not imply that all christened people living in a 
certain geographical reality were simply to be regarded as "good Christians," no matter 
how they lived and conducted themselves. Over and over again in his writings in war 
and peace he laments the fact that "a Christian is a rare bird:" "the world and the 
masses are and always will be un-Christian," says Luther, "even if they are all baptized 
and Christian in name. Christians are few and far between."78 Luther's writings express 
76 For a helpful summary, see "The Concept of Christendom" in Lewis W. Spitz, The Renaissance and 
Reformation Movements, Vol. 1 (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971), 21ff. 
77 Ibid., 21. 
78 Temporal Authority, 91. 
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strong and consistent agreement with Yoder's statement that "Christians must recognize 
that they are a minority not only on the globe but also at home."79 
But what about governmental leaders as God's representatives on earth? Yoder 
sharply criticizes Luther's "positivistic" view of government and governmental authority, 
claiming that "Luther gave to government a degree of divine sanction independent both 
of Christ and of justice which has been a problem to Protestantism ever since."80 
Summarizing "The Classical Lutheran View," Yoder writes: 
With reference...to the maintenance of justice, the insight into human sinfulness 
does not lead to any doubts about whether the standards of justice defined for the 
statesman in his station can be attained; Lutheranism traditionally places 
considerable confidence in rulers.81  
Such trust and confidence, in the view of Yoder and Hauerwas, leads directly (even if 
unwittingly) to the type of "quietistic Constantiniasm" discussed earlier. "The prince of 
whom Luther thought in the sixteenth century," says Yoder, "is replaced today by the 
professional politician, to whom the simple Christian should in a similar way entrust his 
political judgment."82 
One can hardly deny that Luther's concept of the two realms has been used—we 
would argue, abused—to support various historical manifestations of Constantinian 
quietism (it should be noted that even Yoder is not willing to blame Luther for the 
extreme abuse of this concept that took place during the time of Hitler83). At the same 
time, it is difficult, if not impossible, to harmonize Yoder's comments about Luther's 
79 PJ, 248. 
80 Christian Witness to the State, 82. 
81 Ibid., 64. 
82 Ibid., 74. 
83 See Christian Witness to the State, 82; see also the discussion "The Failure of Two Extremes" and "The 
German Church Struggle Against Naziism" in Render, 55ff. 
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positivistic view of government and Lutheranism's historic "confidence in rulers" with 
the essays of Luther himself on war and peace. Statements such as the following abound 
in these essays: 
You must know that since the beginning of the world a wise prince is a mighty 
rare bird, and an upright prince even rarer. They are generally the biggest fools or 
the worst scoundrels on earth; therefore, one must constantly expect the worst 
from them and look for little good....If a prince should happen to be wise, 
upright, or a Christian, that is one of the great miracles, the most precious token of 
divine grace upon that land.84 
Such comments hardly reflect "considerable confidence in rulers." Nevertheless, says 
Luther, God has his own strange, wise, and sovereign way of using such "fools" and 
"scoundrels:" 
They are God's executioners and hangmen; his divine wrath uses them to punish 
the wicked and to maintain outward peace. Our God is a great lord and ruler; this 
is why he must also have such noble, highborn, and rich hangmen and constables. 
He desires that everyone shall copiously accord them riches, honor, and fear in 
abundance. It pleases his divine will that we call his hangman gracious lords, fall 
at their feet, and be subject to them in all humility, so long as they do not ply their 
trade too far and try to become shepherds instead of hangmen.85  
Lutherans honor earthly rulers, therefore, not on the basis of some simplistic 
assumption about their personal goodness, wisdom, honesty, or competence, but on the 
basis of our trust in God's ability to use even fools and scoundrels to carry out his work 
in the world—a trust generated by their knowledge that God used even the fools and 
scoundrels who nailed Christ to the cross to accomplish our salvation. George Forell 
summarizes Luther's views as follows: 
If the rulers were virtuous they would avoid war and work for peace. But Luther 
has no illusions about the sincerity of their desire for peace. He had said that, 
"everybody ought to know that a prince will be venison in heaven." He was sure 
that there would not be many rulers present "when the roll is called up yonder." 
Yet God had made provisions for peace, not through the moral excellency of 
84 Temporal Authority, 113. 
85 Ibid. 
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princes but rather through the balance of power which is the result of the 
multitude of peoples ad interests in this world.86 
God takes care of wicked, selfish, tyrannical rulers 
"...by seeing to it that others, too, have fists, and that there are people on the other 
side of the mountain as well. Thus one sword keeps the other in the scabbard." 
Thus peace is the result of the multiplicity of forces and interests which tend to 
check each other and prevent even a wicked and foolish ruler from dominating 
everybody else. Not in the goodness of man, who wants peace, but in the 
goodness of God, who has created this variety of interests and pressures which 
require compromise and make war risky, rests our hope for peace. Luther carries 
his basic ideas through with amazing consistency. The powers of this world have 
to play God's masquerade. Through them He punishes evil-doers and presses 
toward peace. Even in the international relationships of the nations God rules and 
accomplishes His own ultimate purposes." 
There is more than a hint of sarcasm in Luther's comments above regarding the 
"copious honor" due to the "highborn hangmen" who serve in civil government. This 
serves as a reminder of authentic Lutheranism's realism about the fallen nature of 
governmental structures and leaders, and (therefore) the need to guard against any and all 
idolatrous estimations of them. While it is true, as John Stephenson says, that "Luther 
regards secular government... as an integral part of the good divine work of 
preservation," it is equally true that: 
Perception of the divine benevolence which undergirds the exercise of order-
creating authority in all spheres of life ought not, however, to lead to an 
unbalanced, "enthusiastic" and ultimately idolatrous estimate of the function and 
competence of secular rule. The business of government at all levels is to patch 
up and preserve a non-ideal reality, and were its task to be compared with that of 
a modern hospital, then it might more properly be likened to the casualty 
department than to that of plastic surgery. That is to say, as a preservative of the 
fallen Creation secular authority operates under the law, being only indirectly 
related to the gospel which, as the life-giving message of the forgiveness of sin 
for Christ's sake, plants the new Creation in the midst of the old.88 
86 George W. Forell, "Luther and Politics," in Luther and Culture, co-written by Forell, Harold J. Grimm 
and Theodore Hoelty-Nickel (Decorah, Iowa: Luther College Press, 1960), 38. 
87 Ibid., 38-39. 
88 Ibid. 
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Luther's basic conservatism regarding existing political structures, therefore, 
stems not from positivistic convictions about their reliability and trustworthiness but, in 
sense, from just the opposite: from his realism about the balance of power created by 
competing interests and from his skepticism regarding our human ability to effect lasting, 
positive changes in the realm of government in this fallen world. Since we cannot and 
must not "put our trust in princes" (Psalm 146:3) or in our ability to change the world, we 
must put out trust elsewhere: 
There is as great a difference between changing a government and improving it as 
the distance from heaven to earth. It is easy to change a government, but it is 
difficult to get one that is better, and the danger is that you will not. Why? 
Because it is not in our will and power, but only in the will and hand of God.89 
We are back once again, therefore, to that operative word of Luther's:faith or trust in 
God rather than in human strength, efforts, wisdom, power, rulers, governments, or 
anything else that can be named. And it is this same simple faith, not illusions of 
"creating a just and perfect society" or "controlling history" or "changing the world" that 
underlies Christians decisions about supporting or participating in what they believe to be 
justified acts of governmental violence and war. According to Luther, we are not even to 
trust in the apparent justice of the cause or reason for going to war, even though we are to 
do our best to determine it: "Fearing God means that we do not rely on the justness of 
our cause, but that we are careful, diligent, and cautious, even in the very smallest details, 
in so small a thing as a whistle."9° The considerations of the just war tradition as 
articulated by Luther are crucial questions for determining the boundaries within which 
war can be viewed as an acceptable means of participating in God's work of pursuing 
89 Whether Soldiers, 111-112. 
9° Ibid., 125. 
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peace, but they are not infallible principles for determining the justness of a particular 
ruler or nation or policy. When Christians go to war, they trust in the goodness, justice 
and mercy of God with which they have become so intimately acquainted on the basis of 
the work of Christ and his cross: "In this faith," says Luther, "I will live, die, fight, and 
do everything else. Dear Lord God the Father, preserve and strengthen this faith in me by 
your Spirit. Amen."91  
In view of everything that is said above, Lutherans in America—influenced as 
they undoubtedly are by non-Lutheran notions of America as "God's chosen nation" or as 
a new "promised land" that God has promised to bless in some specially favored or even 
predestined way—need to be especially attentive to a necessary corollary of Luther's 
teaching on government, namely that 
No one form of government, no one form of economic system, can ever become a 
"Christian" system; that is true not only because each system will be permeated 
by human sinfulness. We have no ultimate stake in determining whether 
capitalism, socialism, feudalism, or a barter economy is eternally best. Luther 
preferred feudalism to the incipient capitalism of his day. He may have been right 
in his historical situation; this judgment would be impossible in ours. But no such 
political or social system can ever become an end in itself. The end and goal of 
all political, social and economic activity is the welfare of our fellow creatures, 
the effective working of society, which God designed to be the place in which 
human needs are met through His human "masks," who deliver care and 
concern.92 
Christian willingness to serve as such "masks" in whatever ways necessary is an 
expression of Christian love, motivated by Christ's own loving suffering on the cross. 
When we serve in such ways, we do not leave our Christian convictions behind, nor do 
we lose sight of our ultimate loyalty: 
Religious convictions are most powerfully useful to democracy when they, in 
fact, disturb the consensus because they raise a higher standard against which the 
91 Ibid., 135-136. 
92 "God Calling," 29-30. 
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democracy ought to be judged. Certainly in the abolitionist movement or the civil 
rights movement the relevance of religious convictions was apparent because they 
troubled the consensus. The idea is that as Christians we are in the world but not 
of the world. We are committed to the good creation into which God has placed 
us, and that includes the good order that government provides. But we should 
never confuse that order with our ultimate loyalty, which is to God in Christ. 
Therefore, we can be involved in it [democracy] without idolizing it, without 
making the democracy into a false ido1.93  
James Neuchterlein argues that because they have been so carefully schooled (at 
least in theory) regarding the penultimate nature of politics and human government, 
Lutherans more so than many other Christians—and particularly Missouri Synod 
Lutherans—have been "made safe for patriotism." 
We [LCMS Lutherans] could love America—feel toward it all that respect, pride, 
and affection that is natural for people to extend to their homelands—without 
being tempted to the idolatrous nationalism that has deformed modem history. 
How could American Lutherans make an idol of a nation whose philosophical 
assumptions (enlightenment liberalism) and dominant religious tradition 
(revivalist Calvinism) were so fundamentally at odds with their most basic 
understandings? Because we were at the deepest level of our beings strangers in 
America, we could be safely at home there. We could affirm all its good gifts 
without making of them more than they warranted.94  
This does not mean, of course, that Lutherans are immune from and therefore have no 
need to guard against Constantinian temptations to idolize the state or to seek to take 
control of government for what appear to be good and godly reasons. It means 
remembering that for Lutherans who are genuinely faithful to the theology of Luther, the 
cross—not some temporal or temporary human institution—truly is the meaning of 
history. The message of Christ's cross and resurrection delivers Lutherans from 
delusions of control and false hopes centered in transforming society, and frees them to 
93 Ronald Thiemann, quoted in "Raise Your Political Voice" by Rob Blezard (The Lutheran, September 
1996), 28-29. 
94 James Neuchterlein, "Heaven is My Home: Memoirs of a Lutheran Boyhood" (First Things, October 
1990), 32; cf his essay "Must Lutherans Be Political Conservatives?" reprinted in Forum Letter (December 
1998), 7-8. 
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offer themselves in service to God and to country in whatever ways their vocation 
demands—even in vocations that may require the use of violence as part of God's strange 
and merciful work of creating and preserving order, security and peace. 
Issues Needing Further Clarification and Exploration 
Just War and "A Just Nation" 
With regard to the church and its struggle against the temptation of 
Constantinianism, one issue that needs clarification (and again, we would suggest, even 
correction) is Hauerwas's consistent characterization of virtually any and all forms of the 
just war tradition as based on (unreal and unfounded) assumptions about the "just 
character" of the government waging a "just war." As we have seen, Hauerwas credits 
(and commends) Ramsey for attempting to defend and articulate a theological 
understanding of the just war tradition that takes seriously the person and work of Jesus 
Christ: "Unlike those Catholics who continue to base just war on natural-law 
assumptions of self-defense, Ramsey has from the beginning argued that just war is the 
disinterested love taught by Christ now institutionalized in the state. Just war is love-
transformed justice through which the justice of the earthly city is elevated."95 For 
Ramsey, says Hauerwas (and once again he means this as compliment), "just war is not a 
casuistical checklist to determine when violence might be used; it is a theory of 
statecraft."96 But hidden in this very compliment is serious mischaracterization of 
Ramsey's position, which leads Hauerwas to conclude: 
Both the Bishops and Ramsey remain committed Constantinians. By that I mean 
they argue presuming Christians not only still rule but can and should rule. It is 
95 Speak Up, 169. 
" Ibid., 167. 
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therefore their task to show that Christians can develop an ethic sufficient to 
sustain a civilization. This is a particular temptation for Christians (and even 
more for Methodists) in America, where the idea has long persisted that there is a 
close connection between Christianity and democracy. The Bishops clearly 
assume that if they could simply get the American people concerned about the 
nuclear crisis the issue would be resolved, ignoring entirely that our current 
situation has little to do with the good or evil will of either the American or 
Russian people as people.97 
Ramsey, says Hauerwas, is "much less susceptible" to this criticism. However, 
Ramsey's argument that just war is generated and sustained by Christian love 
would seem to commit him to the view that those civilizations and correlative 
states that are not formed by Christian presence cannot sustain the ethos necessary 
to make war an option for Christians; or that those states of modernity that have 
explicitly rejected their Christian heritage cannot command Christian conscience 
to fight in their wars since Christians can have no confidence that the wars of such 
states can be kept limited.98  
The word "seem" in the quotation above is critical, however, because it signals 
Hauerwas's own (and we would argue, unjustified) interpretation of Ramsey's position, 
not the position as articulated by Ramsey himself (see below). Thus Hauerwas 
concludes: 
Even if the broad outlines of Ramsey's defense of the state as the embodiment of 
love-transformed justice are correct, we must ask if the concrete states we have in 
fact fit Ramsey's moral condition for sustaining a just war. My judgment is that 
they do not.99 
Here it is perfectly proper for Hauerwas to offer his judgment, but it is a judgment based 
on assumptions about Ramsey's position that (we would argue) cannot be sustained on 
the basis of Ramsey's own (quite carefully nuanced) argument. 
Ramsey (in War and the Christian Conscience and elsewhere) does express the 
view that Christianity has had a profound (and positive) influence on Western society and 
97 Ibid.,171-172. 
98 Ibid, 172. 
" Ibid., 173. 
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politics in many ways, one of which is its inheritance of the just war tradition with its 
concern for "rules of war" and limitations on war.'°°  This is true, suggests Ramsey, even 
if and when various political expressions of the just war tradition do not recognize or 
explicitly acknowledge its Christian roots. But (contra Hauerwas) Ramsey does not 
argue that the particularly Christian understanding of the just war tradition assumes 
(much less is tantamount to) a particular theory of statecraft, or that it necessitates for its 
viability particular moral conditions existing in a particular state. As the title of 
Ramsey's book makes clear, Ramsey is not primarily concerned with "War and the Just 
State" (even if Hauerwas would argue that this should be his primary concern); he is 
concerned with "War and the Christian Conscience." In its classical Christian form, 
says Ramsey, 
The just war theory did not rest upon the supposition that men possess a general 
competence to discriminate with certainty between social orders at large by means 
of clear, universal principles of justice, so as to be able to declare (without sin's 
affecting one's judgment of his own nation's cause) one side or social system to 
be just and the others unjust. This was not the premise by which Augustine came 
to a confident enough judgment as to a Christian's responsibility in justifiable (if 
not unambiguously just) war. My contention is that Christian ethics may attribute 
to ordinary men, and to their political leaders, a capacity to know more clearly 
and certainly the moral limits pertaining to the armed action a man or a nation is 
about to engage in, than they are likely to know enough to compare unerringly the 
over-all justice of regimes and nations. There is still more reason to believe that 
men know something of moral significance about proper conduct than to believe 
that they are able to count up all the remote effects of their actions, so as to 
measure their actions by the standards of any consequentialist system of ethics.'°1  
The reason this is significant for our study is that Ramsey's position in this respect 
corresponds exactly to Luther's. As we have seen, Luther's primary concern was to offer 
advice and counsel to Christians who were confused and/or troubled in conscience about 
100 See, e.g., War and the Christian Conscience, xxi. 
1°1 Ibid., 32. 
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the circumstances under which they might obey or disobey governmental authorities by 
participation in war. It was not Luther's purpose to develop a theory of statecraft nor to 
set forth certain moral qualifications necessary for a state's ability to wage a just war. 
Service in a just war is service to God for the sake of peace, regardless of the personal 
faith of the ruler or the moral or political characteristics of the temporal authority to 
which one is bound to submit. Christians may, of course, and even should, be concerned 
to critique and seek to enhance the moral condition of the government in which they live. 
But from Luther's perspective, any Christian living in virtually any state at any time 
might conceivably participate in a justifiable war in obedience to earthly authorities—and 
finally (for Luther) this decision must remain in the realm of personal Christian 
conscience, not in the realm of a supposed "just war theory of statecraft." For Luther, as 
Maurer says, 
The question about the justness of a war thus concerns a monarch's military 
subordinates and not just the monarch himself. Each must make his own 
decision. Here again the judgment about whether a war is just is made personal; 
there is no blind obedience. But all this presupposes that the individual soldier is 
set within a previously existing ethic of orders that is by no means exclusively 
Christian in its expression. It is, however, to be practiced by a Christian when it 
can be done with a good conscience. Everything done in that way is justified by 
the divine demand for obedience.'°2  
We recall Luther's words that "even if I served a Turk and saw my lord in danger, I 
would... stab and hew as long as my heart beat. If I were slain in so doing, I should go 
straight to heaven."1°3 It seems clear that Hauerwas believes that the viability of the just 
war theory is inextricably tied to the concept of the just state, but if honest and 
meaningful dialog is to take place between Hauerwasians and Lutherans, then this 
102 Maurer,  142; emphasis added. 
103 Open Letter, 81. 
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personal belief must be distinguished from the actual position of Luther, historic 
Lutheranism, and the classic Christian just war tradition itself on this issue. 
Distinguishing Between "Trust" and "Control" 
A second issue that needs clarification (and in this case further exploration) is the 
extent to which Hauerwas is truly able to acknowledge the possibility that limited, 
justified violence might be used by Christians not as a sinful way of "exercising control" 
over others or over their own lives but as a genuine act of selfless service to their 
neighbor in need. At times he seems to deny this very possibility: "Our need to be in 
control," says Hauerwas, "is the basis for the violence in our lives."104 As we observed in 
chapter two, however, Hauerwas singles out Enda McDonagh as a particularly persuasive 
representative of the position that this need not always be the case: 
No one can easily dismiss the power of this position....Can Christians ever be 
justified in resorting to arms to do "some good?" Are Christians not unjust if they 
allow another person to be injured or killed if they might prevent that by the use 
of violence? Indeed should not Christians call on the power of the state to employ 
its coercive force to secure more relative forms of justice? Such action would not 
be a question of using violence to be "in control," but simply to prevent a worse 
evil.' u5  
This, of course, is the classic Christian (and Lutheran) just war perspective on the use of 
violence—not just some exceptional or anomalous version of it. Hauerwas claims to 
have sympathy with this perspective and admits that "it certainly cannot be discounted as 
a possibility for Christians." And yet he insists that 
...the problem with these attempts to commit the Christian to limited use of 
violence is that they too often distort the character of our alternatives. Violence 
used in the name of justice, or freedom, or equality is seldom simply a matter of 
justice—it is a matter of the power of some over others. Moreover, when 
violence is justified in principle as a necessary strategy for securing justice, it 
1°4 PK, 47. 
105 Ibid., 114. 
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stills the imaginative search for nonviolent ways of resistance to injustice. For 
true justice never comes through violence, nor can it be based on violence. It can 
only be based on truth, which has no need to resort to violence to secure its own 
existence. Such a justice comes at best fitfully to nation states, for by nature we 
are people who fear disorder and violence and thus we prefer order (even if the 
order is built on the lies inspired by our hates, fears, and resentments) to truth. 
The Church, therefore, as a community based on God's kingdom of truth cannot 
help but make all rulers tremble, especially when those rulers have become "the 
people."1°6 
Despite the validity of these concerns, however, this response is not very satisfying to just 
war Christians who sincerely seek honest and forthright dialog with Hauerwas on the 
questions he himself raises (above) as a summary of McDonagh's position. Instead of 
addressing these questions, Hauerwas simply shifts the debate back to the question of 
"the just character of the state," which (as we discussed above) is clearly not the central 
question for classical just war thinking (even—again—if Hauerwas believes it is or 
should be). 
Christian and Lutheran just war thinkers can certainly affirm Hauerwas's plea to 
search "imaginatively" for nonviolent ways of resolving conflict: this is the primary 
purpose of the just war criterion of "last resort," which may well require more careful and 
creative consideration in numerous instances. Just war thinkers can also affirm 
Hauerwas's call to the church to remind the state (including the democratic state) that it 
has reason to tremble under the ultimate sovereignty of One who is greater than the state. 
But they would also undoubtedly appreciate a clearer Hauerwasian response to the central 
question of the possibility of Christian participation in justified violence as a bona fide 
and even self-sacrificing act of loving service to one's neighbor in obedience to Christ, as 
opposed to his typical shifting of the question to other issues that reflect Hauerwas's 
1°6  Ibid. 
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particular convictions and concerns (however valid these may be). Hauerwas frequently 
affirms Yoder's conviction that 
The resurrection is not the end product of a mechanism which runs through its 
paces wherever there is a crucifixion. There is about the Christian hope in the 
kingdom that peculiar kind of assurance which is called faith, but not the 
preponderant probability of success which is called for by the just war theory or 
by a prudential ethic.1°7 
As should be clear by now, however, a truly Lutheran approach to just war is not based 
on "the preponderant probability of success" or a prudential, pragmatic ethic rooted in 
confidence in our ability to control history. Rather, it too is grounded in "that peculiar 
kind of assurance which is called faith"—faith that the God who brought the greatest 
good our of the greatest evil in the history of humankind (the cross) also has the ability to 
bring great good out of the evil of justifiable war. 
Pacifism and Patriotism 
Finally, even Lutherans who share many of Hauerwas's concerns about the 
dangers and temptations of Constantinianism for American Christians and Lutherans 
might wonder to what extent Hauerwas would be willing to acknowledge the possibility 
that an overly narrow focus on this particular danger and temptation may not result in our 
ignoring other dangers and temptations—such as the failure to be sufficiently thankful to 
God for the blessings (however imperfect) that he provides through earthly government 
(including the imperfect government under which we live in the United States of 
America) and the failure to express (in obedience to the clear commands of Scripture) 
proper honor and support for government and governmental leaders as they carry out 
their God-given vocations. 
1" Nevertheless, 126-127. 
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We recall Elshtain's comment in the introduction (page two) that Hauerwas 
disdains virtually all distinctions between "any and all forms of patriotism, nationalism 
and state worship." Even while granting the necessity of the prophetic witness and 
existence of the church in its relationship to the state, does Hauerwas allow any room at 
all for genuine Christian affirmation of and heartfelt support for the positive functions of 
the state in promoting order, safety, justice, freedom and peace? Hauerwas warns 
incessantly (and often stridently) against the "tribalism" of America, the "murderous 
intensity" of its megalomaniac obsession with "policing the world" and "controlling 
history," and its idolatrous demand that we "qualify our loyalty to God" in the name of 
lesser loyalties and causes (freedom, justice, etc.) that require us to kill (rather than 
forgive) the enemies that threaten us.108 One looks in vain for any indication that 
Christians in America, in addition to critiquing American faults and guarding against 
false loyalties, might actually offer a prayer of sincere thanksgiving to God for the 
positive features of American government—including the freedom (fully taken advantage 
of by Hauerwas) that allows them to criticize their own nation openly and harshly without 
any fear of governmental reprisal. 
In response to Hauerwas's and Griffith's scathing critique of her book Just War 
Against Terror, Elshtain responds in a way that may draw sympathy from many readers 
of Hauerwas who may wonder if they should repent of any patriotic thought or impulse: 
Looking out at a world filled with violence and oppression, they (Hauerwas and 
Griffiths) have nothing to offer their fellow citizens but denunciations of their 
own society. The crude message of this screed suggests to Americans that they 
are essentially deluded by their leaders, even as it simplistically indicates to the 
Christians among them that in finding something worth defending in their society 
they are thereby being untrue to the demands of their faith.'°9  
108 See, e.g., RA, 33; cf. also the collection of essays on war and peace in HR. 
109 FT 138 (October 2003), 46. 
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In a thoughtful article on "Christians as Patriots" that might well serve as a fruitful 
talking point for Hauerwasians and Lutherans, Peter Meilaender draws on the writings of 
Bonhoeffer to make the argument that: 
It is true that Christians inhabit the world "like a pilgrim in a foreign land," 
longing for that city where we will find our perfect rest. But our loyalties are not 
thereby divided; they are multiplied. The one who learns to love the great Giver 
of all life will not suddenly forget how to love his gifts; nor will he who worships 
the God who is Love find his own capacity for love diminished. In Bonhoeffer's 
wonderful image from the passage at the head of this essay, "Where the ground 
bass is firm and clear, there is nothing to stop the counterpoint from being 
developed at the utmost of its limits." Christians, then, are precisely the kind of 
patriots that a decent polity should want to have. They know that their country 
has its faults. But they do not imagine that it can earn their love only by 
becoming faultless. They love their country, not because it is good, but because it 
is given.110 
Stephen Webb has suggested that the nature of Hauerwas's continual "screed" 
against America Hauerwas actually demonstrates (ironically) how "very American" he 
really is: 
Hauerwas is typically American in his insistence that Christian theology be 
translated in American politics in direct and aggressive form, without much 
reflection on the various ways in which democratic structures mediate moral 
action. For Hauerwas, the church is not merely a passive sign of God's grace, but 
an active body that accomplishes God's will. Hauerwas is missing an ironic 
sensibility that understands how our best intentions often end up subverting the 
good we hope to achieve, and how, therefore, even prophetic utterances should 
normally result in reform, rather than revolution." 
Despite his constant insistence that the pacifism he so passionately defends must not be 
judged by its effectiveness, Hauerwas's strong and strident writing and speaking 
(suggests Webb) often belies a very American insistence that what we are saying must 
somehow be translated into action and visible results: 
n° FT 130 (February 2003), 35. 
111 "The Very American Stanley Hauerwas," FT 124 (June/July 2002), 17. 
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Americans, as Tocqueville noted long ago, do not trust thinking that does not lead 
immediately to some kind of action. We are stirred by extravagant rhetoric, and 
we like to think that we can remake the world in the image of our words. We are 
an impatient people, and we like results. Hauerwas praises the virtue of patience 
in his work, but he is also drawn to the grand gesture of sacrificial witness and the 
hope that, even at this late hour, America can still be redeemed by the morally 
pure. In a word, he wants pacifism to pay. Irony is missing from Hauerwas 
precisely because, in spite of his many protestations, he is so perfectly 
American.112 
Even if this characterization of Hauerwas seems rather forced and unfair, it seems 
as though it would be hard for Hauerwas to deny—in view of his strong emphasis on the 
reality-making power and presence of narrative in our lives and world—that "being an 
American" is also part of his story, part of the narrative of his own thinking and 
identity—and that this is reflected in his thinking, writing and speaking in ways that 
perhaps he himself is not fully aware. In any event, the question of whether or to what 
degree it is possible to be both "a good and faithful Christian" and "a good and grateful 
American" is one that would benefit from further explication by Hauerwas. His valid 
criticisms and cautions regarding Christians and government would be even more 
compelling, we would suggest, if they demonstrated a greater awareness of the (less than 
perfect) ways in which God uses government—even American government—to preserve 
and promote the conditions under which Christians like Hauerwas can articulate their 
passionately-held religious views so freely, clearly, and strongly.113 
112 Ibid. 
113 For further elaboration of Hauerwas's specific views regarding democracy, see his review of Jeffrey 
Stout's book Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004) in Performing 
the Faith, 215-241. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the things that makes it difficult to offer final or definitive conclusions 
regarding the views of Stanley Hauerwas (including his pacifism) is his consistent 
reluctance to describe his views as positions which themselves seek to offer fmal 
conclusions. 
I do not write because I am interesting in trying to develop another "position" to 
populate the academic landscape. I am trying to foment a modest revolution by 
forcing Christians to take themselves seriously as Christians. Such an ambition 
means that I am not simply trying to give new answers to old questions, but I am 
trying to change the questions. This forces me to develop new, or at least 
different, ways of putting matters that are not easily learned—particularly by me.1 
William Cananaugh observes: 
Some people have grown impatient with Hauerwas's reliance on short essays and 
await a magnum opus from his pen that will lay down his position in definitive 
form. Such a book or books is unlikely to be forthcoming, however, as Stanley 
does not believe that he has a position....This is why Hauerwas relies on short 
essays done primarily over pastoral problems, such as marriage, education, war 
and health. To write this way risks not being read for very long, because 
particular pastoral problems quickly shift. But Hauerwas claims that a theologian 
should not write for the ages, for to do so is to try to secure a position against the 
movement of the Spirit through time.2 
"Hauerwas's gift," says John Berkman, "is not to give the Christian community tidy 
solutions." Rather, "he wants to transform the way his readers and listeners live and 
think. He is not unlike the tent evangelist; he will draw the lines and seek to have his 
readers and listeners live anew. Hauerwas leaves it to others to tidy things up and work 
out problematic details."3 This explains why Berkman is able to conclude his own 
introduction to Hauerwas's work in such open-ended fashion: 
1 IGC, 12. 
2 HR, 31. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
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We look to some to trace his steps more carefully and precisely; to others to 
explore a direction in which Hauerwas has merely pointed; and finally, to others 
to articulate why Hauerwas's route is not to be followed. May these debates be of 
service to the pilgrim people of God.4 
In this respect, it is as easy as it is difficult to respond to Hauerwas's pacifist 
views, since one is not challenged to provide final answers but simply to participate in the 
journey and to join (and seek to elevate) the debate. For Hauerwas, to seek to offer the 
last word on any issue is to kill the community in which and through which this vital 
dialog takes place: 
It is...true that I do not try to write "the last word" about anything. That is partly 
because I do not believe in the last word about anything, but also because I find 
the politics of such scholarship offensive. "Perfection" kills community. To try 
to write to anticipate all possible criticism, to qualify all strong claims in the name 
of "scholarship," protects authors but too often produces work that serves to 
defeat the necessity of community. That it does so is not surprising, since that is 
exactly what it is meant to do. In contrast, I assume the point is to write in a 
manner that invites others to care about what I care about because they sense there 
is so much to do given the incompleteness of what I have done.5  
This does not mean, of course, that Hauerwas does not often articulate strongly 
held views—including views on war and peace!—that make it clear that he definitely has 
a "position" on specific issues. His own approach, however, suggests an openness to 
continuing dialog, criticism and clarification concerning such matters—for Hauerwas, the 
least helpful criticism (and the one most harmful to the communal life of the church) is to 
be told to "shut up." "I do not want to be told that I write too much," says Hauerwas in 
In Good Company. "Tell me what you want left out and why."6 In a review essay 
published in First Things, Gilbert Meilaender tries to respond to this challenge by 
offering suggestions about what Hauerwas should "leave out" in future books and 
4 Ibid.,16. 
5 IGC, 13-14. 
6 Ibid.,12. 
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essays.' When it comes to Hauerwas's writings on war and peace, however, Lutherans 
who take seriously the just war tradition will very likely be left looking for more, not 
less: more clarity regarding Hauerwas's own understanding and characterization of the 
just war tradition; further discussion of the specific texts of Scripture that offer support 
for the theological principles underlying this tradition; more explicit and direct responses 
to aspects of the just war tradition that attempt to take seriously the very themes that 
Hauerwas emphasizes; more positive efforts by Hauerwas to elevate the debate with just 
war thinkers in a way that shows respect for the integrity of their convictions without 
caricaturing their views or simply changing the questions. 
On the basis of the evidence provided in this study, we have come to the 
conclusion that despite the many common theological concerns shared by Luther and 
Hauerwas on the issue of war and peace, their positions on this issue are finally 
incompatible because of differing presuppositions about the nature of the person and 
work of Jesus Christ and (in turn) about the character and calling of the church. In other 
words, we agree with Hauerwas that "you simply cannot mix just war and pacifism and 
have a consistent position"—at least not if your own conclusions are consistent with their 
presuppositions, as is the case (we have argued) with both Hauerwas and Luther. At the 
same time, we have argued that meaningful conversation and dialog can and should take 
place between committed Hauerwasians and Lutherans on issues of war and peace, not by 
ignoring or caricaturing the presuppositions and positions on either side but by 
acknowledging them, taking them seriously, and seeking to discover what might be 
learned from each other's valid insights and concerns, even when these stem from 
differing presuppositions. 
7 FT (October 1996), 51-58. 
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Any concluding word regarding Hauerwas's pacifism, therefore, must include a 
word of gratitude for challenging Lutherans (among others) to take their own tradition 
and theology more seriously, and to continue to wrestle with how to articulate it and 
apply it in a world in which the threat of war and its horrors and its complexities 
continues to loom larger than ever. We conclude, therefore, with a non-comprehensive 
summarizing list of some of the challenges discussed in this study that Lutherans face in 
this regard—challenges which the work of Hauerwas can help us to identify and 
confront: 
1) The need for Lutherans to re-dedicate themselves to serious study and 
discussion of the issue of war and peace as a theological issue in the face of temptations 
such as (for example): quietism (viewing war and peace as an essentially political issue 
which can be safely ignored by a church dedicated to the "spiritual" task of proclaiming 
the Gospel); survivalism (viewing the "survival" of humanity as an "end" in itself, and 
advocating and pursuing peace on that basis); misguided activism (viewing the church as 
bearing primary and ultimate responsibility for managing society and controlling history); 
and nationalism (failing to question or challenge governmental decisions and authority on 
the basis of an idolatrous patriotism or a faulty understanding of Romans 13). 
2) The need for Lutherans to recover and take more seriously the implications of 
Scripture's teaching (as reflected so clearly in the writings of Luther) regarding God's 
great gift of temporal peace, and to re-affirm the historic Lutheran view that war is 
justifiable only as an instrument of peace. This means also taking seriously the special 
challenges involved in applying the peace-prizing principles of the just war tradition in 
today's military context of nuclear warfare and weapons of mass destruction. 
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3) The need for Lutherans to identify more clearly the specifically Christian 
elements of the just war theory (e.g., participation and/or non-participation in war as an 
act of love in service to God and neighbor which is motivated by faith in Christ and by a 
desire to conform our lives to Christ's perfect and normative example of absolute 
obedience to God no matter what the cost), so that the just war tradition is not seen or 
used by Christians merely as a rationalistic or nationalistic justification for war. 
Hauerwas's cautions and warnings can be especially salutary here, despite his sensitivity 
to being viewed and used merely as a reminder of the potential dangers accompanying 
Christian strategies that take seriously their responsibility for the world. This also 
necessitates dealing with and clarifying "lesser evil" views of just war—clearly 
distinguishing the historic Lutheran view from the Niebuhrian view so strongly (and 
properly) criticized by Hauerwas. 
4) The need for Lutherans to take more seriously the possibility and reality of 
unjust wars and to emphasize the critical role of Christian conscience in responding to 
(i.e., refraining from participation in) such wars in obedience to God. Here the concerns 
of Lutherans such as Hater, Lutz and Bouman about the need for greater Lutheran 
awareness of and activism regarding the current illegality of selective conscientious 
objection are both timely and appropriate. 
5) The need for Lutherans to take seriously Hauerwas's valid (if at times 
overstated) concerns about the dangers of Constantinianism and the temptation of 
competing loyalties, misplaced priorities and false views of the church's responsibility 
for the world, even as we guard against dangers on the opposite extreme. 
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6) The need for Lutherans to take seriously the nature of the church's witness as 
church in and to society—to respond to the very real challenge to present to the world a 
radical and peaceable alternative to the world's violence, discord, and disunity. Here 
Hauerwas's emphasis on character, community, the virtues, Christianpractices (not just 
beliefs), and the normative (not merely salvific) significance of the life, sufferings, death 
and resurrection of Christ can also be very helpful.8 How effectively, as an ecclesial 
community, are we demonstrating to the world the peace that the world lacks and that is 
available only in and through Christ and the church? On the other hand, it seems 
necessary (especially in today's ecclesial context) to emphasize that acknowledging the 
necessity and urgency of a peaceable witness on the part of the church does not 
necessarily mean embracing a pacifist position, nor even conceding the high moral 
ground to pacifists. Christian just war thinkers honestly and sincerely view war, when 
just, as a divinely-appointed and divinely-approved means for achieving or maintaining 
peace. They should not be expected to compromise this conviction, any more than 
pacifists like Hauerwas should be asked or expected to compromise their own views. 
Nor should pacifists like Hauerwas be shocked and offended when they are assailed by 
just war thinkers—just as they assail just war thinkers!—as taking a position that (from 
the just war perspective) ultimately undermines the cause of peace. 
7) The need for Lutherans to engage in honest, substantive dialogue with other 
Lutherans and other Christians on issues of war and peace in order to better understand 
8 In the January 2003 issue of Theology Today, Mark Douglas offers an intriguing proposal for "Changing 
the Rules: Just War Theory in the Twenty-First Century" in which he suggests that (given the drastic social, 
historical, political, economic and technological changes in modern times and their impact on the nature 
and conduct of war) just war thinkers would do well to focus less narrowly on the specific, historic criteria 
for determining "just war" and more broadly on the virtues that underlie those criteria, which may lead to a 
re-thinking and more creative application of the criteria themselves. This proposal for a "virtue-based" 
approach to just war thinking merits serious consideration and begs further development. 
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competing positions, to clarify and sharpen their own position(s), and to seek and suggest 
creative alternatives to resorting to violence as a solution to societal, national and global 
tensions and conflicts. 
8) The need for Lutherans to engage in conversation with those outside the 
church on issues of war and peace as a way of affirming the Lutheran conviction that 
such conversation is not only possible on theological grounds but necessary precisely in 
order to head off the violence that is implied and/or fostered by a lack of such 
conversation. 
9) The need for Lutherans to understand more fully and clearly just how radical 
the Lutheran position really is in its readiness and willingness to trust in God as the Lord 
of the church and of history: a God who accomplishes his purposes in ways that are often 
hidden from our understanding and beyond our control, a God who has revealed himself 
paradoxically yet unambiguously through the violence of Christ's cross, a God who calls 
us to trust and obey him (just as Jesus himself trusted and obeyed) even amidst the 
inevitable uncertainties and ambiguities of life in this world. As we have emphasized, 
Lutherans seem especially well-positioned to demonstrate and articulate how a radical 
theology of the cross offers a way of addressing troublesome issues such as the question 
of war as a lesser evil, God's ability to use even his wrath in the service of his mercy, and 
the Christian's ability and responsibility to exercise Christ-like love even in the service 
and support of a law-based and imperfect justice in the civil realm (over which God also 
rules as Sovereign and King). 
10) The need for Lutheran pastors, church workers, congregations, and laity to 
engage in and support more careful, deliberate, and sustained catechesis on the issue of 
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war and peace and on the theological presuppositions underlying the historic Lutheran 
position on this issue (Luther's teachings concerning the two realms, the theology of the 
cross, Christian vocation, the two kinds of righteousness, etc.), and to support this 
catechesis with authentically Lutheran liturgical practices that faithfully reflect the 
historic Lutheran teaching on these issues. Ultimately, as Hauerwas rightly recognizes 
and emphasizes, the church's calling in this world is simply to worship the Lord and 
Creator of all things—the Creator of the church and of the world, and the Creator and 
Preserver of every kind of peace. Therefore, despite the significant areas of disagreement 
identified in our study between Luther and Hauerwas on issues of war and peace—and in 
light of the significant areas of common conviction and concern—surely Hauerwas and 
all Hauerwasians can join Lutherans in praying and singing: 
Grant peace, we pray, in mercy Lord; Peace in our time, oh, send us! 
For there is none on earth but you, None other to defend us. 
You only, Lord, can fight for us. Amen. (Lutheran Worship 219) 
APPENDIX I: 
STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH— 
MISSOURI SYNOD ON WAR AND PEACE 
To Encourage Peacemaking and 
the Study of Problems Concerning 
the Church and Nuclear Arms 
1983 RESOLUTION 3-06A 
Report 3-01, I, B, 8 (CW, p. 91); App. 3-01A (CW, p. 97); Overtures 1-42-1-47, 3-31 
(pp. 39-41, 106) 
WHEREAS, It is God's desire that all people of the world live in peace with one 
another (Rom. 12:18; Heb. 12:14); and 
WHEREAS, Christians are called to be peacemakers and reconcilers in the world 
(Matt. 5:9); and 
WHEREAS, The state has a divine mandate and responsibility to defend the life, 
welfare, and property of its citizens (Rom. 13:1-7); and 
WHEREAS, The nations of the world are involved in a massive buildup of 
armaments, thereby creating tensions and international concerns about the risk of nuclear 
war and causing concern among many about the most effective use of our limited 
resources; and 
WHEREAS, Many churches and church leaders have been promoting highly 
specific political policies and judgments regarding national defense, nuclear weapons, 
and disarmament; and 
WHEREAS, Various individuals and groups have raised questions about the 
possibility of conducting "just wars" in an age of nuclear weaponry, as well as the 
justification for civil disobedience; and 
WHEREAS, "The Gospel does not legislate for the civil estate but is the 
forgiveness of sins and the beginning of eternal life in the hearts of believers" (Apology 
XVI, 6); and 
WHEREAS, The CTCR in its report to the Synod entitled "Guidelines for Crucial 
Issues in Christian Citizenship" (1965, p. 7) states the following: "The destructive 
potential of modern weaponry and the impersonality of contemporary techniques of 
warfare lay upon the Christian citizen the special burden of reminding himself and others 
that human life is a sacred trust from man's Creator and that the temptation to rely on and 
resort to the kind of massive violence made possible by these inventions has introduced 
into the human situation a new factor of incalculable moral magnitude. It is therefore 
imperative for him to work together with all men of goodwill for the responsible 
limitation of armaments, the eradication of sources of conflict, and an aggressive interest 
in the preservation and expansion of the conditions of peace"; and 
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WHEREAS, Responsible judgments about the global complexities of foreign and 
defense policies require exact information in fields in which church leaders generally 
enjoy no special competence; and 
WHEREAS, The Board of Directors and the President of the Synod have requested 
that the Commission on Theology and Church Relations and its Social Concerns 
Committee review the whole matter of church-state relationships in the light of issues 
which have surfaced in contemporary debate about tuition tax credits, prayer in public 
schools, increased support in the voluntary sector, and "peace" questions; therefore be it 
Resolved, That we acknowledge the cause of all human contention and war to be 
man's sinful nature, and that we therefore intensify our efforts to call all people to 
repentance and to proclaim reconciliation in Christ as the only means of achieving true 
and lasting peace with fellow human beings; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Synod urge its congregations and members 
a. to study what the Scriptures and the Confessions have to say about world peace 
and the respective responsibilities of the state and its citizens, giving special attention to 
Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms and the nature of just wars (AC XVI, XXVIII, Ap. 
XVI); 
b. to carry out their duty as Christian citizens by becoming knowledgable about 
issues such as the arms race, the nature and the results of the use of nuclear weapons, and 
the state of world affairs and by working within the framework of responsible 
participation within the political process to effect those policies which enhance the 
prospects for world peace; 
c. to support the efforts of our duly elected and appointed governmental 
authorities to carry out their constitutional and God-given responsibility to provide for the 
safety and welfare of the citizens of our country; 
d. to pray, both as individual Christians and in our congregations, that God in His 
mercy spare humankind from the horrors of nuclear war and guide the rulers of the 
nations to lead us in the way of world peace; and be it further 
Resolved, That The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod in principle oppose the 
adoption of conscience-binding pronouncements which are not based on the clear 
teachings of Holy Scripture; and be it finally 
Resolved, That the Synod request the Commission on Theology and Church 
Relations and its Social Concerns Committee to carry out a basic study of the various 
aspects of the relationship between church and state, giving special attention to issues 
such as "who speaks for the church," "when," and "on what basis." 
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To Adopt a Statement on Conscientious Objection 
1969 RESOLUTION 2-28 
Overtures 2-37 to 2-43 (CW, pp. 85-88) 
WHEREAS, The Holy Scriptures teach that "every person be obedient to the 
governing authorities" (Rom. 13:1) but recognize the right and duty of the individual to 
obey God rather than men when the civil authorities demand obedience contrary to God's 
will: "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29); and 
WHEREAS, The Lutheran Confessions teach that Christians may without sin 
engage in just wars and serve as soldiers (A. C. XVI; Apology XVI, Tappert, pp. 37.2 
and 222.1); and 
WHEREAS, The theological position of the Lutheran Church declares the 
individual's right to refuse participation in unjust wars (CTCR's "Guidelines for Crucial 
Issues in Christian Citizenship"; "A Christian's Attitude Toward War," CTM, Feb., 1955; 
CTCR's "Civil Obedience and Disobedience"); and 
WHEREAS, The present military draft law exempts only those objectors who on 
the basis of conscience oppose war in every form and allows them a 1A 0 status (military 
noncombatant) and a 1 0 status (nonmilitary service) and does not recognize objection to 
a specific war where the individual conscience is convinced that the government is 
engaged in an unjust war; therefore be it 
Resolved, That the Synod encourage its members to pledge themselves anew to 
loyalty and obedience to the government also in the matter of military service; and be it 
further 
Resolved, That the Synod reaffirm its historic theological position whereby it 
recognizes that ponscientious objection to a war which an individual considers to be 
unjust is a valid stance; and be it further 
Resolved, That the members of the Synod respect an individual's decision not to 
engage in a war which his conscience, enlightened by the Word of God, considers to be 
unjust; and be it further 
Resolved, That the pastors and congregations of the Synod be urged to make use 
of the CTCR's documents "Guidelines for Crucial Issues in Christian Citizenship" and 
"Civil Obedience and Disobedience" in providing a counseling and supporting ministry 
to those who conscientiously object to military service as well as to those who in 
conscience choose to serve in the military; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Synod petition the government to grant equal status under law 
to the conscientious objector to a specific war as it does to a conscientious objector to all 
wars; and be it further 
Resolved, That the Board of Social Ministry study the matter of amnesty for those 
who have refused to serve in the armed forces for reasons of conscience and report its 
findings to the President of the Synod as soon as possible; and be it finally 
Resolved, That this present resolution replace Resolution 2-35 of the New York 
convention (Proceedings, 1967, p. 96). 
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2003 Statement of President Gerald Kieschnick on "Peace" 
These are trying times for all Americans and for people around the world. In confronting 
Saddam Hussein, and others like him, we face a new kind of danger--a danger threatening 
the disruption of the pursuit of a life of peace, a danger placing not only our own citizens 
but also those of other nations under the anxious pall of terror. 
War, terrorism and fighting have characterized this world's history and are clear 
testimony to the imperfection of the human race. In fact, human nature has a desperately 
evil side, which draws people into quarrels that can eventually develop into war. 
Many wonder how to reconcile the teachings of Jesus, the Prince of Peace, with the 
horrors of war. In the early centuries of the Church, this very question arose and was 
addressed by one of the great church Fathers, St. Augustine. He understood that flawed 
human hearts sometimes pursue the path of evil, seeking to oppress and even destroy 
one's fellowman. Can there be times when people of good will may resist such evil? 
What is the role of the state in protecting its citizens from aggression, whether within its 
own borders or from another country? 
St. Augustine understood that the state is a God-ordained institution and that its primary 
leader is 'God's servant...who does not bear the sword for nothing...but is an agent of 
wrath to bring punishment on the evildoer.' He wrote that nations, in defense of their 
own people and in order to preserve the peace, may declare war in the case of a just cause 
and for the purpose of self-defense. 
Martin Luther, the great 16th century Christian reformer, spoke of the reality of this 
tension in terms of two kingdoms, both under the rule of God but each ruling differently. 
The kingdom of the left hand is the secular kingdom ruled by kings, presidents and 
governors. Its guiding principles are human reason and the sword. The kingdom of the 
right hand is the Church, whose power lies in the forgiveness and mercy won by Christ's 
death and resurrection. 
All people live in the kingdom of the left, whether they are or are not believers in Christ. 
It is here that our elected officials rule by reason and, when necessary, by the sword. 
President Bush faces a great challenge when confronting a new kind of evil that no longer 
is neatly contained or defined by political borders. He is charged with protecting 
American citizens and American interests from those who would destroy the peace and 
terrorize. 
Our President has been entrusted with the sword. He may have to use it. We pray for 
God's wisdom to guide him in the execution of his duty, that peace may prevail for us and 
for all people. 
The Bible tells of a peace in Christ that gives confidence and hope for the future. It is a 
peace borne of His mercy and forgiveness. We pray this peace for all people everywhere 
and that our world may be spared the crucible of war. 
APPENDIX II: 
SAMPLE SERMONS ON ISSUES RELATED TO WAR AND PEACE 
Alien Citizens'  
Matthew 22:15-21 
Part of my job at the so-called "purple palace," the LCMS headquarters in St. Louis, is to 
respond to requests for information about what Lutherans believe and why and how we as 
a church body try to put our beliefs into practice. A number of years ago I received a 
phone call from a young woman who was, to use a technical theological term, "as mad as 
hell" and who obviously wasn't going to take it any more. To be honest, she sounded at 
times as if she were on the verge of a nervous breakdown. This woman was so upset, so 
enraged and outraged at all the problems and evils in our society, the moral and political 
scandals being reported in the media at that time, the lack of honest and courageous and 
trustworthy leadership in our nation. She admitted that she'd been spending a lot of time 
lately listening to various political talk radio programs, and now she was making the 
move from education to action. She felt she just had to try to "do something" about all 
these problems, and what she decided to do on this day was to call the headquarters of her 
church body and give somebody there a piece of her mind. Because you see, as angry as 
she was with the leadership in our nation at the time, she was just as angry, if not more, 
with the leadership in the church, her church, The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 
because at least from her perspective the church didn't seem to be doing much of 
anything about all of these problems that were destroying our society. "Doesn't the 
church care about these things? What are you people doing there in that building in St. 
Louis? You can talk all you want about 'saving souls,' but isn't anybody trying to save 
our country from being swallowed up by the evil of this world?" 
I listened as she talked and cried and shouted and vented for about 15 or 20 minutes, and 
when I finally got a chance to respond I tried to assure her, first of all, that nearly all the 
concerns she had raised were concerns that I shared personally and that our church also 
shared in one way or another. And I agreed with her that we have often failed, as a 
church body and as individual members of the church, to respond to those problems as 
pro-actively and as passionately as we should. And I tried to explain what a difficult and 
complicated task that is for a church that wants to be about God's business, and we'll be 
talking more about that in our adult forum this morning. But after I was done with all my 
assuring and explaining, I did something that I rarely do as part of my "day job" at the 
International Center. I spoke to this woman as if I were her pastor, and I told her as 
gently as I knew how that as much as I sympathized with her concerns, I also had a 
concern for her: for her spiritual and emotional health and well-being. 
I said, "I commend you for your deep concern for the health and well-being of our nation 
and society. I wish every Christian had your passion for wanting to make a difference as 
a Christian in this world and in this country which we love. But as you wrestle with these 
1 Written by Joel D. Lehenbauer and delivered on a number of occasions in various LCMS congregations. 
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important issues and try to decide how best to respond to them, God also wants you to 
have peace, he wants you to have joy, he wants you to be thankful for all the blessings he 
has given you: the heavenly blessings that are yours through faith in Jesus Christ 
regardless of any earthly circumstances; and also the earthly blessings he has given you, 
including the many good things he provides even through a less-than-perfect earthly 
government. And God wants you to have faith—faith in his promise that all authority in 
heaven and on earth belongs to Him and that he has the power to cause all things to work 
together for the good of his church." 
Now the last thing I want to do this morning is to convey any sense at all that I am 
judging this woman or belittling her or patronizing her for her deep and sincere struggle 
with these very important issues. There are many Christians, many Lutherans—including 
myself—who probably don't struggle nearly enough with this question of what 
responsible Christian citizenship is all about. Jesus clearly teaches in Matthew 22 that we 
Christians do have a debt to pay to the government in which we live: "Render unto 
Caesar what is Caesar's," says Jesus. Other passages of the Bible, like Romans 13, help 
us to understand more fully what this means. It means, among other things, that we are to 
respect those in authority, even when we may not agree with what they are doing or 
saying: we are to respect them for the office that they hold. It means that we are to pay 
our taxes, to give the government the money that it needs to do the things that God 
established government to do: to protect and defend the innocent, to restrain and punish 
those who seek to do harm to others or to society as a whole, and to promote the common 
good. It means that we Christians are to obey the laws of the land, unless we are forced 
to do something that is clearly contrary to the Word of God. And, in a democratic 
system, it also means that we have both the privilege and the obligation to work for and 
support better laws, better leaders, better social and political programs and policies and 
institutions, so that we and all citizens can live in greater peace and harmony, justice and 
freedom. 
But this same passage of Scripture contains a warning as well. And the warning is this: 
No matter how things are going in the social and political realm, whether they're going 
great or terrible from your perspective, you are never to render unto Caesar what you 
should be rendering unto God. You are never to give to Caesar what God says belongs to 
Him and Him alone: your faith, your trust, your ultimate loyalty and love and allegiance. 
And you are never to try to get from Caesar what you can only get from God: perfect and 
lasting peace, true and enduring joy, real and unshakeable security and stability and 
identity, for this life and the life to come. 
The Bible says in Psalm 146: "Put not your trust in princes, in mortal men, who cannot 
save." Whether we agree or disagree with the particular decisions made by people in the 
White House or in Congress or wherever, the Bible warns us not to trust in them for the 
things that they have not been gifted by God to give. As much as we try to select and 
support good, fair, honest earthly leaders, we dare never forget that every one of them is 
still a poor, miserable sinner like you and me, and not one of them can solve the "real 
problem" in our country and in our world: the problem of sin, the problem of people who 
worship themselves instead of God, the problem that was solved once and for all by a 
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very different kind of prince—a prince who ruled from a cross— whose greatest victory 
was gained not by force of law or threat or show of strength but by an act of sheer grace 
and willing surrender. A Prince who lived and toiled and slaved and died in this world, 
but who said: "My kingdom is not of this world." 
A long time ago, when Christians were a small, hounded, persecuted minority in the vast, 
mighty, sprawling empire of Rome, a Christian whose name has been lost to history 
wrote a letter to a non-Christian friend named Diognetus, trying to explain who these 
Christians were and how they lived in this world. This is what he wrote: 
Christians cannot be distinguished from the rest of the human race by country or 
language or customs. They do not live in cities of their own; they do not use a 
special form of speech; they do not follow a strange manner of life. This doctrine 
of theirs has not been discovered by the ingenuity or deep thought of inquisitive 
men, nor do they put forward a merely human teaching, as some people do. Yet 
though they live in both Greek and barbarian cities alike, as each man's lot has 
been cast, and follow the customs of the country in clothing and food and other 
matters of daily living, at the same time they give proof of the remarkable and 
extraordinary nature of their own kingdom. They live in their own countries, but 
only as aliens. They have a share in everything as citizens, and yet they endure 
everything as foreigners. Every foreign land is their fatherland, and yet for them 
every fatherland is a foreign land. They marry, like everyone else, and they have 
children, but they do not cast out their offspring. They share their table with one 
another, but not their marriage bed. It is true that they are "in the flesh," but they 
do not live "according to the flesh." They busy themselves here on earth, but 
their true citizenship is in heaven. 
The great "faith chapter," Hebrews 11, catalogues the heroic exploits of some of the 
greatest saints of the Old Testament, and then says this: "All these people (Abraham, 
Noah, Enoch, Abel) admitted that they were aliens and strangers on earth. People who 
say such things show that they are looking for a country of their own." As much as we 
love our own nation, our own homeland, our own fatherland, Scripture reminds us that 
we can never really call it our own in the deepest sense of the term. It doesn't belong to 
us as Christians, and we do not fully or completely belong to it. "All these people," says 
the writer to the Hebrews, "were longing for a better country—a heavenly one. 
Therefore, God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared a (country) for 
them." 
During these challenging days in the life of our nation and our world, we realize perhaps 
like never before how much our country means to us, how blessed we are to be citizens of 
a nation that places, at least in principle, such high value on principles like freedom and 
justice and human rights, especially in contrast to many other nations around the world. 
But even as thank God for those great blessings and embrace the great responsibilities 
that go with them, we also realize that as Christians we march to the beat of a different 
drummer, we get our primary marching orders from above. And here they are, straight 
from the top, from Matthew 28: 
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"All authority," says Jesus, "All authority in heaven and on earth belongs to me. 
Therefore go and....do what?" "Therefore go, and defend the rights of the oppressed and 
persecuted and needy!" That's a good thing, that's a godly thing—but it's not the 
specific thing commanded by Jesus in this all-important passage of Scripture. "Therefore 
go, and join in the struggle for justice and freedom for all people everywhere!" That's a 
good thing, it may well be a godly thing, but it's not the specific task that Jesus lays upon 
us in his final moments on this earth. "Therefore go, and change the world and make it a 
better place to live!" That, too, is a good thing, and something God surely wants us to do. 
But none of these things is the unique and primary mission of Christ's church on earth. 
They are not the primary reason God called his church into existence. They are not the 
reason God calls pastors to serve his people with words and water and bread and wine in 
the shadow of a cross. The parting mission Jesus gave to his church on earth is this: 
"Therefore go, and make disciples of all nations (all nations!!!), baptizing them in the 
name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey 
everything I have commanded you. And surely, I will be with you, to the very end of the 
age." That's our commission in the service of our Master and King, those are our 
marching orders as a church, that's the reason for our existence on this earth. If we ever 
forget that, if we ever allow our good and proper allegiance to any earthly person or 
institution or denomination or nation to deter us or distract us from this heavenly work, 
we have lost our way as Christians and we've forgotten our reason for existence as a 
church. We are looking for another country—a country that we can truly call our own in 
every sense of the word. And we are trying to bring as many people with us to that 
country as we possibly can. 
If we stay focused on that heavenly mission, something very interesting will likely 
happen. The Christian author and apologist C. S. Lewis once wrote: "If you read history 
you will find that the Christians who did the most for the present world were just those 
who thought the most of the next. The Apostles themselves, who set on foot the 
conversion of the Roman Empire, the great men who built up the Middle Ages, the 
English evangelicals who abolished the slave trade, all left their mark on earth precisely 
because their minds were occupied with heaven. It is since Christians have largely 
ceased to think of the other world that they have become so ineffective in this one. Aim 
at heaven and you will get earth 'thrown in.' Aim at earth, and you will get neither." 
Dear friends in Christ, may all of us who live in this foreign land which is also our 
cherished fatherland, busy ourselves on earth by embracing with utmost seriousness our 
responsibilities as Christian citizens (especially during these critical days in our life 
together as a nation). And as we do so, may we never forget who is in control, and may 
we never lose sight of our ultimate goal: to spread and proclaim the reign of our crucified 
and risen King, who rules by grace alone, whose kingdom is not of this world and will 
never, ever come to an end. In the name of Jesus. Amen. 
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Prayer and Politics2 
1 Tim. 2:1-4 
The theme of this morning's sermon is "Prayer and Politics." Just in case that title or 
topic makes you a little nervous, let me assure you right off the bat that you are not going 
to hear a political commentary from the pulpit this morning. This is not Pastor 
Lehenbauer's version of "Crossfire" or "Meet the Press" or "Face the Nation." Pastors in 
The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod are trained to be very careful not to mix matters 
of faith with matters of politics, not to tell people how to vote or how to think on social or 
political issues that are not clearly or specifically addressed in the Word of God. 
At the same time, however, we cannot ignore the fact that God does have some very clear 
and crucial things to say, at least in general, about Christian concern for and involvement in 
the affairs of government—and so does the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. In 1986, 
for example, our church body adopted a resolution called "To Encourage Political 
Involvement of Individuals as a Christian witness," and I thought it might be appropriate on 
this July 4 weekend to read this resolution to you (read 1986 Res. 2-19). 
As this resolution rightly states, we Christians have a God-given responsibility to be 
politically informed and politically involved—in appropriate ways—for the sake of our 
church and our nation. This morning I'd like to focus on just one of those ways, one "little 
thing" that you and I and all Christians everywhere can do for our church and for our 
country, one "little thing" that just might be the most important thing of all. It's mentioned 
in the very first resolved of this resolution: "That we as a Synod be mindful of the need for 
continued prayer...on behalf of both our Synod and our nation." 
There's no Bible passage listed at this point in the resolution, but there certainly could be; 
and the one that comes first to mind is 1 Timothy 2:1-4, where St. Paul writes: 
I urge then, first of all [and in the original language this means first in 
importance, first in priority], that requests, prayers, intercession and 
thanksgiving be made for everyone—for kings and all those in authority, 
that we may live peaceful and quiet lives in all godliness and holiness. This 
is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all people to be saved and 
to come to a knowledge of the truth. 
Paul urges us here to pray for all people, but what I find striking about this text is that he 
mentions by name only one group of people: not mothers or fathers or children or families, 
not friends or neighbors or fellow-Christians, not pastors or teachers or missionaries, not 
even the sick or suffering or needy—not that these people aren't important, not that we 
shouldn't pray for them, but the fact is that Paul does not single them out for special 
mention in this text. Instead he holds up, of all people, political leaders: "Pray for kings," he 
says, "and all those in positions of authority." 
2 Written by Joel D. Lehenbauer and delivered on a number of occasions in LCMS congregations. 
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Now, I guess the first question is: How often do you actually do this? How do politicians 
rate on your personal prayer list? When is the last time you got down on your knees and 
fervently prayed for the president, the vice-president, for potential candidates for those high 
offices, for the members of congress, senators, Supreme Court Justices, governors, mayors, 
and so on—much less for political leaders around the world, in Africa or Europe or the 
Middle East? Well, let me be the first to admit my failures in this area. Number one on my 
personal prayer list, if I were to be completely honest, is probably me, then comes my wife 
and family, close friends and fellow Christians, various people who I know have special 
needs. Since the tragic events of nine-eleven and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I think I've 
gotten a little bit better about remembering government leaders in my prayers. But I've 
still got a long way to go: I don't pray nearly as often or as fervently as I should for 
political leaders, even though Paul says that such people ought to be at the very top of my 
prayer list—and of yours. 
The second question is, Why—why is this so important? And I think the Bible gives us 
some pretty good answers to that question. First of all, it's important to pray for those in 
authority, because in doing so we express our conviction that good leaders and good 
government are great gifts from God Himself. 
One of the most tragic consequences of the moral and ethical scandals that so often seem to 
surface in the world of politics is that they tend to feed our natural tendency to become 
suspicious, even cynical about politicians and politics in general. If one politician is 
dishonest, almost all of them must be dishonest; if so-and-so can't be trusted to do what he 
said he was going to do, then how can we trust anybody who holds a political office? 
Notice what Paul says in our text: "I urge then, above all, that requests, prayers, 
intercession and thanksgiving be made for everyone—for kings and all those in authority." 
Now obviously, God doesn't expect us to be thankful for everything that every political 
leader does or stands for; that's just not possible for us as Christians. But he does expect us 
to be thankful for the many blessings that he himself gives us in and through the 
government in which we live. He expects us to be thankful for the peace and freedom, 
justice and protection, safety and security and opportunity that we so often take for granted 
as American citizens. And he expects us to be thankful for the many capable and 
courageous and trustworthy leaders who serve us and represent us in various ways and 
places in our state and community and nation, and to honor them and support them 
however we can—including through our prayers. 
Whether we realize it or not, we do this every time we pray the Lord's Prayer, whenever we 
say, "Give us this day our daily bread." Do you remember from your confirmation days 
how the catechism explains this fourth petition of the Lord's Prayer? Daily bread, says the 
catechism, includes "everything that belongs to the support and needs of the body, such as 
food, drink, clothing, shoes, house, home, a faithful spouse, faithful children, faithful rulers 
good leaders and good government." Obviously our government is not perfect—a lot of 
things and a lot of people could be a whole lot better than they are, and in a government 
like ours, we share responsibility for striving to make things better through our involvement 
in the political process. And yet it's also important to realize that through it all God 
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continues to answer most abundantly our prayers for daily bread, and I think we need to say 
"Thank you" a little more often than we do, so that we don't lose the joy of knowing just 
how blessed we are by God as a nation, despite the many problems and challenges that still 
exist. 
Reason number two: It's important to pray for those in authority, because in doing so we 
express the conviction that even in times of bad government and bad leadership, God is still 
in control. Today's text takes on a whole new meaning when we realize that Paul wrote 
these words to young pastor Timothy right around the time of (perhaps even during) the 
reign of one of the most vicious, godless, immoral kings who ever lived: King Nero. No 
one persecuted the Christian church more savagely and sadistically than Nero. He actually 
enjoyed burning Christians alive and eating dinner while listening to their screams. It was 
under Nero's reign that both Paul and Timothy were eventually tortured and executed for 
their faith. And yet Paul says to Timothy, during the reign of this very king, "I urge, then, 
above all, that prayers, intercession and thanksgiving be made for everyone—for kings and 
all those in authority." 
How in the world could Paul say this in light of the political circumstances under which he 
lived? Because Paul, by the power of the Holy Spirit, knew something that only we 
Christians can understand. Paul knew that King Nero wasn't really in control—God was in 
control. Paul knew that King Nero wouldn't be anything and couldn't do anything unless 
God allowed him to be it and to do it. So why did God allow Nero to be king, why did he 
allow him to do the things he did? I really don't know the answer to that question, and I 
suspect that Paul himself didn't know for sure what God was doing or why in the case of 
King Nero. But Paul also knew very well the story of Jesus: he knew how unwise and 
unjust officials had condemned the innocent Son of God to death on a cross, and how God 
had used those horribly wrong decisions to accomplish the salvation of the world. Paul 
knew that his business was not to try to figure out God's business, but simply to do what 
God had called him to do: to preach the Gospel, to love his neighbor, to stand up for what 
was right, to work, to trust and to pray. And that's our business too, in times of good 
government and in times of bad government, remembering at all times that God is in 
control, that someday the scales of justice will be balanced, and that on that day all 
people—including King Nero and all political leaders—will stand before God's throne of 
judgment and answer to God for how they exercised the authority which God himself 
entrusted to them. 
Now I suppose someone might say, "Well, if God is in total control, I guess it really 
doesn't matter what I do or don't do as a Christian citizen." But that attitude ignores what 
the Bible teaches about the responsibility that God has given to us as Christians living in 
this world, and how God often chooses to use us and work through us to accomplish his 
will. And that brings us to point number three: It's important to pray for those in authority, 
because in doing so we express our conviction that our prayers really do make a difference; 
as James says: the prayer of a righteous person is powerful and effective. 
I heard a story once about a small church whose members were greatly distressed because a 
tavern was being built right next door to the church. Some of the members got together to 
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pray to the Lord for some solution to this problem, and lo and behold, a few days later the 
tavern was struck by lightning and it burned to the ground. The tavern owner, who had 
heard about the prayer meetings, brought a lawsuit against the members of the church, 
claiming that their prayers were responsible for the destruction of his business. The church 
members adamantly denied the charge. At the initial hearing the judge said: "I don't know 
how this case is going to come out, but it seems to be that we have on the one side a tavern 
owner who firmly believes in the power of prayer and on the other side a group of church 
members who don't." 
I'm not encouraging you to pray for lightning to strike undesirable places or persons—
political or otherwise—but I am encouraging you to pray: pray for our nation, pray for its 
present and future leaders, pray about moral and social issues that are or ought to be of 
grave concern to us as Christians today, pray that God would guide you and others to make 
wise and God-pleasing political choices, and pray firmly believing that your prayers will 
make a difference, that God hears and answers the heartfelt requests of his people. 
Martin Luther had some remarkable things to say about the power of prayer, also in the 
realm of government and politics. Luther wrote, "In human affairs we accomplish 
everything through prayer. What has been properly arranged we keep in order through 
prayer. What has gone amiss we change and improve through prayer. What cannot be 
changed and improved we bear through prayer, overcoming all the trouble and sustaining 
all the good through prayer." Elsewhere Luther said: "If any good is to be done today and 
any evil is to be prevented, it must be accomplished by prayer. Every Christian should say 
to himself: Since prayer is so pleasing to God and so necessary...for the church and for the 
temporal government, I intend to pray as much as I can, for I know that my prayer will not 
and cannot be offered in vain." And finally, this gem: "Our prayers and the prayers of all 
God-fearing people in the world do the work. If Christians were to stop praying, God have 
mercy on the world." 
Before I close, let me raise one final question. All of this talk about prayer for those in 
authority is well and good, someone might say, but what does it have to do with the Gospel 
and the church's primary mission, which is to bring people to saving faith in Jesus Christ? 
Well, that's a pretty good question, and I think Paul gives us the answer in our text: "I urge 
you to pray for all those in authority," he says, "so that you may live quiet and peaceful lives 
in all godliness and holiness. This is good, and pleases God our Savior, who wants all 
people to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Do you see what Paul is 
saying here, do you see the connection? When we pray for our country and its leaders, says 
Paul, we help bring about and preserve peace and order and harmony in our nation and in 
our communities. This, in turn, allows us as Christians to bear witness to our faith in Christ 
without fear of opposition or persecution or restriction. And this witness, in turn, is used by 
God to bring more and more people to the saving knowledge of Jesus Christ. Nothing could 
be more urgent or important than that, and according to Paul, it begins with and is centered 
around the simple act of prayer: prayer for all people, but especially for those in authority. 
Of course, it's one thing to talk about prayer, in a sermon or wherever—it's another thing 
to actually do it. Therefore, dear friends in Christ, I'd like to close this morning by asking 
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you to bow your heads and join me in a prayer for our nation and its leaders: Lord God, 
our heavenly Father, You said in Old Testament times that if your people who are called by 
your name would humble themselves, pray, seek your face and turn from their wicked 
ways, you would hear them and forgive their sin and heal their land. We acknowledge, 
Lord, the many blessings that You have so graciously and abundantly poured out upon us 
in and through our nation, and for these blessings we thank and praise You. But we also 
recognize that the citizens of this country, including those who call ourselves Christians, 
are constantly in need of repentance, renewal and guidance. And so we pray, Lord, bless 
our nation, its present and future leaders, and its citizens. Give them and us wisdom to 
make wise choices and courage to stand up for what is right. Help us to trust you, because 
often the condition and direction of our country deeply concerns and disturbs us, and we 
need You to help us remember and believe that all authority in heaven and on earth has 
been given to You. Help us to go about our business of spreading Your Gospel with 
renewed excitement and zeal, and in your grace preserve for us the freedom to worship 
You and to bear witness to You in ways that bring glory to your name and blessing to our 
land. In Jesus' name we pray. Amen. 
The Same Old Story3  
Text: "Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday and today and forever" (Hebrews 13:8). 
"Things will never be the same again." That's been a common refrain since the horrific 
events of last Tuesday, and it's hard not to take it seriously. Our conception of war and 
of peace will probably never be the same. Our assumptions about safety and security in 
the air, on the ground, even in the workplace will never be quite the same. Our 
understanding of the nature of freedom and how to protect and preserve it without 
sacrificing it or compromising it will never be the same. And the list goes on of the ways 
that the events of one day have changed irreversibly our lives and perhaps the whole 
course of human history. 
At the same time, from another perspective, we might say that the events of last Tuesday 
have demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that nothing has changed. Just a few 
weeks ago in church the appointed Old Testament lesson came from Ecclesiastes 1 and 2, 
which includes these inerrant words of God: "What has been will be again, what has been 
done will be done again; there is nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which 
one can say, 'Look! This is something new'? It was here already, long ago; it was here 
before our time" (1:10-11). 
In his statement last week President Kieschnick observed: "The monstrous attacks on 
New York City and Washington D.C. are an astounding example of mankind's fall into 
sin and the forces of evil at work in this world. The fall was not [merely] a one-time 
event. It continues to happen. It is an ongoing process, a downward trajectory, that 
3 This sermon was written by Joel D. Lehenbauer and delivered on September 19, 2001 in chapel at the 
International Center of The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod. 
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shapes every moment of our lives." Although we are rightly shocked and deeply 
saddened by the horrible events of recent days, we who know what God's Word teaches 
ought not be shocked at the depth of human sin and depravity and the capacity of fallen 
human beings to think and act in ways that are so completely contrary to God's good and 
perfect will. It's really the same old story—the story that goes back to Adam and Eve 
and Cain and Abel and Sarah and Hagar and Isaac and Ishmael and Jacob and Esau and 
on down through the generations of all those born in the image and likeness of Adam. 
And we know that story so well not only because we read about it again and again and 
again in the Scriptures but because we see it and feel it again and again and again in our 
own hearts and in our own lives and in our own families and in our own church and in 
our nation: pride, envy, anger, greed, hatred, hostility, jealousy, the lust for power and 
position and control, the stubborn, hard-hearted refusal to love and forgive and live 
together in God-pleasing harmony and humility and unity and diversity and peace. 
In the chapel service that was held here at the International Center last Wednesday, the 
Gospel reading was from Luke 13, where Jesus says: "Do you think that these Galileans 
were worse sinners than all the other Galileans because they suffered in this way? I tell 
you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish. Or those eighteen who died when 
the tower in Siloam fell on them—do you think they were more guilty than all the others 
living in Jerusalem? I tell you, no! But unless you repent, you too will all perish." 
As Americans, we puff out our chests at a time like this to show the world how much our 
country means to us—and well we should. And even as we puff out our chests as 
Americans we beat our breasts as Christians. Even as we sing "God bless our native 
land," we cry out "Kyrie eleison: Lord have mercy on us all—and on me, a poor, 
miserable sinner." 
It's the same old story—the story of human sin and its awful consequences, the story of 
our desperate need for repentance, and the old, old story of a Savior who came to rescue a 
world gone wrong. Last Tuesday changed everything, and yet last Tuesday changed 
nothing, because Jesus is the same yesterday and today and forever. 
What does this mean? It means that when we are horrified and terrified by the sin and 
evil of this world, we turn and run where God's people have always run: to the shelter 
and safety of Christ's cross, to the One who knows more about the horror of sin and evil 
than anyone who has ever lived, because he took it all upon himself when he hung on 
Calvary's cross. When we feel crushed and suffocated by the filthy soot of our own sin, 
we cry out to the one who became sin for us on the cross, and who continues to call out to 
us, saying: "Come to me, all you who are weary and burdened, and I will give you rest." 
When we are overwhelmed by human need and pain and grief unlike anything we have 
ever seen before, we respond as God's people have always responded: with simple acts of 
love and service and kindness that reflect God's loving-kindness toward us in Christ. 
In his address to the seminary community last week, President John Johnson quoted these 
words of Martin Luther: "Christians are wise when they persevere in believing God's 
promises. His promises are dependable and lasting. The Lord's own pledge is 
permanent, as we read in the Psalms: 'Indeed, the Guardian of Israel never rests nor 
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sleeps' (Psalms 121:4)." Some things, it is true, may never be the same again. Other 
things, the things that matter most, have not changed at all: Our need for God. His love 
for us in Christ. The stability and reliability of His Word and His promises. The 
responsibility and opportunity that we have as God's people to share His Word and His 
love with all people everywhere, until that day when we are assembled with that great 
multitude beyond counting from every nation, tribe, people and language, worshiping the 
Lamb on his throne as he wipes away every tear from our eyes. When that day comes we 
may truly say, "Things will never be the same again," for "there will be no more death or 
mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away." To which we 
say: "Amen! Come, Lord Jesus!" Amen. 
Christian Knights4 
Eph. 6:10-20 
Introduction 
Today our land stands on the brink of war. 
On Monday evening President Bush announced to the world that Saddam Hussein had 48 
hours to "Flee or Fight." Approximately 36 of these 48 hours have elapsed, after which, 
if the Iraqian dictator does not step down and leave, war is set, as the Wall Street Journal 
put it yesterday, "for a time of our choosing." 
People all over the world, although divided over many aspects of this impending war, are 
united in the tension of getting ready for it. Will there be a war? When will it start? 
How long will it last? What will be its consequences? Will it provoke another terrorist 
attack? Have all possibilities of resolving this conflict diplomatically been exhausted? 
Can Christians go to war and fight to kill and still be faithful to the teachings of Christ 
who commanded us to love one another? 
These are questions being discussed wherever I have been in the last couple of weeks— 
• from Buenos Aires, Argentina to Porto Alegre, Brazil 
• from last weekend's meeting of the Faith and Order Commission of the 
National Council of Churches in Washington, D.C. to Immanuel Lutheran in 
Washington, Missouri where my family worships 
• from the discussions at our dinner table at home to the hallways of the IC. 
The position of Lutherans on war is well known. Martin Luther wrote an essay in 1527 
titled "Whether Soldiers Too, Can Be Saved." "Of course," he answered. A soldier does 
a good work when he serves his government in carrying out its God-given task of 
maintaining the peace. Luther writes: "Every lord and prince is bound to protect his 
4 This sermon was written by Dr. Samuel H. Nafzger and delivered in chapel at the International Center of 
The Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod on March 19, 2003. 
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people and to preserve the peace for them. That is his office: that is why he has the 
sword." 
A soldier serves the needs of his neighbor and pleases God when he goes into battle to 
kill—but this is not always so, as Luther is quick to point out. "No war is just. . . unless 
one has such a good reason for fighting and such a good conscience that he can say, "My 
neighbor compels and forces me to fight, though I would rather avoid it." 
The Lutherans gathered in Augsburg, Germany in 1530 agreed with Luther, as the 
Augsburg Confession states: "Christians may without sin. . . engage in just wars, serve as 
soldiers. . . condemned are those" who teach that Christians may not serve in the military. 
Does this mean that all Lutherans believe that war with Iraq is justified at this point in 
time? Not at all. Since God's Word does not address this specific question, Lutheran 
Christians may and in fact do come to different conclusions about this. 
But there is one thing about which the Scriptures are quite clear. Long before there was a 
Saddam Hussein, we Christians were already involved in a war far more serious, far more 
difficult, more far reaching in its consequences than the present crisis in the Middle East. 
And it is this war which St. Paul describes in the reading from Ephesians Chapter 6. 
I. The Enemy . 
First of all, the Apostle tells us who the real enemy is. He writes: "Finally, be strong in 
the Lord. . . that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil." He continues: 
"We are not contending against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the 
powers, against the world rulers of this present darkness, against the spiritual hosts of 
wickedness in heavenly places." 
Our opponent in this war is one whose craft and deceit we underestimate to our own 
peril. Like a roaring lion he prowls about, eager to devour us. He has allies all around 
us, and he even has a "fifth column" well entrenched deep inside each of us. He's good 
at quoting—or should we say misquoting—Scripture to seduce us. He often masquerades 
as an angel of light, but he is always a liar and a murderer. He has only one ultimate 
goal—to get as many of us human creatures as possible to spend eternity with him in hell. 
And, we should point out, he is at his crafty best during those times when God's special 
creatures are at warfare and engaged in bloodshed, in times like the present moment. So 
watch out. Be careful. Get ready for battle, says the Apostle. 
II. The Armor 
Against such an enemy, Paul has only one word of advice: "Put on the whole armor of 
God, that you may be able to stand. . ." The Apostle repeats himself: "Therefore take the 
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whole armor of God, that you may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done 
all to stand." 
My wife is a 5th grade teacher at Immanuel Lutheran in Washington, Mo., where we have 
lived for the past seven years. Two weeks ago, as a part of its celebration of Lutheran 
School's Week, the Immanuel Lutheran student body was enthralled by an hour long 
presentation by a real live knight dressed in his suit of armor. The real knight was 
actually a resident of Webster Gardens here in the St. Louis area by the name of Karl M. 
Kindt III, who had been dubbed a knight by the Mayor of St. Louis on November 10, 
1999. 
Mr. Kindt told a fascinating story as he described the $4,500 suit of armor he was 
wearing piece by piece, using the language of the Apostle Paul in Ephesians 6. He was 
born four months after his father's death in 1945 near the close of the 2nd World War in 
France. Shortly before his death, he wrote a letter to his soon-to-be-born child, should he 
not return from the war, to be delivered to his mother with a dozen roses. In this letter he 
expressed his great love for his child and how he longed to hold him and tell him how 
much he loved him. And how he wanted his unborn child to be a strong Christian man or 
woman. 
Everyone who knew him, Mr. Kindt told the Immanuel student body, described him as a 
Christian knight, a man who was a manly soldier, a courteous gentleman, a man of 
sterling character, and a strong Christian. 
Piece by piece he illustrated the armor which a Christian knight has at his disposal. 
There was 
• the belt, or girdle fastened around his waist. The belt was extremely 
important to brace up the knight's arms for action and to provide a place to 
which the sword and breastplate could be attached. The Apostle calls it "the 
girdle of truth," the sincerity of mind and heart with which to oppose the 
deceit of the enemy. 
• the breastplate of righteousness which covers the body from neck to 
thigh. It consists of two parts, front and back, and Paul describes it as the holy 
life and moral rectitude which serves to guard against Satan's accusations. 
The Apostle calls upon Christians who have been declared holy by God to live 
lives worthy of their calling, as children of the light. 
• the feet of a Christian knight, says the Apostle, are shod with the 
equipment of the Gospel of peace. Knights don't go barefoot. Proper 
footwear made a knight ready to fight. The Good News of the Gospel of 
forgiveness through the blood of Christ gives the Christian knight the peace of 
mind to fight the good fight with a singleness of heart. 
• the shield of faith. The purpose of the shield is to protect the body and 
especially the vital organs of the heart and the lungs from the fiery darts of the 
enemy. The shield, about 4 foot by 2 foot, was covered by leather soaked in 
water and served to blunt the sharp points of flaming arrows. Similarly, the 
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faith which God gives us through Word and Sacrament blunts the fiery bolts 
of the devil's tricks of anguish, tribulation, doubt, fear, hate, lust, ambition, 
greed, and mistrust of our fellow knights. 
• the helmet of salvation, language which the Apostle borrows from 
Isaiah who describes the Messiah as wearing such headgear. In his letter to 
the Thessalonians (1 Thes. 5:8), Paul identifies the helmet with "the hope of 
salvation." It is this hope which gives the Christian knight the courage to 
persevere when the fighting gets tough and he is battle weary. 
• last of all is the most conspicuously offensive weapon, "the sword of 
the Spirit which is the Word of God." Paul has in mind here the short sword, 
the one carried by every armed Roman soldier. With it the knight can not 
only defend himself, but with it he can actually go on the offensive. This 
sword is the Word of God which stands forever, which the very gates of Hell 
cannot overcome. And it is the gift of the Spirit to every Christian knight. 
So equipped, the Christian knight will be able to stand, to prevail, to defeat the devil and 
win the victory. 
Conclusion 
We are living in uncertain times. Today is a moment of truth, for it really describes every 
day in the life of a Christian knight. We do not know what tomorrow may bring, to say 
nothing of next week, next month or next year. 
As President Bush has told us over and over again, we Americans and indeed the whole 
world are fighting a new kind of enemy since 9/11. As citizens of a state where we have 
a government of the people, by the people, for the people, we have a God-given duty to 
be informed and involved. 
But even as we do so, Christian knights continue to fight against an Old Enemy. But 
thanks be to God, we have a knight's armor, we have the equipment necessary to win the 
victory as we move into the future, carrying out our callings where God has placed us. 
We go into the future even in times of war and rumors of wars, with confidence, a 
confidence which comes not from underestimating our real enemy and his craft, but with 
a confidence founded on the cross of the one who suffered and died on it, whose blood 
forgives us, and whose resurrection makes us more than conquerors, come what may. 
Therefore, to use the words of the 1864 hymn written in 15 minutes for children to sing in 
a Sunday School procession, "Onward Christian soldiers, marching as to war, with the 
cross of Jesus, going on before." Amen. 
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